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Abstract	
 
This	thesis	explores	the	UK	Government’s	Department	for	Environment	Food	and	Rural	
Affairs’	 (DEFRA)	 2-year	 pilot	 study	 into	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 (BDO)	 in	 England.	 The	
objective	 is	 to	 investigate	 the	 socio-technical	 assemblages	 of	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 to	
examine	 what	 it	 means	 to	 value	 biodiversity	 in	 practice,	 how	 the	 ensuing	 values	
materialise	and	with	what	effects.		
The	 thesis	 undertakes	 a	 multi-sited	 investigation	 of	 the	 DEFRA	 pilot	 study.	 Firstly	 I	
explore	the	origins	of	the	BDO	assemblage	focussing	on	two	of	its	critical	elements,	the	
policy	 standard	 of	 ‘no	 net	 loss’	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 the	 central	 calculative	 device,	 the	
DEFRA	metric.	I	contextualise	these	conceptual	and	calculative	technologies	within	the	
wider	socio-political	milieus	in	which	they	were	conceived,	circulated	and	subsequently	
took	 effect.	 The	 next	 three	 chapters	 present	 case	 studies	 built	 through	 diachronic	
empirical	 engagements	 with	 three	 sites	 of	 the	 DEFRA	 pilot.	 These	 chapters	 trace	 the	
assemblages	 of	 actual	 BDO	negotiations,	 efforts	 to	 value	 biodiversity	 by	 actors	 in-situ,	
and	 the	 tensions	 that	 threaten	 these	 processes.	 Lastly,	 I	 explore	 the	 value/s	 conflicts	
appearing	in	these	case	studies	through	an	empirical	investigation	of	the	BDO	dispute	as	
it	played	out	at	the	Business	and	Biodiversity	Offsetting	Programme	(BBOP)	conference	
in	London	in	June	2014.	
I	argue	for	an	understanding	of	value	making	in	conservation	as	a	performative	project	
through	which	 the	 values	 of	 nature	 are	 actively	 constructed	 and	 assembled	 via	 social,	
political	and	technical	processes	that	can	be	documented	empirically.		I	emphasise	that	
biodiversity	 value	 does	 not	 therefore	 exist	 waiting	 to	 be	 captured	 but	 is	 actively	
performed	 through	 the	 assemblages	 and	 practices	 of	 BDO.		 The	 thesis	 concludes	 by	
discussing	the	implications	of	a	valuation	approach	in	conservation	noting	the	necessary	
occlusions	 this	 sustains	 and	 the	 important	 changes	 to	 biodiversity	 conservation	 policy	
and	practice	it	signals.		
Keywords:	 Biodiversity	 offsetting,	 Conservation	 policy,	 English	 biodiversity	 offsetting	
pilot,	DEFRA,	Assemblage,	Performativity,	Value	
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CHAPTER	1	
INTRODUCTION	
1.1	A	key	moment		
On	 a	wet	 summer's	 day	 in	 June	 2014,	 an	 international	 congregation	 of	 delegates	
assembled	at	 the	Zoological	Society	of	London's	 (ZSL)	headquarters	on	 the	outer	
circle	 of	 Regent’s	 Park	 in	 central	 London.	 The	 collection	 of	 professionals	 from	
global	 conservation	 NGOs	 and	 private	 consultancies,	 universities	 and	
multinational	corporations	ranging	from	fashion	to	aggregates	 industries	-	within	
earshot	of	the	fading	dawn	chorus	of	the	zoo’s	inhabitants	-	assembled	for	the	first	
global	conference	of	its	kind.	The	event,	To	No	Net	Loss	of	Biodiversity	and	Beyond	
was	 christened	 as	 ‘the	 first	 global	 conference	 on	 approaches	 to	 avoid,	minimise,	
restore,	and	offset	biodiversity	loss’1.	The	conference	was	hosted	by	Forest	Trends,	
The	 Business	 and	 Biodiversity	Offset	 Programme	 (BBOP)	 in	 conjunction	 the	UK	
Government's	Department	for	Environment,	Food	and	Rural	Affairs	(DEFRA)	and	
with	the	ZSL.	
Two	months	prior	to	the	occasion,	DEFRA	had	concluded	its	official	two	year	pilot	
study	into	the	feasibility	of	biodiversity	offsetting	(BDO)	in	England2.	The	moment	
was	a	significant	one,	not	only	for	DEFRA,	since	it	coincided	with	the	end	of	this	
controversial	and	perhaps	surprisingly	high	profile	pilot	period	but	also	for	BBOP	
since	it	marked	a	decade	long	programme	of	vigorous	agenda	building,	promoting	
BDO	 to	 industry,	 financial	 bodies	 and	 governments.	 Arguably,	 this	 was	 also	 a	
pivotal	moment	for	the	broader	 international	biodiversity	conservation	sector.	As	
this	 thesis	 will	 show,	 this	 scientific	 and	 policy	 field	 is	 being	 profoundly	
reconfigured	through	acquiescence	to	an	economic	valuation	approach	under	the	
auspices	of	BDO,	amongst	a	range	of	other	market	based	mechanisms	within	the	
so	called	 ‘green	economy’	(DEFRA	2011b).	Amid	the	series	of	technical	sessions	at	
the	 conference	 covering	 the	methodological	 and	practical	matters	of	BDO	policy	
																																																						
1	http://bbop.forest-trends.org/events/no-net-loss/	(Accessed	17th	July	2016).	
2 	While	 the	 DEFRA	 is	 part	 of	 the	 UK	 Government	 it	 is	 responsible	 for	
environmental,	 farming	 and	 rural	 economic	 issues	 in	 England	 and	 independent	
from	the	devolved	administrations	of	Wales,	Scotland	and	Northern	 Ireland.	The	
DEFRA	BDO	pilot	study	was	therefore	conducted	in	England	only. 
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and	practice	it	was	not	unusual	to	hear	expressions	such	as	‘nature	is	the	new	asset	
class’	or	‘give	business	the	right	language	and	stand	back	to	watch	it	be	the	engine	
of	change’.	This	was	a	conference	dedicated	to	consolidating	the	seemingly	neutral	
and	 technical	 conservation	 ideal	 ‘no	 net	 loss	 of	 biodiversity’.	 Yet,	 as	 these	
utterances	 testify,	 it	 was	 also,	 ostensibly,	 part	 of	 a	 longer	 epistemic	 and	
institutional	 shift	 in	 the	 conservation	 institutional	 landscape	 towards	 economic	
valuation	of	biodiversity	and	ecosystem	services	with	market	based	instruments.	
DEFRA’s	 pilot	 study	 had	 attained	 something	 of	 an	 iconic	 status	 amongst	 the	
international	 promulgators	 advancing	BDO	approaches.	 It	was	 expected	 that	 the	
summit	 would	 form	 a	 platform	 through	 which	 the	 UK	 Government	 would	
announce	its	 intentions	to	endorse	a	state	sponsored	programme	of	BDO.	Yet	no	
such	 endorsements	 were	 forthcoming.	 Indeed	 DEFRA’s	 Secretary	 of	 State	 Owen	
Patterson	 did	 not	 even	 show	up,	 foretelling	 the	 precarious	 status	 for	 the	 idea	 of	
BDO	 and	 its	 ‘practices	 of	 becoming’.	 Meanwhile	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 black	
capped	 squirrel	 monkey	 cage	 claiming	 to	 ‘recreate	 the	 Bolivian	 rain	 forests	 as	
closely	 as	 is	 possible	 in	 central	 London’,	 and	 outside	 the	 fenced	 enclosures	 of	
London	Zoo,	 a	 smaller	 but	no	 less	 committed	 coterie	 of	 individuals	 convened	 to	
conduct	 a	 counter	 forum3.	 The	 counter-forum’s	 participants	 from	 international	
civil	society	organisations,	academia,	journalism	and	the	concerned	and	interested	
general	 public	 congregated	 under	 the	 banner	 that	 Nature	 is	 not	 for	 sale!	 The	
attendees	of	 this	 conference	had	assembled	 to	 resist	 an	 agenda	 that	was	broadly	
conceived,	through	its	eagerness	to	ascribe	monetary	proxies	to	economic	‘units	of	
biodiversity',	 to	 be	 emblematic	 of	 a	 new	 paradigm	 of	 conservation	 governance	
consolidating	 around	 the	 'financialisation	 of	 nature'	 under	 the	 ‘green	 economy’.	
This	thesis	seeks	to	understand	this	moment	in	the	emergence	of	BDO	policy	for	
conservation	and	the	struggles	over	its	establishment	and	implementation.		
1.2	The	DEFRA	biodiversity	offsetting	pilot	study	2012-2014	
This	thesis	explores	efforts	to	 ‘secure	the	value	of	nature’	(DEFRA	2011b),	through	
biodiversity	 offsetting	 in	 England.	 It	 follows	 DEFRA’s	 two-year	 biodiversity	
offsetting	 pilot	 study	 between	 2012-2014,	 initiated	 by	 the	 recently	 instated	
Conservative	 led	 Liberal	 Democrat	 coalition	 government	 via	 the	 first	 natural	
environmental	 White	 Paper	 for	 20	 years	 (DEFRA	 2011b).	 This	 pilot	 study	
																																																						
3 	http://www.fern.org/publications/presentations/nature-not-sale	 (Accessed	 20th	
April	2017).	
15  
constituted	just	one	component	part	of	a	broader	repertoire	of	‘natural	capital’	and	
‘valuation	 of	 nature’	 approaches	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 White	 Paper.	 The	 Natural	
Capital	Committee	(NCC),	the	formation	of	which	was	but	one	the	White	Paper’s	
recommendations,	defines	natural	capital	as	‘those	elements	of	nature	which	either	
directly	provide	benefits	or	underpin	human	wellbeing’	and	as	such	‘generate	value	
for	people’	(NCC	2013:	11).	The	emphasis	on	capturing	and	securing	the	‘economic	
values	of	nature’	within	the	White	Paper	coincided	with	the	themes	of	the	National	
Ecosystem	Assessment	released	just	the	month	before	hand	(NEA	2011).		
‘Ecosystem	services’,	‘natural	capital’,	‘valuation’	and	the	‘economics	of	biodiversity’	
-	 these	 expressions	 comprise	 the	 contemporary	 vocabulary	 of	 conservation	 ideas	
and	governance	that	have	ushered	in	a	new	era	of	national	conservation	thinking	
in	 England.	 The	 terms	 are	 also	 ostensibly	 the	 lexicon	 that	 the	 UK	 Government	
drew	 from	 in	 setting	 about	 formulating	 its	 national	 biodiversity	 strategies	
following	 commitments	 made	 at	 10th	 Conference	 of	 Parties	 (COP)	 to	 the	
Convention	 of	 Biological	 Diversity	 (CBD)	 in	 2010.	 In	 the	 UK,	 these	 approaches	
were	broadly	collected	under	the	Government’s	agenda	entitled	‘securing	the	value	
of	 nature’	 underlined	 by	 the	 title	 of	 the	 White	 Paper	 that	 went	 by	 this	 name	
(DEFRA	2011b).		
Framed	 as	 an	 innovation	 that	 would	 help	 align	 economic	 and	 environmental	
rationales	 through	 streamlining	 planning,	 the	 following	 statement	 by	 Owen	
Paterson,	Secretary	of	State	at	the	time	sets	the	scene:	
England	faces	the	twin	challenges	of	growing	its	economy	and	improving	
its	natural	environment.		We	must	be	open	to	new	thinking	about	how	
our	planning	system	deals	with	biodiversity	if	we	are	going	to	achieve	
these	goals.	Our	economy	cannot	afford	planning	processes	that	deal	with	
biodiversity	expensively	and	inefficiently	or	block	the	housing	and	
infrastructure	our	economy	needs	to	grow.	(DEFRA	2013:	1)	
Government’s	 solution	 to	 this	 impediment	 was	 put	 forward	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 a	
biodiversity	offsetting	pilot.	DEFRA’s	definition	reads:	
Biodiversity	offsets	are	conservation	activities	designed	to	deliver	
biodiversity	benefits	in	compensation	for	losses	in	a	measurable	way.	
Good	developments	incorporate	biodiversity	considerations	in	their	
design	but	are	still	likely	to	result	in	some	biodiversity	loss.	One	way	to	
compensate	for	this	loss	is	by	offsetting:	the	developer	secures	
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compensatory	habitat	expansion	or	restoration	elsewhere.	(DEFRA	2011d:	
1)	
Offsetting	 is	 therefore	 predicated	 on	 the	 use	 of	 methodologies	 for	 technical	
calculation	 so	 as	 to	 quantify	 biodiversity	 impacts	 and	 gains	 as	 ‘values’.	 The	
envisaged	 benefit	 to	 the	 English	 planning	 system	 is	 that	 rather	 than	 ‘block’	
development,	 developers	 could	 instead	 trade	 these	 impacts,	 as	 values	with	 other	
actors	 performing	 conservation	 investments	 elsewhere.	 In	 England	 the	 basis	 for	
calculating	 these	 values	 is	 the	 biodiversity	 offset	 metric	 developed	 by	 DEFRA,	
which	 enables	 impacts	 on	 one	 habitat	 type	 in	 one	 location	 to	 be	 ‘offset’	 with	
another	 ‘habitat	 type	 or	 quality’	 through	 conservation	 action	 elsewhere	 (DEFRA	
2011d).	 As	 a	 valuation	 technology	 (which	 I	 label	 in	 this	 thesis	 as	 a	 calculative	
device),	the	metric	constructs	representations	of	biodiversity	debits	and	credits	as	
‘biodiversity	units’,	which	perform	as	 a	 fungible	 currency	 system	 for	 the	 trade	of	
such	‘values’.		
In	parallel	to	the	introduction	of	offsetting	in	England,	planning	reforms	delivered	
through	 the	 National	 Planning	 Policy	 Framework	 (NPPF)	 in	 2012,	 set	 out	 policy	
guidance	for	local	planning	authorities	to	deliver	a	‘no	net	loss’	of	biodiversity.	As	a	
means	of	delivering	biodiversity	compensation,	the	NPPF	stipulated	that	offsetting	
must	 observe	 the	 mitigation	 hierarchy,	 whereby	 developers	 should	 first	 seek	 to	
avoid,	 mitigate	 as	 far	 as	 possible	 and	 only	 as	 a	 last	 resort,	 compensate	 residual	
losses	with	‘offsets’	(DCLG	2012:	3).		It	was	envisaged	that,	‘used	in	a	strategic	way’,	
‘offsets	could	expand	and	restore	the	ecological	network	in	England’	(DEFRA	2012a:	
22).		
DEFRA	initiated	 its	biodiversity	offsetting	pilot	study	to	be	tested	via	the	English	
planning	system	in	six	local	authorities	across	the	country.	These	local	authorities	
were	 Devon,	 Doncaster,	 Essex,	 Greater	 Norwich,	 Nottinghamshire	 and	
Warwickshire,	 Coventry	 and	 Solihull.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 local	 planning	
authorities,	 the	 pilot	 also	 included	 voluntary	 ‘complementary’	 pilots,	 comprising	
six	 private	 sector	 entities	 and	 three	 local	 government	 authorities.	 More	 latterly,	
Network	Rail’s	Thameslink	Programme,	which	at	the	time	was	Britain’s	largest	rail	
infrastructure	 initiative,	 was	 promoted	 to	 become	 the	 only	 official	 DEFRA	 BDO	
demonstration	project.		
In	 many	 ways,	 BDO	 reflects	 the	 continuation	 of	 a	 planning	 discourse	 around	
‘environmental	gains’	that	has	been	around	for	over	two	decades	(Whatmore	and	
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Boucher	 1993,	 Adams	 1996).	 As	 a	 means	 of	 withdrawing	 the	 sting	 of	
environmentalism	 as	 an	 oppositional	 standard,	 ‘environmental	 gains’	 or	
‘compensation’	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 previous	 DEFRA	 White	 Paper,	 This	
Common	 Inheritance	 in	 1990	 (Whatmore	 and	Boucher	 1993).	 Forms	of	 ecological	
compensation	to	mitigate	the	adverse	and	unavoidable	impacts	to	sites	designated	
under	 the	 European	Union’s	 (EU)	Habitats	Directive	 have	 been	part	 of	 planning	
policy	 since	 1994.	 The	 contemporary	 manifestation	 of	 this	 longer	 trajectory,	
however,	is	distinct	for	the	calculative	precision	and	market	orientation	that	BDO	
signals.	Specifically,	BDO	invokes	a	currency	to	numerically	commensurate	losses	
with	 gains	 across	 space	 and	 time	 to	 provide	 ‘measurable	 gains’	 in	 biodiversity	
‘values’	 (DEFRA	2013),	 and	 therefore	a	 ‘no	net	 loss’	 of	biodiversity	overall	 (DCLG	
2012).		
1.3	Thesis	justification	
A	 growing	 body	 of	 literature	 addresses	 the	 scientific,	 political	 and	 institutional	
implications	for	biodiversity	valuations	in	conservation	and	BDO	policy	specifically	
(e.g.	 Pawliczek	 and	 Sullivan	 2011,	 Maron	 et	 al.	 2012,	 Calvet	 et	 al.	 2015,	
Apostolopoulou	 and	Adams	 2015,	 2017,	Apostolopoulou	 2016).	 Yet	 little	 has	 been	
written	 that	 addresses	 the	 actual	 valuation	 process	 and	 how	 offset	 contracts	
between	 impact	 and	 receptor	 sites	 are	 agreed	 in	 practice.	 The	 relative	 youth	 of	
BDO	 in	 application	 means	 that	 empirical	 engagements	 with	 the	 detailed	
enactments	 of	 the	 policy,	 its	 long	 term	 implications	 or	 conservation	 outcomes	
remain	 limited.	 Detailed	 case	 histories	 are	 therefore	 important	 to	 remedy	 these	
gaps	in	the	literature	so	as	to	better	understand	how	BDO	is	deployed	in	practice	
to	better	inform	debate	regarding	conservation	effectiveness	and	the	implications	
of	the	approach	more	generally.	My	thesis	responds	to	these	lacunae	in	particular	
by	demonstrating	how	biodiversity	gains	or	yields	were	calculated	and	negotiated	
for	 specific	 offset	 contracts	 within	 DEFRA’s	 government-led	 pilot	 study.	 	 In	
particular,	 my	 empirical	 engagements	 trace	 the	 processes	 of	 value	 making	 in	
conservation	 policy	 and	 practice	 and	 illustrate	 how	 conflicts	 and	 tensions	
identified	within	environmental	markets	more	generally	(Sulzman	and	Ruhl	2000)	
are	resolved	by	actors	in	practice.	
Beyond	these	empirical	contributions	 to	understanding	the	specific	practices	and	
processes	 of	 value	 making	 in	 situ	 through	 case	 studies,	 the	 thesis’s	 broader	
contribution	 illuminates	 the	 specificities	 of	 this	 nascent	 conservation	 policy.	 Its	
insights	 are	 therefore	 significant	 to	 understanding	 other	 areas	 of	 market	 based	
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environmental	 management	 or	 those	 based	 on	 ‘valuation’.	 In	 relation	 to	 a	
burgeoning	 landscape	 of	 commodification	 generally	 of	 ‘species,	 climate,	 water,	
ideas,	 genomic	 information’	 Larry	 Lohmann	 (2014:	 158)	 suggests	 that	 for	
geographical	 research	 exploring	 specific	 empirical	 fields	 ‘paying	 attention	 to	
particularities	 and	 resistances	 has	 never	 been	 more	 important’.	 This	 thesis	 is	
therefore	 situated	 in	and	 speaks	 to	a	 larger	body	of	 critical	 literatures	 concerned	
with	 ‘neoliberal	 conservation’,	 that	 is, ‘the	 premise	 that	 natures	 can	 only	 be	
“saved’’	through	their	submission	to...and	revaluation	in	capitalist	terms’	(Büscher	
et	al.	2012:	1549).	My	study	makes	a	unique	contribution	to	the	expanding	interest	
in	the	shifting	institutional	order	of	this	field.  
Increasingly,	attention	is	also	moving	towards	value	and	the	practice	of	valuation	
as	its	own	unique	and	lively	topic	of	investigation.	This	scholarly	interest	is	partly	
attributable	to	the	‘significant	shifts	in	the	valuation	of	various	entities	—	objects,	
products	services,	people,	projects,	organisations’	(Kjellburg	et	al.	2013).	Such	shifts	
often	entail	the	creation	of	new	markets	and	regimes	of	value	in	a	range	of	policy	
arenas	 (Bracking	 et	 al.	 2014).	 Thus,	 one	 of	 the	 paradoxes	 of	 valuation	 in	 public	
policy	 that	 forms	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 interest	 is	 that	 ‘although	more	 quantitatively	
defined...the	 valued	 entities	 which	 emerge	 often	 appear	 to	 lose	 their	 earlier	
intrinsic	 value’	 and	 thus	 are	 rendered	more	 ‘disposable	 than	 ever’	 (ibid.:	 2).	 This	
phenomenon	has	been	articulated	elsewhere	as	the	'tragedy	of	the	well	intentioned	
valuation’	(Gomez-	Baggethun	and	Ruiz-Perez	2011).	It	is	these	paradoxes	that	this	
thesis	grapples	with	through	exploring	biodiversity	offsetting	in	England.	These	are	
also	 the	 concerns	 and	 interests	 that	 shaped	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 Leverhulme	
Centre	for	the	Study	of	Value	(LCSV)	of	which	my	doctoral	research	formed	one	of	
several	 different	 case	 studies.	 The	 Centre	 was	 tasked	 with	 understanding	 how	
‘valuation	technologies	[along	with]	the	production	of	markets	and	prices...and	the	
quantification	of	value,	legitimacy	and	care’	has	emerged	in	a	number	of	key	policy	
areas	across	the	humanitarian,	climate,	conservation,	water	and	agricultural	policy	
domains	(Bracking	et	al.	2014:	1).		
Anthropologist	Daniel	Miller	notes	that	‘the	word	value	has	a	rather	extraordinary	
semantic	 range	 in	 the	 English	 language’	 (2008:	 1123)	 (cited	 by	 Castree	 and	
Henderson	 2013:	 28).	 It	 is	 partly	 the	 word’s	 polysemy	 that	 makes	 value	 such	 a	
potentially	 complex	 but	 rewarding	 topic	 of	 study	 as	 well	 as	 such	 a	 powerful	
organising	 social	 force.	David	Graeber	 (2001)	 summarises	 the	main	ways	 value	 is	
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typically	spoken	about	in	social	theory	into	three	modalities;	moral,	economic	and	
semiotic:		
1. ‘values’	in	the	sociological	sense:	conceptions	of	what	is	ultimately	
good,	proper,	or	desirable	in	human	life			
2. ‘value’	in	the	economic	sense:	the	degree	to	which	objects	are	
desired,	particularly,	as	measured	by	how	much	others	are	willing	
to	give	up	to	get	them			
3. ‘value’	in	the	linguistic	sense,	which	goes	back	to	the	structural	
linguistics	of	Ferdinand	de	Saussure	(1966),	and	might	be	most	
simply	glossed	as	‘meaningful	difference	(Graeber	2001:	2)	
We	will	encounter	each	of	these	forms	of	value	in	the	chapters	that	follow.		
At	the	same	time,	at	its	most	abstract	level,	value	has	also	recently	been	defined	as	
the	 ‘quality	 of	 being	measurable	 and	 comparable	 with	 other	 things’	 (Bigger	 and	
Robertson	 2017:	 68).	My	 thesis	 therefore	 takes	 inspiration	 from	 the	 rich	 body	 of	
empirical	 and	 theoretical	 literature	 in	 economic	 sociology	 investigating	 how	
systems	 of	 measurement	 and	 comparability	 are	 enacted	 and	 organised	 and	 by	
whom.	This	approach	is	enhanced	by	a	theoretical	orientation	to	Marxian	political	
ecology	that	provides	explanatory	clarity	over	why	such	systems	are	underway	and	
importantly,	 attends	 to	 their	 socio-ecological	 justice	 implications.	 The	 joint	
endeavor	 of	 these	 two	 approaches	 are	 concerned	 with	 exploring	 the	 socio-
technical	processes	 forming	assemblages	 that	enable	hitherto	un-priced	things	 to	
move	 into	 economic	 framings,	 while	 attending	 to	 the	 implications	 and	
consequences	 and	 signaling	 alternatives	 to	 such	 moves.	 As	 such,	 this	 research	
enquiry	 aligns	 with	 nascent	 scholarly	 interest	 coalescing	 at	 the	 modes	 and	
methods	of	such	practices	and	the	act	of	valuation	itself	(Helgesson	and	Muniesa	
2013)	
The	political	possibilities	that	arise	from	the	study	of	value	are	substantial.	David	
Graeber	 (2001),	 for	 example	 notes	 ‘the	 ultimate	 stake	 of	 politics	 is	 not	 even	 the	
struggle	to	appropriate	value;	it	is	the	struggle	to	establish	what	value	is’	(cited	by	
Bigger	and	Robertson	2017:	68).	My	investigation	is	therefore	concerned	with	what	
the	biodiversity	‘value’	articulated	and	circulated	through	BDO	policies,	actually	is.		
Additionally,	by	making	 transparent	how	socio-technical	 valuation	happens,	who	
controls	the	process	and	exactly	how	the	tensions	and	paradoxes	are	resolved	(or	
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not)	 -	 various	 openings	 for	 political	 contestation	 and	 potential	 and	 change	may	
also	 be	 illuminated.	 It	 is	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 these	 empirical,	 theoretical	 and	
political	interests	that	my	study	into	value	making	through	biodiversity	offsetting	
is	situated	and	justified.		
1.4	Key	themes		
1. Performing	biodiversity	values	
Through	the	prism	of	biodiversity	offsetting,	 this	 thesis	studies	 the	practices	 that	
make	 biodiversity	 valuable.	 In	 DEFRA’s	 2011	 Natural	 Environment	 White	 Paper	
announcing	the	BDO	pilot,	the	Secretary	of	State	at	the	time,	proposed:	
Government	and	society	need	to	account	better	for	the	value	of	nature,	
particularly	the	services	and	resources	it	provides.	Valuing	nature	
properly	holds	the	key	to	a	green	and	growing	economy,	one	which	
invests	in	nature	-	not	just	for	us,	but	for	our	children’s	children.	(Rt.	Hon	
Caroline	Spelman	MP,	DEFRA	2011b)	
And	yet	this	agenda,	and	its	plea	to	‘account	better	for	the	value	of	nature’	would	
imply	that	the	biodiversity	‘values’	have	been	there	all	along,	simply	waiting	to	be	
recognised,	 accounted	 for	 and	 captured.	 Further,	 it	 rests	 on	 the	 implicit	
assumption	 that	 the	biodiversity	 crisis	 is	 rooted	 in	 a	 failure	 to	properly	 cost	 and	
internalise	 what	 neo-classical	 economics	 frames	 as	 ‘externalities’	 -	 those	 things	
lying	 just	outside	of	 the	economic	pricing	structures,	 thereby	creating	 inefficient,	
partially	 functioning	 markets.	 	 In	 contrast	 to	 this	 conjecture	 I	 argue	 for	 an	
understanding	of	value	making	under	offsetting	as	a	performative	project	through	
which	the	values	of	nature	are	actively	assembled	and	enacted	via	social,	political	
and	technical	processes	that	can	be	documented	empirically.	
I	 propose	 that	 to	 understand	 exactly	how	 these	 values	 appear	 and	what	 they	do	
requires	 a	 dissection	 of	 the	 assemblage	 itself	 by	 tracing	 the	 assorted	 array	 of	
human	 and	 non-human	 actors	 of	which	 it	 is	 comprised.	A	 starting	 point	 for	my	
study	therefore	exceeds	the	consideration	of	human	relations	and	agencies	and	in	
parallel	emphasises	 the	role	 that	non-humans	play.	 In	particular	 I	accentuate	 the	
performative	 and	 political	 agencies	 of	 calculative	 devices	 (Callon	 and	 Muniesa	
2005).	The	DEFRA	biodiversity	metric,	conceived	to	be	the	quantitative	means	of	
achieving	the	‘no	net	loss’	of	biodiversity	is	the	most	obvious	of	these.	Along	with	
the	metric,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 policy	 standard	 and	 abstract	 ideal	 of	 ‘no	net	 loss’	 of	
biodiversity	is	itself	one	of	BDO’s	most	powerfully	performative	devices,	especially	
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as	 it	 is	mobilised	by	 conservationists	 as	 a	moral	 imperative.	 BDO	need	not	 even	
exist	 as	official	policy	once	NNL	has	been	adopted.	The	proliferation	of	 the	NNL	
standard	 at	 national,	 local	 government	 or	 firm	 level	 enacts	 a	 balance	 sheet	
accounting	 approach	 to	 conservation	 that	 in	 turn	 requires	 an	 accounting	
technology	like	biodiversity	offsetting	for	its	realisation.		
Throughout	 this	 study,	 I	 distinguish	 between	 the	 wider	 formation	 of	 BDO	 as	 a	
policy	approach	based	on	accounting	technologies	and	the	‘biodiversity	unit’	as	the	
valued	entity	it	calculates.	This	distinction	aligns	with	Latour’s	characterisation	of	
‘metrology’,	which	he	proposes		‘is	the	name	of	a	gigantic	enterprise	to	make	of	the	
outside	a	world	inside	which	facts	and	machines	can	survive’	(Latour	1987:	251).	By	
this	 account,	 BDO	 is	 a	metrological	 network	 or	 assemblage	 -	 it	 is	 an	 idea	 and	 a	
policy,	a	set	of	standards,	a	series	of	technological	devices,	spread	sheets,	biological	
records,	 maps,	 ecological	 knowledges	 and	 professionals,	 market	 brokers,	
normative	 beliefs	 and	moral	 assertions.	 ‘Biodiversity	 units’	 are	 the	 commodified	
numerical	 representations	 of	 ecological	 debits	 and	 credits	 that	 the	 network	
(assemblage)	produces	as	‘facts’.			
Rather	than	being	fixed	in	place,	I	demonstrate	the	ways	in	which	this	assemblage	
unfolds	 in	 a	 processural	 and	 dynamic	 way	 (Anderson	 and	 MacFarlane	 2011).	
Although	my	 research	 is	 grounded	 in	 specific	 geographic	 settings,	 the	 entangled	
connections	between	the	elements	of	the	assemblage	transcend	scale	as	they	link	
various	places	and	moments	 in	 time.	 I	emphasise	 that	as	 the	assemblage	unfolds	
over	 time,	 it	 is	 reconfigured	 through	 collisions	 with	 other	 assemblages	 such	 as	
local	 government	 organisational	 settings,	 prior	 conservation	 frameworks	 or	
English	land	markets.	The	result	is	that	the	practices	constituting	BDO	are	socially	
and	geographically	 contingent.	Biodiversity	 values	 are	provisional	 and	performed	
entities.	Furthermore,	 I	propose	 that	offsetting	 is	performative	 in	a	 recursive	and	
circular	 sense.	 I	 show	 how	 BDO	 expands	 our	 ‘capacity	 to	 envision’	 (Li	 2014)	
biodiversity	as	an	economic	abstraction	and	calculable	entity,	while	simultaneously	
relying	on	such	frames	for	its	legitimation.	
2. Shifts	in	conservation	practice	-	the	effects	of	using	‘value’	in	conservation	
As	 well	 as	 illustrating	 how	 economic	 values	 are	 made	 in	 practice,	 my	 study	
highlights	 the	 various	 consequences	 of	 these	 processes.	 In	 particular	 I	 trace	 the	
wider	shifts	to	conservation	practice	in	England	that	offsetting	is	engendering.	The	
first	 shift	 relates	 to	 offsetting’s	 powers	 of	 commensuration	 forming	 the	 basis	 of	
biodiversity’s	economic	value	making	(as	exchange	value).	Drawing	from	detailed	
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empirical	data	I	demonstrate	the	ways	in	which	offsetting	is	producing	surprising	
theoretical	equivalences	between	sites	of	biodiversity	impact	and	gain,	making	two	
distinct	habitats	appear	the	same	through	representation	as	a	numerical	surrogate.	
I	demonstrate	 the	ability	of	 the	metric	 to	 fabricate	numerical	 abstractions	which	
commensurate	 distinct	 biota	 across	 space	 and	 time.	 These	 commensuration	
processes	 have	 a	 particular	 utility	 for	 planners	 or	 developers,	 since	 biodiversity,	
abstracted	to	universal	equivalence	can	be	easily	conceptually	dis-embedded	from	
its	geographic	and	 temporal	 context	and	 thereby	becomes	easier	 to	dispose	of	 in	
planning	decisions.	I	suggest	that,	in	so	far	as	these	processes	are	built	on	a	range	
of	problematic	assumptions	and	technical	 fantasies	they	are	producing	somewhat	
un-intuitive	 and	 ecologically	 questionable	 conservation	 outcomes,	 which	 are	
concealed	by	the	apparent	objectivity	of	numbers.		
Furthermore,	 this	 new	 liquidity	 arising	 from	 fabricated,	 commensurable	 natures	
ensures	 biodiversity	 becomes	 compliant	 with	 the	 spatial	 demands	 of	 economic	
growth	 vis	 a	 vis,	 infrastructural	 development.	 Through	 the	 disappearance	 of	
specificities	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 equivalences,	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 introduces	 a	
geographic	 and	 temporal	 flexibility	 to	 biodiversity	 concerns	 within	 the	 spatial	
frictions	 of	 a	 contested	 and	 crowded	 planning	 landscape.	 The	 second	 shift	 to	
conservation	 that	 BDO	 begets,	 I	 therefore	 propose,	 is	 that	 that	 contrary	 to	
DEFRA’s	proposal	 to	make	space	for	nature,	BDO	primarily	serves	to	make	space	
for	development.		
Thirdly,	consistent	with	the	wider	neoliberal	values	that	governed	the	formation	of	
BDO,	 the	 approach	 is	 pushing	 conservation	 in	 a	 direction	 that	 favours	 market	
values	 as	 actors	 search	 for	 economies	 of	 scale,	market	 efficiencies	 and	 value	 for	
money	 in	 a	 bid	 to	 make	 offsetting	 ‘work’	 economically.	 The	 subjugation	 of	 an	
ecological	rationale	to	an	economic	one	has	grave	implications	for	the	robustness	
of	the	conservation	outcomes	under	offsetting.	
3. Reconciling	‘value’	with	‘values’	
In	relation	to	the	prior	point,	through	illuminating	the	empirical	particularities	of	
BDO	 I	 discuss	 how	 the	 process	 is	 stalked	 by	 an	 enduring	 tension	 between	 the	
production	of	economic	exchange	value	and	wider	‘sociological’	values	about	what	
is	 ‘right,	proper	and	desirable’	 (Graeber	2001:	2).	As	BDO	is	 frequently	positioned	
as	 a	 ‘quantitative	 force	 for	 morality’	 (MacDonald	 and	 Corson	 2012),	 efforts	 to	
secure	 the	 value	 of	 nature	 using	BDO	are	 situated	 in	moral	 complexity	manifest	
through	the	conflict	and	debate	in	which	BDO	emerged	in	England	and	continues	
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to	persist.	In	relation	to	this	dispute,	actors	tend	to	articulate	biodiversity’s	‘many	
green	orders	of	worth’	(Blok	2013),	some	of	which	are	antithetical	to	quantification.	
These	moral	intricacies	ensure	that	BDO	is	situated	within	an	on	going	social	and	
political	 controversy	 over	 the	 appropriate	 ways	 to	 conceive	 of,	 value	 and	
subsequently	govern	nature.	Various	moral	framings	may	de-stabilise	and	threaten	
the	coherence	of	BDO	in	a	‘counter-performative’	(MacKenzie	et	al.	2007)	sense	by	
reinforcing	 biodiversity’s	 non-fungibility	 as	 well	 as	 its	 geographic,	 temporal	 and	
socio-ecological	 specificity.	 In	 parallel,	 however,	 I	 discuss	 numerous	 cases	where	
NNL	 is	 frequently	 elevated	 as	 a	 ‘worthy’	 conservation	 ideal	 that	 necessarily	
brackets	 out	 the	 wider	 pragmatic	 values	 that	 shaped	 its	 origins.	 I	 illustrate	 the	
means	by	which	quantitative-moral	values,	manifest	 in	abstract	models	 like	NNL	
reside	 on	 the	 fetishised	 neoliberal	 norms	 of	 efficiency	 and	 flexibility,	 making	
various	kinds	of	business	friendly	environmental	compromises.	As	such,	the	moral	
weight	 of	 NNL	 is	 uncritically	 associated	 with	 a	 strong	 ecological	 rationale	 and	
drawn	on	so	as	to	legitimate	BDO.	It	is	in	this	way,	I	argue	that	the	moral	frames	
serve	to	strengthen	the	BDO	assemblage.		
Finally,	I	show	how	the	broader	sociological	and	political	values	under	which	BDO	
was	 embraced	 by	 the	 UK	 government	 matter	 to	 the	 way	 the	 policy	 unfolds	 in	
practice.	 Overt	 political	 priorities	 for	 de-regulation,	 economic	 austerity	 and	
accelerated	 residential	 and	 infrastructure	 development	 comprised	 the	 higher	
structuring	 frameworks	 in	 which	 actors	 enacted	 BDO	 and	 adjudicated	 over	 the	
policy’s	 value	 in	 government.	 These	 values	 underpinned	 the	 paradox	 that	 BDO	
came	to	occupy.	The	official	pilot	evaluation	report	unambiguously	indicated	that	
the	 approach	 would	 require	 more	 not	 less	 regulatory	 input	 into	 the	 planning	
system	meaning	 that	 as	 a	policy,	BDO	could	not	prove	 its	worth	 to	government.	
Furthermore,	 these	 higher	 values	 for	 economic	 development	 and	 de-regulation	
illustrate	the	risks	of	introducing	the	BDO	into	political	contexts,	which	are	likely	
to	 exacerbate	 rather	 than	 overturn	 weaknesses	 of	 biodiversity	 considerations	 in	
English	 planning	 system.	 As	 I	 will	 show	 throughout	 the	 thesis,	 an	 emphasis	 on	
economic	valuation	served	to	reinforce	rather	than	overturn	prior	configurations	of	
power	 and	 influence	 in	 the	 planning	 system	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 biodiversity	
protection.		
4. Tensions	at	the	heart	of	the	project	
Throughout	my	empirical	examples	of	value	making	in	practice	I	show	how	BDO	is	
besieged	by	tensions	that	must	be	actively	worked	through	or	silenced	so	that	the	
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approach	 appears	 logical	 and	 coherent	 for	 social	 consensus.	 Firstly,	 frictions	
obscured	within	 the	 technical	 calculation	practices	arise	as	actors	 face	additional	
value	judgments	and	struggles	over	arriving	at	the	‘right’	numerical	values.	Despite	
the	 patina	 of	 robust	 quantification	 underpinning	 the	 perceived	 neutrality	 of	
decision	making	under	offsetting,	planners	instead	face	the	challenge	of	producing	
outcomes	that	are	simultaneously	economically	palatable,	politically	pragmatic	as	
well	 as	 ecologically	 coherent.	 Instead	 of	 acting	 as	 technical	 means	 for	 the	
standardised	production	of	impartial	and	objective	calculations	based	on	observed	
site	characteristics,	the	new	metrics	associated	with	BDO	are	being	used	differently	
by	 different	 actors.	 Efforts	 to	 make	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 applicable	 to	 real-life	
planning	cases	therefore	appear	as	a	process	of	constant	iteration,	trial	and	error.	
Scores	 are	 negotiated	 and	 adjusted	 to	 suit	 actors with	 competing	 interests	 in	
negotiations.	 Such	 differences	 in	 application	 may	 be	 appropriate	 in	 response	 to	
real-world	complexities	but	conflict	with	the	stated	aims	in	BDO	policy	design	for	
standardisation	and	comparability.		 
Furthermore,	 concealed	 within	 the	 design	 of	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 are	 a	 series	 of	
uncomfortable	 settlements,	 for	 example	 in	 the	 search	 for	 simplicity,	 ease	 of	 use	
and	 economic	 efficiency	 thereby	 compromising	 scientific	 precision	 or	 ecological	
accuracy.	Lastly,	 in	cases	where	BDO	eventually	 lead	 to	efforts	 to	 initiate	habitat	
banks	envisaged	to	circumnavigate	the	shortage	of	supply	side	offset	providers,	an	
allied	 set	 of	 compromises	 became	 apparent.	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	 actors	
searched	for	bank	sites	that	offered	appropriate	legal,	economic	and	administrative	
characteristics	 foremost	 over	 the	 ecological	 features,	 again	 significantly	
compromising	future	conservation	outcomes.		
In	 summary,	 the	 enduring	 tensions	 over	 striking	 the	 right	 balance	 between	
economic	 and	 ecological	 rationales	 is	 consistent	with	 concerns	 that	 an	 emphasis	
on	 market	 values	 for	 biodiversity	 conservation	 will	 encourage	 developers,	 as	
purchasers	of	impact	compensation,	to	push	prices	downward	so	as	to	lower	their	
costs.	In	doing	so,	both	the	quality	and	quantity	of	conservation	outcomes	through	
BDO	may	also	be	reduced. Thus,	while	BDO	is	frequently	positioned	as	a	win-win	
policy	 and	 means	 to	 ‘transcend	 the	 trade-offs’	 (ten	 Kate	 et	 al.	 2004)	 between	
development	 and	 environmental	 considerations,	 the	 schism	 between	 economic	
and	ecological	rationales	persists	but	is	often	instead	displaced	from	view.	 
1.5	Thesis	structure		
To	guide	my	enquiry,	in	this	thesis	I	ask:		
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1. How	 is	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 assembled	 discursively,	 institutionally	 and	
materially	as	a	governance	approach?		
2. How	is	habitat	turned	into	a	market	good?		
3. How	do	actors	manage	the	tensions	associated	with	the	formation	of	BDO	
policy	and	production	of	the	valued	entity,	the	biodiversity	unit?	
4. And	 what	 are	 the	 implications	 of	 these	 projects	 for	 biodiversity	
conservation	policy	and	practice?		
To	answer	 these	questions,	 I	have	 split	 the	 thesis	 into	 five	parts	 that	are	broadly	
organised	according	to	the	chronology	of	DEFRA’s	BDO	pilot	study.	Although	this	
structure	 is	 more	 or	 less	 shaped	 by	 the	 sites	 and	 moments	 wherein	 these	
assemblages	converge	I	address	all	questions	synchronically	at	each	setting.		
Part	1	Theorising	the	nature-value	nexus:	conceptual	and	methodological	
approaches	
Following	this	 introductory	chapter	I	situate	the	research	enquiry	theoretically	 in	
chapter	2	where	I	 introduce	the	conceptual	approaches	I	draw	from	to	frame	and	
open	 up	 my	 empirical	 material.	 These	 concepts	 derive	 from	 critical	 political	
ecologies	 and	 post-structural	 theory.	My	 theoretical	 approach	 is	 a	 hybrid	 in	 the	
sense	 that	 it	 combines	 Marxian	 political	 ecology	 with	 Science	 and	 Technology	
Studies	 (STS)	 approaches	 such	 as	 Actor-Network	 Theory	 (ANT)	 and	 economic	
sociology.	 I	 group	 these	 conceptual	 approaches	 under	 the	 respective	 titles	 of	
abstracting,	assembling	and	performing.	 	The	first	part	of	the	chapter	 follows	the	
political	 agency	 of	 abstraction	 (as	 semiotic	 referent)	 and	 the	 work	 it	 does	 with	
relation	to	my	topics	of	 interest:	 ‘nature’,	 ‘biodiversity’	and	 ‘value’.	 I	contextualise	
this	 literature	 against	 other	 approaches	 theorising	 the	 ‘green	 economy’	 and	
neoliberal	conservation.	My	enquiry	aims	to	contribute	new	insights	to	the	ways	in	
which	 certain	 representational	 and	 figurative	 aspects	 of	 biodiversity	 -	 framed	 as	
generalised	entities,	both	non-specific	and	universally	equivalent	-	can	help	make	
sense	of	a	contemporary	nature-conservation-value	nexus.	The	second	half	of	 the	
chapter	 introduces	 my	 STS	 approach	 under	 the	 headings	 of	 assembling	 and	
performing.	Here	I	introduce	the	concept	of	the	socio-material	assemblage	drawing	
on	ANT	and	related	work	on	the	 ‘practices	of	assemblage’	(Li	2007a).	ANT,	along	
with	 assemblage	 theory	 more	 broadly,	 provides	 the	 theoretical	 lens	 for	
investigating	human	 and	non-human	 agents	 symmetrically	 as	 ‘actants’	 that	 form	
relational	 topologies.	 In	 so	 far	 as	 these	 socio-technical	 assemblages	 have	
consequences	 in	 the	world	 (Law	 1999),	 I	 take	 them	to	be	performative.	The	 final	
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part	of	the	chapter	introduces	economic	performativity	theory	in	order	to	explore	
the	ways	in	which	BDO	assemblages	come	to	perform	and	thus	make	the	values	of	
biodiversity	in	practice.	The	theoretical	approach	could	be	summarised	as	drawing	
on	a	range	of	conceptual	resources	to	attend	to	the	ways	in	which	the	‘enactments	
of	nature	and	enactments	of	economy	go	together’	(Asdal	2008:	125).	
Chapter	 3	 outlines	 my	 methodological	 approach,	 explaining	 the	 range	 of	
qualitative	methods	 I	deployed	to	gather	and	order	my	empirical	data	within	the	
three	 phases	 of	 the	 research	 strategy.	 My	 methodology	 consisted	 of	 the	
construction	 of	 case	 studies	 through	 repeat	 visits,	 semi-structured	 interviews,	
participant	observation	as	well	as	primary	and	secondary	document	analysis.		I	also	
drew	 from	 participant	 observation	 and	 discourse	 analysis	 of	 conferences	 and	
events,	 in	 particular	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 chapter	 8.	 Chapter	 3	 also	 details	 some	
methodological	reflections	on	research	partialities	as	well	as	my	own	positionality	
in	addition	to	methodological	ethics.	
Part	2	Assemblages	in	a	socio-historical	context	
Chapter	4	 is	my	 thesis’s	hinge	 that	provides	a	historical	analysis	of	 the	origins	of	
BDO	 to	 set	 the	 scene	 for	my	 empirical	 chapters	 5-8.	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	 trace	 the	
longer	 tail	 of	 the	 discursive,	 material	 and	 institutional	 assemblages	 of	 valuing	
nature	through	biodiversity	offsetting.	In	particular	this	chapter	demonstrates	how	
biodiversity	became	conceptually	‘offsettable’	in	connection	with	the	emergence	of	
aggregate	rules	(Sullivan	2017)	in	US	environmental	policy	in	the	1970s.	Key	to	the	
overall	trajectory	of	BDO	are	the	political	origins	of	what	I	identify	to	be	the	core	
actants	within	the	assemblage;	the	policy	standards	of	 ‘no	net	loss’	of	biodiversity	
(NNL)	 and	 the	 ‘mitigation	 hierarchy’.	 I	 trace	 how	 these	 two	 separate	 histories	
conjoined	 to	 give	 rise	 to	 the	 innovation	 that	 became	 known	 as	 ‘biodiversity	
offsetting’.	 Due	 to	 their	 performative	 effects	 on	 making	 BDO	 ‘thinkable’	 I	 label	
these	 devices	 conceptual	 technologies.	 Having	 contextualised	 the	 broader	
paradigm	in	which	the	idea	of	environmental	offsetting	was	conceived,	developed	
and	set	free	from	its	origins	in	US	environmental	policy	in	the	1970s	I	subsequently	
introduce	the	empirical	context	for	the	present	investigation.	Through	the	lens	of	
assemblages,	the	chapter	demonstrates	how	the	UK	government	came	to	embrace	
the	 idea	 of	 offsetting	 and	 instantiate	 a	 pilot	 study	 in	 England.	 The	 chapter	 then	
presents	 the	 case	 study	 topic	 itself;	 the	 DEFRA	 pilot	 study	 and	 the	 central	
calculative	 technology	 it	employs	 in	service	 to	 its	efforts,	 the	DEFRA	biodiversity	
offsetting	metric.	The	main	contributions	this	chapter	make	are	demonstrating	the	
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performative	 aspects	 of	 two	 key	 calculative	 and	 conceptual	 devices:	 the	 policy	
standard	 of	 NNL	 and	 the	 DEFRA	 metric.	 My	 analysis	 of	 these	 conceptual-
calculative	technologies	sets	the	scene	for	the	empirical	chapters	that	follow.		
Part	3	The	making	of	biodiversity	values	in	practice	
In	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 thesis	 from	 chapter	 5	 onwards,	 I	 trace	 the	 empirical	
settings	within	the	DEFRA	pilot	study	where	biodiversity	values	are	actually	made	
(chapters	5-7)	as	well	as	contested	(chapter	8).	Chapters	5,	6	and	7	present	in	depth	
case	 studies	 investigating	 and	 demonstrating	 how	 local	 government	 residential	
planning	applications	 (chapters	5	and	6)	or	 infrastructure	developments	 (chapter	
7)	 were	 subject	 to	 practices	 of	 offsetting	 within	 the	 DEFRA	 pilot	 study.	 The	
chapters	each	illuminate	the	practices	of	value	making	through	BDO	in-situ.	They	
provide	 detailed	 accounts	 of	 the	 translation	 of	 ecological	 data	 into	 economic	
frames	through	the	assembling	and	then	pricing	of	biodiversity	as	‘units’.	I	address	
all	 of	 research	 questions	 throughout	 each	 case	 study.	 As	microcosms,	 each	 case	
study	presents	overarching	findings	that	straddle	the	others	as	well	as	highlighting	
their	own	unique	conclusions.		
Chapter	 5	 charts	 my	 in	 depth	 empirical	 engagement	 with	 the	 Warwickshire,	
Coventry	and	Solihull	(WCS)	arm	of	the	DEFRA	pilot	study.	Deploying	the	analytic	
lens	 of	 assemblage	 I	 explore	 the	 background	 to	 WCS’s	 local	 government	
environmental	and	planning	policy	context	that	enabled	it	to	develop	a	‘bottom	up’	
approach	 to	 offsetting.	 The	 next	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 presents	 the	 working	
through	of	a	specific	BDO	contract	in	WCS.	In	particular	it	focuses	on	the	practices	
of	 value	 making	 using	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 and	 demonstrates	 real	 examples	 of	
ecological	 commensuration	 that	 occur	 through	 this	 device.	 I	 note	 various	
implications	and	consequences	of	this	commensuration	process.	This	section	also	
explores	how	 the	 scores	 and	 the	 compensation	costs	 attached	 to	habitat	 impacts	
are	 actively	 struggled	 over	 by	 different	 actors	 in	 the	 process.	 These	 negotiation	
processes	 highlight	 the	 ways	 in	 which,	 rather	 than	 being	 a	 settled	 technical	
approach,	BDO	reflects	prior	configurations	of	power	within	the	English	planning	
system.	 The	 chapter	 also	 traces	 the	 shift	 towards	 a	 habitat-banking	 model	 in	
Warwickshire.	 In	 so	 doing,	 it	 illustrates	 how	 market	 pressures	 for	 delivering	
economies	 of	 scale	 in	 offset	 provision	 indicate	 a	 re-positioning	 of	 conservation	
discourse	in	line	with	agricultural	production	and	growth	narratives	according	to	a	
‘good	biodiversity	yield	per	hectare’.	As	well	as	demonstrating	the	actual	practices	
of	 valuation	 through	 offsetting,	 this	 chapter	 concludes	 by	 illustrating	 and	
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expanding	 a	 discussion	 over	 the	 significant	 shifts	 to	 conservation	 policy	 and	
practice	that	BDO	is	engendering	within	this	county.			
Chapter	 6	 builds	 on	 the	 insights	 offered	 by	 chapter	 5	 around	 local	 government	
efforts	 to	 shift	 biodiversity	 considerations	 under	 planning	 towards	 offsetting.	 It	
follows	 another	 of	 the	 DEFRA	 pilot	 sites,	 at	 South	 Devon.	 Following	 a	 parallel	
structure	to	the	prior	chapter,	chapter	6	is	similarly	arranged	in	five	parts.	It	starts	
by	 exploring	 the	 professional,	 political	 and	 institutional	 context	 of	 the	 pilot	 site	
and	the	ways	in	which	these	factors	shaped	how	BDO	was	enacted,	noting	various	
distinctions	 to	 the	 WCS	 pilot.	 Subsequently,	 it	 presents	 empirical	 data	 on	 the	
processes	 pertaining	 to	 the	 biodiversity	 impact	 valuations	 and	 arrangements	 for	
compensation	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 residential	 development	 of	 255	 houses.	Much	 like	
chapter	 5,	 the	 example	 brings	 an	 actual	 BDO	 contract	 to	 life	 so	 as	 to	 illuminate	
how	 values	 are	made	 and	 traded.	 Throughout	 this	 chapter	 I	 emphasise	 the	 local	
conservation	 and	 land	 market	 assemblages	 to	 which	 the	 BDO	 assemblage	
inevitably	 binds,	 thereby	 creating	 a	 hybrid	 form	 of	 valuation	 and	 ecological	
compensation	as	actors	attempt	to	make	sense	of	and	‘muddle	through’	BDO	as	a	
new	 framework.	 In	 particular,	 chapter	 6	 highlights	 the	 local	 geographical	
particularities	of	a	disproportionate	 focus	on	the	conservation	of	 flagship	species.	
In	addition,	it	explores	the	significance	and	challenges	to	offsetting	in	a	landscape	
peppered	 with	 statutory	 conservation	 designations,	 which	 fall	 under	 a	 different	
valuation	category	to	the	habitats	envisaged	by	DEFRA	as	subject	to	offsetting.	The	
chapter	concludes	by	highlighting	five	core	themes	exploring	the	implications	for	
the	production	of	hybrid	forms	of	BDO.	It	expands	the	discussion	over	the	various	
policy	implications	for	efforts	to	use	offsetting,	indicated	through	the	specificities	
of	this	case	study.		
Chapter	7	presents	the	final	case	study	of	BDO	within	this	research	project	and	is	
distinguished	 from	 the	 prior	 two	 in	 that	 it	 derives	 from	 a	 voluntary	 initiative	
undertaken	 by	 Network	 Rail	 on	 the	 Thameslink	 Programme	 (TLP)	 rail	
construction	project.	Since	the	TLP	BDO	initiative	was	a	voluntary	undertaking	on	
works	 already	with	planning	permission,	offsetting	was	not	 therefore	 conditional	
on	 meeting	 regulatory	 compliance	 requirements	 set	 by	 the	 LPA.	 So	 that	
Government	 could	 assess	 how	 offsetting	 might	 work	 in	 such	 contexts,	 TLP	 was	
quickly	 adopted	 as	 the	DEFRA	demonstration	project	within	 the	 complementary	
arm	of	the	pilot	study.	The	chapter	explores	how	actors	actively	managed	tensions	
related	 to	 reconciling	 business	 values	 with	 biodiversity	 values.	 Justification	 and	
29  
legitimation	 are	 thus	 overt	 themes	 woven	 throughout	 the	 chapter.	 The	 chapter	
highlights	 how	 the	 production	 of	 new	 corporate	 subjectivities	 is	 central	 to	 the	
realisation	of	BDO	at	TLP.	The	discussion	of	market-green	compromises	(Nyberg	
and	White	2013)	sets	the	scene	for	chapter	8.		
After	 exploring	 the	ways	 in	which	market-green	 compromises	 are	 established	 in	
enactments	of	BDO,	chapter	7	moves	on	to	explore	the	specific	biodiversity	offset	
process	at	TLP.	This	section	follows	the	structural	format	of	the	previous	two	case	
studies.	But	in	contrast	to	the	prior	two,	the	emphasis	of	chapter	7	is	on	the	actual	
delivery	 of	 the	 offset,	 since	 receptor	 sites	 and	 an	 offset	 delivery	 partner	 were	
identified	and	employed.	Through	tracing	this	process,	I	discuss	practical	features	
and	difficulties	of	 the	delivery	arrangements,	which	 I	 show	were	characteristic	of	
the	 higher	 structuring	 values	 of	 the	 corporate	 and	 voluntary	 nature	 of	 the	
programme.	Through	exploring	TLP,	I	demonstrate	how	the	logic	of	BDO	and	the	
imaginaries	 of	 NNL	 are	 assembled	 through	 mutually	 circular	 strategies	 of	
legitimation	 across	 scales	 and	 geographies.	 In	 so	 far	 as	 there	 is	 a	 ‘global	 BDO	
assemblage’	then	I	show	how	TLP	came	to	occupy	an	important	node	within	this	
through	its	techniques	of	‘selling	success’	(Büscher	2014).		
Part	4	The	moral	complexity	of	biodiversity	offsetting	
In	 the	 last	 part	 of	 the	 thesis	 my	 discussion	 turns	 to	 the	 discursive	 and	 moral	
tensions	sitting	at	the	heart	of	 the	effort	to	value	biodiversity	under	an	offsetting	
model.	 Chapter	 8	 engages	 with	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 as	 it	 has	 played	 out	 as	 a	
‘dispute’	 in	 English	 policy	 discourse.	 It	 revisits	 the	 2014	 BBOP	 conference	 that	
opened	 this	 introductory	 chapter	 and	 the	 public	 debate	 the	 organisers	 staged	
Agree	to	disagree:	Biodiversity	offsetting	in	the	mitigation	hierarchy,	opportunity	or	
peril?	Taking	this	debate	as	an	empirical	field	site,	this	chapter	charts	the	various	
politico-ethical	 value	 systems	 manifesting	 in	 conflicts	 and	 compromises	 that	
animated	the	dispute	over	BDO	during	the	DEFRA	pilot	study	between	2012-2014.	
This	part	of	 the	 thesis	 temporarily	 shifts	gear	away	 from	the	assemblage	analytic	
towards	the	pragmatic	sociology	of	critique,	an	ethno-methodological	twin	to	ANT	
which	 attends	 to	 contested	 norms,	moral	 ambiguity	 and	 the	 fragile	 character	 of	
political	reality	(Guggenheim	and	Potthast	2012).	Chapter	8	explores	how	actors	try	
to	 make	 sense	 of	 what	 is	 ‘just’	 so	 as	 to	 dissect	 the	 structuring	 logics	 and	 value	
systems	 sustaining	 the	 controversy	over	offsetting.	The	objective	 is	 to	 isolate	 the	
specific	moral	 values	 imbricated	within	 the	 discursive	 strategies	 that	 function	 to	
direct	and	shape	human	agencies	within	the	socio-technical	assemblage	of	BDO.				
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Chapter	 8	 builds	 on	 the	 findings	 from	 two	 important	 recent	 contributions	 to	
English	 BDO	 literatures	 (Sullivan	 and	 Hannis	 2015,	 Apostolopoulou	 and	 Adams	
2017)	and	combines	them	with	the	theoretical	frames	of	the	pragmatic	sociology	of	
critique	(Thévenot	et	al.	2000,	Boltanski	and	Thévenot	 1999,	2006)	to	empirically	
explore	the	architecture	of	argumentation	that	sustains	BDO	as	a	controversy.	The	
chapter	argues	 that	divergent	ontological	 foundations	of	what	biodiversity	 is	 and	
the	ethical	 frameworks	of	 action	 they	 imply	 (Sullivan	2017)	 form	 the	basis	of	 the	
dispute.	In	addition,	the	ways	in	which	these	different	ontological	frames	appear	as	
compromises	 with	 other	 value	 systems,	 or	 ‘orders	 of	 worth’	 (Boltanski	 and	
Thévenot	2006)	creates	a	moral	complexity	that	sustains	the	dispute	as	an	impasse.	
In	 summary,	 this	 chapter	 contributes	 theoretically	 and	 empirically	 grounded	
insights	 to	 clarify	 and	 elucidate	 the	 value	 conflicts	 embedded	 within	 efforts	 to	
value	nature	through	BDO.		
Part	5	Concluding	thoughts	on	an	un-official	evaluation	of	the	DEFRA	pilot	study	
In	 the	 thesis’	 conclusion,	 I	 discuss	DEFRA’s	 official	 evaluation	 study	 of	 the	 pilot	
and	reflect	on	the	similarities,	overlaps	and	divergences	with	what	I	came	to	see	in	
my	 own	 investigation	 -	 an	 ‘unofficial’	 evaluation.	 In	 particular,	 here	 I	 frame	 the	
differences	as	 those	 falling	under	an	 immanent	critique	 (Castree	2008)	as	well	as	
an	 external	 one	 (Boltanski	 and	 Thévenot	 1999).	 The	 former	 reflects	 on	 how	
offsetting	ultimately	 failed	according	 to	 its	own	rationale	 (even	 if	 the	pilot	was	a	
successful	process	for	government	to	decide	about	BDO),	the	latter	questions	the	
basic	 assumptions	 it	 was	 carried	 by.	 I	 then	 provide	 a	 thesis	 summary	 so	 as	 to	
thematically	group	my	discussion	points	and	implications	drawn	from	the	previous	
five	chapters	into	an	overall	presentation	of	main	findings.	I	close	by	offering	some	
concluding	 thoughts	 and	 reflections	 built	 around	 my	 main	 argument,	 which	
proposes	biodiversity	value	making	must	be	understood	as	a	performative	project	
comprised	 of	 the	 social,	 institutional	 and	 technical	 components	 of	 the	 BDO	
assemblage.		
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PART	1	
CHAPTER	2		
THEORISING	THE	NATURE-VALUE	NEXUS	
	
2.1	Introduction	
This	 thesis	 investigates	 practices	 that	 make	 biodiversity	 valuable.	 To	 guide	 this	
endeavour,	 I	 will	 address	 the	 following	 research	 questions:	 how	 is	 biodiversity	
offsetting	 assembled	 discursively,	 institutionally	 and	 materially	 as	 a	 governance	
approach?	How	is	habitat	turned	into	a	market	good?	How	do	actors	manage	the	
tensions	associated	with	the	formation	of	BDO	policy	and	production	of	the	valued	
entity,	 the	 biodiversity	 unit?	And	what	 are	 the	 implications	 of	 these	 projects	 for	
biodiversity	conservation	policy	and	practice?	
In	this	chapter	I	identify	a	number	of	concepts	that	are	useful	for	addressing	these	
research	questions.	I	have	grouped	these	approaches	under	the	respective	titles	of	
abstracting,	assembling	and	performing.		The	decision	to	frame	these	headings	as	
verbs	 rather	 than	 nouns	 was	 deliberate	 -	 since	 the	 investigative	 approach	 is	
interested	in	things	that	agents	do,	the	active	processes	of	assembling	the	values	of	
biodiversity.	 The	 emphasis	 of	 this	 approach	 is	 therefore	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	
assemblages	 and	 their	 unfolding	 across	 time	 and	 space	 as	 well	 as	 subsequent	
formations	and	their	effects	(Anderson	and	McFarlane	2011).	I	am	interested	as	to	
how	these	 formations	are	sustained	and	by	the	refractory	processes	that	threaten	
to	de-stabilise	them	(Li	2007a).		
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 also	 introduce	 various	 ways	 in	 which	 scholars	 have	 already	
deployed	 some	 of	 these	 conceptual	 approaches	 to	 my	 empirical	 subjects,	 for	
example	 questioning	 ‘biodiversity’	 (Turnhout	 et	 al.	 2012,	 Maier	 2012,	 Fredriksen	
2017,),	the	performativity	of	markets	(e.g.	Callon	1998,	MacKenzie	2003,	MacKenzie	
and	 Millo	 2007,	 Çalışkan	 and	 Callon	 2009,	 2010)	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 environmental	
markets	within	neoliberal	conservation	(McAfee	1999,	Castree	2002,	Sullivan	2010,	
Büscher	et	al.	2012,).	My	analytical	approach	is	a	conceptual	hybrid.	The	tools	I	use	
for	 opening	 up	my	 empirical	material	 draw	 from	 both	 critical	 political	 ecologies	
and	post-structural	theory.		
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I	open	my	theoretical	 review	with	a	discussion	of	 ‘abstracting’,	 the	processes	and	
practices	of	which	I	identify	to	be	foundational	features	for	analysing	two	vast	and	
amorphous	geographical	subjects:	nature	and	value.	I	trace	abstractions	(as	stable	
formations	 and	 representational	 practices)	 so	 as	 to	 decentre	 and	 de-stabilise	 the	
meaning	of	these	two	subjects.	To	paraphrase	Li	(2014:	590),	this	section	serves	as	a	
reminder	 that	 the	 words	 ‘nature’,	 ‘biodiversity’	 and	 ‘value’	 carry	 with	 them	 a	
cultural	baggage	that	we	need	to	‘make	strange	again	for	the	purpose	of	analysis’.		
I	then	move	into	a	discussion	of	the	socio-material	assemblage	of	BDO,	drawing	on	
Actor	Network	Theory	(ANT)	and	related	work	on	the	‘practices	of	assemblage’	(Li	
2007a).	These	frameworks	trace	the	coming	together	of	heterogeneous	factors	that	
assemble	 in	certain	ways	with	consequences.	They	provide	a	 context	 in	which	 to	
identify	the	various	elements	of	BDO,	namely	its	actors,	discourses,	conceptual	and	
material	 technologies	and	 institutional	alliances,	which	together	 form	alignments	
and	 relations	 that	 constitute	 it	 as	 an	 assemblage.	 Lastly,	 I	 discuss	 economic	
performativity	 theory	 in	 order	 to	 explore	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 BDO	 assemblages	
come	to	perform	the	reality	they	seek	to	represent.	In	other	words,	this	theoretical	
body	of	work	is	interested	in	how	a	range	of	varied	practices	can	bring	into	being	
certain	 things	which	 they	 subsequently	measure	and	calculate	as	economic	 facts.	
In	the	concluding	section	of	this	chapter	I	bring	these	varied	approaches	together	
to	 explain	 how	 their	mutual	 compatibilities	 can	 shape	my	 conceptual	 schema	 of	
biodiversity	value	making	through	BDO	in	England.		
2.1	Abstracting	
abstraction,	n.	
a.	The	action	of	considering	something	in	the	abstract,	independently	of	
its	associations	or	attributes;	the	process	of	isolating	properties	or	
characteristics	common	to	a	number	of	diverse	objects,	events,	etc.,	
without	reference	to	the	peculiar	properties	of	particular	examples	or	
instances.	Also:	the	state	of	being	considered	in	this	way;	abstractness.	
b.	Something	considered	or	expressed	in	abstract	terms;	something	which	
exists	only	as	an	idea	or	in	theory;	an	abstract	concept	or	idea;	(also	
occas.)	a	visionary	or	impractical	idea.	(Oxford	English	Dictionary,	2017a)	
2.1.1	Abstraction	1:	The	question	of	‘nature’	
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Drawing	on	the	intellectual	heritage	of	post-structuralism	associated	with	Foucault	
and	Derrida	in	the	final	two	decades	of	the	last	century,	geographers	investigating	
society-nature	 relations	generated	an	emerging	academic	 field	 loosely	 referred	 to	
as	 ‘social	 natures’	 (Peet	 and	 Watts	 1996,	 Macnaghten	 and	 Urry	 1998).	 The	
intellectual	 energy	 of	 this	 period	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 prior	 turn	 in	 human	
geography	 towards	Marxist	 political	 economy	 in	 the	 1970s,	 but	was	beginning	 to	
transcend	Marxism’s	 largely	 structuralist	 basis	 (Castree	 2000).	Within	 this	 shift,	
geographers	responded	to	seminal	contributions	on	the	question	of	nature	in	neo	
Marxian	 scholarship,	 such	 as	 Neil	 Smith’s	 (1984)	 Uneven	 Development,	 which	
‘provided	 the	 building	 blocks	 for	 the	 conceptual	 reintegration	 of	 nature	 into	
critical	 geographic	 enquiry’	 (Whatmore	 and	 Boucher	 1993:	 167) 4 .	 As	 these	
intellectual	 resources	 came	 to	 bear	 on	 the	 ‘question	 of	 nature’	 in	 human	
geography,	 Castree	 (2002:	 112)	 explains,	 a	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 body	 of	
literature	 on	 the	 topic	 transformed	 ‘in	 a	 few	 short	 years	 from	one	of	 intellectual	
silence	 to	 a	 deafening	 noise’.	 The	 prospect	 that	 nature	 is	 in	 part	 socially	
constituted	 led	 geographers	 to	 question	 the	 ontological	 polarity	 of	 Nature	 and	
Society,	 as	 capitalised	nouns	of	 the	Modern	Constitution	 (Latour	 1993).	Through	
this	 intellectual	 upheaval,	 scholars	 identified	 discourses	 concerning	 nature	 as	
fundamentally	‘artefactual’;	as	social	products	fashioned	by	economic,	cultural	and	
scientific	 representational	 practices	 (Braun	 and	 Castree	 1998).	 Nature,	 the	
narrative	went,	‘cannot	pre-exist	its	construction’	(Haraway	1992:	296).		
A	 broader	 typology	 of	 the	 social-natures	 approaches	 (Demeritt	 2002)	 locates	
discursive	 constructionism	 to	 be	 inherited	 from	 the	 linguistic	 turn	 in	 the	 social	
sciences	 more	 generally	 as	 well	 as	 Foucaultian	 concerns	 with	 power/knowledge	
relations.	 Linguistic	 and	 textual	 discourse	 as	 the	 agent	 of	 this	 construction	 is	
characterised	by	 ‘frameworks	 that	embrace	particular	combinations	of	narratives,	
concepts,	ideologies	and	signifying	practices,	each	relevant	to	a	particular	realm	of	
social	action’	(Barnes	and	Duncan	1992	cited	by	Peet	and	Watts	1996:	14).	Political	
ecology’s	interest	lies	with	the	political	effects	of	certain	hegemonic	environmental	
narratives	and	discourses	(ibid.).	Through	identifying	‘nature’	as	being	constituted	
																																																						
4	I	expand	on	Marxian	political	ecology	in	2.2.4	below.	
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by	semiotic	and	textual	representations	that	variously	perform	it,	‘nature’	was	thus	
de-naturalised	and	repositioned	as	a	linguistic	and	ideational	abstraction5.		
I	also	draw	on	the	 first	definition	of	 ‘abstraction’	provided	by	 the	Oxford	English	
Dictionary	at	the	opening	of	this	section	-	as	a	term	of	generalisation	that	operates	
‘without	 reference	 to	 the	 peculiar	 properties’	 (OED	 2017a).	 Abstraction	 as	
generalisation	entails	 glossing	over	 the	 ‘particular	 instances’	 of	whatever	 is	being	
described	 -	 towards	 a	 universal	 or	 totalising	 representation.	 As	 I	 will	 show	
throughout	 this	 thesis,	 totalising	 representations	 also	 have	 consequences.	 I	 will	
expand	on	this	idea	in	the	following	section	in	relation	to	‘biodiversity’	and	in	the	
role	of	abstraction	in	Marxian	understandings	of	exchange	value	in	Section	2.2.3	-	
through	the	making	of	‘universal	equivalents’	under	commodification.	
One	 of	 the	 principal	 political	 gains	 the	 theoretical	 concern	 with	 the	 social	
construction	of	nature	–	provided	through	its	problematisation	of	the	ontological	
separation	of	nature	 and	 society/culture	 –	was	 to	 illuminate	 the	power	 effects	of	
this	 socially	 maintained	 boundary	 line.	 Rejecting	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 separate	 and	
external	 nature,	 epitomised	 in	 statements	 such	 the	 ‘end	 of	 nature’	 (McKibben	
1989),	was	considered	scandalous	in	many	ways	in	the	late	20th	century,	and	still	is	
to	 a	degree	 today	 (Braun	 and	Castree	 1998).	But	 if	 nature	 is	 taken	 to	be	 a	 social	
construction,	 it	can	also	be	seen	as	an	 instrument	of	social	power	(Haraway	1991,	
																																																						
5	I	should	clarify	why	I	have	grouped	theories	over	the	social	construction	of	nature	
under	 the	 heading	 ‘abstraction’.	 While	 the	 semantic	 similarity	 between	
‘abstraction’	 and	 ‘construction’	 is	 not	 comprehensive,	 there	 are	 overlaps	 in	
meaning	between	the	two	practices,	which	are	important	to	my	theorisation.	I	take	
‘representation’	 to	 be	 the	 signal	 connection	 between	 ‘construction’	 and	 the	
definition	of	abstraction	provided	by	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary	that	opens	this	
section.	In	other	words,	I	see	both	construction	and	abstraction	(both	as	processes	
and	 states)	as	being	constituted	by	and	resulting	in	representational	practices.	As	
identified	 by	 various	 post-structuralist	 perspectives,	 and	 expanded	 below,	 these	
representations	 have	 ‘worldly	 effects’	 and	 political	 agency.	 My	 focus	 on	 the	
construction	of	nature	in	this	section	relates	specifically	to	the	second	definition	of	
abstraction	 in	 the	Oxford	 English	Dictionary	 above,	 ‘something	 that	 exists	 as	 an	
idea	in	theory’	-	idealism	(in	contrast	to	realism).	The	meaning	is	clarified	by	one	
of	 the	 entry’s	 contextual	 illustrations	 of	 its	 use	 (the	 subject	 matter	 is	 a	 lucky	
coincidence):	
1903			Philos.	Rev.	12	620	[Abstraction]	That	sensible	and	single	picture	of	
that	individual	tree	may,	by	the	mysterious	process	of	intuition	that	we	
call	abstraction,	be	converted	into	the	intellectual	universal	
representation	of	the	tree	in	itself.	(Oxford	English	Dictionary,	2017a)	
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Escobar	1996,	Peet	and	Watts	1996,	Braun	and	Castree	1998).	These	developments	
in	political	ecology	at	 the	 turn	of	 the	Millennium	offered	emancipatory	potential	
for	both	 theoretical	and	social	movements	 in	 ‘third	world’	 socio-natural	 relations	
that	 were	 undergoing	 rapid	 capitalist	 transformations	 and	 development	
interventions	 (Peet	 and	 Watts	 1996).	 Openings	 from	 these	 intellectual	
transformations	permitted	the	asking	of	critical	questions	such	as:	
	Who	currently	holds	power	over	influential	narratives?	How	is	this	power	
employed	and	with	what	political	consequences?	What	is	the	‘science’	
within	defined	narratives?	And	what	are	the	ideas	of	morality	infusing	
narratives	and	their	supporting	‘science’?	(Stott	and	Sullivan	2000:	2)		
Thus,	 the	 consequences	 of	 certain	 environmental	 narratives	 bear	 relevance	 for	
questions	 of	 socio-environmental	 justice,	 which	 leads	 to	 other	 questions	 about	
how	environmental	change	is	understood	and	to	whom	responsibility	is	attributed.	
Such	narratives	are	also	significant	for	ontological	assumptions	about	nature	itself.	
In	relation	to	the	expansion	and	deepening	of	a	capitalist	framing	of	nature	under	
the	 paradigm	 of	 the	 ‘green	 economy’	 (section	 2.2.4),	 such	 questions	 are	 just	 as	
relevant	 today.	 Sullivan	 (2017)	 recently	 reminds	 us	 that	 knowledge	 and	
representational	 exercises	 contained	 in	 environmental	 and	 scientific	 narratives	
(and	in	particular	those	associated	with	the	‘green	economy’)	‘affirm	what	becomes	
known	ontologically’.	Sullivan	(2017:	223)	writes:		
Ontological	assumptions	and	praxis,	then,	denote	what	entities	can	exist,	
into	what	categories	they	can	be	sorted,	and	by	what	practices	and	
methods	they	can	be	known	(i.e.	epistemology),	for	participants	in	a	
social	grouping	sharing	and	negotiating	these	assumptions.	
Assumptions	about	what	nature	‘is’	matter,	since	‘categories	of	being	in	the	world’	
influence	human	action	 and	 therefore	have	 ‘ethical,	 including	 eco-ethical	 effects’	
(Sullivan	 2017:	 225).	 The	 upshot	 of	 what	 later	 became	 dubbed	 the	 ‘science	wars’	
(Sullivan	2017)	was	that	social	 influences	and	interests	as	well	as	the	 institutional	
contexts	of	knowledge	production	 shaped	which	 ‘realities’	were	 revealed	 through	
scientific	practices.	Through	these	intellectual	upheavals,	truth,	much	like	nature,	
became	a	contingent	and	precarious	phenomenon	(see	Bloor	1976,	Barnes	1977	for	
an	early	iteration	of	these	issues).	
Critical	realism	emerged	in	response	to	what	many	considered	to	be	the	over-reach	
of	 idealism	and	constructionist	philosophies	 (Forsythe	2003,	Sullivan	2017).	 If	 the	
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post-structuralist	 branch	 of	 scholarship	 is	 taken	 too	 far,	 the	 argument	 goes,	 the	
implications	would	be	unfettered	epistemological	 relativism	and	 the	 annihilation	
of	 scientific	 objectivity6.	 Critical	 realist	 perspectives	 do	 not	 deny	 the	 ontological	
existence	of	the	world	but	draw	attention	to	the	social	practice	and	contexts	that	
represent	 it.	 Critical	 realism	 –	 or	 what	 David	 Demeritt	 (1998)	 has	 called	
‘artefactural	 constructivism’	 –	 proposes	 that	 knowledge	 about	 nature	 and	 the	
frames	 and	narratives	 that	 these	knowledges	 give	 rise	 to	 are	 constituted	both	by	
nature’s	materiality	and	agency	as	well	as	through	socio-cultural	and	institutional	
contexts.	 Critical	 realism,	 and,	 in	 turn,	 critical	 political	 ecology,	 integrates	 a	
political	 awareness	 of	 environmental	 conflicts	 with	 a	 realist	 understanding	 of	
environmental	 change;	 in	 other	 words	 it	 promotes	 ‘epistemic	 skepticism	 with	
ontological	realism’	(Forsyth	2003:	9).		
The	victories	associated	with	peeling	back	the	layers	of	representation	that	come	to	
shape	 the	 category	 of	 nature	 and	 those	 that	 advanced	 through	 constructivist-
realist	 debates	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	Millennium	 in	 the	Academy	have	not	 yet	 been	
translated	 into	 policy	 programmes.	 	 In	 the	 latter	 context,	 nature	 is	 still	 largely	
conceived	of	as	‘out	there’	-	as	‘an	assemblage	of	things	independent	from	society,	
whose	 properties...	 and	 social	 utility	 are	 revealed	 by	 science’	 (Bakker	 and	Bridge	
2006:	8).	This	is	as	true	for	conservation	science	and	practice	and	its	concerns	for	
‘biodiversity’,	 as	 any	 other	 facet	 of	 environmental	 governance.	 The	 question	 of	
‘biodiversity’	thus	forms	the	focus	of	the	next	section.			
2.1.2	Abstraction	2:	The	question	of	‘biodiversity’	
In	 so	 far	as	 ‘Nature’	 is	 a	meta-abstraction,	biodiversity	 is	one	 too.	Post-structural	
theoretical	resources	that	came	to	bear	on	the	question	of	nature	are	also	relevant	
to	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘biodiversity’,	 as	 a	 universal	 representation	 of	 all	 life	 on	 earth	
(Hannegan	 1995,	 Escobar	 1996,	 Takacs	 1996,	 Farnham	 2007,	 Youatt	 2008,	 Maier	
																																																						
6 The	political	implications	for	such	epistemological	relativism	are	arguably	just	as	
problematic	 as	 universalism.	 Science,	 it	 would	 seem,	 can	 easily	 become	 caught	
between	a	double	pincer	movement	comprised	of	strong	post-modern	relativism	as	
well	 as	 science	 denialism.	 The	 latter	 is	manifest	 for	 example	 in	 renewed	 science	
skepticism	 of	 the	 present	 US	 administration,	 evidenced	 by	 the	 recent	
announcement	 to	 close	 the	 US	 State	 Department	 the	 Environmental	 Protection	
Agency.	 Indeed	 the	 term	 ‘post-truth’	 has	 become	 so	 popular	 as	 to	 be	 officially	
incorporated	 into	 the	 Oxford	 English	 Dictionary	 in	 2016.	 These	 ideas	 and	 their	
relationships	 to	 ontology,	 epistemology	 and	 ethics	 in	 the	 green	 economy	 are	
discussed	at	length	in	Sullivan	(2017).  
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2012).	 These	 resources	 helped	 to	 de-centre	 and	 de-naturalise	 the	 idea	 of	
biodiversity	from	something	that	appears	in	a	pre-formed	state	to	the	outcome	of	
various	social,	institutional	and	material	practices.		
The	expression	‘biological	diversity’	was	abridged	to	‘biodiversity’	in	the	late	1980s	
(Farnham	 2007).	 Since	 then,	 the	 subject	 has	 given	 rise	 to	 a	 global	 policy	
infrastructure	and	emerged	as	one	of	the	defining	environmental	crises	associated	
with	 late	 industrial	 modernity.	 Alongside	 the	 rise	 of	 ‘biodiversity’	 as	 a	 defining	
concept	 for	 conservation,	 a	 small	 collection	 of	 North	 American	 scientists	 were	
vigorously	 engaged	 in	 enacting	 a	 new	 normatively	 focused	 field	 of	 conservation	
biology.	Takacs	(1996:	2)	describes	the	emergence	of	this	contemporary	discipline	
as	 an	 effort	 by	 ‘an	 elite	 group	 of	 biologists’	 who	 ‘[aimed]	 to	 change	 science,	
conservation,	 cultural	 habits,	 human	 values,	 our	 ideas	 about	 nature,	 and	
ultimately,	 nature	 itself’.	 From	 the	 1980s	 onwards,	 the	 growth	 in	 data	 of	 genetic	
and	 species	 loss,	 and	 concerns	 over	 the	 economic	 implications	 (Farnham	 2007),	
shaped	 the	development	 of	 biodiversity	 science	 as	 the	 ‘mission	driven	discipline’	
(Meine	 et	 al.	 2006).	 As	 such,	 Maier	 (2012)	 argues	 that	 as	 a	 scientific	 subject,	
‘biodiversity’	 has	 always	 been	 infused	 with	 moral	 arguments,	 whether	 or	 not	
scientists	 writing	 in	 ostensibly	 neutral	 scientific	 contexts	 are	 aware	 of	 it.	 The	
normative	thrust	of	this	scientific	discourse	is	invoked	through	a	sense	of	urgency	
surrounding	 what	Martin	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 identify	 as	 the	 ‘preservation	 of	 remaining	
biodiversity’.	 The	 ethical	 assumptions	 of	 biodiversity	 science	 therefore	 tend	 to	
dwell	 in	the	ontological	dualism	separating	nature	and	society.	Normative	frames	
such	 as	 ‘preservation’	 are	 predisposed	 towards	 valuing	 ideals	 of	 naturalness	 over	
un-naturalness	or	pristine,	pure	states	of	nature	prior	to	human	influence	(Cronon	
1996,	Adams	2004,	Fredriksen	2016).		
Efforts	to	institutionalise	a	newly	minted	expression	of	 ‘biodiversity’	were	focused	
upon	establishing	an	umbrella	discipline	to	encompass	a	single	unified	topic.	Early	
advocates	 for	 this	 scientific	 and	 policy	 subject	 coalesced	 around	 the	 conceptual	
aggregation	 of	 biotic	 entities	 and	 assemblages	 across	 biological	 hierarchies,	
temporal	 and	 spatial	 scales	 into	 one	 catch	 all	 label.	 As	 the	 abstract	 concept	 of	
biodiversity	was	institutionalised	in	the	early	1990s,	there	was	a	veritable	explosion	
in	 the	 number	 of	 publications	 applying	 the	 term	 (Haila	 and	 Kouki	 1994).	
Biodiversity	 loss	 came	 to	 be	 recognised	 as	 but	 one	 of	 several	 parallel	
environmental	 crises	 broadly	 considered	 under	 the	 maxim	 of	 ‘sustainable	
development’	and	christened	with	an	official	definition	at	the	multilateral	United	
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Nations	(UN)	Convention	of	Biological	Diversity	(CBD)	at	the	Rio	Earth	Summit	in	
1992.	 The	 CBD	 defines	 biological	 diversity	 as	 ‘the	 variability	 among	 living	
organisms	 from	 all	 sources	 including,	 inter	 alia,	 terrestrial,	 marine	 and	 other	
aquatic	 ecosystems	 and	 the	 ecological	 complexes	 of	 which	 they	 are	 part;	 this	
includes	diversity	within	species,	between	species	and	of	ecosystems’	(CBD	1992).	
I	 propose	 three	 abstractions	 constituting	 contemporary	 ‘biodiversity’	 that	 are	
relevant	 to	 this	 discussion	 of	 offsetting.	 The	 first	 is	 related	 to	 its	 ‘state	 based	
ontology’	 (Maier	 2012).	 As	 an	 umbrella	 category,	 ‘biodiversity’	 steadily	 mutated	
through	policy	and	popular	vernaculars	to	be	conceived	as	a	quantitative	measure	
of	a	‘thing’.	As	such,	Maier	(2012:	11)	asks:		
does	biodiversity	admit	of	more	and	less	–	that	is,	increments	and	
decrements	–	in	a	way	that	permits	orderings	–	that	is,	more	or	less	
biodiverse	states	of	a	place	or	of	the	world?	
	Totalising	abstractions	 ‘flatten	diversity’,	 and	 ironically	 also	 the	 scope	of	 entities	
actually	constituting	 (bio)diversity	 (Sullivan	2017).	 In	 this	 respect,	Maier	 (2012:	9)	
proposes	that	mainstream	uses	of	biodiversity	contain:	
	Category	mistakes	that	reduce	biodiversity	to	and	confuse	it	with	
biological	identity	of	some	one	or	another	of	the	entities	that	contribute	
to	its	diversity	-	such	as	individual	organisms	or	particular	species.	
It	 is	 this	unhelpful	abstraction	that	Maier	argues	sustains	flawed	statements	such	
as	 biodiversity	 (as	 opposed	 to	 particular	 population	 of	 flying	 insects)	 provides	 a	
pollination	 service.	This	 is	 also	 true	 for	 the	ways	 in	which	biodiversity	 advocates	
tend	 to	 draw	 deductive	 conclusions	 about	 causal	 relationships	 between	 one	
component	of	biotic	relationships	with	another	deemed	to	be	good	for	humans.	To	
say	cows	reduce	malaria	is	not	the	same	as	biodiversity	is	good	for	human	health	
(Maier	2012).	Maier’s	contributions	at	times	appear	as	pedantic	if	not	hair	splitting	
attachments	 to	 the	 logical	 fallacies	 in	 the	 concept,	 and	 popular	 deployment	 in	
scientific	 literatures,	 of	 ‘biodiversity’.	 Nevertheless,	 they	 help	 to	 illuminate	 the	
‘peculiar	properties’,	(to	follow	the	Oxford	Dictionary	definition),	of	biotic	entities	
and	 their	 relationships	 that	 are	 framed	 out	 of	 meta-abstractions	 of	 biodiversity.	
The	danger,	Maier	(2012)	argues	is	that	‘valuing	other	things	about	biotic,	sentient	
entities,	 creatures	 or	 assemblages	 that	 have	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 diversity	 vanish	
when	 they	 are	 attributed	 the	 term	 ‘biodiversity’.	He	 says	 their	 ‘salient	 points	 are	
obscured	 or	 lost	 entirely’	 (ibid.:	 342).	 Where	 does	 this	 leave	 us	 therefore	 for	
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identifying	 the	 ‘value’	 of	 biodiversity.	 What	 exactly	 does	 valuing	 ‘biodiversity’	
mean?	How	does	this	abstraction	come	to	bear	on	how	value	is	conceived?	
The	 second	 abstraction	 I	 locate	 relates	 to	 two	 of	 biodiversity’s	 sub	 categories;	
species	 and	 habitats,	 principally	 drawing	 from	 Fredriksen	 (2017).	 Species	 are	 the	
common	units	used	to	measure	biodiversity	(Mace	2014)	and	are	therefore	often	in	
practice	taken	to	comprise	the	sub-collections	of	diversity	in	biodiversity.	Various	
authors	 also	 locate	 the	 category	 of	 species	 to	 be	 a	 powerful	 abstraction	 with	
worldly	 effects	 (e.g.	Braverman	2015;	 Lorimer	 2015,	Tsing	 2015).	 Fredriksen	 (2017)	
for	 example	 discusses	 the	 historical	 formation	 and	 stabilisation	 of	 reified	 and	
separable	‘units’	within	biodiversity	conservation.	Fredriksen	(2017:	2)	writes	of	the	
‘rationalising	 and	 universalising’	 aspirations	 of	 biodiversity	 conservation,	 which	
‘enact	 values...through	abstract	 categories	of	 species	 and	habitats’.	This	 relatively	
recent	 way	 of	 ordering	 the	 non-human	 realm,	 Fredriksen	 argues,	 arose	 as	
conservation	 developed	 its	 positivist	 ontology	 through	 scientific	 practices	 of	
measurement.	This	historical	 transition	 in	the	 latter	part	of	 the	20th	century	was	
characterised	 by	 abandoning	 concern	 for	 the	 ‘emplaced	 lifeworlds’	 of	 animals	 in	
specific	 places	 in	 favour	 of	 biological	 generalisations	 of	 habitats	 and	 biologically	
defined	species	(ibid.).		
Although	the	categories	of	habitats	and	species	pre-dated	the	rise	of	‘biodiversity’,	
Fredriksen	proposes	 that	 the	 institutional	 and	 scientific	 apparatus	of	biodiversity	
science	exerted	a	powerful	‘organising	force	in	science	and	policy’.	The	significance	
of	 these	 generalisations	 and	 orderings,	 Fredriksen	 (2017:	 2)	 writes,	 is	 that	 they	
effected	 ‘a	 commensurability	 between	 places	 and	 things’,	 rendering	 categories	 of	
animals	and	plants	as	interchangeable	and	exchangeable	due	to	the	eradication	of	
the	 uniqueness	 and	 specificity	 of	 individuals	 and	 their	 contexts.	 Moreover,	 as,	
Adams	 and	 Apostolopoulou	 (2017)	 argue,	 for	 BDO	 to	 appear	 coherent	 at	 all,	
biodiversity	 had	 to	 first	 be	 re-framed	 discursively	 as	 measurable,	 isolated	 units,	
spatially	disconnected	 to	 space	and	compatible	with	price	 signals.	My	 interest	 in	
this	 idea,	along	with	Fredriksen’s	and	Apostolopoulou	and	Adams’,	 is	 in	the	ways	
in	 which	 prior	 non-pecuniary	 value	 orderings	 of	 biodiversity,	 as	 abstractions,	
formed	 preludes	 to	 subsequent	 market	 (pecuniary)	 ones.	 Market	 values	 require	
and	affirm	an	ontology	of	biodiversity,	in	which	living	things,	places,	and	complex	
ecological	 relations	 are	 separable	 into	 commensurable	 units	 of	 exchange	
(Fredriksen	 2017).	 I	 expand	 on	 this	 relationship	 between	 abstraction	 to	 units,	
commensuration,	exchange	and	commodification	in	section	2.2.4,	which	discusses	
40  
the	 nature-value	 nexus.	 I	 also	 return	 to	 it	 in	 chapter	 4	 through	 exploring	 the	
origins	of	BDO’s	unique	abstraction	as	a	market-scientific	hybrid	-	the	‘biodiversity	
unit’.		
The	universalising	abstraction	of	biodiversity	is	also	significant	for	the	‘diversity	of	
practices’	in	relation	to	knowing	and	valuing	nature	that	it	‘occludes	and	displaces’	
(Martin	 et	 al.	 2013:	 129).	As	 a	 constructed	phenomenon,	biodiversity	 ‘perpetuates	
dualistic	 thinking’	 and	 obscures	 alternative	 onto-epistemologies	 for	 the	 non-
human	 realm	 (ibid.).	 In	 relation	 to	 these	 effects,	 anthropology	 literatures	 have	
examined	the	ways	in	which	‘biodiversity’	forecloses	alternative	worlds	predicated	
on	 ‘living	 with’	 more	 than	 human	 individuals	 or	 landscapes,	 in	 particular	 those	
which	 constitute	 animist	ontologies	 (Turnhout	 et	 al.	 2013,	 Sullivan	2010,	Vivieros	
de	 Castro	 1998).	 The	 ‘pacification	 of	 lively	 entities’	 (Fredriksen	 2017;	 see	 also	
Çalışkan	and	Callon	2010)	through	technologies	that	render	them	visible,	knowable	
and	governable	reflect	classic	Foucaultian	conceptualisation	of	biopower	(Foucault	
1979).	In	relation	to	the	biopolitics	of	biodiversity	conservation,	Escobar	(1996:	56)	
writes	of	the	‘institutional	apparatus	that	systemically	organises	the	production	of	
forms	 of	 knowledge	 and	 types	 of	 power’.	 This	 apparatus	 is	 comprised	 of	
‘international	 institutions,	 Northern	 NGOs,	 botanical	 gardens,	 universities	 and	
research	 institutes	 in	 the	 first	 and	 third	 worlds,	 pharmaceutical	 companies,	 and	
the	great	variety	of	experts	located	in	each	of	these	sites’	(ibid.:	56).	Youatt	(2008)	
also	directly	 attributes	 biodiversity	 conservation	 to	be	 an	 exemplary	 of	 biopower	
and	contends	that	biological	conservation	 is	a	project	as	much	concerning	power	
and	political	life	as	scientific	endeavour.		
The	 third	 abstraction	 is	 thus	 related	 to	 conceptualisations	 of	 biopower,	 and	
highlights	biodiversity	policy	 and	governance	apparatus’	drive	 to	 try	 and	capture	
the	 entirety	 of	 life	 on	 earth	 through	 measurement	 in	 databases	 (Bowker	 2000,	
2008).	 These	 governing	 surveillance	 efforts	 are	 characterised	 as	 panoptic	 in	
ambition	 (Lorimer	 2006,	 Youatt	 2008).	 The	 drive	 towards	 measurement	 is	
significant	 precisely	 for	 data’s	 amenability	 to	 be	 translated	 seamlessly	 into	 the	
metrology	of	the	‘green	economy’.	Relatedly,	it	has	become	somewhat	of	a	truism	
amongst	promulgators	of	natural	capital	accounting	that	‘you	cannot	manage	what	
you	 do	not	measure’	 (often	misattributed	 to	 author	 of	 TEEB	Pavan	 Sukhdev	 but	
originally	 coined	by	management	 theorist	W.E.	Demming	 in	 1994).	 This	 popular	
expression	was	adapted	from	new	public	management	(NPM)	sciences	in	business	
and	government	(Turnhout	et	al.	2014).		
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‘Doing’	 conservation	under	 these	 institutional	 conditions	depended	on	 ‘knowing’	
biodiversity	 in	 ways	 that	 were	 amenable	 to	 quantitative	 measurement	 and	
management.	Quantification	of	biodiversity	therefore	forms	the	third	abstraction	I	
highlight	as	a	representation.	Since	the	CBD	in	1992,	the	majority	of	conservation	
practice	 has	 entailed	 the	 construction	 of	 censuses	 based	 on	 measuring	 and	
mapping	 biodiversity	 as	 records	 to	 be	 stored	 in	 databases	 and	 classification	
systems	 (Raven	 and	Wilson	 1992,	Turnhout	 and	Boonman-Berson,	 2011).	 Lorimer	
(2006)	 notes	 that	 over	 this	 period,	 biodiversity	 was	 constructed	 as	 a	 passive,	
disembodied	 object	 revealed	 through	 quantitative	 and	 classificatory	 drive	 of	
natural	 sciences.	 Maps	 and	 databases	 presenting	 quantified	 units	 of	 nature	 can	
thus	appear	to	reflect	a	flat	ontology	through	depicting	continuous	and	horizontal	
space	(Ellis	and	Waterton	2005),	entirely	abstracted	from	context.		
	In	 relation	 to	 such	 flat	 ontologies,	 through	 the	 numerical	 and	 economistic	
framings	of	biodiversity	as	‘natural	capital’,	Sullivan	(2010:	122)	writes:		
Nature	meanwhile,	is	further	abstracted,	distanced,	flattened	and	
somehow	dematerialised;	to	be	valued	and	exchanged	remotely,	via	the	
transformation	of	its	sensual	and	embodied	aspects	into	the	transcendent	
zeros	and	ones	of	more	easily	manipulable	digital	information.			
Biodiversity	conservation	has	thus	become	primarily	concerned	with	‘technologies	
and	measures	such	as	monitoring,	reporting	and	verification	procedures,	auditing	
and	 performance	 management’	 (Turnhout	 et	 al.	 2014:	 582).	 	 Economisation	 of	
biodiversity	 therefore	 could	be	 seen	 as	 simply	 an	 extension	 to	 the	quantification	
practices	that	came	before	it	(ibid.).	
The	 significance	 for	 the	 discussion	 above	 is	 that	 each	 of	 these	 abstractions	 of	
biodiversity	are,	 in	their	own	ways,	preliminary	frames	for	the	creation	of	market	
values	through	processes	of	commodification.	Commodification	of	nature	depends	
on	 its	 abstraction	 from	 space,	 time	 and	 context	 (Castree	 2008).	 	 Before	 I	 discuss	
commodification	I	will	turn	towards	the	role	of	abstraction	in	Marxian	perspectives	
on	the	creation	of	exchange	value	for	prior	context	before	moving	on	to	the	final	
part	of	this	review;	the	nature-conservation-value	nexus	and	the	political	ecologies	
of	the	‘green	economy’.		
2.1.3	Abstraction	3:	The	question	of	value	
Since	this	thesis	is	concerned	with	the	rise	of	value	in	nature	within	the	logic	of	the	
‘green	economy’,	the	value	I	am	principally	engaged	with	investigating	is	exchange	
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value	under	 the	neoliberal	 capitalist	 system.	For	Marx,	 the	 specific	 value	 form	of	
the	commodity	under	capitalism	is	synonymous	with	exchange	value	represented	
as	 price	 (Marx	 1990	 [1887]).	 In	 the	 first	 Volume	 of	 Capital,	 Marx’s	 theory	 of	
exchange	value	identifies	how	the	material	and	specific	labour	contained	within	a	
commodity	 is	 effaced	 through	 its	 translation	 into	 an	 abstract	 quantity	 that	
subsequently	 emerges	 in	 an	 equivalent	 form.	 The	 outcome	 permits	 the	 relative	
(comparative)	 value	 of	 market	 commodities	 to	 become	 established.	 Any	
differences	or	unique	attributes	of	both	the	labour	or	the	use	value	of	the	product	
thereby	disappear	from	view	and	no	longer	matter	under	the	new	calculus	of	value	
within	a	market	exchange.	Marx	writes,	
‘Along	with	the	useful	qualities	of	the	products	themselves,	we	put	out	of	
sight	both	the	useful	character	of	the	various	kinds	of	labour	embodied	in	
them,	and	the	concrete	forms	of	that	labour;	there	is	nothing	left	but	what	
is	common	to	them	all;	all	are	reduced	to	one	and	the	same	sort	of	labour,	
human	labour	in	the	abstract.’	(Marx	1990	[1887]:	128)	
Here,	 labour	 ‘congeals’	 in	 commodities	 as	 abstract	 undifferentiated	 quantities.		
Marx	proposed	that	money	is	the	‘representation	of	socially	necessary	labour	time	
and	 price	 is	 the	 “money	 name	 of	 value”’	 (Marx	 cited	 by	 Harvey	 1996:	 152).	 This	
abstract	quantity	of	 ‘socially	necessary	 labour	time’	ultimately	 functions	to	create	
the	sense	of	a	‘universal	equivalent’	through	which	comparability	and	relativity	can	
be	calculated.	As	an	intentional	structure	of	capitalism,	a	Marxist	understanding	of	
abstraction	 identifies	 how	 the	 process	 serves	 to	 render	 irrelevant	 the	 ‘material	
properties	 of	 the	 product,	 the	 character	 of	 the	 labour,	 which	 shapes	 it,	 and	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 want	 it	 satisfies.’	 (Benton	 1989:	 70).	 Instead,	 the	 production	 of	
capitalist	 value	 rests	upon	 the	 exploitation	of	 ‘abstract’	 labour	 seeking	 an	overall	
quantitative	 increase	 in	 exchange	 value.	 To	Marx	 (1990	 [1887]:	 275),	 capital	 thus	
exists	as	a	process	where	‘it	comes	out	of	circulation,	enters	in	to	it	again,	preserves	
and	multiplies	itself	within	circulation,	emerges	from	it	in	increased	size	and	starts	
the	 same	 cycle	 again	 and	 again’.	 The	 central	 objective	 therefore,	 becomes	 an	
increase	 in	 the	 quantitative	 value	 of	 money	 -	 the	 specificities	 of	 use	 value	 are	
irrelevant.			
By	 ascending	 to	 the	 ultimate	 universal	 equivalent,	money	 as	 capital	 flattens	 the	
world	 through	 its	 ability	 to	 abstract	 and	 homogenise	 qualitatively	 different	
phenomena	and	processes	able	 to	be	exchanged	on	a	market	 (Fourcade	2011).	By	
acting	 as	 a	 universal	 equivalent	 able	 to	 effect	 commensuration	 across	 otherwise	
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different	 valued	 entities,	 monetary	 valuation	 is	 an	 abstraction	 tout	 court.	 In	
relation	 to	my	 conceptual	 interest	 in	 abstraction,	Harvey	 (1996:	 150)	writes	 that,	
‘money	 is	 the	 only	 well-understood	 and	universal	yardstick	 of	 value	 that	 we	
currently	 posses’.	 This	 begs	 the	 questions,	 what	 happens	 when	 biodiversity	 is	
represented	 as	 value	 through	 this	 universal	 yardstick?	What	 must	 happen	 both	
conceptually	 and	materially	 for	 this	 translation	 to	make	 sense?	What	moreover,	
are	the	implications?		
Harvey’s	(1996)	use	of	Marxist	value	theory	identifies	the	precise	processes	shaping	
the	journey	that	any	general	entity	must	undergo	so	as	to	be	ascribed	value	within	
capitalist	relations	-	that	is	the	act	of	making	a	commodity	with	exchange	value.	As	
so	far	discussed,	the	historical	and	social	constituents	of	commodities	are	obscured	
through	 establishing	 a	 universal	 equivalent	 of	 exchange	 value.	 As	 such,	 Marx	
proposed	 that	people	 tend	 to	perceive	 the	value	of	 a	 commodity	 to	 reside	 in	 the	
money	form	(exchange	value)	itself,	rather	than	its	use	value	or	the	labour	used	to	
make	it.	This	perception	endues	because	the	relationship	between	production	and	
consumption	 has	 been	 severed.	 As	 Marx	 explains	 this	 ‘mysterious’	 and	
‘transcendent’	quality	of	the	commodity	is	a	form	of	‘fetishism’.	He	writes:	
There,	the	existence	of	the	things	quâ	commodities,	and	the	value	relation	
between	the	products	of	labour	which	stamps	them	as	commodities,	have	
absolutely	no	connection	with	their	physical	properties	and	with	the	
material	relations	arising	therefrom.	(Marx	1990	[1887]:	165)	
Appearing	 thus	 from	 the	 alienation	 that	provides	 a	 conceptual	 and	physical	 ‘cut’	
between	an	object	with	exchange	value	and	its	background	production	conditions	
people	take	what	 is	 in	 fact	a	 ‘social	relation	between	men	[sic]’	 to	 instead	be	 ‘the	
fantastic	form	of	a	relation	between	things.’	(Marx	1990	[1887]:	165)	
Marxian	political	 economy	 locates	 the	 role	 of	 abstraction	 as	 critical	 for	 ‘thinking	
and	envisioning	capitalism’	(Castree	1999:	 156).	For	example,	Marxist	geographers	
have	 long	 expounded	 the	 foundational	 role	 of	 spatiotemporal	 abstraction	 in	
facilitating	 its	 processual	 and	 self-reproducing	 structures	 and	 systems	 (Harvey	
1985,	 Lefevbre	 1991	 both	 cited	 by	 McCormack	 2012).	 In	 so	 far	 as	 it	 extends	
universalising	tendencies	and	serves	to	elide	and	obscure	corporeal	difference	and	
lived	 experience	 (McCormack	 2012),	 abstraction	 within	 the	 capitalist	 mode	 of	
production	 functions	 to	 create	 a	 certain	mode	of	 calculability	 through	 fabricated	
generality.	Indeed,	the	political	effects	of	these	abstractions	carry	a	violence	(Sayre	
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1989)	 that	 forcibly	 alienates	 human	 labour	 and	 non-human	 bodies	 from	 their	
context.	 The	 result	 is	 to	 situate	 them	 within	 a	 frame	 of	 commensurability	 and	
comparability	 from	 which	 calculations	 of	 exchange	 value	 may	 subsequently	 be	
established.	My	enquiry	therefore	attends	to	the	potential	violence	associated	with	
monetary	abstractions	of	emplaced	wildlife	habitats	and	non-human	natures.		
2.1.4	The	nature-value	nexus	and	the	political	ecologies	of	the	‘green	economy’		
In	 drawing	 from	 a	 long	 pedigree	 of	 Marxian	 political	 economy	 approaches	 to	
understanding	 the	 value-nature	 nexus	 (Schmidt	 1971,	 Smith	 1984,	 Benton	 1989,	
Fitzsimmons	 1989),	 political	 ecology	 is	 concerned	 by	 the	 transformation	 to,	 and	
co-production	 of,	 socio-natures	 through	 the	 dialectical	 forces	 of	 capitalism.	
Despite	 their	 differences,	 this	materialist	 strand	 of	 political	 ecology	 is	 related	 to	
the	 post-structural	 constructvism	 described	 above	 in	 its	 shared	 interest	 in	
overturning	 the	 separation	 of	 nature	 from	 society,	 exemplified	 in	 particular	 as	
previously	discussed	by	Neil	Smith’s	1984	book	Uneven	Development.	According	to	
Castree	 (2000),	 this	 was	 the	 first	 time	 that	 a	 ‘Marxian	 theory	 of	 nature	 was	 not	
founded	on	Nature-Society	dualism’.	Castree	(2000:	24)	develops	ideas	advanced	in	
Smith’s	 work	 on	 the	 ‘production	 of	 nature’	 -	 which	 he	 explains	 is	 ‘a	 continuous	
process	 in	which	nature	and	capital	 co-constitute	one	another	 in	 temporally	 and	
geographically	 varied	 and	 contingent	 ways’.	 Associated	 with	 the	 discursive	
constructivist	 positions	 so	 far	 discussed,	 the	 social	 natures	 in	 the	 ‘production	 of	
nature’	 are	 materially	 and	 discursively	 constituted	 and	 reproduced	 through	 the	
social	relations	of	capitalist	production.	Thus,	‘the	major	analytical	issue	from	this	
political	 economy	 perspective	 becomes	 the	 question	 of	 how	 nature	 is	
(re)produced,	and	who	controls	this	process	of	(re)production	in	particular	times	
and	 places’	 (Whatmore	 and	 Boucher	 1993:	 167).	 Along	 with	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	
construction	 of	 environmental	 narratives	 (Stott	 and	 Sullivan	 2000)	 political	
ecology	 highlights	 the	 social	 justice	 and	 distributive	 implications	 for	 the	
transformation	of	socio-ecologies	inextricably	bound	to	and	made	by	the	capitalist	
system.	Along	with	the	‘production	of	nature’,	much	of	this	literature	has	dwelled	
at	the	downstream	impacts	of	capitalist	transformations	and	the	commodification	
of	nature	and	associated	socio-political	relations	(Robertson	and	Wainwright	2013).		
Latterly,	 a	 range	 of	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 contributions	 have	 tracked	 the	
political	 ecology	 of	 neoliberal	 conservation	 (Büscher	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Neoliberal	
conservation	 ‘shifts	 the	 focus	 from	 how	 nature	 is	 used	 in	 and	 through	 the	
expansion	of	capitalism,	to	how	nature	is	conserved	in	and	through	the	expansion	
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of	 capitalism.’	 (Büscher	 et	 al.	 2012:	 4	 emphasis	 added).	 In	 their	 ‘synthesised	
critique’	of	 the	 field,	Büscher	et	al.	 (2012:	9),	write	 that	neoliberal	conservation	 is	
characterised	by:	
infusing	conservation	policy	and	practice	with	the	analytical	tools	of	
neoliberal	economics,	without	recognising	that	these	are	themselves	
infused	with,	and	reinforce,	particular	ideological	positions	regarding	
human	relationships	with	each	other	as	well	as	with	non-human	nature.	
In	relation	to	the	idea	of	BDO,	‘the	analytical	tools	of	neoliberal	economics’,	under	
the	guise	of	 the	 ‘green	economy’,	 frame	environmental	degradation	as	connected	
to	 a	 valuation	 deficit.	 The	 premise	 is	 that	 green	 accounting	 practices	 which	
internalise	 these	 unaccounted	 for	 ‘costs’	 can	 rectify	 the	 alleged	 deficit	 through	
attributing	 market	 prices	 to	 hitherto	 un-priced	 aspects	 of	 nature	 (that	 is,	 those	
aspects	 of	 nature	 that	 were	 previously	 categorised	 as	 ‘externalities’	 within	
mainstream	 economic	 analyses)	 (Costanza	 et	 al.	 1997,	 Daily	 1997,	 Bayon	 and	
Jenkins	 2010,	 Helm	 and	 Hepburn	 2014).	 The	 political	 ecology	 of	 conservation	 is	
therefore	 interested	 by	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 environmental	 economic	 framings	 of	
nature	 abound	 within	 the	 consolidating	 paradigm	 of	 the	 ‘green	 economy’	
(MacDonald	 2013,	McAfee	 1999,	 Pawliczek	 and	 Sullivan	 2011,	 Sullivan	 2010,	 2013,	
2017).	Noel	Castree	 (2008)	 refers	 to	 this	market	 turn	 as	 the	 ‘re-regulation’	 of	 the	
environment	 according	 to	 neoliberal	 emphases	 on	 prices,	 markets,	 and	 private	
property.	In	this	sense,	environmental	markets	provide	an	ecological	‘fix’	(ibid.)	to	
neoliberal	capitalism's	parallel	crises	of	failing	rates	of	profit	and	productivity.	For	
example,	imputing	prices	onto	hitherto	unvalued	or	un-priced	things	is	purported	
to	 achieve	 duel	 outcomes.	 This	 alleged	win-win	 relates	 to	 securing	 the	 on-going	
conditions	 for	 capitalist	 expansion	 through	 enlarging	 the	 spaces	 for	 market	
exchange	 and	 therefore	 capital	 accumulation	 (Harvey	 1996,	 Katz	 1998)	 while	
simultaneously	 responding	 to	 the	 biodiversity	 crisis	 by	 ‘selling	 nature	 to	 save	 it’	
(McAfee	1999).			
Escobar	(1996)	characterises	capitalism’s	interest	in	conservation	as	the	difference	
between	modern	ecological	capital	and	post-modern	ecological	capital.	The	latter,	
he	 explains	 ‘develops	 a	 conservationist	 tendency,	 significantly	 different	 from	 its	
usual	 reckless,	 destructive	 form’	 (ibid.:	 47).	 The	 transformation	 in	 capitalism’s	
locus	of	value	in	nature	is	in	part	driven	from	what	James	O'Connor	(1991)	termed	
the	 ‘second	 contradiction	 of	 capitalism’.	 This	 describes	 the	 failure	 of	 commodity	
production	to	account	for	its	external	conditions	therefore	driving	degradation	and	
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ecological	 crises.	The	contradiction	 is	understood	 to	be	capital’s	 inability	 to	 fully	
reproduce	 nature,	 which,	 having	 been	 depleted	 by	 industrial	 processes,	 is	
increasingly	unable	 to	 support	 capital	 accumulation	 (ibid.).	 In	 this	 respect,	 Jason	
Moore	(2014),	asks	whether	capitalism	is	witnessing	the	 ‘end	of	cheap	nature’,	on	
which	 capitalist	 production	 depends	 as	 input.	 The	 counter-point	 is	 the	 end	 of	 a	
‘cheap	 dustbin’	 as	 repository	 for	 industrial	 outputs,	 such	 as	 green-house	 gas	
emissions	(Emel	and	Bridge	1995).	
The	corrective,	according	to	environmental	economics,	 therefore	seems	to	be	the	
further	 commodification	 of	 un-priced,	 but	 increasingly	 ‘valued’	 parts	 of	 nature.	
Along	 this	 thinking,	 the	question	becomes	how	nature,	 conceived	as	 ‘externality’	
can	 be	 brought	 ‘inside’	 economic	 value	 calculations.	 Castree	 (2003)	 provides	 a	
synthesis	 of	 Marxian	 theorisations	 of	 the	 commodification	 of	 nature	 as	 being	
predicated	 on	 the	 privatisation,	 alienation,	 individuation,	 abstraction	 (functional	
and	spatial)	and	eventual	monetary	pricing	of	nature.	This	point	 is	 crucial	 to	my	
conceptual	 repertoire	 for	 the	production	of	value	 in	biodiversity.	At	 the	risk	of	 it	
getting	 lost	 within	 this	 broader	 theoretical	 overview,	 I	 wish	 to	 emphasise	 the	
significance	 of	 Castree’s	 typology	 of	 commodification	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 broader	
concern	 with	 abstraction.	 In	 particular,	 I	 connect	 this	 theorisation	 of	
commodification	with	the	calculative	and	framing	practices	of	the	DEFRA	metric	I	
identify	below	under	economic	performativity.	The	DEFRA	metric	 is	 the	 framing	
device	that	permits	the	translation	of	biodiversity	from	‘outside’	to	‘inside’	market	
calculations.	 The	 metric	 enacts	 the	 abstractions	 of	 biodiversity	 necessary	 to	 be	
valued	with	numbers	or	money.			
Neo-Marxian	 theorisations	of	 the	nature-value	nexus	drawing	on	 the	 ‘production	
of	nature’	have	also	come	to	recognise	the	valuation	of	nature’s	 ‘indirect’	benefits	
or	 services	 which	 are	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 non-use	 values	 (c.f.	 Mace	 2014).	
Contrary	to	the	role	of	physical	‘natural	capital’	as	a	direct	input	to	the	technology-
land-labour	 equation	 of	 Marxist	 value	 theory,	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 contemporary	
‘green	economy’	is	predicated	on	the	valuation	of	the	non-consumption	of	material	
nature	 (Büscher	 2013,	 Castree	 and	 Henderson	 2013),	 even	 while	 so	 called	 ‘eco-
system	 services’	 it	 produces	 are	 consumed	 by	 society.	Optimistically	 termed	 the	
‘new	economy	of	nature’	 (Daily	 1997),	 in	 the	environmental	economic	 literatures,	
this	approach	seeks	to	create	and	extract	capitalist	value	through	the	maintenance	
of	 living,	 standing,	 flourishing	 ecosystems.	 Under	 this	 guise,	 ecosystems	 are	 re-
framed	 as	 stocks	 of	 capital	 and	 providers	 of	 services	 through	 their	 biological	 or	
47  
abiotic	 functions	 as	 constitutive	 of	 the	 broader	 ‘conditions	 of	 production’	
(O’Connor	1991,	Harvey	1996),	and	human	wellbeing	more	generally.	
The	original	purpose	of	the	ecosystem	service	concept	was	to	be	pedagogical	and	
communicative	for	the	cause	of	biodiversity	conservation	more	generally	(Gomez-
Baggenthun	 et	 al.	 2011).	 It	was	mobilised	 through	 a	 growing	 sense	 of	 urgency	 in	
biodiversity	 conservation	 quarters	 aiming	 to	 show	 how	 the	 disappearance	 of	
biodiversity	 directly	 affects	 the	 functioning	 of	 ecosystems	 underpinning	 human	
wellbeing	 and	 society	 (ibid.) 7 .	 The	 history	 of	 economising	 biodiversity	 has	
therefore	 been	 summarised	 as	 a	 shift	 in	 utilitarian	 frames	 used	 to	 show	 why	
biodiversity	 matters	 to	 scientific	 debates	 over	 which	 biodiversity	 matters	 for	
services	 and	 functions	 useful	 to	 human	 society	 and	 economies	 (Dempsey	 2015).	
The	economistic	rationale	has	arguably	always	been	infused	with	and	drawn	from	a	
moral	normative	proposition	as	well	as	a	utilitarian	one.	Throughout	this	thesis	I	
will	show	that	strategies	to	promote	BDO	are	no	different.		
The	 conceptualisation	 of	 ecosystem	 services	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 powerful	 metaphor	
(Norgaard	2010)	and	seductive	idea	adopted	with	great	speed	and	with	little	critical	
discussion	(Adams	and	Redford	2007).	Contemporary	engagements	with	 interests	
in	the	construction	of	economic	values	within	conservation	have	located	a	putative	
drive	 towards	 the	 ‘re-framing	 of	 nature	 to	 save	 it’	 (Apostolopoulou	 and	 Adams	
2017).	Since	the	iconic	and	influential	Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment	(MEA)	in	
2005,	 value	 frames	 of	 ecosystem	 services	 and	 by	 extension	 the	 whole	 of	 the	
biosphere,	have	consolidated	through	the	discursive	and	institutional	stabilisation	
of	approaches	towards	‘natural	capital’	(Sullivan	2014,	2017).	Indeed,	natural	capital	
has	come	to	dominate	a	global	institutional	policy	landscape	in	what	is	considered	
																																																						
7		 Although	 biodiversity	 is	 often	 used	 in	 tandem	 with	 the	 expression	 ecosystem	
services	 they	 are	 not	 the	 same	 thing	 and	 this	 is	 but	 one	 of	 the	 examples	 of	 the	
misnomers	 buried	 within	 the	 contemporary	 reading	 ‘biodiversity’	 that	 forms	
Maier’s	 complaint.	Mace	 (2014)	 for	 example	 explains	 that	 while	most	 ecosystem	
services	 rely	 on	 biological	 inputs,	 they	 also	 crucially	 depend	 on	 chemical	 and	
physical	ones.	Furthermore,	in	various	cases,	the	efficiency	with	which	ecosystems	
can	capture	and	convert	energy,	decompose	and	recycle	organic	material	(forming	
a	fundamental	ecosystem	service)	is	often	enhanced	by	with	low	biodiversity	(Mace	
2014).	This	negative	relationship	is	why	Redford	and	Adams	(2009)	point	towards	
the	risks	associated	the	potency	of	ecosystem	services	language.	The	seductive	idea	
of	 ecosystem	services,	 they	 explain	 can	easily	 lead	 to	overlooking	 components	of	
biodiversity	 that	 are	 not	 valued	 for	 their	 role	 in	 providing	 ecosystem	 services,	
ultimately	 risking	 an	 ‘ecological	 brittleness’	 (ibid.)	 through	 for	 example,	 ideas	 of	
redundancy.		
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to	be	the	greening	of	capitalism	through	the	costing	and	internalisation	-	known	as	
the	 ‘bringing	 into	account’	of	hitherto	un-priced	environmental	services	 (see	also	
Helm	and	Hepburn	2014;	Helm	2015).	 ‘Natural	Capital’	 can	 today	 lay	 claim	 to	 an	
expansive	 global	 policy	 and	 scientific	 apparatus	 advanced	 by	 nation	 states,	
financial	 institutions,	 corporate	 bodies	 and	 international	 NGOs	 such	 as	 United	
Nations	 Environment	 Programme	 (UNEP)	 (The	 Economics	 of	 Ecosystems	 and	
Biodiversity,	 TEEB),	 World	 Bank’s	 WAVES	 Programme,	 International	 Union	 for	
the	 Conservation	 of	 Nature	 (IUCN)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 World	 Business	 Council	 for	
Sustainable	Development	 (WBCSD).	 It	 is	 spoken	 about	 as	 being	 a	 ‘revolution	 in	
economic	 thinking’8	and	 one	 in	 which	 the	 UK	 sees	 itself	 becoming	 the	 ‘world	
leader’ 9 .	 These	 narratives	 increasingly	 incorporate	 and	 make	 use	 of	 a	 moral	
justification	 associated	 with	 a	 ‘transformation	 of	 capitalism’	 through	 efforts	 to	
measure	and	value	additional	things	to	shareholder	dividends.		
Closely	 related	 to	 the	 broader	 apparatus	 of	 neoliberal	 conservation	 and	 the	
development	 of	 natural	 capital	 is	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 field	 loosely	 referred	 to	 as	
‘business	 and	 biodiversity’	 (see	 also	MacDonald	 2010a,	 2010b,	 Corson	 et	 al.	 2012,	
Wilshusen	 and	 MacDonald	 2015).	 Geographers	 interested	 by	 the	 institutional	
dynamics	of	 conservation	policy	 and	practice	 as	 an	ethnographic	 research	 site	 in	
itself	 propose	 that	 this	 field	 is	 characterised	by	 strengthening	 coalitions	between	
conservation	 biologists,	 NGOs	 and	 corporate	 business.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	
institutional	 alliances,	Wilshusen	and	MacDonald	 (2015)	propose	 that	 the	 field	 is	
formed	 of	 three	 constitutive	 narratives	 and	 conjoined	 logics,	 which	 can	 be	
paraphrased	as:	
• Seeing	nature	as	a	provider	of	goods	and	services;		
• Framing	business	as	relying	upon	and	impacting	on	these	services;		
• Advocating	for	methods	to	account	for	biodiversity	and	ecosystem	services	
so	that	business	can	capture	and	leverage	its	natural	assets	as	opportunities	
and	reduce	material	risks	in	connection	to	these.	
																																																						
8	CEO	of	the	Scottish	Wildlife	Trust,	Jonny	Hughes	made	this	point	at	the	closing	
Plenary	 address	 of	 the	World	 Forum	 for	 Natural	 Capital	 24th/	 25th	 November	 in	
Edinburgh	http://naturalcapitalforum.com/	(Accessed	November	15th	2016)		
9	Deputy	Director	of	Natural	Capital	at	DEFRA,	Nick	Barter	made	this	point	at	his	
keynote	 at	The	Wildlife	Trust’s	 event	Conservation	 in	 the	 21st	 Century:	 The	 why,	
what,	 how	 of	 natural	 capital	 on	 the	 25th	 November	 2015	
http://www.wildlifetrusts.org/node/118099	(Accessed	November	15th	2016)  
49  
In	 designing	 compliance	 and	 voluntary	 economic	 instruments	 as	 incentives	 for	
environmental	 restoration	 in	some	types	and	places,	 in	exchange	 for	degradation	
in	others	via	techniques	of	trades	and	offsetting	(Wilshusen	and	MacDonald	2015),	
actors	 are	 said	 to	 building	 ‘economies	 of	 repair’	 (Leach	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Such	
economies,	through	trades	and	techniques	for	offsetting,	are	predicated	on	a	range	
of	conceptual	technologies	that	flow	from	some	of	the	abstractions	this	theoretical	
overview	has	already	discussed.	These	abstractions	are	also	part	and	parcel	of	the	
conceptual	 technologies	 (no	 net	 loss,	 mitigation	 hierarchy	 and	 aggregate	 rules)	
that	 shape	 how	 economies	 of	 repair	 (trades,	 offsets)	 through	 their	
commodification	 and	 valuation	 work	 in	 practice.	 I	 return	 to	 these	 conceptual	
technologies	in	chapter	4.		
So	as	to	bring	this	overview	of	‘abstracting’	and	the	value-nature	nexus	in	the	green	
economy	 to	 a	 close,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 here	 that	 I	 have	 so	 far	 been	 discussing	
abstraction	largely	as	a	noun	-	a	formation.	In	this	sense,	I	have	been	concerned	by	
the	 variety	 of	 representations	 of	 nature	 and	 biodiversity,	 along	 with	 the	
implications	of	 these	 representations	 for	 their	underlying	ontologies.	Abstraction	
is	evidently	also	a	verb	-	something	that	actors	do.	In	taking	abstractive	processes	
and	abstract	representations	to	be	central	to	the	act	of	producing	new	value	from	
biodiversity	 within	 BDO,	 this	 thesis	 is	 therefore	 engaged	 with	 identifying	 the	
constitutive	 practices	 and	 actors	 (human	 and	 non	 human)	 engaged	 in	 these	
undertakings.	 I	 trace	 these	 acts	 to	 be	 outcomes	 of	 and	 sustained	 through	 socio-
technical	assemblages	and	performativity.	These	tools	form	companion	conceptual	
resources	for	this	enquiry.	It	is	to	these	literatures	that	my	discussion	now	turns.	
2.2	Assembling	
The	second	theoretical	approach	I	draw	from	to	investigate	the	practices	of	value-
making	and	circulation	within	biodiversity	offsetting	 in	England	 is	actor-network	
theory	 (ANT)	 developed	 by	 Bruno	 Latour	 (1987),	 John	 Law	 (1986)	 and	 Michel	
Callon	 (1986).	 Originating	 as	 an	 anti-essentialist,	 post-structuralist	 branch	 of	
science	and	technology	studies	(STS),	the	central	proposition	is	to	overturn	binary	
categories	 that	 had	 hitherto	 shaped	 and	maintained	 as	 separate	 fields	 of	 study	 -	
‘scientific’	and	 ‘social’	analysis.	Doing	away	with	these	pre-determined	categories,	
ANT	 instead	 seeks	 to	 trace	 the	 associations	 between	 the	 entangled	 agency	 of	
people	 and	 things	 that	 sustain	 the	 Modern	 dualism.	 ANT	 posits	 that	 the	
distinctions	that	shape	pre-given	dualisms	(human/non-human,	agency/structure,	
truth/falsehood)	are	not	taken	to	be	given	in	the	order	of	things,	but	instead	must	
50  
be	 taken	 as	 ‘effects	 or	 outcomes’	 of	 arrangements	 and	 networks	 (Law	 1999:	 3).	
Echoing	 the	 literatures	 concerned	 with	 social-natures	 in	 the	 first	 section	 of	 this	
chapter,	ANT	rejects	that	ontological	polarity	is	antecedent	to	these	arrangements.	
Crucially,	 non-human	 beings	 are	 treated	 symmetrically	with	 human	 actors,	 each	
posed	as	‘actants’	–	that	is,	things	with	different	capacities	to	act	within	a	relational	
network.	Thus,	 all	 actants	have	 various	 kinds	 of	 agency	 although	not	necessarily	
intentionality.		
ANT	 is	 therefore	 principally	 interested	 in	 methodological	 approaches	 to	
identifying	relationality	and	the	shapes,	or	‘topological’	arrangements,	of	networks	
that	have	effects.	Disrupting	the	ontology	of	agency	through	the	notion	of	actants	
returns	us	to	the	notion	of	hybrids	and	in	particular,	socio-material	arrangements.		
Due	 to	 their	 interest	 in	 socio-material	 arrangements,	ANT	and	other	non-dualist	
approaches	 loosely	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘after	 ANT’,	 share	 a	 lineage	 with	 assemblage	
thinking	 of	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari	 (1987).	 ‘Assemblage’	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 a	 rough	
translation	 of	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari’s	 term	 agencement,	 which	 has	 no	 English	
counterpart	 (Callon	2007:	 319).	Callon	 (2007:	 320)	explains,	 that	 ‘agencement	has	
the	 same	 root	 as	 agency:	 agencements	 are	 arrangements	 endowed	 with	 the	
capacity	 of	 acting	 in	 different	 ways	 depending	 on	 their	 configuration’.	 Thus	
assemblage	 (agencement)	 and	 ANT,	 are	 ‘concerned	 with	 why	 orders	 emerge	 in	
particular	ways,	how	 they	hold	 together,	 somewhat	precariously,	how	 they	 reach	
across	or	mould	space	and	how	they	fall	apart’	(Müller	2016:	27).	In	this	sense,	and	
as	 mentioned	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 chapter,	 Anderson	 and	 McFarlane	 (2011)	
caution	 against	 deploying	 assemblage	 as	 a	 static	 ‘form’	 and	 instead	 recommend	
that	 assemblage	 is	 considered	 as	 practice.	 They	 propose	 the	 key	 task	 is	 ‘to	
understand	 assembling	 as	 a	 process	 of	 ‘co-functioning’	 whereby	 ‘heterogeneous	
elements	come	together	in	a	non-homogenous	grouping’	(ibid.:	275).	Assemblages,	
they	propose,	are	always	under	assembly.	
ANT	 draws	 from	 more	 philosophical	 assemblage	 theories	 (for	 example	 Deleuze	
and	 Guattari	 1987	 or	 De	 Landa	 2006)	 in	 order	 to	 formulate	 a	 more	 grounded	
approach	 to	 empirical	 analysis.	 Latour	 (1999:	 9)	 proposes	 ANT	 is	 merely	 a	
‘sociology	 of	 associations’	 or	 what	 his	 colleague	 Callon	 (1986)	 has	 called	 a	
‘sociology	 of	 translations’.	 Translations	 become	 an	 important	 theme	 throughout	
the	 processes	 of	 value-making	 with	 BDO	 as	 the	 empirical	 chapters	 will	 show.	
Latour	 therefore	 suggests	 that,	 rather	 than	 a	 theory,	 ANT	 is	 more	 helpfully	
considered	 as	 methodological	 practice.	 In	 this	 sense,	 ANT	 and	 assemblage	
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approaches	provide	‘a	way	to	travel	form	one	spot	to	the	next,	from	one	field	site	to	
the	next,	not	an	interpretation	of	what	actors	simply	do,	glossed	in	a	different	and	
more	 palatable	 universalist	 language’	 (Latour	 1999:	 21).	 ANT	 and	 assemblage	
thinking	 inform	 the	 conceptual	 resources	 as	 well	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 my	 thesis’	
empirical	 strategy.	 In	 so	doing,	 I	 trace	 the	 associations	 and	 translations	between	
human	 actors,	 discourses,	 institutional	 networks,	 and	 non-human	 actants	
comprising	English	biodiversity	offsetting	networks	and	assemblages.		I	expand	on	
this	approach	in	the	methodological	strategy	laid	out	 in	the	next	chapter.	Table	1	
presents	a	snapshot	of	some	of	the	main	human	actors	(through	their	institutional	
contexts)	 and	 non-human	 actants	 within	 BDO	 assemblages	 in	 England.	
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Table	1	Human	agents,	their	contexts	and	nonhuman	actants	of	the	BDO	assemblage	
	
	
	
	
Human	
individuals	
situated	in	
institutional	and	
organisational	
networks	
	
	
Transnational	 UK	and	England	
Government		
(at	all	scales)	
Private	sector	 Civil	Society	
BBOP	&	Forest	
Trends,	
international	
consultancy	
firms	(ecology	
and	BDO	
specific),	
UNEP,	
TEEB,	
	
	
DEFRA	economists	
and	policy	makers,	
HM	Treasury,	
Local	Planning	
Authority	(LPA),	
Natural	England,	
Developers,	
consultant	
ecologists,	
planning	
consultants,	
offset	
brokers,	
research	
consultants	
(i.e.	IEEP)	
Conservation	
and	wildlife	
NGOs,	
campaign	and	
activists,	
think	tanks,		
local	residents,	
landowning	
offset	
providers,	
journalists,		
	
	
	
	
	
Non-human	
actants;	(social,	
technical,	textual,	
material,	
normative)	
	
Conservation	policy	designations	(habitats	and	species)		
Biological	records	and	databases	
Texts	and	planning	documents	
Policy	standards	
Conceptual	(intellectual)	technologies	(‘no	net	loss’	and	the	mitigation	
hierarchy)	
Inscription	devices,	maps	and	interactive	maps	(i.e.	Natural	England’s	
Magic	Maps,	strategic	habitat	maps	in	Local	Planning	Authorities)	
The	DEFRA	metric	(calculative	device),	other	calculative	devices	and	
equations	
Computer	programmes	and	spread	sheet	technologies	
Material	natures,	places	and	geo-physical	characteristics	of	landscapes		
Wider	planning	objectives	and	values	
Moral	framings	
Source:	Author	
Following	 Latour’s	 (1993)	 question,	 ‘what	 counts	 as	 nature?’	 I	 ask	 what	must	 be	
assembled	for	biodiversity	units	and	offsetting,	the	market-based	policy	approach	
on	 which	 it	 relies	 and	 its	 economic	 units	 to	 manifest?	 ANT	 is	 helpful	 to	 this	
enquiry	 since	 it	 reveals	 ‘things’	 to	 be	 situated	 and	 contingent	 achievements.	 In	
relation	to	the	abstractions	outlined	in	part	 1	of	this	chapter,	 I	draw	on	ANT	as	a	
methodological	 and	 theoretical	 resource	 to	 trace	 how	 practices	 of	 abstraction	
become	 meaningful	 representations	 (Robertson	 2012).	 The	 ‘socially	 necessary	
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abstractions	 that	 are	 adequate	 to	 bear	 value	 in	 capitalist	 circulation’	 (ibid.:	 387)	
require	 shared	 ‘consent’	 to	durable,	 stabilised	 truths	 for	BDO	 to	 assume	 rational	
coherence.	 How	 is	 this	 ‘consent’	 manufactured?	 Using	 ANT	 and	 assemblage	
thinking	 it	 becomes	 possible	 to	 investigate	 empirically	 how	 this	 valuation	 work	
and	 the	 broader	 political-economic	 programme	 in	 which	 it	 is	 embedded	
materialises	 and	unfolds.	This	 thesis	 therefore	 responds	 to	 the	 charge	 that	while	
Marxian	 political	 ecology	 enquiries	 have	 contributed	 many	 insights	 into	 ‘liberal	
environmentalism’	 of	 market	 based	 conservation	 programmes,	 very	 few	 have	
focussed	 on	 the	 ‘emergence,	 dynamics	 and	 relative	 durability	 of	 transnational,	
economistic	governance	arrangements	over	time’	(Wilshusen	and	MacDonald	2015:	
4).		
In	 its	 ‘strong’	 version,	 ANT	 displays	 antagonisms	 with	 critical	 political	 economy	
approaches	outlined	 in	 the	prior	section.	 In	 this	 respect,	ANT	has	been	criticised	
for	being	de-politicised	and	neutral	towards	political	ecology’s	core	commitments	
to	 analysing	 the	 overarching	 drives	 to	 capitalist	 production,	 accumulation	 and	
associated	social	justice	concerns	(Lave	2015).	Another	principal	complaint	political	
economy	 levels	 at	 ANT	 is	 the	 latter’s	 conceptualisation	 of	 non-human	 agency.	
Castree	 (2002)	 nonetheless,	 proposes	 the	 perceived	 incompatibilities	 between	
political	ecology	and	ANT	to	be	a	‘false	antithesis’.	Elsewhere,	scholars	have	noted	
how	Marxian	political	ecology	actively	enhances	ANT	through	providing	a	sharper	
focus	on	the	power	relations	between	actors	and	the	other	nonhuman	actants	they	
create	 (Dempsey	 and	 Robertson	 2012,	 Christophers	 2014,	 Bigger	 and	 Robertson	
2017).	 The	 important	 contribution	 a	 synthesis	 of	 the	 two	 theoretical	 foundations	
can	 offer	 is	 that	 an	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 Marxist	 political	 economy	 lens	 can	
remain	central,	‘while	multiplying	the	actors	and	complicating	the	politics	involved	
in	 approaching	 the	 society	 -	 environment	 nexus’	 (Castree	 2002:	 111).	 Increasingly	
scholars	 are	 looking	 at	 the	 unique	 contributions	 that	 political	 economy	 and	
economic	 sociology	 can	 offer	 for	 the	 study	 of	 value,	 in	 tandem.	 Bigger	 and	
Robertson	(2017:	72)	articulate	this	combined	approach	as	powerful	because:		
Marx’s	concept	encompasses	economic	and	moral	valences	of	value,	while	
valuation	studies	and	STS	allow	for	sophisticated	understandings	of	
semiotic	valence,	the	task	of	creating	distinctions	between	things,	
performed	by	people	with	specific	motivations	and	in	particular	contexts.		
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In	 relation	 to	 studying	 value,	 they	 note,	 economic	 sociology	 and	 STS	helps	 to	
reveal	 the	 questions	 of	 ‘how’	 while	 political	 economy	 is	 adept	 to	 attend	 to	
questions	of	‘why’,	and	with	what	social	consequences	(ibid.).	
Closely	 related	 to	ANT’s	methodological	 approach	of	 tracing	 relational	networks,	
and	 processural	 dynamics	 of	 ‘becoming’	 in	 ANT,	 Tania	 Murray	 Li	 (2007a:	 263)	
identifies	 ‘practices	 of	 assemblage’	 as	 ‘on-going	 labour	 of	 bringing	 disparate	
elements	together	and	forging	connections	between	them’.	This	weaker	version	of	
ANT	might	also	characterise	assemblages	to	be	constituted	by	‘on	going	processes	
of	 reproduction	 grounded	 in	 conditions	 of	 contestation,	 where	 directionality	
emerges	 from	the	configuration	of	power	 relations	and	agency	continually	 in	 the	
making’	(MacDonald	and	Corson	2012:	163).	Li	(2007a)	provides	a	critical	political	
edge	 to	 the	 possibilities	 of	 ANT	 or	 its	 looser	 manifestation	 of	 assemblage	 in	
locating	 the	 power	 strategies	 employed	 by	 various	 actants	 or	 agents	 of	 the	
assemblage.	For	example,	 the	practices	Li	 identifies	within	 the	assemblage	derive	
from	 Foucaultian	 interests	 in	 active	 power	 strategies	 such	 as	 ‘anti	 politics’,	
‘authorising	 knowledge’	 and	 ‘managing	 failures’	 as	 well	 as	 ‘rendering	 technical’	
with	 quantification	 and	 calculative	 practices	 (shown	 in	 Table	 2).	 Key	 to	 Li’s	
methodological	 effort	 is	 demonstrating	 how	 assemblages	 stabilise.	Her	 empirical	
engagements	 trace	 the	 production	 of	 land	 as	 an	 investible	 resource	 (2014)	 and	
investment	 in	 community	 forest	 programmes	 in	 Indonesia	 (2007a).	 Part	 of	 her	
analytic	is	concerned	with	how	the	latter	have	been	sustained	for	more	than	thirty	
years,	attracting	vast	sums	of	money	and	on-going	 interest	(ibid.).	 In	this	way,	Li	
demonstrated	how	 the	 Indonesian	community	 forest	governance	assemblage	was	
maintained	 through	performative	practices	 that	 involved	manufacturing	 consent,	
maintaining	 stability	 and	 durability.	 In	 a	 related	way,	 this	 dissertation	 identifies	
the	 networks	 of	 elements	 that	 have	 given	 rise	 to	 the	 project	 of	 biodiversity	
offsetting	 as	 a	 proliferating	 conservation	 imaginary,	 grounding	 itself	 in	 distinct	
administrative	processes	around	the	world	 in	spite	of	scant	empirical	evidence	of	
its	success	and	indeed	widespread	controversy.		
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Table	2	Tania	Murray	Li’s	(2007a)	Practices	of	assemblage	
‘Forging	alignments’	 ‘The	work	of	linking	together	the	objectives	of	the	various	
parties	to	an	assemblage’.	Examples	of	these	‘objectives’	
include	efficiency,	profit,	conservation,	sustainability	etc.	
(263)		
‘Rendering	technical’	 The	process	of	‘extracting	from	the	messiness	of	the	social	
world...	a	set	of	relations	that	can	be	formulated	as	a	
diagram,	in	which	problem	(a)	plus	intervention	(b)	will	
produce	a	beneficial	result	(c)’.	I	take	‘rendering	technical’	
to	be	similar	to	practices	of	abstraction	I	have	so	far	
discussed.	
‘Authorising	knowledge’	 ‘Specifying	the	requisite	body	of	knowledge;	confirming	
enabling	assumptions;	containing	critiques’	
‘Managing	failures	and	
contradictions’	
‘Presenting	failure	as	the	outcome	of	rectifiable	
deficiencies;	smoothing	out	contradictions	so	that	they	
seem	superficial	rather	than	fundamental;	devising	
compromises.’		
‘Anti-politics’	 ‘Reposing	political	questions	as	matters	of	technique;	
closing	down	the	debate...	by	reference	to	expertise;	
encouraging	citizens	to	engage	in	debate	while	limiting	the	
agenda’	
‘Re-assembling’	 ‘Grafting	on	new	elements	and	reworking	old	ones;	
deploying	existing	discourses	to	new	ends;	transposing	the	
meanings	of	key	terms.’	
Source:	Li	2007a:	265	unless	otherwise	noted	
Li’s	vocabulary	of	‘managing	failures’	resonates	with	my	use	of	‘tensions’.	Tensions	
lie	at	 the	heart	of	environmental	markets	 (Sulzman	and	Ruhl	2000)	and	must	be	
actively	managed	so	as	to	stabilise	an	environmental	market	assemblage	to	prevent	
it	from	unravelling.	The	persistence	of	these	tensions	and	failures	may	frustrate	the	
assemblage	 from	 ever	 becoming	 established	 at	 all	 (Fredriksen	 2014).	 	 In	 the	
following	 section	 I	 expand	 on	 these	 refractory	 processes	 as	 versions	 of	 ‘counter-
performativity’	 (Blok	 2011)	 in	 considering	 what	 I	 identify	 to	 be	 de-stabilising	
tensions	within	 the	BDO	assemblage.	 In	 relation	 to	my	 third	 research	question	 I	
ask,	how	do	actors	manage	such	tensions	and	with	what	effect?		
Affiliated	 to	 ANT	 is	 a	 branch	 of	 economic	 sociology,	 concerned	 with	 the	
performativity	 of	 economic	 theory.	 The	 relational	 network	 model	 is	 extended	
under	 this	 programme	 to	 trace	 the	 ways	 economic	 frameworks,	 markets	 and	
market	goods	are	constituted	by	set	of	performative	networks.	 It	 is	 to	theories	of	
economic	performativity	that	my	discussion	now	turns.		
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2.3	Performing		
As	 the	 third	conceptual	 resource	 for	my	 investigation	 into	 the	processes	of	value	
making	 in	 BDO,	 I	 draw	 from	 performativity	 theory	 within	 strands	 of	 economic	
sociology	 developed	 principally	 by	 Michel	 Callon	 (1998,	 2007)	 and	 further	
advanced	 by	 Çalışkan	 and	 Callon	 (e.g.	 2009,	 2010)	 and	 MacKenzie	 (e.g.	 2006,	
2009).	Associated	with	ANT	and	STS,	performativity	theory	in	economic	sociology	
is	adapted	to	an	investigation	of	the	economy	and	the	formation	of	markets.	Callon	
(1999:	182)	notes	‘it	would	be	worrying	if	ANT	had	nothing	to	say	about	the	market	
when	 it	 was	 all	 along	 designed	 specifically	 to	 analyse	 those	 imbroglios	 in	which	
humans	 and	 non-humans	 alike	 are	 involved’.	 The	 concept	 of	 performativity	
implies	 that	 what	 appears	 as	 reality	 -	 as	 the	 given	 order	 of	 things	 -	 is	 in	 fact	
circumscribed	 by	 particular	 socio-technical	 assemblages.	 Another	 word	 that	 is	
sometimes	preferred	over	performativity	is	‘enactment’	(Mol	1999,	Fredriksen	et	al.	
2014).	As	Mol	explains,	performativity	is	meant	to	convey	that	‘a	reality	is	done	and	
enacted	rather	than	observed’	(Mol	1999:	77).		
I	 identify	 performativity	 operating	 in	 two	 respects	within	 BDO.	 The	 first	 locates	
the	socio-technical	arrangements	of	BDO	as	a	policy	approach	and	market	based	
instrument	 of	 conservation	 governance.	 To	 look	 at	 BDO	 as	 a	 policy	 approach	 I	
explore	the	processes	under	the	heading	Economisation	and	Marketisation	below.	
The	 second	 process	 of	 performativity	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 production	 of	 the	
economic	 units	 of	 biodiversity	 as	 BDO’s	 currency,	 which	 I	 address	 under	 the	
heading	Calculating	Market	Goods.	The	two	foci	of	the	research	relate	to	my	first	
and	second	research	questions;	how	is	BDO	assembled?	And	how	is	habitat	turned	
into	a	market	good?	
Economisation	and	marketisation		
Drawing	from	Callon	(1998)	I	interpret	the	formation	of	biodiversity	offsetting	as	a	
market	 arrangement	 achieved	 through	 processes	 of	 economisation	 and	
marketisation	 (Çalışkan	 and	 Callon	 2009,	 2010).	 Economisation	 ‘refers	 to	 the	
assembly	and	qualification	of	actions,	devices	and	analytical/	practical	descriptions	
as	 ‘economic’	 by	 social	 scientists	 and	market	 actors’	 (Çalışkan	 and	 Callon	 2009:	
369).	Economisation	also	entails	performativity,	proposing	that	‘economics,	in	the	
broad	sense	of	 the	 term,	performs,	 shapes	and	 formats	 the	economy,	 rather	 than	
observing	how	 it	 functions’	 (ibid:	369).	Marketisation,	Çalışkan	and	Callon	(2010)	
explain,	 is	 but	 one	modality	 of	 economisation.	 They	 use	marketisation	 to	 attach	
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the	 wider	 programme	 of	 economic	 performativity	 to	 an	 empirical	 context	 of	
markets.	
It	 is	worth	noting	 that	here,	 that	 in	a	parallel	 to	ANT’s	 treatment	of	non-human	
agency	through	its	‘hybrid	ontology’,	economisation	and	marketisation	are	said	to	
be	shaped	by	social	forces	as	well	as	materialities	which	Çalışkan	and	Callon	(2009)	
label	 ‘techniques’.	 As	 these	 authors	 (ibid.)	 explain,	 a	 pure	 sociology	 of	 economy	
would	be	 limited	to	 the	discipline’s	 ‘favourite	objects	 -	networks,	 social	 relations,	
institutions,	 rules,	 conventions	norms	and	power	 struggles’	 (ibid.:	 384).	Yet,	 they	
say	 that	 empirical	 work	 increasingly	 points	 towards	 the	 decisive	 role	 ‘played	 by	
techniques,	 sciences,	 standards,	 calculating	 instruments,	 metrology	 and	 more	
generally,	 material	 infrastructure	 in	 market	 formation’	 (ibid.:	 384)	 These	
materialities,	 together	 with	 social	 networks	 form	 a	 ‘socio-technical	 hybrid’	 that	
works	 to	 format	 and	 condition	 market	 spaces	 as	 well	 as	 conferring	 value	 on	
‘things’.	 Through	 this	 conjecture,	 market	 formations	 and	 economic	 values	 are	
taken	 to	 be	 a	 consequence	 of	 socio-technical	 assemblages	 rather	 than	 a	 priori	
reality.	 Therefore,	 economic	 performativity	 traces	 the	 agency	 of	 economic	 actors	
(both	human	and	non-human)	to	better	understand	the	work	that	the	profession,	
its	knowledges	and	tools	actively	does	in	rendering	things	economic.		
I	extend	a	similar	conceptual	approach	to	BDO	in	England.	In	this	respect,	I	take	
BDO	 as	 a	 market	 based	 instrument,	 albeit	 one	 requiring	 significant	 regulatory	
input,	 to	 be	 enacted	 by	 a	 series	 of	 performative	 practices	 that	 align	 actors,	
discourses,	technological	devices	and	mechanisms,	policies	and	institutional	logics	
(see	also	Bracking	et	al.	2014).	In	chapter	4	I	trace	the	conceptual	technologies	of	
BDO	 (‘no	 net	 loss’,	 aggregate	 environmental	 policy	 rules	 and	 the	 mitigation	
hierarchy),	 the	 institutional	 alliances,	 charismatic	 individuals,	 frames	 and	
discourses	 of	 the	 biodiversity	 values	 and	 material-calculative	 device	 (DEFRA	
metric)	 that	performed	 the	BDO	assemblage	 in	England	 in	 2011/2012.	 I	 carry	 this	
analytic	through	to	examine	in	depth	empirical	accounts	of	specific	BDO	contracts	
under	 the	pilot	 study.	This	 latter	 element	 of	 the	 assemblage,	 the	DEFRA	metric,	
leads	me	on	to	the	second	scale	of	economic	performativity	in	BDO.		
Calculating	market	goods	
Moving	 the	 discussion	 here	 to	 the	 actual	 practices	 of	 valuation,	 I	 draw	 on	
performativity	 theory	 to	 attend	 to	my	 second	 research	 question	 -	 how	 is	 habitat	
turned	 into	a	market	good?	In	this	 respect,	economic	sociology	offers	conceptual	
resources	 for	 how	 valued	 entities	 are	 defined	 in	 practice,	 and	 thus	 how	 the	
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economic	‘x’	 is	made	(Callon	2007).	The	socio-technical	hybrids	of	economisation	
described	above	 relate	 to	human	actors	 in	combination	with	 the	application	of	 a	
material,	or	calculative	devices.		
	A	 useful	 definition	 of	 what	 the	 device	 does	 is	 provided	 by	 Callon	 and	Muniesa	
(2005:	14):	
Calculative	material	devices	frame	the	world	of	possible	choices	by	
drawing	a	boundary	between	goods	displayed	and	those	taken	into	
account.	The	device	therefore	is	the	delimitation	of	the	boundary	between	
goods	included	in	the	space	of	market	calculation	and	those	that	were	
excluded.	
In	this	sense,	Robertson	(2012)	rejects	the	notion	that	capital	simply	expands	into	
new	 frontiers	 and	 fields	 of	 accumulation	 in	 environmental	 markets.	 The	
calculation	 of	 value	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 entails	 a	 series	 of	 definitional	 and	
representational	 practices	 that	 bring	 ecosystem	 services	 as	 market	 entities	 into	
being.	As	Robertson	observes,	‘“the	red	legged	frog	habitat”	service	is	not	out	there	
waiting;	 rather	 it	 is	 fundamentally	 defined	 as	 a	 service	 in	 the	 process	 of	 its	
marketing	 and	 sale’	 (ibid.:	 387).	 The	 calculative	 device	 seeks	 to	 achieve	
standardisation	 and	 feasible	 substitutability	 between	 commodities	 in	 order	 to	
facilitate	the	equivalence	required	for	trade	(Callon	and	Muniesa	2005).	Calculative	
devices	 therefore	 place	 goods	 in	 a	 frame	 with	 other	 goods	 to	 build	 a	 relational	
connection	between	them.	In	this	way,	new	types	of	classification	and	calculation	
can	occur	(ibid).	
Bearing	direct	 relevance	 to	 the	case	of	BDO	and	 the	DEFRA	metric,	Callon	et	al.	
(2007)	also	refer	to	these	devices	as	‘metrics’.	Metrics	work	‘for	the	description	and	
the	 assessment	 of	 products’	 which	 ‘is	 a	 crucial	 ingredient	 of	 the	 performative	
processes	that	shape	markets’	(ibid.:	9).	The	key	calculative	device	in	this	study	is	
the	 DEFRA	 metric,	 although	 we	 encounter	 others	 such	 as	 cartographic	 and	
valuation	technologies	 (which	 interact	with	the	DEFRA	metric)	 in	chapter	5.	The	
metric	equation	is	conceived	as	a	matrix	and	later	given	effect	as	an	Excel	spread	
sheet	 so	 as	 to	 process	 ecological	 data	 into	 market	 values	 under	 offsetting.	 It	 is	
through	this	device	that	actors	are	able	to	define	and	measure	biodiversity	values	
as	 individual	 ‘units’.	 The	 DEFRA	metric,	 therefore	 enacts	 an	 economic-scientific	
hybrid	 entity	 invented	 uniquely	 for	 BDO,	 called	 a	 ‘biodiversity	 unit’.	 As	 a	 newly	
minted	market	 good,	 the	 BDO	 currency	 permits	 the	 trade	 of	 biodiversity	 ‘value’	
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between	developers	and	offset	providers.	 I	examine	how	actors	utilise	 this	metric	
in	 situ	 across	 three	 case	 studies	 in	 chapters	 5,	 6	 and	7	 so	 as	 to	 illuminate	how	a	
conservation	 ‘valuation’	 approach	 is	 mobilised	 in	 practice.	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 I	
show	how	associated	conceptual	frames	and	vocabulary	also	do	work	as	discursive	
actants	in	commodity	formation.	Additionally,	and	in	relation	to	my	third	research	
question,	I	illustrate	how	conflicts	and	tensions	intrinsic	to	environmental	markets	
more	generally	(Sulzman	and	Ruhl	2000),	are	resolved	by	actors	in	situ.	
Counter	performativities,	tensions	and	failures	
One	of	the	central	contributions	of	performativity	theory	is	to	assist	in	identifying	
the	 processes	 and	 practices	 that	 are	 involved	 with	 ‘keeping	 things	 going’	 (Li	
2007a).	And	yet,	 sensitivity	 to	 the	active	work	 that	constitutes	 these	assemblages	
should	also	point	to	their	fallibilities	-	to	the	fissiparousness	inherent	within	these	
processes	(Li	2007a,	Greenhough	2011).	Rather	than	a	monolithic	trajectory	that	is	
static,	performative	assemblages	urge	us	 to	 follow	how	active	agents	are	engaged	
with	 keeping	 things	 on	 track.	 Actants	 are	 also	 engaged	 with	 contesting	 and	
challenging	the	course	and	in	so	doing	triggering	various	inflections	and	mutations	
along	 the	way.	 	The	 tensions	 that	 emerge	 through	counter-performativities	must	
be	actively	overcome	so	as	to	sustain	the	directionality	of	the	assemblage.		
For	 example,	 economic	 performativity	 and	 market-making	 sometimes	 occurs	 at	
sites	 of	 intense	 political	 contestation	 (Blok	 2011).	 In	 relation	 to	 the	 laborious	
formation	of	environmental	market-making	in	biodiversity	governance,	Blok	alerts	
us	to	the	important	and	influential	role	that	a	class	of	transnational	environmental	
NGOs	 play	 in	 ‘practices	 of	 contestation’.	 Blok’s	 (2011)	 notion	 of	 ‘performation	
struggles,	 as	 different	 worlds	 trying	 to	 prevail’	 asks	 that	 we	 locate	 and	 duly	
recognise	 actors	 who	 articulate	 alternative	 visions	 and	 value	 systems.	 	 These	
gestures	 and	 strategies	 of	 disruption	 are	 in	 large	 part	 what	 I	 seek	 to	 trace	 in	
chapter	 8	 in	 considering	 the	 counter-performative	 (MacKenzie	 et	 al.	 2007)	
tendencies	 of	 NGOs	 and	 activists	 weighing	 in	 on	 the	 dispute	 over	 biodiversity	
offsetting.	 Blok	 notes	 that	 NGOs	 as	 public	 knowledge	 brokers	 in	 environmental	
governance	 can	 foreground	 and	 frame	 tensions	 between	 economy	 and	 ecology	
thus	showing	that	the	‘clash	of	the	eco-sciences’	is	still	alive	and	kicking	even	if	an	
institutional	mainstream	points	to	the	opposite.		
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2.4	Chapter	Summary		
To	summarise,	the	theoretical	and	interpretative	framework	I	am	using	to	address	
my	enquiry	into	biodiversity	value	and	valuation	under	BDO	incorporates	a	variety	
of	approaches	that	introduce	the	discursive,	material	and	institutional	agents	that	
form	 assemblages.	 Figure	 1	 illustrates	 the	 hybrid	 conceptual	 approach	 in	 a	Venn	
diagram.	 Figure	 2	 below,	 indicates	 how	 I	 use	 these	 resources	 together	 in	
application	to	my	empirical	topic.	
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Figure	1	A	hybrid	conceptual	approach	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
I	 opened	 the	 chapter	 exploring	 how	 a	 post-structural	 turn	 in	 human	 geography	
underpinned	the	growth	of	 idealist	constructivist	approaches	 in	the	 final	decades	
of	last	Millennium.	The	principal	gains	these	constructivist	insights	offered	were	to	
illuminate	 the	political	agency	of	 representational	abstractions.	Through	severing	
the	un-mediated	link	between	language	and	reality,	human	geography	opened	up	
the	question	of	‘nature’,	challenging	the	prospect	that	it	could	be	maintained	as	a	
separate	category	from	society.	The	consequence	was	to	transform	nature	from	an	
ontological	 given	 to	 a	muddled	 socio-natural	hybrid.	Additionally,	 these	 changes	
ushered	 in	 a	 fresh	 approach	 to	 political	 ecology	 and	 provided	 a	 conceptual	
armoury	 resolved	 on	 actively	 politicising	 debates	 about	 socio-natural	 relations,	
since	abstract	representations	are	not	neutral.	As	a	way	to	organise	and	make	sense	
of	 the	world,	 these	 assumptions	 and	 the	 ethical	 actions	 they	 engender	 (Sullivan	
2017)	have	agency	on	our	everyday	practices	and	as	such,	‘worldly	effects’	(Barnett	
1995	 cited	 by	 Castree	 2002).	 I	 draw	 from	 this	 spirit	 of	 reflexivity	 over	 the	
production	 of	 knowledge	 in	 the	 next	 chapter	 in	 discussion	 over	 the	 methods	 I	
selected	for	my	study.	To	advance	this	theoretical	frame	I	cannot	escape	the	need	
to	reflect	on	abstractions	of	my	own	making.		
With	the	theoretical	scene	set,	I	subsequently	discussed	how	‘biodiversity’	is	thus	a	
socio-natural	hybrid	comprised	of	various	representational	and	ordering	practices.	
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In	 particular,	 I	 traced	 three	 abstractions.	 The	 first	 is	 biodiversity’s	 ‘state	 based	
ontology’	 (Maier	 2012),	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 a	 totalising	 ‘thing’	 with	
boundaries.	In	chapter	4,	I	discuss	the	significance	for	this	abstraction	in	relation	
to	 the	 role	 of	 aggregate	 rules	 (Sullivan	 2017)	 in	 BDO	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘offsetting’	
interchangeable	quantities	of	‘biodiversity’.	I	propose	that	language	which	permits	
speaking	of	biodiversity	in	quantitative	frames	of	more	or	less,	and	ultimately	non-
specific	terms,	enables	an	abstract	conceptualisation	of	exchange.	As	I	will	show	in	
chapter	8,	the	ontological	assumptions	that	these	frames	affirm	are	central	to	the	
rationality	of	BDO.		Interchangeability	is	also	relevant	to	the	second	abstraction	of	
biodiversity	I	discussed.	This	is	biodiversity’s	ontology	of	discrete	separable	reified	
units	made	of	species	and	habitats	(Fredriksen	2017).		
Finally,	 I	briefly	 introduced	political	 ecology	 literatures	 that	are	 interested	 in	 the	
representation	 of	 biodiversity	 as	 numbers	 in	 databases.	 The	 global	 coding	 and	
classification	 exercise	 within	 the	 science-policy-governance	 nexus	 of	 biodiversity	
conservation	suggests	that	the	development	of	economisation	of	biological	life	and	
relationships	 are	 not	 novel	 ideas	 but	 simply	 extensions	 of	 a	 longer	 trajectory	 of	
quantification	 (Turnhout	 et	 al.	 2014).	 I	 connect	 these	 two	 latter	 abstractions	
together	in	chapter	4	by	discussing	the	scientific	and	policy	hybrid	that	forms	the	
backdrop	 to	 the	 DEFRA	 metric.	 In	 particular	 I	 show	 how	 this	 combination	 of	
abstractions	 interact	 through	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 to	 produce	 something	 called	 a	
‘habitat	 hectare’	 as	 a	 unit	 of	 biodiversity	 value	 but	 represented	 as	 a	 numerical	
surrogate.		
Following	 the	 overview	 of	 abstract	 representations	 in	 nature	 and	 biodiversity	 I	
moved	the	discussion	to	the	ways	 in	which	Marxian	theories	of	value	conceive	of	
exchange	value.	In	particular,	I	discussed	the	universalising	properties	of	money	as	
a	 flat	 ontology	 (Fourcade	 2011)	 that	 functions	 as	 the	 definitive	 abstraction.	 The	
production	 of	 exchange	 value	 through	 commodities	 and	 the	 attribution	 of	 price	
forces	 the	 ‘peculiar	 properties’	 of	 things	 (originally	 the	 social	 relations	 of	
production)	but	in	this	case	‘biodiversity’,	to	rescind	from	view.			
In	 the	 final	 stage	 of	 this	 theoretical	 approach	 I	 combined	 the	 abstractions	
identified	 in	 the	 prior	 sections	 to	 explore	 political	 ecology	 theorisations	 of	 the	
green	 economy.	 Here	 I	 introduced	 contemporary	 Marxian	 approaches	 to	 the	
nature-value	nexus	and	also	more	recent	interest	in	the	conservation-value	nexus.	
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The	 latter	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 variously	 by	 authors	 as	 ‘neoliberal	 conservation’	
(Büscher	 et	 al.	 2012),	 or	 ‘post-modern	 ecological	 capital’,	 with	 a	 conservationist	
drive	(Escobar	1996:	56).	
Practices	 that	 flatten	biotic	heterogeneity	 into	discrete	and	quantifiable	units	are	
engaged	in	building	a	form	of	scientific	inventory	for	global	governance,	as	I	have	
detailed	 above.	 The	 propensity	 for	 this	 scientific	 inventory	 to	 convert	 into	
economic	‘inventory’	(Tsing	2015)	does	not	demand	such	a	sizable	conceptual	leap.	
I	propose	 that	 calculating	and	producing	 standardised	and	 stable	units	of	nature	
shapes	compatibilities	with	other	flat	and	interchangeable	systems	of	value	such	as	
money.	 My	 approach	 is	 summarised	 by	 Robertson	 (2011:	 388)	 in	 discussing	 the	
classification	 and	 valuation	 of	 wetlands	 as	 when	 a	 ‘Derridean	 concern	 with	 the	
ordering	of	appearances	could	speak	constructively	to	a	Marxian	concern	with	the	
constitution	of	abstraction’.		The	construction	of	abstract	spaces	and	the	definition	
of	boundaries	between	types	and	bits	of	 the	biological	 realm	 is	used	to	segregate	
nature	 out	 so	 that	 it	 increasingly	 becomes	 one	 that	 ‘capital	 can	 see’	 (Robertson	
2006).	 Therefore,	 in	 following	 Robertson	 (2012:	 388),	 I	 propose	 it	 is	 the	
‘technologies	of	measurement	and	abstraction	[that]	are	used	specifically	to	define	
adequate	bearers	of	value’	that	render	nature	visible,	and	valuable	in	new	ways.		
Robertson’s	 interest	 in	 the	 ‘technologies	 of	measurement	 and	 abstraction’	 in	 the	
production	 of	 value	 brings	 me	 squarely	 to	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 theoretical	
overview.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 turned	 to	 theoretical	 approaches	 better	 suited	 to	
addressing	questions	of	 ‘how’	(Bigger	and	Robertson	2017).	Underpinning	my	first	
and	 second	 research	 questions	 are	 sub-questions,	 such	 as	 how	 is	 it	 that	 these	
abstract	representations	of	biodiversity	emerge	and	are	sustained	over	time?	How	
do	they	stabilise	as	normative	facts?	Who	or	what,	has	agency	to	accomplish	these	
feats?	To	address	these	questions,	I	zoned	in	on	the	conceptual	resources	that	can	
account	for	the	role	of	social	as	well	as	the	material	components	in	socio-technical	
assemblages	 that	 have	 effects.	 Abstractions	 form	 but	 one	 of	 the	 multitude	 of	
actants	 within	 the	 assemblage	 of	 BDO.	 Figure	 2	 illustrates	 my	 conceptual	
framework.	
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Figure	2	Conceptual	schema	of	the	socio-technical	assemblages	of	BDO	
	
As	 I	 have	 explained,	 this	 thesis	 is	 concerned	 with	 discursive,	 material	 and	
institutional	 assemblages	 that	 convene	 to	 perform	BDO	as	 a	market	 instrument,	
and	with	this	-	to	determine	how	habitat	can	become	a	market	‘good’.	Additionally,	
I	 trace	 the	 tensions	 and	 counter-performativities	 that	 have	 emerged,	 and	 how	
actors	 attempt	 to	 overcome	 these	 in	 practice.	 The	 theoretical	 resources	 I	 have	
introduced	 provide	 me	 with	 a	 hybrid	 conceptual	 framework	 that	 draws	 on	
different	strengths	of	each	literature	for	its	explanatory	powers.	I	now	turn	towards	
my	 empirical	 strategy	 and	 explain	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 resources	 came	 to	
inform	my	methodological	approach.		
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CHAPTER	3		
EMPIRICAL	STRATEGY	
3.1	Introduction	
My	 study	 into	 the	 production	 of	 biodiversity	 values	 through	 offsetting	 under	 the	
DEFRA	 pilot	 study	 necessitated	 a	multi-sited	 approach.	 The	 research	 drew	 on	 the	
analytical	 frame	 of	 assemblages	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 how	 values	 are	 made	 through	
practices	 (the	production	of	 a	 ‘biodiversity	unit’),	 as	well	 as	 the	broader	discursive,	
institutional	and	material	elements	that	enabled	and	influenced	these	processes	(the	
development	of	BDO	policy).	 	The	sites	I	selected	include	three	case	studies,	which	
illustrate	 the	development	of	BDO	contracts	at	offsetting	sites	 involved	 in	 the	pilot	
study.	 These	 case	 studies	 trace	 the	 assemblages	 of	 offsetting	 practices	 in	 situ.	 In	
addition	 to	 these	 case	 studies,	 the	 research	 also	 visits	 the	 BBOP/	 DEFRA	 2014	
biodiversity	 offsetting	 conference,	To	 No	 Net	 Loss	 and	 Beyond.	 	 The	 latter	 was	 an	
important	 locus	 for	 the	 broader	 picture	 of	 BDO	 in	 England	 and	 internationally.	
Specifically	 the	 public	 debate	 it	 staged	 between	 advocates	 and	 critics	 of	 BDO	
provided	 a	 rich	 empirical	 site	 for	 exploring	moral-political	 value	 systems	 in	 which	
NNL	and	offsetting	are	advocated	and	contested.		
To	 explain	 the	 empirical	 strategy	 for	 this	 investigation	 I	 will	 first	 outline	 my	
methodology,	 contextualising	my	 approach	within	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 from	
the	prior	chapter.	 I	 then	justify	why	I	selected	my	case	study	sites	for	the	fieldwork	
and	 explain	 the	 phased	 approach	 in	which	 I	 engaged	with	 them.	 The	 next	 section	
presents	 my	 methods	 -	 drawing	 from	 interview,	 document	 analysis	 and	 event	
ethnography	and	the	means	by	which	I	organised,	ordered	and	analysed	the	data	to	
respond	 to	 my	 research	 questions.	 The	 chapter	 closes	 with	 methodological	
reflections	and	a	discussion	over	the	limitations	of	the	approach.	
3.2	Methodology	
My	 enquiry	 into	 the	 production	 of	 value	 from	 biodiversity	 primarily	 drew	 on	
‘qualitative	 methods	 to	 study	 the	 quantitative’	 (Kjellburg	 and	 Mallard	 2013:	 28).		
Perhaps	it	is	more	accurate	to	describe	this	research	as	an	investigation	into	how	‘the	
quantitative’	 is	 actually	 made.	 Taking	 my	 cue	 from	 Muniesa	 (2012,	 cited	 by	
Fredriksen	2014),	who	argued	that	such	an	approach	is	consistent	with	a	pragmatist	
tradition	associated	with	John	Dewey	who	emphasises	the	need	to	replace	the	notion	
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of	value	(as	something	that	objectively	exists)	with	the	act	of	valuation	(as	something	
performed	or	 practiced).	 The	 emphasis	 therefore,	 is	 squarely	 placed	 on	 the	 idea	 of	
action	-	on	acts	and	agency.	Thus,	as	discussed	in	the	prior	chapter	the	starting	point	
for	 this	 enquiry	 is	 the	 agencement	 -	 the	 active	 processes	 of	 assembling	 socio-
technical	hybrids,	which	have	performative	effects.	The	outcomes	I	am	interested	in	
are	the	ways	in	which	the	economic	 ‘x’	 is	made,	the	processes	that	qualify	things	as	
‘economic’	 or	 valuable,	 which	 elements	 or	 actants	 do	 significant	 work	 in	 these	
relational	 networks	 and	 how.	 Table	 1	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 frames	 the	 most	
important	 actors	 and	 actants	 of	 the	 English	 BDO	 networks	 comprising	 the	
assemblages	my	empirical	strategy	sought	to	trace.	Latour	(1993:	20)	suggests	that	to	
explore	 the	 effects	 of	 relations	 coming	 together	 under	 assemblages	we	must	 ‘leave	
the	 confines	 of	 intellectual	 history	 and	 pass	 from	 the	 world	 of	 opinions	 and	
arguments	to	the	world	of	practices	and	networks’.	It	is	the	practices	and	networks	of	
elements	 configuring	under	 the	 label	 of	 ‘biodiversity	 offsetting’	 that	 form	 the	basis	
for	my	qualitative	methodology.	
If	value	is	something	afforded	by	the	practices	of	measurement	(Mallard	1998,	Bigger	
and	Robertson	2017),	then	the	starting	point	is	not	so	much	on	what	is	being	valued	
but	how	it	 is	defined	as	valuable.	 In	an	effort	 to	 follow	the	metrological	practices,	a	
large	focus	of	my	research	is	centered	on	the	role	of	calculative	devices	(Callon	2007)	
–	 as	 new	 techniques	 of	 quantification.	 Along	 with	 investigating	 the	 institutional	
assemblages	 such	 as	 the	 arrangements	 of	 people,	 policies,	 standards,	 rules	 and	
organisations	 -	 the	 research	also	 sought	 to	explore	 the	discursive	 framings	of	 value	
and	 normative	 and	 moral	 imperatives	 that	 configure	 within	 institutional	
assemblages.	 For	 example,	 I	 was	 interested	 by	 how	 actors	 managed	 tensions	 or	
barriers	to	their	attempts	to	value	biodiversity	through	offsetting	such	that	the	socio-
technical	 network	 was	 extended	 and	 BDO	 continued	 to	 appear	 coherent.	 In	 other	
words,	how	was	an	ethical	consensus	built?	
In	 mapping	 these	 networks	 of	 relations,	 Latour	 (2005:	 27)	 suggests	 that	 the	
researcher	should	start	‘in	the	middle	of	things’	and	then	travel	from	‘one	spot	to	the	
next’.	For	the	purposes	of	my	enquiry,	however	the	starting	point	was	necessarily	the	
specific	 sites	 enrolled	 as	pilot	participants	of	 the	DEFRA	 study	 (shown	 in	Table	 3).	
The	DEFRA	pilot	sites	were	my	gateways	to	the	assemblages	of	value	making	in	situ.	
So	as	to	observe	the	specific	practices	of	valuation	empirically,	I	needed	to	get	close	
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to	 the	 actual	 valuation	 processes.	 My	 intention	 was	 to	 observe	 how	 numeric	 and	
economic	values	were	made	and	then	travelled	through	the	network,	how	they	were	
translated	 at	 certain	 points	 across	 elements	 and	 between	 actors.	 The	 way	 these	
processes	unfolded	over	time	shaped	my	research	design	and	underlined	my	reasons	
for	exploring	offsetting	through	in	depth	case	studies	and	specifically	those	where	a	
full	 offset	 contract	 was	 underway.	 A	 methodology	 that	 entailed	 the	 building	 of	
detailed	 case	 studies	 over	 a	 period	 of	 many	 months	 allowed	 me	 to	 observe	 the	
contextual	content	of	BDO	contracts	in	specific	places	and	document	the	complexity	
and	changes	over	time.	The	building	of	case	studies	also	provided	a	means	by	which	I	
could	 follow	 the	 production,	 negotiation	 and	 circulation	 of	 values	 empirically	 and	
entailed	 following	 the	 relevant	 actors	 and	 actants	 and	 their	 work.	 Detailed	 case	
studies	 were	 appropriate	 because	 thinking	 about	 value	 in	 terms	 of	 assemblage	
requires	a	focus	on	actual	situated	practices	and	relations	(Fredriksen	2014:	4).		
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Table	3	The	DEFRA	pilot	sites	
Local	planning	authorities	 Devon	
1. Exeter	and	East	
Devon	Growth	Point	
2. South	Devon	
3. North	Devon	
UNESCO	Biosphere	
Reserve	
	
Doncaster	
Essex	
Greater	Norwich	
Nottinghamshire	
Warwickshire,	Coventry	and	
Solihull	
Complementary	pilot	sites	 Atkins	 Construction	
Aggregate	Industries	 Mineral	extraction	
Balfour	Beatty	 Construction	
Eco	Box	and	Code	7	
Consulting	
Ecological	consultancies	to	
large	residential	developers	
Golder	Associates	 Mineral	extraction	
Somerset	Biodiversity	
Partnership	
Range	of	local	authorities,	
private	entities	and	
conservation	agencies	
Worcestershire	County	
Council	
Local	authority	
DEFRA	demonstration	
project	
Thameslink	Programme	 Rail	infrastructure,	south-
east	of	England	and	London	
Source:	Author	
To	 explore	 the	 production	 of	 value	 under	 offsetting	 in	 the	DEFRA	 pilot	 I	 selected	
three	pilot	sites	as	the	basis	for	detailed	case	studies.	I	built	my	first	two	case	studies	
around	the	Warwickshire,	Coventry	and	Solihull	(WCS)	and	South	Devon	pilot	sites	
(chapters	5	and	6	respectively).	These	two	sites	comprise	two	of	the	six	overall	local	
government	 planning	 authorities	 (LPAs)	 participating	 in	 DEFRA’s	 study	 shown	 in	
Table	 3.	 The	 third	 case	 study	 (chapter	 7)	 is	 based	on	 a	 voluntary	private	 offsetting	
arrangement	 within	 Thameslink	 Programme	 (one	 of	 three	 contemporary	
infrastructure	operations	within	Network	Rail).	 I	 provide	 contextual	detail	 for	 each	
case	 study	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 chapter	 in	which	 they	 are	 presented.	 The	 latter	
69  
case	proved	an	important	counterpoint	to	the	prior	two	cases	in	that	BDO	here	was	
entirely	unrelated	 to	obtaining	planning	permission,	 existing	 as	part	of	 a	 voluntary	
corporate	sustainability	agenda.	The	rationales,	actors,	processes	and	broader	context	
are	therefore	distinct	at	Thameslink	Programme	to	the	others.	This	makes	chapter	7	
comparatively	 interesting	 and	 relevant	 to	 understanding	 the	 implications	 for	 value	
making	 in	 conservation	 in	 a	 voluntary	 capacity.	 Thameslink	 Programme	 was	 also	
significant	 to	 the	 DEFRA	 pilot	 study	 since	 it	 became	 the	 official	 demonstration	
project	and	therefore	assumed	an	elevated	position	overall.	
Before	moving	 on	 to	 describe	my	methods	 for	 building	 the	 case	 studies	 as	well	 as	
some	 of	 the	 ethical	 and	 political	 components	 of	 this	 empirical	 work,	 I	 will	 briefly	
outline	the	phases	of	my	research	to	explain	how	I	selected	these	case	studies	within	
the	broader	outline	of	my	methodology.		
Phase	1.		
In	 the	preliminary	 round	of	 research	 I	 sought	 to	 familiarise	myself	with	 the	DEFRA	
pilot	and	to	initiate	the	sampling	process	for	the	development	of	detailed	case	studies	
later	on.	Between	April	2013	to	January	2014	I	interviewed	individuals	from	the	ecology	
or	green	infrastructure	departments	of	county	or	district	councils	where	pilot	sites	had	
been	established.	Of	the	six	overall	pilot	sites,	during	this	stage	I	made	contact	with	
five	pilot	 leaders	as	well	as	an	Environment	Bank	officer	 located	at	the	WCS	pilot.	 I	
also	interviewed	five	individuals	from	four	of	the	seven	complementary	pilot	sites.	It	
became	 apparent	 during	 this	 preliminary	 phase	 that	 little	 in	 the	 way	 of	 actual	
offsetting	 had	 been	 initiated	 during	 the	 pilot	 period.	 There	were	 also	 considerable	
disparities	 between	 different	 sites	 within	 the	 pilot	 -	 some	 had	 almost	 no	 practical	
experience	 to	 report	 and	 in	 these	 cases	my	 interview	questions	necessarily	dwelled	
over	my	respondent’s	views	on	and	expectations	for	the	policy	as	well	as	the	reasons	
for	a	the	slow	development	of	offsetting.			
I	had	originally	envisaged	that	I	would	develop	six	cases	of	specific	offset	contracts.	
Although,	 almost	 two	 years	 into	 the	 DEFRA	 pilot	 study,	 not	 a	 single	 site	 had	
achieved	a	full	offset	contract	where	the	units	associated	with	development	impacts	
had	 been	 matched	 to	 units	 created	 at	 a	 receptor	 site.	 This	 disparity	 in	 progress	
between	sites	as	well	as	the	paucity	of	actual	offset	contracts	forms	part	of	the	story	
in	the	chapters	that	follow.	Following	these	preliminary	interviews	and	the	associated	
desk	 based	 research,	 I	 selected	 two	of	 the	DEFRA	 pilot	 sites	 as	well	 as	 the	DEFRA	
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demonstration	complementary	 site	 (Thameslink	Programme)	 for	 the	compilation	of	
detailed	case	studies.	My	selection	was	based	primarily	on	the	comparative	progress	of	
these	 sites	 in	 trialling	 offsetting.	 By	 progress	 I	 refer	 to	 the	 availability	 of	 data	 and	
evidence	 pertaining	 to	 the	 scoring	 and	 negotiation	 processes	 involved	 with	
biodiversity	 impact	 as	well	 as	 receptor	 site	 biodiversity	 unit	 calculations.	Settling	 at	
three	 rather	 than	 six	 case	 studies	 also	 seemed	 appropriate	 given	 the	 unexpected	
richness	and	detail	of	each.	
The	liveliness	and	the	fast	paced	nature	of	the	policy	field	underlined	a	perceived	time	
pressure	to	begin	interviewing	very	early	on	in	the	overall	doctoral	research.		The	two	
year	DEFRA	pilot	had	already	been	underway	for	eight	months	when	I	started	my	PhD	
and	 I	was	 anxious	 to	 allow	myself	 the	 time	 to	 follow	arrangements	during	 the	pilot	
period.	 Jumping	 in	 at	 this	 initial	 phase	 proved	 extremely	 valuable	 for	 guiding	 my	
research	 design	 and	 bringing	 some	 of	 the	 relevant	 empirical	 literature	 to	 life	 in	
tandem	 with	 this	 initial	 data	 collection.	 In	 particular,	 I	 was	 inspired	 by	 Morgan	
Robertson’s	(2ooo,	2004,	2012)	work	that	followed	the	practical	and	political	processes	
involved	in	the	construction	of	wetland	mitigation	markets	in	the	US.		
Contrary	to	my	early	concerns,	however,	there	was	no	actual	‘cut	off ’	point	from	April	
2014	when	the	pilot	finished	and	when	offsetting	would	suddenly	end.	Indeed	much	of	
the	 actual	 data	 that	 I	 collected	 and	 present	 within	 this	 thesis	 was	 connected	 with	
events	towards	the	very	end	of	and	after	the	pilot	period	as	the	LPAs	were	just	getting	
their	projects	underway.	The	official	pilot	phase	revealed	as	much	about	the	barriers	to	
shift	LPA	institutional	processes	towards	offsetting	as	actually	doing	it,	perhaps	even	
more.	
Phase	2.		
After	selecting	my	three	in	depth	case	studies,	between	January	2014	to	January	2016	I	
made	repeated	site	visits	to	observe	BDO	related	scoring	activities	and	negotiations	at	
the	three	sites.	During	these	visits	I	conducted	semi-structured	interviews	(see	Table	4	
below	 in	 Methods),	 examined	 planning	 documents	 and	 biodiversity	 impact	
assessments	 (the	 DEFRA	 metric)	 as	 well	 as	 observing	 public	 planning	 committee	
meetings.	This	triad	of	methods	formed	the	basis	of	my	three	detailed	case	histories	
that	tracked	the	design	and	development	of	offset	contracts	in	England	from	2013	to	
early	2016.	 I	 examined	 the	processes	used	 to	make	biodiversity	 calculations	 so	 that	
biodiversity	 values	 could	 be	 referred	 to	 in	 terms	 of	 losses	 or	 gains	 (or	 yields)	 and	
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prices	 could	 be	 assigned	 to	 different	 sites	 in	 the	 offset	 agreement	 for	 a	 particular	
offset	 contract.	 These	 values	 and	 prices	 were	 often	 negotiated	 over	 a	 period	 of	
months.		
I	drew	on	multiple	sources	of	data.		Text	and	talk	communications	with	respondents	
included	semi-structured	and	un-structured	interviews	as	well	as	quicker	‘catch	ups’	
via	emails	or	telephone	calls.	Document	analysis	was	central	to	filling	in	knowledge	
gaps	 or	 showing	me	 where	 a	 lot	 of	 the	 action	 had	 happened.	 I	 analysed	 planning	
documents	 accessible	 from	 the	 local	 planning	 authorities’	 web	 portals,	 campaign	
group	 web	 communications	 and	 consultant	 ecologist	 reports	 to	 describe	 the	
development	site	and	to	present	in	detail,	the	metric	calculations	in	the	biodiversity	
impact	assessment	(BIA).	I	frequently	relied	on	documents	that	my	respondents	sent	
me,	 such	 as	 PowerPoint	 presentations	 of	 talks	 they	 had	 given	 or	 in-house	 analysis	
they	 had	 undertaken	 on	 the	 actual	 BIA	 spread	 sheets.	 I	 also	 focused	 on	 the	
negotiation	process	that	ensued	regarding	the	levels	of	mitigation	and	compensation	
payments	 required	 and	 on	 the	 biodiversity	 yields	 projected	 to	 arise	 from	 these	
transactions.	 I	 followed	 the	 specific	 roles	of	 actors,	how	 these	 changed,	which	new	
actors	were	enrolled	and	why.		
The	research	data	collection	triangulated	(Denzin	1970)	across	numerous	sources	and	
several	methodologies	to	build	a	detailed	comparative	case	study	analysis	of	different	
pilot	study	areas.	I	conducted	46	interviews	over	phases	1	and	2,	with	many	of	them	
repeated	with	the	same	respondent.	For	example,	I	spoke	with	the	South	Devon	pilot	
lead	 five	 times.	 This	 total	 interview	 schedule	 breaks	 down	 as	 nineteen	 with	WCS,	
fifteen	 with	 South	 Devon,	 six	 with	 Thameslink	 Programme	 and	 six	 with	 the	
complementary	 pilots.	The	 total	 sample	 size	 of	 respondents	 was	 26,	 which		
comprised	nine	respondents	in	Devon,	eight	in	WCS,	four	at	Thameslink	Programme	
and	five	from	the	complementary	pilots.	
Phase	3.		
A	 third	 and	 on-going	 research	 phase	 entailed;	 textual	 analysis	 of	 documents	
connected	with	BDO	policy	in	England	more	generally,	further	interviews	with	four	
stakeholders	 unrelated	 to	 specific	 offset	 arrangements,	 and	 the	 collection	 of	 data	
from	 participant	 observation	 at	 relevant	 events	 and	 conferences.	 This	 phase	 was	
weighted	towards	the	latter	approach	with	a	focus	on	event	ethnography.	In	general,	
72  
it	was	concerned	the	wider	assemblages	of	BDO	away	from	specific	value	production	
within	the	contracts	at	DEFRA	pilot	sites.		
I	expand	on	the	interview,	textual	analysis	and	event	ethnography	methods	below.	
3.3	Methods	
Interview	
Having	 identified	 case	 studies	 and	 individuals	 to	 interview,	 I	 approached	 my	
respondents	 through	 email	 or	 telephone	 to	 explain	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 research	 and	
request	 an	 interview.	 If	 they	 accepted	 before	 the	 research	 started,	 I	 sent	 a	 plain	
language	 research	 summary	 and	 an	 ethics	 consent	 form,	 explaining	 the	 right	 to	
withdraw	from	the	process,	research	confidentiality,	anonymity10.	The	data	collection	
entailed	 repeat	 calls	 or	 visits	 across	 all	 the	DEFRA	pilot	 sites	 selected	 for	 in	 depth	
observations	 and	 interviews.	 I	 repeated	 the	 interviews	 with	 the	 pilot	 leader	 or	
another	central	respondent	but	I	frequently	also	visited	the	area	of	the	pilot,	 if	only	
to	 get	 a	 better	 sense	 of	 actors’	 organisational	 settings	 as	 well	 as	 to	 observe	 the	
context	 of	 development	 sites	 in	 question.	 Looking	 back	 now,	 it	 seemed	 naïve	 to	
imagine	I	would	be	able	to	perform	repeat	interviews	with	the	same	person	monthly	
or	bi-monthly.	Such	a	frequency	would	have	been	an	impossible	demand	for	my	key	
respondents	 and	 in	 any	 case,	 given	 the	 snail	 pace	 at	 which	 things	 were	 moving	 I	
doubt	how	much	there	would	have	been	to	actually	follow.	I	cross-referenced	what	I	
was	finding	out	in	the	interviews	against	public	planning	archives	and	findings	from	
interviews	 with	 other	 stakeholders	 (e.g.	 the	 developer	 or	 the	 local	 residents).	
Questions	 and	 interview	 style	 were	 oriented	 towards	 identifying	 the	 ‘what’,	 ‘how’,	
‘who’,	 ‘why’	and	 ‘when’	aspects	of	both	the	 impacted	site	under	planning	as	well	as	
the	proposed	offset	sites.		
During	the	interview,	things	frequently	emerged	that	I	had	not	anticipated,	requiring	
me	to	think	on	my	feet	so	that	the	interview	could	flow.	If	a	new	actor	had	entered	
the	 picture	 (as	 was	 the	 case	 in	 Warwickshire	 when	 an	 offset	 broker	 was	 sub-
contracted)	 I	 allowed	my	 sample	 to	 snowball.	 The	 goal	 was	 to	 assemble	 as	 much	
																																																						
10 The	names	of	my	respondents	have	been	anonymised	 in	 this	 thesis,	however,	 for	
the	purposes	of	presenting	 the	case	 study	contexts,	 the	 locations	and	organisations	
have	 not	 been.	 Nevertheless,	 I	 have	 and	 will	 continue	 to	 anonymise	 these	 other	
factors	 for	 published	 work,	 such	 as	 Carver	 and	 Sullivan	 (2017)	 and	 Carver	 and	
Sullivan	forthcoming.  
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technical	information	as	possible	over	a	period	of	time	regarding	both	sites	of	impact	
and	gain	and	to	obtain	the	metric	data	for	the	ecological	loss,	the	baseline	and	target	
improvements	to	understand	the	way	that	 ‘value’	was	transferred.	Very	often	 it	was	
difficult	 to	 get	 at	 specific	 facets	 of	 this	 datum	 as	 one	 respondent	 would	 suggest	 I	
needed	to	gain	permission	from	another	before	it	could	be	released.	Examples	might	
include	 Biodiversity	 Offset	 Management	 Plans	 or	 offset	 price	 data.	 Since	 elite	
interviewees	 are	 typically	 connected	 to	 each	 other	 through	 larger	 networks	 and	
structures	 (Cormode	 and	 Hughes	 1999),	 many	 of	 my	 respondents	 were	 already	 in	
touch	 commercially	 or	 professionally.	 These	 connections	 meant	 that	 I	 needed	 to	
display	sensitivity	to	the	power	relations	and	hierarchies	between	respondents	as	well	
as	being	discrete	about	my	conversations	with	other	individuals	involved	in	the	same	
planning	case.	
I	 generally	 aimed	 to	 meet	 respondents	 face	 to	 face	 and	 on	 such	 occasions	 I	 was	
usually	 hosted	 at	 their	 offices.	 Occasionally	 an	 interview	 took	 place	 while	 walking	
around	an	offset	site,	a	local	café	or	eating	sandwiches	outside	on	a	summer’s	day	(I	
have	already	noted	that	LPAs	are	time	poor	and	a	quick	lunch	might	be	the	only	way	
to	achieve	a	diary	 slot).	Quite	 frequently	an	 interview	would	 include	speaking	with	
two	people	at	once	if	both	respondents	had	been	involved	in	the	project.	These	group	
interviews	 inevitably	 became	more	 conversational.	 Except	 where	 it	 was	 impossible	
(due	 to	 a	 technical	 hitch	 or	 sound	 interference)	 I	 recorded	 the	 interviews	 and	
transcribed	 them	as	 soon	as	possible	afterwards.	The	 time	 it	 took	 to	 transcribe	 the	
interview	 permitted	 me	 to	 reflect	 on	 and	 develop	 closeness	 to	 the	 data	 and	
consequently	 enabled	me	 to	 begin	 identifying	 themes	 as	 the	 case	 study	 narratives	
were	emerging.	
I	organised	interviewees	 into	stakeholder	categories	(regional	and	local	government,	
the	private	sector	and	civil	society)	and	nine	subcategories	(see	Table	4).	In	referring	
to	 interview	transcripts	throughout	the	thesis,	stakeholder	categories	 for	the	DEFRA	
pilot	 sites	 are	 abbreviated	 to	 indicate	 the	 pilot	 site	 they	 relate	 to	 (of	 the	 six	 local	
planning	authorities	[LPA]	that	took	part	in	the	pilot).	The	complementary	voluntary	
pilot	 site	 is	 denoted	 by	 TLP	 (Thameslink	 Programme).	 Sequential	 codes	 for	
interviewees	 follow	 the	 format	 of	 stakeholder	 sub-category,	 the	 individual	 within	
that	 site,	 and	 date	 of	 interview	 and	 the	 pilot	 site	 (e.g.,	 LPA3-SD	 130515	means	 the	
third	individual	interviewed	within	the	LPA	stakeholder	category	at	South	Devon,	on	
13	May	2015).	In	the	Thameslink	Programme	case	study,	which	was	a	‘complementary’	
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(non	LPA)	pilot	in	chapter	8,	I	use	the	acronym	TLP	to	denote	the	actors	associated	
with	 this	 (CE-TLP	 241114,	 indicating	 the	 TLP	 consultant	 ecologist	 on	 24	November	
2014).	Interviews	with	individuals	not	directly	connected	with	the	any	of	the	DEFRA	
pilot	sites	are	coded	according	to	their	institutional	attachment	but	without	a	DEFRA	
pilot	 code,	 e.g.	 WCS,	 SD	 or	 TLP,	 attached	 to	 them,	 but	 simply	 a	 number	 to	
differentiate	different	individuals.		
Table	4	Category	and	subcategory	of	case	study	interviewees	and	category	code	
	
Categories	
	
Sub	categories	
Regional	and	
Local	
Government	
Local	
Planning	
Authority	
(LPA)	
Natural	
England		
(NE)	
	
	
	
Private	Sector	 Developers	
(DEV)	
Consultant	
Ecologists	(CE)	
Planning	
Consultants	(PC)	
Offset	
Brokers	
(OB)	
Civil	Society	 Conservation	
and	Wildlife	
NGOs	(NGO)	
Local	
Residents	(LR)	
Landowning	
Offset	Providers	
(OP)	
	
Source:	Author	
Although	 the	 data	 I	 present	 in	 the	 case	 study	 examples	 are	 built	 from	 three	main	
pilot	sites,	my	insights	benefited	from	the	broader	data	set	collected	from	phase	one.			
Document	analysis	
As	already	discussed,	my	 research	 relied	heavily	on	document	 and	 textual	 analysis,	
which	frequently	included	analysing	both	documents’	content	as	well	as	their	format.	
This	 included	 analysing	 different	 versions	 of	 the	 filled	 out	 DEFRA	 metric	 for	 the	
specific	 cases	 I	 was	 following.	 Sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘Biodiversity	 Impact	
Assessment’	(BIA)	and	presented	in	Excel	spread	sheets,	these	documents	contained	
all	of	the	biodiversity	impact,	mitigation	and	target	creation	scores	for	development	
or	 offset	 sites.	 Sometimes	 these	 spread	 sheets	 stretched	over	 three	 or	 four	 pages.	 I	
printed	 and	 cello-taped	 these	 pages	 together	 so	 as	 to	 make	 detailed	 notes,	
calculations	 and	 comparisons	 on.	 I	 found	 that	 I	 needed	 to	 frequently	 oscillate	
between	 these	 texts	 and	 artefacts	 and	my	 interviewees	 who	may	 have	 created	 the	
documents	 so	 as	 to	 follow	up	on	questions	 that	 the	 texts	opened	up.	Other	 texts	 I	
analysed	 included	 official	 central	 and	 local	 government	 policy	 documents,	 policy	
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reports,	digitalised	planning	data	archives	containing	all	the	documents	created	over	
the	course	of	the	planning	process	(usually	in	an	overwhelming	quantity),	newspaper	
or	web	 news	 articles,	 professional	 association	 and	 industry	white	 papers	 and	NGO	
and	academic	texts.	
The	offset	process	generated	its	own	specific	paper	trail.	Apart	from	the	Biodiversity	
Impact	 Assessments	 already	 mentioned,	 this	 included	 Biodiversity	 Offset	
Management	Plans	 	 (BOMP).	 BOMPs	 stipulate	 the	proposed	habitat	 creation	work	
along	with	the	administrative	and	governance	arrangements	 for	the	offsets.	BOMPs	
might	 also	 contain	 the	 itemised	 costings	 of	 the	 habitat	 creation	 work	 (the	 offset).		
Other	documents	I	analysed	included	local	biodiversity	offset	strategies	and	policies.	
Event	ethnography	
So	 as	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 wider	 institutional	 and	 policy	 landscape	 associated	
with	the	development	BDO	in	England	I	 immersed	myself	 in	relevant	policy	events	
and	 conferences.	 Here	 I	 took	 inspiration	 from	 the	 emergent	 and	 vibrant	
methodological	field	of	event	ethnographies	(Brosius	and	Campbell	2010,	Campbell	et	
al.	2014,	Corson	et	al.	2014).	I	treated	these	events	as	windows	into	the	politics	of	the	
development	 of	 scientific,	 policy	 and	 corporate	 networks	 comprising	 the	
consolidating	 field	 of	NNL	 and	biodiversity	 offsetting	 (Campbell	 et	 al.	 2014).	 	 Such	
events	 after	 all,	 are	 important	 ‘nodes’	 in	 BDO	 networks	 (ibid.),	 where	 epistemic	
communities	align	and	where	their	 ‘ideological	work	is	partly	done’	 	(Campbell	and	
Brosius	 2010:	 247).	 Meetings	 are	 also	 active	 political	 spaces	 and	 technologies	 of	
spectacle	 	 (Campbell	 et	 al.	 2014,	 Wilshusen	 and	 MacDonald	 2015,)	 since	 they	 are	
frequently	designed	to	build	legitimacy	over	the	topic	for	which	they	are	convened.		
Events	also	formed	a	methodological	focus	for	exploring	the	way	actors	were	related	
to	 the	 to	 specific	 case	 studies	 I	 present,	 through	 the	 way	 they	 engage	with	 public	
platforms	 to	 reach	 wider	 epistemic	 BDO	 communities,	 often	 across	 professional	
sectors.	Studying	these	contexts	entailed	tracking	actors’	public	communications	and	
analysing	the	content	of	their	presentations	and	PowerPoint	slides.	Throughout	the	
research	 period,	 I	 was	 also	 a	 frequent	 virtual	 attendee	 of	 BBOP’s	 community	 of	
practice	webinars	and	 in	particular	 those	webinars	hosted	by	 individuals	connected	
with	my	three	case	studies.	
The	full	list	of	events	I	attended	as	a	participant	and	observer	exceeded	those	relating	
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to	BDO	and	NNL	but	 related	 to	 the	broader	 field	 of	 business	 and	biodiversity	 and	
specifically	 the	 valuation	 of	 ‘natural	 capital’.	 These	 events	 included	 both	 ‘insider’	
events	 for	 BDO’s	 epistemic	 communities,	 as	 well	 as	 campaign	 and	 activist	 related	
civil	 society	events.	All	of	 the	conference	 field	sites	 I	attended	are	 listed	 in	Table	5.	
While	this	thesis	presents	data	from	the	NNL	Summit	and	the	Counter-forum	in	June	
2014	 my	 reflections	 and	 insights	 are	 built	 from	 observations	 collected	 from	 the	
broader	series	of	events.	While	I	attended	conferences	ethnographically,	sensitive	to	
their	 ‘inner	 dynamics	 of	 micro	 politics’	 	 (Schatz	 2009:	 305),	 I	 also	 conducted	
structured	discourse	analysis	on	the	public	debate	at	the	NNL	Summit.	Read	through	
the	 lens	of	 the	pragmatic	sociology	of	critique	(Boltasnki	and	Thévenot	 1999,	2006)	
this	discourse	analysis	forms	the	basis	for	my	investigation	into	the	architectures	of	
argumentation	 sustaining	 the	 political-moral	 dispute	 over	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 in	
chapter	8.	I	transcribed	the	recording	of	the	debate	published	on	the	BBOP	website	
as	 the	basis	 of	 the	data.	 So	 that	 this	 research	method	 can	be	 read	 closely	with	 the	
theoretical	literatures	it	is	informed	by,	I	describe	the	pragmatic	sociology	of	critique	
more	fully	in	chapter	8.	
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Table	5	Author	participation	in	‘valuation	of	nature’	conferences	2013-2015	
Event	 Date	 Location	
Civil	Society	Consultation	Event	on	Biodiversity	Offsetting,	
hosted	by	FERN	International	and	Re:	Common	
24	&	25th	
October	2013	
Brussels	
The	(first)	World	Forum	for	Natural	Capital,	hosted	by	the	
Scottish	Wildlife	Trust	
23	&	24th	
November	
2013	
Edinburgh	
Nature	is	Not	for	Sale!	Civil	Society	Counter	Forum,	hosted	
by	FERN	International	and	the	World	Development	
Movement	
2nd	June	2014	 London	
To	No	Net	Loss	of	Biodiversity	and	Beyond:	The	first	global	
conference	on	approaches	to	avoid,	minimise,	restore	and	
offset	biodiversity	loss,	hosted	by	BBOP,	DEFRA,	Forest	
Trends	and	ZSL	
3	&	4th	June	
2014	
London	
Workshop	on	Systems	Change,	Natural	Capital	and	Policy	
Making,	hosted	by	The	Natural	Capital	Coalition	
	30th	July	2015	 London	
The	World	Forum	for	Natural	Capital,	hosted	by	Scottish	
Wildlife	Trust	
23	&	24th	
November	
2015	
Edinburgh	
Conservation	in	the	21st	Century:	The	why,	what	and	how	
of	natural	capital.	Hosted	by	The	Wildlife	Trusts	
25th	November	
2015	
Edinburgh	
Strategy	Meeting	on	Biodiversity	and	Carbon	offsetting,	
hosted	by	Re:	Common	and	Counter	Balance	
7th	December	
2016	
Brussels	
	
3.4	Ordering	the	data	
Managing	and	categorising	data	using	CAQDAS	
The	 data	 coding	 to	 enable	 the	 creation	 of	 concepts	 and	 categories	 and	 their	
comparisons	 (Bryman	 2012)	 was	 assisted	 with	 a	 cloud	 based	 CAQDAS	 (computer	
assisted	qualitative	data	 analysis	 software)	 called	Dedoose11.	 I	uploaded	data	 sets	of	
interview	transcripts,	relevant	texts,	documents	and	passages,	field	notes,	and	those	
from	 planning	 archives	 to	 the	 programme	 so	 as	 to	 ‘label,	 separate,	 compile	 and	
organise	the	data’	(Charmas	1983:	186)	(emphasis	in	original).	As	a	means	of	ordering	
																																																						
11	www.dedoose.com		
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and	 structuring	 the	 data,	 Dedoose	 enables	 close	 scrutiny	 of	 the	 transcripts	 for	
comparative	 analysis.	 In	 addition,	 the	 software’s	 data	 visualisation	 features	 enable	
the	creation	of	a	range	of	charts	and	graphics	that	are	downloadable	so	as	to	identify	
patterns.	 The	 paradox	 of	 using	 a	 coding	 and	 classification	 approach,	 however,	 in	 a	
study	 considering	 the	 performativity	 of	 measurement	 systems	 and	 the	 occlusions	
sustained	 by	 categorisation	 was	 not	 lost	 on	 me.	 During	 my	 use	 of	 Dedoose	 I	
discovered	 that	 the	 process	 of	 imposing	 categories	 and	 codes	 depends	 on	 drawing	
sometimes	unstable	boundaries	and	frames	around	ideas,	equating	loosely	connected	
concepts	with	others	and	systematically	generalising	and	abstracting	upwards	in	the	
search	for	meaning	and	order.		
Writing	up	
Along	with	 the	 coding	exercises	on	 the	 software	programme	Dedoose,	many	of	my	
insights	emerged	through	the	writing	up	of	case	studies	into	narrative	chronologies.	
The	 organising	 and	 arranging	 of	 triangulated	 sources	 of	 data	 over	 three	 years	 of	
research	 into	 narrative	 story	 lines	 was	 a	 painfully	 slow	 process	 but	 thereby	 also	 a	
productive	 form	of	analysis.	The	mere	challenge	of	ordering	 the	data	 into	coherent	
narratives	 enabled	 a	 certain	 closeness	 such	 that	 I	 could	 spot	 patterns	 and	 themes	
often	without	 the	help	of	 the	Dedoose.	For	 this	 reason,	 I	 found	Dedoose	 to	be	 less	
useful	for	the	compiling	of	the	case	studies.	Where	it	was	invaluable,	however,	was	in	
the	structured	textual	analysis	of	the	transcripts	from	the	debate	at	the	NNL	Summit	
comprising	chapter	8.	During	this	analysis	I	subjected	the	data	of	the	debate	a	series	
of	 inductive	 and	 deductively	 originated	 codes	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 quantitative	
comparison.		
Many	similar	and	overlapping	themes	emerged	from	the	case	studies,	which	indicates	
that	in	unity,	the	explanatory	capacity	of	these	cases	are	greater	than	the	sum	of	their	
parts.	 For	 this	 reason,	 throughout	writing	 this	 thesis	 I	 deliberated	 over	whether	 to	
present	my	data	 thematically	or	as	bounded	 individual	case	studies.	 I	opted	 for	 the	
latter	because	the	story	lines	and	temporal	components	were	crucial	to	contextualise	
the	nuance	of	the	practices	actors	were	engaged	in.	Thus,	while	there	are	divergences	
and	distinctive	features	within	each	case	study,	several	patterns	stood	out	across	all	
three	pilot	case	studies.		
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3.5	Methodological	reflections	
Reflecting	on	my	own	practices	of	knowledge	production	is	consistent	with	the	post-
structural	 and	 critical	 approach	 that	 this	 enquiry	 draws	 from	 (Rose,	 1997,	 Burawoy	
1998,	 Peck	 and	Theadore	 2012,).	My	 reflections	were	 oriented	 towards	 both	 ethical	
and	methodological	issues.	A	preponderant	theme	for	this	reflection	was	the	issue	of	
‘researching	 up’	 (Smith	 2006),	 by	 focussing	 on	 the	 policy	 ‘elite’	 (Cormode	 and	
Hughes	 1999,	Smith	2006,	Hanson,	Thiem	and	Robertson	2010).	 In	particular	 I	was	
interested	 in	 the	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 engaging	 with	 critical	 political,	
potentially	 even	 ‘oppositional’	 research,	 as	well	 as	my	 subjectivity	 and	positionality	
(Hanson,	Thiem	and	Robertson	 2010).	The	 individuals	participating	 in	my	 research	
were,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 occupied	 in	 positions	 of	 relative	 seniority	 and	 power,	 as	
central	or	local	government	officers,	senior	NGO	conservation	personnel,	consultants	
and	 managers.	 David	 Mosse	 (2006)	 writes	 about	 the	 tensions	 that	 emerge	 as	
fieldworkers	 inadvertently	 betray	 the	 trust,	 rapport	 and	 confidence	 they	 have	
deliberately	 or	 inadvertently	 established	 with	 respondents	 as	 they	 distance	
themselves	from	the	process	while	performing	the	analysis.		
Some	 interviewees	 were	 more	 guarded	 than	 others,	 NGOs	 and	 private	 sector	
organisations	 for	example	 tended	be	more	 restrained,	LPA’s	 less	 so.	All	 the	 same,	 I	
was	surprised	and	grateful	at	how	amenable	and	generous	many	of	my	respondents	
were,	indeed	this	fact	can	not	be	overlooked	in	considering	the	biases	within	the	case	
study	selection.	As	described	above,	 I	 selected	case	studies	based	on	 the	pilot	 site’s	
progress	and	experience	with	offsetting.	Inevitably	this	latter	point	is	in	no	small	way	
related	to	the	active	and	motivated	individuals	who	were	involved	there,	who	because	
of	 their	 personal/professional	 interest	 in	 BDO	 were	 also	 often	 open	 to	 and	
cooperative	with	my	research.	Some	individuals	were	eager	to	share	their	experiences	
and	 thoughts,	 almost	 pedagogically	 or	 perhaps	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 sense	 of	 public	
accountability.	 	Some	people	 felt	 that	 I	was	doing	 important	 in-depth	work,	similar	
to	 the	official	DEFRA	evaluation,	 or	 even	better	 than	 it.	 In	 one	 instance	 a	Wildlife	
Trust	 ecologist	 commented	 that	 no	 one	 had	 ever	 asked	 her	 such	 questions	 and	
commended	me	for	the	detail	I	was	searching	for	in	relation	to	the	processes.	Several	
expressed	an	interest	in	seeing	my	research	after	I	finished.	
I	 used	 this	 eagerness	 to	 my	 advantage	 to	 build	 rapport	 with	 my	 respondents	 and	
sometimes	 acted	 as	 a	 sympathetic	 ear	 to	 the	 frustrations	 they	 faced	 professionally.	
Yet,	for	these	reasons	I	often	felt	conflicted	over	the	tensions	this	dynamic	opened	up	
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with	respect	to	undertaking	‘critical’	analysis.	I	usually	responded	to	an	interest	in	my	
published	 work	 with	 a	 polite	 detachment.	 I	 was	 concerned	 that	 my	 respondents	
would	 feel	 disconcerted	 by	 the	 content	 of	 my	 critique	 and	 my	 apparent	 lack	 of	
sympathy	to	their	‘will	to	improve’	(Li	2007b).	Tania	Murray	Li	(2013)	reflects	on	the	
relation	between	fieldwork	 involving	policy	professionals	and	critique.	My	concerns	
about	 feeding	back	my	published	work	to	my	respondents	was	perhaps	appropriate	
since	Li	(2013:	234)	notes	that	‘programmers	[tend	to]	tolerate	critique	only	so	long	as	
it	can	be	translated	back	into	programming’.	I	revisit	the	question	of	critique	and	the	
specific	contributions	my	study	makes	to	understanding	the	DEFRA	pilot	in	the	final	
chapter.	
Even	 though	 many	 people	 expressed	 interest	 in	 participating	 in	 my	 research,	
sometimes	the	practical	realities	of	doing	presented	barriers.	The	repeat	nature	of	the	
visits	proved	challenging.	Local	authority	professionals	are	often	time	poor	and	not	
altogether	willing	or	able	 to	participate	 in	 lengthy	and	 repeat	 interviews	over	 time.	
Furthermore,	 the	 high	 level	 of	 interest	 in	 the	 pilot	 scheme	 meant	 that	 other	
researchers	 were	 frequently	 approaching	 the	 same	 people	 exacerbating	 this	 prior	
predicament.	 This	 research	 interest	 originated	 from	 other	 academics	 as	 well	 the	
official	pilot	evaluation	consultants.		
During	and	after	the	pilot	period,	BDO	emerged	as	a	highly	politicised	and	contested	
policy	 approach.	 Chapter	 8	 for	 example	 is	 wholly	 based	 on	 the	 controversy	 and	
conflict	 that	 BDO	 was	 situated	 within.	 While	 some	 of	 my	 research	 participants	
perceived	 BDO	 to	 be	 transformative	 in	 its	 potential	 to	 address	 the	 dire	 nature	 of	
biodiversity	 considerations	under	English	planning	policy,	most	were	 also	 aware	of	
the	scrutiny	and	critique	 the	approach	was	attracting,	 in	particular	 from	a	 range	of	
mainstream	 media	 articles	 from	 2010	 onwards.	 The	 highly	 politicised	 currents	 in	
which	the	policy	was	situated	became	relevant	to	my	methodological	approach.	For	
example	the	pilot	was	also	attracting	a	 lot	of	attention	and	many	emails	requesting	
interviews	 went	 ignored	 or	 were	 declined.	 Notably	 Tom	 Tew,	 CEO	 of	 the	
Environment	 Bank	 informed	me	 the	 brokering	 organisation	 had	 received	 so	many	
requests	for	interviews,	their	new	policy	was	to	refrain	from	participating	in	research	
at	all.	I	was	fortunate	in	this	respect,	since	I	had	already	formed	a	relationship	with	
one	of	the	Environment	Bank	officers	at	Warwickshire	County	Council.	Even	so	more	
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than	 once,	 people	 I	 approached	 for	 an	 interview	 attempted	 to	 group	me	 together	
with	another	researcher	who	was	also	seeking	an	interview.		
In	 response	 to	 some	 of	 the	 barriers	 around	 gaining	 access	 to	 my	 interviewees,	 I	
became	adaptive	 and	opportunistic.	This	 included	being	highly	 amenable	 to	 fitting	
around	busy	work	schedules	and	sometimes	meant	a	quick	catch	up	call	or	email	as	
an	expedient	way	 to	keep	up	with	what	was	happening	within	pilot	 site	contexts.	 I	
discovered	that	just	making	contact	often	yielded	a	new	planning	reference	number,	
a	heads	up	over	 a	 forthcoming	public	meeting	or	 an	online	document	 that	 I	 could	
follow	 up	 with.	 The	 difficulty	 around	 gaining	 the	 access	 I	 needed	 also	 led	 me	 to	
initiate	 a	 ‘shadowing’	 exercise	 with	 LPA	 officers.	 I	 planned	 for	 this	 kind	 of	micro-
ethnography	 (Bryman	 2012)	 so	 that	 I	 could	 perform	 participant	 observation	 in	
addition	 to	 performing	 interviews.	 In	 one	 instance	 I	 helped	 an	 LPA	 officer	 try	 to	
make	 sense	 of	 the	 opaque	 guidance	 provided	 by	 DEFRA	 and	 experimented	 with	
cartographic	 representations	 of	 biodiversity	 impact	 and	 mitigation	 that	 could	 be	
translated	 into	 the	 metric’s	 values.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 approach	 proved	 to	 be	
somewhat	of	a	methodological	false	start	as	the	practices	of	offsetting	in	reality	take	
place	in	ad	hoc	and	disjointed	moments	throughout	the	longer	working	day,	often	in	
solitude	 behind	 a	 desk.	 Actually	 doing	 the	 work	 of	 offsetting	 might	 be	 an	 email	
conversation	 (as	 negotiation)	 or	 a	 telephone	 call,	 yielding	 nothing	 particularly	
observable	for	the	researcher	other	than	the	paper	trail	or	oral	account.	Biodiversity	
offsetting,	it	turns	out,	is	predominantly	an	administrative	exercise.		
As	 my	 response	 rate	 to	 requests	 for	 interview	 was	 patchy,	 my	 sampling	 process	
necessitated	 a	 similarly	 opportunistic	 approach.	 Meetings	 and	 conferences	 were	
useful	places	to	bump	into	professionals	who	would	otherwise	have	been	too	busy	or	
difficult	 to	 track	down.	Furthermore,	 the	 ‘networky’	 and	 social	 atmosphere	of	 such	
events	helped	me	to	build	rapport	with	people	and	thus	the	likelihood	of	obtaining	at	
least	 one	 interview	 with	 otherwise	 busy	 professionals.	 Indeed	 such	 events	 also	
provided	me	with	opportunities	for	casual	conversations	and	a	chance	to	soak	up	the	
atmosphere,	 write	 ethnographic	 field	 notes	 or	 follow	 developments	 outside	 of	 the	
confines	 of	 the	 formal,	 scheduled	 interview.	The	 research	process	was	messy	 and	 I	
can’t	 deny	 that	 luck	 didn’t	 also	 play	 a	 part.	 I	 met	 one	 respondent,	 central	 to	 the	
Thameslink	 Programme	 case	 study	 in	 a	 lunch	 queue	 at	 The	 Wildlife	 Trust’s	 2015	
conference	 on	 Natural	 Capital	 in	 Edinburgh.	 	 I	 tended	 to	 participate	 in	 industry	
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events	either	as	a	participant	or	volunteer	organiser,	somewhat	further	confusing	the	
distinction	 between	 occupying	 the	 roles	 of	 programmer	 or	 critic,	 identified	 by	 Li	
(2013).		
3.6	Conclusion	
Research	Partialities		
Inevitably	it	was	impossible	to	ensure	that	as	a	researcher,	my	own	rhythms	perfectly	
aligned	with	 those	 that	 I	wanted	 to	 learn	 from.	One	of	 the	disappointments	of	 the	
research	was	not	being	able	to	observe	the	ecological	ordering	practices	of	the	actual	
biodiversity	surveys	and	metric	application	first	hand	by	accompanying	the	ecologists	
to	development	and	offset	sites.	This	was	perhaps	an	unavoidable	consequence	of	the	
case	 study	methodology,	where	 I	was	 committed	 to	 following	 the	 specific	 chain	 of	
events,	 individuals	 and	 processes	 in	 connection	 with	 particular	 offset	 contracts	 or	
pilot	sites.	For	the	three	case	studies	presented	within	this	thesis,	I	found	that	I	had	
already	 missed	 the	 actual	 ecological	 surveys	 assessing	 the	 baseline	 and	 target	
biodiversity	value	surveys	to	be	translated	and	processed	through	the	DEFRA	metric.	
The	 ecological	 survey	 is	 a	 vital	 part	 to	 their	 story	 and	 no	 doubt	 would	 have	 been	
illuminating	for	understanding	the	practices	and	paradoxes	of	biodiversity	valuation	
under	offsetting	arrangements	(c.f	Robertson	2004,	2012).	As	such,	while	in	no	way	a	
complete	 substitute	 for	 actual	 participant	 observation	 I	 was	 left	 with	 secondary	
accounts	of	the	process	and	their	resultant	inscriptions	and	documents	with	which	to	
work.	 While	 the	 case	 study	 approach	 and	 my	 focus	 on	 whole	 BDO	 contracts	
produced	rich	data,	methodologically	it	was	also	sometimes	limiting	in	terms	of	what	
could	be	covered,	geographically	or	temporally.	I	was	interested	in	the	sequences	of	
events	for	specific	contracts	and	was	therefore	committed	to	following	certain	cases	
over	time,	sometimes	at	the	expense	of	starting	new	enquiries	elsewhere	to	plug	gaps	
that	I	couldn’t	close	with	my	chosen	examples.		
Nevertheless,	the	commitment	to	building	detailed	case	studies	entailing	repeat	visits	
and	the	successive	tracing	of	things	over	time	revealed	many	of	the	things	within	the	
case	 studies	 that	 would	 have	 been	 lost	 from	 a	 synchronic	 or	 snapshot	 window	 of	
fieldwork.	All	 the	same,	 the	period	of	 fieldwork	was	actually	very	short	 in	planning	
timeframes	and	too	brief	to	be	able	to	observe	the	material	biodiversity	outcomes	of	
offsets	 (although	 we	 do	 encounter	 offset	 woodland	 planting	 in	 chapter	 7).	
Developments,	and	thus	 their	actual	offsetting	works,	may	not	start	 for	many	years	
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after	 they	have	been	 awarded	planning	permission	 and	 this	 is	 notwithstanding	 the	
broader	 difficulties	with	 finding	 actual	 offset	 sites	 I	 have	 already	 discussed.	 In	 any	
case,	 it	 would	 take	 many	 more	 years	 after	 offset	 initiation	 to	 be	 able	 to	 observe	
biodiversity	 outcomes	 arising	 from	 the	 habitat	 creation	 and	 management	
programmes	 under	 an	 offset.	 As	 such	 I	 was	 not	 able	 to	 follow	 the	 material	
conservation	outcomes	of	a	BDO	in	action,	an	issue	ripe	for	future	research.		
I	should	also	flag	that	the	case	studies	built	around	the	pilot	sites	are	inevitably	going	
to	be	somewhat	anomalous	examples	of	BDO	practices	in	England.	Firstly,	offsetting	
in	these	sites	was	a	highly	experimental	project.	The	approach	was	new	and	many	of	
my	 respondents	 were	 still	 getting	 to	 grips	 with	 what	 it	 entailed	 and	 how	 it	 could	
work.	A	noticeable	 feature	 therefore	of	 the	research	process	was	 the	anxiety	people	
seemed	to	feel	about	‘getting	it	right’.	This	nervousness	was	particularly	pronounced	
with	 respondents	 from	NGOs	who	were	 often	 conflicted	 over	 their	 involvement	 in	
the	 first	 place	 (explored	 further	 in	 Chapters	 6	 and	 7).	 Since	 the	 examples	 I	 was	
following	were	associated	with	a	pilot	programme,	 furthermore,	 (and	 in	the	case	of	
the	 TLP,	 was	 DEFRA’s	 official	 demonstration	 project)	 the	 planning	 cases	 under	
consideration	were	receiving	perhaps	a	disproportionate	level	of	attention	and	more	
than	local	government	planners	or	consultant	ecologists	would	ordinarily	be	able	to	
afford	 for	 other	 developments	 or	 future	 cases	 with	 BDO.	 In	 so	 far	 as	 I	 document	
various	 limitations	 of	 BDO,	 this	 latter	 point	would	 seem	 to	highlight	 the	 potential	
risks	 for	offsetting	generally	weakening	 the	overall	process	 for	meeting	biodiversity	
considerations	 in	 planning,	 that	 is	 already	 showing	 signs	 of	 resourcing	 strains	
(Oxford	2013).	Furthermore,	the	dynamic	and	emergent	nature	of	the	new	policy	field	
meant	 that	 novel	 systems,	 policies	 and	operations	were	 always	 under	 development	
throughout	 my	 research	 period.	 Even	 if	 I	 had	 a	 positivist	 commitment	 to	 the	
research,	 the	 shifting	 nature	 of	 the	 field	 would	 make	 the	 process	 impossible	 to	
replicate.		
Finally,	 it	 cannot	 be	 overlooked	 that	 the	 sheer	 facet	 of	 being	 observed	 probably	
affected	the	nature	of	what	I	observed	as	my	presence,	in	some	small	ways	shifted	the	
nature	 of	 the	 assemblage.	 As	 I	 have	mentioned,	 I	 was	 not	 the	 only	 one	 doing	 the	
observing,	but	my	research	overlapped	with	the	official	DEFRA	evaluation	study	and	
high	academic	interest	generally.	In	my	methodological	travels	from	‘one	spot	to	the	
next’	 through	 network	 analysis,	 I	 became	 conscious	 that	 I	 was	 gathering	 my	 own	
assemblage	 as	well	 becoming	one	 element	within	 the	one	 I	was	 tracing.	 In	 light	of	
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this	growing	awareness,	it	seemed	increasingly	relevant	to	reflect	on	the	performative	
role	that	academics	and	scientists	can	play	through	studying	their	topics	of	interest.	
Irwin	and	Michael	(2003:	113)	for	example	note	how	‘academic	analysis	is	part	of	the	
production	of	particular	versions	of	public	and	science	and,	therefore,	of	the	hybrid	
admixtures	 that	 make	 up	 the	 assemblages	 themselves’.	 In	 its	 strong	 version,	 ANT	
thus	 ‘collapses	the	distinction	between	epistemology	and	ontology,	arguing	that	the	
network	constitutes	the	world	itself’	(ibid.:	357).	
Thus,	 while	 this	 facet	 raises	 important	 methodological	 questions,	 it	 also	 yields	
political	ones.	I	would	suggest	that	such	political	openings	are	both	emancipatory	as	
well	 constrictive.	 As	 discussed,	 academic	 practices	 and	 knowledge	 making	 can	
themselves	become	imbricated	by	‘intervening	in	the	world’	(Asdal	and	Marres	2014).		
Such	 interventions	may	 ‘challenge,	de-stabilise	and	disturb...raising	 the	possibilities	
of	new	 relationships	 and	associations’	 (Greenhough	2011:	 137).	 	Haraway	 (2008),	 for	
example	 suggests	 social	 scientists	 scrutinise	 their	 own	 complicity	 towards	 building	
the	 assemblages	 they	 are	 studying	 and	 in	 so	 doing	 attend	 to	 the	 political	
opportunities	 this	 offers.	 Conversely,	 interventions	 could	 serve	 to	 consolidate	 and	
actively	 close	 down	 political	 opportunities	 by	 overstating	 the	 significance,	 size	 or	
hegemony	of	the	subject	of	research.	Dempsey	and	Suarez	(2016)	for	example,	discuss	
the	ways	in	which	both	advocates	and	critics	of	ecosystem	markets	tend	to	inflate	the	
proposed	size	and	trajectory	of	such	markets.	This	point	seems	especially	relevant	for	
BDO,	since	it	was	an	idea	conceived	by	policy	entrepreneurs	and	later	picked	up	by	
academic	 scientists,	 rather	 than	 the	 other	way	 around	 (Calvet	 et	 al.	 2015a).	 Today,	
BDO	 is	 the	 topic	 of	 a	 burgeoning	 literature,	 not	 a	 small	 part	 of	 it	 written	 by	
individuals	wearing	multiple	caps	 -	as	natural	 scientists	but	with	other	professional	
interests	in	the	approach,	as	biodiversity	brokers,	consultants	or	policy	advisors.	This	
issue	is	picked	up	and	further	discussed	in	chapter	4,	to	which	I	now	turn.		
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PART	2	
CHAPTER	4	
ASSEMBLAGES	OF	BIODIVERSITY	OFFSETTING	AT	DIFFERENT	
SCALES	
It	is	an	interesting	coincidence	that	what	might	be	called	economic	‘netting’,	
the	process	of	summing	losses	and	gains	to	arrive	at	a	final	(neat)	figure,	
seems	here	to	overlap	so	closely	with	mechanical	‘netting’,	as	in	capturing	
something	desirable	in	a	mesh,	filtering	away	extraneous	material	or	liquid.	
(Sullivan	and	Hannis	2015:	11)		
4.1	Introduction	
The	 aim	 of	 the	 ‘no	 net	 loss’	 (NNL)	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 the	 calculative	 means	 of	
achieving	 this	 is	 one	 of	 BDO’s	 unique	 and	 defining	 features.	 The	 seemingly	
innocuous	insertion	of	the	word	‘net’	to	the	otherwise	conventional	goal	of	reversing	
the	 disappearance	 of	 species,	 habitats	 and	 ecosystems	 with	 whom	 we	 share	
(increasingly	shared)	this	planet,	single	handedly	enacts	a	balance	sheet	accounting	
approach	in	conservation.	This	proposition	forms	the	crux	of	the	chapter	and	sets	the	
scene	for	the	empirical	chapters	that	follow.			
In	tracing	the	etymological	roots	of	‘net’,	Sullivan	and	Hannis	(2015:	11)	note	that	the	
idea	of	‘netted’	natures	within	BDO’s	manifesto	(and	increasingly,	wider	conservation	
discourse	generally)	 is	steeped	in	 ‘evaluative	content’.	 I	argue	here	that	NNL	makes	
the	idea	of	trading	and	exchanging	different	individuated	bits	of	nature	‘thinkable’.	In	
so	 far	 as	 NNL	 plays	 a	 performative	 role	 in	 contemporary	 efforts	 to	 calculate	 and	
measure	impressions	of	a	‘balanced,	final	and	conclusive’	state	of	biodiversity,	we	can	
say	that	it	does	work	-	NNL	acts.	For	the	purposes	of	my	assemblage	analytic,	tracing	
the	 ‘who’s’	and	the	 ‘what’s’	of	assembling	the	economic	values	of	biodiversity	under	
BDO,	 I	 label	NNL	as	 a	 ‘conceptual	 technology’	 -	 an	abstraction	 that	performatively	
shapes	the	world	in	its	image.			
How	did	NNL	 stabilise	over	 time	and	appear	 in	England’s	biodiversity	 strategies	 in	
2010?	 Perhaps	 more	 importantly,	 under	 what	 conditions	 did	 this	 conceptual	
technology	emerge	and	what	can	these	origins	tells	us	about	its	meaning?	To	return	
to	net’s	etymology,	this	chapter	follows	the	mesh-like	nature	of	the	contexts	in	which	
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NNL	circulates	and	 sticks	 in	place	and	 time.	The	chapter	 traces	 its	 inscription	 into	
policy	 documents	 and	 invocations	 through	 persuasive	 discourses	 at	 all	 scales	 of	
biodiversity	 governance.	 ‘No	 net	 loss’	 is	 not	 intrinsic	 to	 conservation	 policy	 or	 a	
natural	 and	 intuitive	 ethical	 commitment	 to	 biodiversity.	 The	moral	 weight	 of	 the	
NNL	of	biodiversity	was	constituted	by	and	further	enacts	political	relations	between	
people,	 persuasive	 discourses	 and,	 of	 course,	 metrological	 technologies	 as	 the	
calculative	means	of	delivering	it.	Efforts	in	‘netting	out’	natures	rely	on	quantitative	
equations.	 This	 chapter	 traces	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 NNL	 and	 accountancy	
approaches	to	calculate	the	values	of	biodiversity.	The	chapter	opens	by	exploring	the	
origins	 of	 ‘aggregate	 rules’	 (Sullivan	 2017)	 in	US	 environmental	 policy	 in	 the	 1970s	
and	 closes	 by	 investigating	 the	 UK	 government	 sponsored	 ‘DEFRA	 biodiversity	
metric’	deemed	to	maintain	an	aggregated	‘net’	quantity	of	biodiversity.		
In	the	first	section	of	this	chapter,	I	trace	the	origins	of	NNL	as	part	of	a	wider	set	of	
principles	 known	 as	 ‘aggregate	 rules’	 (Sullivan	 2017)	 that	 appeared	 as	 neoliberal	
inventions	 within	 US	 environmental	 policy-making	 in	 the	 1970s.	Most	 accounts	 of	
the	history	of	biodiversity	offsetting	trace	its	origins	to	the	Clean	Water	Act	(CWA)	
in	 the	 1970s	 (Pawliczek	 and	Sullivan	 2011,	Calvet	 et	 al.	 2015),	 but	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 go	
back	a	 little	 further	so	as	 to	understand	the	theoretical	and	political	 ideals	 that	 the	
NNL	of	wetlands	 themselves	emerged	 from.	 I	 chart	how	these	 innovations	came	 to	
form	the	conceptual	and	policy	foundations	for	wetland	mitigation	markets,	species	
and	habitat	banking	and,	later,	the	invention	of	biodiversity	offsets.		
Following	 this	extended	history	 I	 turn	my	attention	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	NNL	was	
detached	 from	 its	 regulatory	 context	 in	 the	 United	 States	 in	 the	 early	 2000s	 and	
forged	 to	 a	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 (CSR)	 agenda	 in	 the	 extractive	 industry	
sector.	In	particular,	this	section	focuses	on	the	agency	of	BBOP,	as	a	newly	formed	
institutional	 body	 and	 its	 role	 in	 advocating	 for	 BDO	 markets.	 The	 charismatic	
individuals	 engaged	 at	 BBOP	 deployed	 various	 discursive	 strategies	 to	mainstream	
BDO	 as	 part	 of	 an	 agenda	 seeking	 to	 reconcile	 business	 with	 biodiversity	
conservation	at	 a	 time	when	 the	extractive	 sector	was	 coming	under	 fire	 from	civil	
society	campaigners.		
In	the	second	half	of	the	chapter,	I	move	the	focus	of	the	discussion	to	the	UK	scale	
to	introduce	the	arrival	of	BDO	in	England	when	the	Conservative-	Liberal	Democrat	
Coalition	Government	came	into	power	in	2010.	Since	the	premise	of	my	thesis	is	that	
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valuation	should	be	understood	as	a	social	exercise	(Muniesa	2011),	the	socio-political	
contexts	in	which	‘valuation’	is	embedded	and	its	desired	political	goals	seem	to	me,	
to	 be	 crucial.	 This	 political	 period	 in	 England	was	 a	 unique	moment	whereupon	 a	
variety	of	elements	converged	to	propel	BDO	up	the	conservation	agenda,	just	as	the	
two	year	DEFRA	pilot	study	was	announced	and	 initiated.	Here	we	encounter	NNL	
again	 and	 explore	 how	 it	 became	 attached	 to	 biodiversity	 conservation	 policies	 in	
England.	 I	 focus	 initially	 on	 how	 this	 new	 policy	 standard	 was	 inscribed	 into	 a	
multitude	of	reports	and	studies	that	frequently	recommended	biodiversity	offsetting	
as	 government’s	 number	 one	 conservation	 priority.	 	 I	 also	 chart	 the	 role	 of	
charismatic	 individuals	 as	 agents,	 actively	 promoting	 BDO	 through	 institutional	
alliances	and	studies	-	and	variously	‘authorising	knowledges’	(Li	2007a).	Within	this	
relatively	small	community,	I	frame	a	‘revolving	door’	of	individuals,	many	of	whom	
were	 also	 connected	 to	 the	 transnational	 scale	 of	 BDO,	 helping	 it	 to	 re-scale	 in	
England	and	at	EU	levels.	Throughout	this	section	I	contextualise	the	development	of	
BDO	 within	 the	 social,	 political	 and	 ideological	 dynamics	 of	 the	 moment.	 The	
coalition	 government	 came	 into	 power	 amid	 a	 wave	 of	 iconic	 environmental	
commitments,	 declaring	 that	 theirs	 would	 be	 the	 ‘greenest	 government	 ever’.	 But	
overwhelming	priorities	for	‘economic	recovery’	following	the	Global	Financial	Crisis	
(GFC)	of	2007	shaped	a	climate	of	further	de-regulation	and	austerity	and	ultimately	
the	grounds	on	which	these	commitments	would	fizzle	out.	I	argue	that	the	DEFRA	
pilot	study	was	initiated	at	the	junction	of	these	political	imperatives	but	in	the	end	
the	primacy	of	HM	Treasury’s	de-regulation	agenda	prevented	DEFRA	from	adopting	
BDO	as	policy.	The	expected	costs	for	developers	were	simply	too	great	to	stimulate	a	
political	appetite	 for	extra	regulatory	 frameworks.	 ‘No	net	 loss’	as	a	policy	standard	
however,	 remains	 in	 place.	 The	 significance	 of	 this	 detail	 will	 become	 apparent	 in	
chapter	5	and	picked	up	again	in	the	final	chapter.		
In	 the	 concluding	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 I	 turn	 towards	 the	 central	 material	
calculative	 device	 of	 this	 study	 -	 the	 DEFRA	 metric.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 outline	 the	
metric’s	development	and	design	principles	and	expand	on	how	it	is	able	to	produce	
something	 called	 a	 ‘biodiversity	 unit’	 to	 act	 as	 BDO’s	market	 currency	 for	 trade.	 I	
consider	 the	 existing	 conservation	 legislation	 on	 which	 the	 metric	 is	 based	 to	
establish	the	terms	under	which	biodiversity	habitats	are	made	to	appear	numerically	
equivalent	 with	 one	 another	 -	 and	 the	 translation	 processes	 this	 entailed.	 My	
presentation	of	the	theoretical	and	practical	development	of	the	DEFRA	metric	forms	
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a	backdrop	to	my	detailed	empirical	observations	for	how	it	is	deployed	by	actors	in	
situ,	through	chapters	5,	6	and	7.	But	first	we	need	to	go	back	to	the	beginning	of	the	
story	to	see	where	it	all	began;	1970s	Washington.		
4.2	The	rise	of	BDO’s	conceptual	technologies	
Aggregate	rules	in	early	US	emissions	policy	
The	moment	is	2nd	January	1970	and	President	Nixon	has	signed	into	legislation	the	
Natural	 Environment	 Policy	 Act	 (NEPA).	 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 year,	 Nixon	 will	 have	
created	the	governmental	department	-	the	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(EPA).	
In	the	long	shadow	cast	by	Rachel	Carson’s	Silent	Spring,	the	world	was	waking	up	to	
the	 dawning	 ecological	 crisis	 associated	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 intensive	 agriculture,	
industrial	capitalism	and	rapid	post-war	economic	growth.	Following	the	creation	of	
NEPA,	 a	 series	 of	 seminal	 environmental	 legislative	 Acts	 were	 passed.	 In	 1970	
President	 Nixon	 initiated	 the	 Clean	 Air	 Act	 (CAA)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Federal	 Water	
Pollution	Control	Act	(FWPCA)	(which	later	became	the	Clean	Water	Act	in	1977),	as	
‘action	 forcing	 regulatory	 strategy’	 (Liroff	 1986	 cited	 by	 Lane	 2012:	 589).	 The	
Endangered	Species	Act	(ESA)	followed	shortly	thereafter,	in	1973.		
The	origins	to	the	logic	of	netting	out	aggregated	sums	of	environmental	‘goods’	and	
‘bads’	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 entangled	 histories	 of	 some	 of	 these	 pivotal	 pieces	 of	
environmental	legislation.	Struggles	over	the	growth	of	environmental	regulation	and	
implementation	 of	 new	 emissions	 reductions	 standards	 under	 the	CAA	 triggered	 a	
backlash	 from	 industry	 and	 economists	 and	 catalysed	 the	 initial	 regulatory	
compromises	with	business	interests	(Bonneuil	2015,	Lane	2012,	Voß	2016).	Through	
being	 framed	 and	 thus	 denounced	 as	 an	 exemplary	 archetype	 of	 inefficient	
‘command	and	control’	regulation,	by	1975	the	EPA	was	forced	to	accept	 ‘controlled	
breaches’	 in	 the	 CAA	 emissions	 targets.	 The	 growing	 festishisation	 of	 ‘efficiency’	
underpinned	 the	 framing	 of	 a	 binary	 narrative	 with	 expensive	 and	 inefficient	
command	 and	 control	 policies	 on	 one	 side	 and	 flexible,	 business	 friendly	 market	
based	approaches	on	the	other	(Lane	2012).	
These	ad	hoc	assemblages,	arising	from	struggles	to	shape	environmental	regulation	
and	its	norms	underpinned	the	emergence	of	something	entitled	the	‘bubble	policy’	
or	a	‘no	net	increase’	as	part	of	the	CAA’s	controlled	breaches	in	emissions	reductions	
(Lane	 2012).	 The	 ‘bubble’	 is	 predicated	 on	 harnessing	 the	 concept	 of	 an	 aggregate	
total	 of	 environmental	 pollution	 as	 a	 limit	 or	 ‘cap’.	 	 These	 policy	 innovations	
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constituted	 for	 the	 first	 time	 a	 quantitative	 device	with	 the	 principles	 of	 flexibility	
and	exchange	of	environmental	good	 for	bad	baked	 in.	By	conceptualising	a	cap,	 it	
was	deemed	that	firms	could	more	efficiently	and	cheaply	decide	how	or	where	to	cut	
emissions	 on	 their	 own	 terms	 (Lane	 2012).	Where	 this	 ‘cap’	 may	 eventually	 prove	
impractical	 for	 business	 it	 was	 amenable	 to	 be	 supplemented	 with	 principles	 of	
exchange	 and	 offsetting	 and	 thereby	 conjoined	 with	 ‘trade’	 underpinning	 the	
formation	of	early	emissions	trading	markets	(Bonneuil	2015).		
The	 key	 neoliberal	 innovation	 therefore	 lay	 in	 the	 act	 of	 separating	 the	 means	 of	
regulation	from	the	ends	(Lane	2012).	Under	these	arrangements	these	firms	were	no	
longer	 regulated	 on	 specific	 mitigation	 activities	 (the	 means)	 but	 on	 emissions	
outcomes	 (the	ends).	The	objective	of	 this	de-coupling	was	 to	enable	conditions	of	
flexibility	 and	 voluntarism	 at	 the	 level	 of	 individual	 firms	 in	 respect	 to	 meeting	
overall	 capped	 emissions	 thresholds.	 The	 cap,	 i.e.	 the	 ‘end’	 to	 be	 reached,	was	 the	
regulation	but	 the	means	of	meeting	 this	were	 flexible	 and	voluntarily	decided.	An	
EPA	 press	 release	 from	 1979	 described	 this	 new	 framework	 as	 an	 ‘innovation	
inducing,	cost	cutting	‘bubble’	policy	allowing	industry	management	to	figure	out	the	
best	 way	 to	 clean	 up	 air	 pollution	 at	 individual	 plants’	 (EPA	 1979:	 no	 page).	 EPA	
Administrator	at	 the	 time,	Doug	Costle	argued,	 ‘We’ll	 get	 further	by	 regulating	 the	
results,	not	means’	in	what	he	considered	‘will	prove	to	be	the	most	important	single	
reform	of	the	regulatory	process’	(EPA	1979:	no	page).	The	capitulation,	therefore	of	
environmental	policy	to	‘aggregate	rules’	and	market	based	instruments,	was	in	fact	a	
reform	 to	 make	 environmental	 policy	 compatible	 with	 capitalism	 and	 enacted	
according	 to	 entrenching	 neoliberal	 orthodoxies	 of	 firm	 flexibility,	 efficiency	 and	
voluntary	compliance.	
‘No	Net	Loss’	and	mitigation	banking	
In	 a	 related	 history	 to	 the	 compromises	 reached	 through	 the	 CAA	 detailed	 so	 far,	
Robertson	(2004)	discusses	the	trajectory	by	which	the	1977	Clean	Water	Act	(CWA)	
shaped	 the	 landmark	 innovation	 that	was	an	equivalent	compromise	 to	 the	 ‘no	net	
increase’	in	emissions	–	namely,	the	‘no	net	loss’	of	wetlands.	In	1972,	Section	404	of	
the	CWA	stipulated	that	developers	seeking	to	build	on	wetlands	must	seek	permit	
approval	 from	 the	Regulatory	Branch	of	 the	 local	District	of	 the	US	Army	Corps	of	
Engineers	 (COE)	(ibid.).	After	consulting	with	 the	regional	EPA	office,	 the	US	COE	
would	either	grant	or	deny	permission	to	developers.	But,	there	was	also	a	third	way.	
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The	 COE	 might	 permit	 development	 on	 the	 condition	 that	 the	 developer	 would	
create	 compensatory	 wetland	 habitat	 so	 as	 to	 ‘offset’	 the	 losses	 (ibid.).	 This	
innovation	was	characterised	as	 the	 ‘regulatory	basis	 that	prohibits	an	activity...and	
later	permits	 it	 conditionally’	 (Sulzman	and	Ruhl	2000	cited	by	Walker	et	 al.	 2009:	
149).		
Although	compensatory	mitigation	for	wetlands	had	become	a	common	practice	by	
the	 1980s,	 it	 was	 subsequently	 scandalised	 by	 a	 range	 of	 field	 reports	 that	 showed	
that	 many	 of	 the	 mitigation	 sites	 had	 never	 in	 fact,	 even	 been	 created.	
Environmentalists	were	outraged	and	developers	were	 frustrated	with	 the	 slow	and	
rigid	 framework	 of	 Section	 404	 (Robertson	 2004).	 Regulators	were	 therefore	 under	
cross	 fire	 from	both	groups	 (ibid.).	What	 followed	 is	 a	 turn	of	 events	 that	 strongly	
foretells	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 BDO	 emerged	 in	 the	 UK	 two	 decades	 later	 where	 a	
political	 economy	 of	 economic	 competitiveness	 provided	 grounds	 on	 which	
regulators	 sought	 to	 build	 in	 greater	 flexibility	 and	 compromises	 to	 environmental	
regulations.		
Just	 as	 the	 housing	 industry	 was	 applying	 pressure	 to	 the	 EPA	 to	 de-regulate	 and	
streamline	Section	404	of	the	CWA	through	attributing	its	recent	mitigation	failures	
to	centralised	and	inefficient	command	and	control	policies,	the	EPA	was	gathering	
steam	 to	 initiate	 its	 'National	 Wetlands	 Policy	 Forum'	 in	 1987.	 Drawing	 from	
experiences	 of	 mitigation	 banking	 from	 a	 pilot	 programme	 with	 Tenneco	 Oil	 in	
Louisiana	 and	 the	 first	 State	 level	 wetland	 offsetting	 legislation	 in	New	 Jersey,	 the	
Forum	 arrived	 at	 a	 set	 of	 recommendations	 that	 concluded	 that	 the	 EPA’s	 policy	
going	forward	would	be	based	on	the	‘no	net	loss	of	wetlands’	(Bonneuil	2015).		
The	CWA	adopted	the	aggregate	principles	but	instead	inverted	the	maximum	'cap'	
of	 emissions	 under	 the	 CAA’s	 bubble	 policy	 and	 set	 the	 threshold	 as	 a	 minimum	
baseline	 under	which	 quantitative	 acreage	 of	wetland	 habitat	 should	 not	 fall.	 	 The	
power	of	both	policy	 innovations	was	their	ability	 to	 invoke	threshold	baselines	(as	
maximum	 or	 minimum	 quantities)	 over	 or	 under	 which	 the	 overall	 quantity	 of	
environmental	goods	or	bads	should	not	exceed.	The	concept	of	the	baseline,	as	well	
as	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 common	 unit	 of	 measurement	 as	 I	 will	 explain	 below,	
becomes	 the	 conceptual	 backbone	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 quantitative	 environmental	
mechanisms	 and	 their	 drive	 towards	 commensuration	 of	 dissimilar	 things	 through	
universal	exchange	values.	Shortly	after	the	National	Wetlands	Policy	Forum	in	1988	
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(soon	to	become	President)	George	H.W.	Bush	adopted	the	‘no	net	loss’	of	wetlands	
within	 his	 policy	 campaign	 to	 promote	 himself	 as	 a	 business	 friendly,	 free-market	
environmentalist,	changing	forever	the	representation	of	wetlands	(Robertson	2000).		
As	 well	 as	 setting	 up	 an	 intellectual	 and	 discursive	 framework	 for	 an	 entire	
generation	of	environmental	trading	policies	to	ameliorate	regulatory	restrictions	on	
development,	the	NNL	innovation	triggered	opportunities	for	‘for	profit’	conservation	
actors	 and	 stimulated	 a	new	 industry	 of	 environmental	 credit	providing	businesses	
(ten	 Kate	 et	 al.	 2004).	 Under	 these	 new	 frameworks,	 landowners	 could	 now	 profit	
from	producing	and	selling	environmental	(wetland	or	more	latterly,	species)	credits	
from	 their	 land.	Robertson	describes	 entrepreneurial	 individuals	who	 sprung	up	 to	
help	 the	 development	 community	 appease	 the	 requirements	 set	 by	 the	 US	 Army	
Corps	 of	 Engineers	 in	 S404	 of	 the	 CWA.	 Early	 commercial	 wetland	 mitigation	
banking	 was,	 by	 this	 account,	 largely	 initiated	 through	 a	 series	 of	 coincidences	
‘extended	 by	 personal	 relationships	 and	 geographic	 proximity’	 of	 key	 catalytic	
individuals	rather	than	an	overt	fiat	of	a	neoliberal	state	(Robertson	2004:	364).	As	I	
will	 illustrate	 is	 also	 the	 case	 for	 BDO	 in	England,	 the	history	 of	wetland	banking,	
Robertson	argues,	 is	 a	 contingent	one.	Spontaneous	 innovations	by	entrepreneurial	
individuals,	collaborative	regulators	and	an	enabling	geography	of	federal	regulatory	
agency	offices	in	the	Chicago	area	shaped	the	wetland	banking	assemblage	(ibid.).			
The	 birth	 of	 conservation	 banking	 in	 California	 followed	 a	 similarly	 happenstance	
turn	 of	 events	 (ten	 Kate	 et	 al.	 2004).	 Inspired	 from	 wetland	 mitigation	 banking,	
(Pawliczek	and	Sullivan	2011)	species	banking	was	formally	introduced	in	the	State	of	
California	 in	 1995	 and	 deployed	 at	 a	 federal	 level	 in	 2003	 (Bonneuil	 2015).	 Species	
banking	 subsequently	 developed	 the	 Safe	 Harbour	 Programme	 (SHP)	 so	 that	
landowners	could	profit	 from	the	presence	of	endangered	species	on	their	 land	and	
thus	provide	an	economic	incentive	to	maintain	protected	species	habitat	rather	than	
develop	 it.	 The	 US	 Fish	 and	 Wildlife	 Service	 would	 measure	 and	 then	 limit	
developers’	 liability	 to	an	established	baseline	of	endangered	species.	Any	surpluses	
(net	gains)	of	species	numbers	that	the	landowners	could	demonstrate	could	then	be	
sold	as	 ‘species	credits’	 to	developers	 seeking	mitigation	values	 for	habitat	 impacts.		
The	 Safe	 Harbour	 Principle	 was	 deemed	 to	 act	 as	 economic	 compensation	 to	 the	
landowner	 for	 not	 comprising	 the	 protected	 species	 ecosystems	 through	
development.	 In	 their	 2004	 report	 discussed	 above,	 ten	 Kate	 et	 al.	 (2004)	 propose	
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that	 the	SHP	 rules	 set	 the	 stage	 for	 the	 creation	and	 the	use	of	biodiversity	offsets	
and	mitigation	going	forward.		
A	hybrid	model:	‘no	net	loss’	with	the	mitigation	hierarchy	
The	 ushering	 in	 of	 a	 NNL	 policy	 in	 relation	 to	 wetland	 ecosystems	 and	 species	 is	
significant	 for	 its	 role	 in	re-framing	biodiversity	as	 ‘off-settable’.	But	 the	conceptual	
technology	 of	 NNL	 in	 combination	 with	 the	 equally	 abstract	 schematic	 of	 the	
mitigation	hierarchy	forms	a	hybrid	device	that	performatively	shapes	the	conditions	
for	making	 BDO	 conceivable.	 	 The	 concept	 of	 the	mitigation	 hierarchy	 along	with	
requirements	 for	 Environmental	 Impact	 Assessments	 (EIA)	 and	 Statements	 (EIS)	
emerged	under	Nixon	in	1970	with	the	creation	of	the	EPA.	The	mitigation	hierarchy	
was	 introduced	 to	 encourage	 regulators,	 prior	 to	 the	 permission	 of	 approval	 being	
awarded	to	major	development	projects	effecting	change	to	the	natural	or	man-made	
environment,	 to	 assess	 each	 potential	 impact	 and	 appropriate	mitigation	measure.	
Under	 the	 terminology	of	clause	 1508.20	(CEQ	40CFR)	of	 the	NEPA,	 the	mitigation	
hierarchy	is	defined	as:	
(a)	Avoiding	the	impact	altogether	by	not	taking	a	certain	action	or	parts	of	
an	action.		
	(b)	Minimising	impacts	by	limiting	the	degree	or	magnitude	of	the	action	
and	its	implementation.		
(c)	Rectifying	the	impact	by	repairing,	rehabilitating,	or	restoring	the	
affected	environment.		
(d)	Reducing	or	eliminating	the	impact	over	time	by	preservation	and	
maintenance	operations	during	the	life	of	the	action.		
(e)	Compensating	for	the	impact	by	replacing	or	providing	substitute	
resources	or	environments.		
(Council	for	Environment	Quality	Executive	Office	of	the	President	[CEQ]	
2005:	28)	
The	 ways	 in	 which	 the	mitigation	 hierarchy	 and	 NNL,	 as	 conceptual	 technologies	
afford	a	coherent	logic	to	biodiversity	or	other	ecosystem	service	offsets	is	observable	
in	the	duel	ways	the	mitigation	hierarchy	can	be	represented.	The	first,	and	original	
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NEPA	mitigation	hierarchy	was	a	linear	model	outlining	individual	gateways	through	
which	 regulators	 could	 assess	 a	 project’s	 environmental	 impacts	 so	 as	 to	 inform	
decision	making	 around	 permit	 approval	 (Figure	 3).	 The	 second,	 and	more	 recent	
method,	now	widely	promoted	by	BBOP	and	used	by	Rio	Tinto	and	others	promoting	
BDO,	attaches	an	aggregate	rule	of	‘no	net	loss’	to	the	schema	(Figure	4).	This	hybrid	
model	 represents	 the	mitigation	hierarchy	as	 a	 two-dimensional	diagram	with	an	x	
and	y	axis.	Here,	the	vertical	axis	represents	‘biodiversity	value’	as	an	aggregate	sum	
and	the	horizontal	axis	represents	an	imaginary	baseline	at	a	moment	in	time	prior	to	
impacts.	 Much	 like	 the	 role	 of	 the	 baseline	 measurement	 under	 the	 SHP,	 the	
threshold	 on	 the	 x-axis	 acts	 as	 the	 ‘limit’	 or	 ‘cap’	 and	 conceptually	 performs	 the	
possibility	 for	 trade	 thereafter.	The	notion	of	 compensation	as	 the	 final	 step	 in	 the	
mitigation	 hierarchy	 is	 made	 coherent	 by	 the	 framing	 of	 biodiversity	 in	 flat	
quantitative	 value	 terms	 -	 as	 either	 positive	 or	 negative	 value	 on	 the	 y-axis.	
Biodiversity’s	biotic,	contextual	or	temporal	variegation	and	heterogeneity	is	effaced	
through	its	representation	in	the	aggregate	-	as	‘value’.		
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Figure	3	Mitigation	hierarchy	as	a	linear	gateway	model	prior	to	the	‘net’	aggregate	rule		
Source:	Author	adapted	from	NEPA	mitigation	hierarchy	2000	
	
Figure	4	Mitigation	hierarchy	and	NNL	hybrid	model	
	
	
Source:	BBOP,	adapted	from	Rio	Tinto	and	Govt.	of	Australia	
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I	propose	that	it	is	the	unique	capacity	of	the	net	of	a	biodiversity	baseline	(x-	axis)	in	
combination	with	the	aggregate	conceptual	framework	represented	on	the	y-axis	that	
facilitates	the	principles	of	efficiency	and	flexibility	under	a	market	mechanism.	The	
mitigation	 hierarchy’s	 framing	 of	 ‘value’	 on	 a	 linear	 scale	 enacts	 conceptual	
substitutability	and	encourages	exchange	of	loss	for	gains	in	quantitative	terms.	It	is	
consequently	 the	 ‘net’,	which	 amounts	 to	 ‘efficiency’	 so	prized	by	business	 friendly	
environmental	 regulations	 because	 it	 enacts	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 biotic	
equivalence	 and	 facilitates	 development	 but	 with	 the	 possibility	 for	 flexible,	 self-
determination	over	the	remedy.	Bigger	(2015),	 for	example	notes	within	the	climate	
market	policy	of	Cap	and	Trade,	the	cap	is	the	environmental	protection,	the	trade	is	
simply	perceived	to	make	it	cheaper.	In	other	words,	the	cap	is	the	'end'	and	'trade'	is	
the	‘means’,	de-coupled	from	one	another	through	the	1970’s	bubble	policy.		
Wilshusen	and	MacDonald	(2015:	16)	propose	that	the	mitigation	hierarchy	‘provides	
a	 framing	 mechanism	 that	 schematically	 abstracts,	 simplifies	 and	 homogenises	
biodiversity	 in	 ways	 that	 compartmentalise	 negative	 impacts	 and	 enable	
compensatory	trade-offs’.	But	this	is	to	underestimate	the	significance	for	the	way	the	
two	dimensional	model	reduces	the	holistic	character	of	biodiversity	to	a	linear	scale.	
This	 hybrid	 model	 was	 an	 innovation	 that	 emerged	 to	 introduce	 flexibility	 and	
latitude	 in	 conservation	 compliance	 almost	 three	 decades	 after	 the	 mitigation	
hierarchy	was	invented.		
The	conceptual	potency	of	 ‘NNL’	and	its	host,	the	mitigation	hierarchy,	are	perhaps	
what	 Latour	 (1993)	 would	 consider	 archetypal	 immutable	 mobiles.	 NNL	 and	 the	
mitigation	hierarchy	have	achieved	a	 sticky	quality	 through	being	 replicated	across	
time	 and	 space	 as	 a	 policy	 standard	 in	 conservation	 strategies	 across	 the	 world.	
Today	NNL	appears	as	a	goal	in	biodiversity	policy	targets	and	standards	at	a	variety	
of	scales.	This	includes	27	nation	states	(Madsen	et	al.	2011)	as	well	as	a	multitude	of	
multinational	 corporations	 (Rainy	 et	 al.	 2014)	 and	 financial	 institutions	 (IFC	 2012).	
The	 European	 Union	 adopted	 a	 goal	 of	 NNL	 as	 Action	 7	 in	 its	 2011	 Biodiversity	
Strategy	 to	 2020,	 as	 did	 the	UK	 in	 its	 national	 planning	policy	 reform	and	 its	2011-
2020	Biodiversity	Strategy	(DEFRA	2011a),	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.	‘No	net	loss’	
has	even	been	adopted	as	policy	in	select	English	local	government	level	biodiversity	
strategies,	and	 incorporated	 into	corporate	sustainability	 frameworks	at	 the	 level	of	
individual	firms,	as	discussed	later.		
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The	 autopoietic	 success	 of	 NNL	 is	 not	 authorless,	 however.	 	 Several	 decades	
separated	 its	 conceptualisation	within	 the	 assemblages	 of	US	 environmental	 policy	
and	 re-scaling	 in	 local	 government	 departments	 across	 England.	 Various	 invested	
market-makers	 were	 involved	 in	 efforts	 to	 institutionalise	 NNL	 outside	 of	 the	
regulatory	contexts	of	US	environmental	policy.	It	 is	to	this	period	in	NNL’s	history	
that	I	now	turn.		
4.3	Scaling	up	NNL:	transnational	assemblages	of	BDO	
BBOP	and	other	market	makers	
In	2004,	Kerry	ten	Kate	left	her	role	as	Director	of	Investor	Responsibility	at	Insight	
Investment,	 to	 take	 up	 the	 Directorship	 post	 of	 the	 newly	 founded	 Business	 and	
Biodiversity	Offset	Programme	(BBOP).	Shortly	before	she	transferred,	 ten	Kate	co-
authored	 with	 Josh	 Bishop	 at	 IUCN	 and	 independent	 consultant	 Ricardo	 Bayon12	
Biodiversity	offsets:	views,	experience	and	the	business	case	(ten	Kate	et	al.	2004).	The	
report	 is	 considered	 to	 have	 been	 biodiversity	 offsetting’s	 gateway	 from	 US	
environmental	regulation	into	the	rest	of	the	world	(Calvet	et	al.	2015a).	It	propelled	
the	 idea	 into	 global	 conservation	 discourse,	 but	 specifically	 with	 a	 voluntary	
corporate	audience	in	mind	(Benabou	2014).	Although	varieties	of	wetland	or	species	
offsets	had	been	developing	for	the	previous	two	decades	in	the	US,	this	moment	was	
the	first	time	the	word	‘biodiversity’	had	been	attached	to	‘offsets’	and	presented	for	
use	 in	 a	 voluntary	 transnational	 context.	 The	 drivers	 of	 this	 transition	 came	 about	
largely	due	to	the	increasing	pressure	the	international	mining	industry	was	facing	at	
the	time	to	improve	its	social	and	environmental	record	(Benabou	2014).	The	flipside	
to	 these	 reputational	 challenges,	 as	 John	Groom	of	Anglo	American	 explains,	were	
implications	 for	access	 to	 land	and	markets	and	cost	of	capital	 (ibid:	 104),	meaning	
that	there	was	a	strong	business	case	 for	attending	to	the	environmental	and	social	
impacts	of	the	sector’s	activities,	rather	than	any	crisis	of	conscience	per	se.			
	Pressure	 on	 the	 largest	 mining	 corporations	 mounted	 in	 the	 early	 2000s	 from	 a	
range	 of	 NGOs	 (Benabou	 2014).	 The	 industry	 responded	 through	 forming	 the	
International	 Council	 on	 Mining	 and	 Metals	 (ICMM),	 which	 was	 increasingly	
																																																						
12	At	the	time	of	authoring	this	report	Bayon	was	an	independent	consultant	but	later	
founded	carbon	and	ecosystem	service	 investment	and	trading	company	EKO	Asset	
Management	Partners	and	the	Ecosystem	Market	Place.		
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engaging	with	the	IUCN	specifically	in	relation	to	residual	biodiversity	losses	at	sites	
of	minerals	 extraction	 (ibid.).	 Over	 this	 period,	 early	 articulations	 of	 business	 and	
biodiversity	collaborations	were	consolidating	and	ten	Kate	was	 intimately	 involved	
in	promoting	BDO	mechanisms	to	business	and	investment	audiences	in	the	mining	
sector	 as	 a	 convenient	 and	 effective	 strategy	 to	 manage	 these	 reputational	 risks	
(ibid.).	The	‘offset	mindset’,	as	the	ten	Kate	et	al.	(2004),	report	puts	it,	was	gaining	
ground.	An	individual	at	British	Petroleum	(BP)	communicated	as	much	in	2003,	in	
claiming	 that	 she	 expected	 BDO	 to	 allow	 the	 company	 to	 ‘transcend	 the	 trade-offs	
between	 the	 benefits	 of	 development	 and	 energy	 use,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	
environmental	 considerations,	 on	 the	 other’	 (ten	 Kate,	 Bishop	 and	 Bayon	 2004:	 53	
emphasis	added).		
In	 2004,	 Rio	 Tinto	 adopted	 the	 ‘net	 positive	 impact’	 principle	 into	 its	 Biodiversity	
Strategy,	putting	itself	at	the	forefront	of	this	voluntary	initiative	(Benabou	2014).	As	
is	 the	 case	 today,	 BDO	 in	 these	 early	 years	 was	 promoted	 according	 to	 its	
compatibility	 with	 commercial	 logics.	 In	 this	 way,	 it	 echoed	 the	 ostensibly	
unchallengeable	neoliberal	principles	undergirding	the	‘controlled	breaches’	of	early	
regulatory	standards	in	the	mid	1970s	and	the	associated	aggregate	rules	model	of	a	
bubble	policy	and	NNL.	The	 ‘business	case’	 for	BDO	was	emphasised	on	account	of	
its	 ‘flexibility,	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness’	 (ten	Kate	 2003:	 no	 page),	 and	 like	NNL,	
BDO	was	framed	as	an	‘innovation’	as	a	means	‘to	think	outside	the	box’	(see	Figure	
5)	from	the	very	beginning.	In	particular,	this	emphasis	on	the	business	case	and	the	
novel	opportunity	 it	offered	to	 ‘transcend	the	trade-offs’,	between	development	and	
biodiversity	 sought	 to	 neutralise	 the	 perceived	 antagonism	 between	 economic	
growth	 and	 biodiversity	 conservation.	 This	 business	 case	 was	 key	 to	 stimulating	
corporate	interest	in	voluntary	capacities	(Benabou	2014).		
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Figure	5	Biodiversity	offsetting	comedy-	try	some	‘lateral	thinking’	
Source:	ten	Kate	2003	
In	 the	 language	 of	 assemblages	 (Li	 2007a),	 for	 the	 next	 10	 years	 BBOP	 worked	 to	
authorise	 the	 expert	 knowledges	 and	 language	 of	 BDO,	 forge	 alignments	 between	
individuals	 and	 institutions	 and	 generally	 condition	 contexts	 where	 BDO	 could	
stabilise	 as	 an	 idea	 and	 policy	 approach.	 It	 did	 this	 institutionally	 through	 prolific	
report	writing	and	the	building	of	epistemic	communities	through	actively	convening	
spaces	 for	 professional	 networking	 and	 collaboration.	 Over	 the	 past	 twelve	 years	
BBOP	has	published	dozens	of	papers,	technical	reports	and	guidelines.	The	years	of	
2009	and	2012	were	particularly	productive,	and	 included	release	of	 the	Biodiversity	
Offsetting	Handbook	(BBOP	2009)	and	the	BBOP	Standard	(BBOP	2012)	as	the	means	
of	 encouraging	 the	 mainstreaming	 and	 adoption	 of	 BDO	 by	 institutional	
conservation	actors	around	the	world.		
Today	 BBOP	 sees	 itself	 as	 central	 to	 ‘coordinating	 an	 international	 community	 of	
practice’	 in	 offsetting	 amongst	 auditors,	 developers,	 conservation	 groups,	
communities,	governments	and	financial	 institutions.	 It	also	frequently	collaborates	
with	 technical	 experts	 in	 consultancies	 such	 as	 The	 Biodiversity	 Consultancy	 and	
eftec,	 with	 whom	 individuals	 from	 its	 Secretariat	 co-author	 their	 reports	 and	
scientific	 papers	 referred	 to	 above.	 	 Notably,	 the	 institutional	 and	 organisational	
networks	 of	 this	 field	 are	 quite	 small	 meaning	 that	 many	 of	 the	 same	 individual	
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promoters	 appear	 repeatedly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 different	 reports,	 conferences,	 and	
programs.	 Indeed,	by	positioning	 these	papers	as	 scientific	 journals,	 for	 example	as	
the	Bayon	and	Jenkins’	2010	article	in	the	journal	Nature	testifies,	a	sense	of	technical	
and	empirical	legitimacy	for	the	agenda	is	built.		
The	 discourses,	 knowledge,	 programmes	 and	 collaborations	 that	 these	 networks	
constitute,	worked	to	establish	the	field	of	 ‘business	and	biodiversity’	over	the	early	
2000s	 (Wilshusen	 and	MacDonald	 2015).	 Through	 novel	 institutional	 alliances	 the	
agenda	 filtered	 through	 into	 the	 global	 policy	 infrastructures	 of	 the	 CBD	 and	
strategic	priorities	of	 IUCN	under	the	rubric	of	 the	 ‘green	economy’	more	generally	
(MacDonald	 2010).	 In	 respect	 to	 BDO	more	 specifically,	 BBOP’s	 language	 of	 NNL,	
dovetailing	 with	 the	 forthcoming	 iconic	 TEEB	 study,	 was	 incorporated	 into	 the	
Jakarta	Charter	 in	preparation	 for	Nagoya	and	the	Aichi	 targets	 that	 followed	(CBD	
2010).		
BBOP’s	 scope	was	 initially	 directed	 towards	 catalysing	uptake	of	BDO	 in	 voluntary	
corporate	responsibility	amongst	mining	and	infrastructure	firms,	and	subsequently	
on	 conservation’s	 global	 governance	 frameworks.	 Though	more	 latterly,	 BBOP	 has	
engaged	 with	 promoting	 BDO	 within	 national	 and	 sub-national	 legislative	
progammes.	 Indeed,	when	 the	 states	of	Victoria	and	New	South	Wales	 in	Australia	
began	to	develop	formal	biodiversity	offsetting	principles	in	2012,	it	was	directly	due	
to	the	guidance	provided	by	BBOP	(Miller	et	al.	2015).	Similarly,	and	as	I	document	in	
the	 following	 section,	 ten	 Kate	 specifically,	 through	 advocacy	 and	 report	 writing	
played	an	important	role	in	the	generation	of	a	BDO	pilot	study	in	England.		Through	
BBOP’s	 channels,	 BDO	 has	 been	 actively	 and	 purposefully	 translated	 into	 new	
institutional	and	national	contexts.		
Biodiversity	offsetting	in	practice	
By	 2011,	 BDO	 existed	 as	 a	 legislative	 mandate	 in	 45	 countries	 and	 was	 under	
development	in	another	27	(Madsen	et	al.	2011).	Despite	the	apparent	appetite	for	the	
idea	 and	widespread	 uptake	 in	 regulatory	 as	well	 as	 voluntary	 contexts,	 Bull	 et	 al.	
(2013)	propose	that	after	a	decade	in	development,	biodiversity	offsetting	has	reached	
a	‘critical	moment’.	Systematic	reviews	of	academic	and	grey	literatures	indicate	that	
the	 approach	 was	 lacking	 clear	 guidance	 and	 evaluation	 criteria	 and	 was	 thus	
besieged	 with	 theoretical	 and	 practical	 challenges	 of	 implementation	 (ibid).	 These	
challenges	 include	 difficulties	 in	 defining	 ecological	 currencies	 for	 establishing	
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biodiversity	equivalences	in	losses	and	gains	through	appropriate	metrics;	consensus	
over	 establishing	 biodiversity	 baselines	 and	 measuring	 improvements	 as	 counter-
factual	 scenarios;	 compliance	 with	 design	 principles	 and	 enforcement;	 and	 a	 vast	
range	of	other	ecological	and	political	complexities	(Bull	et	al.	2013.).	
In	particular,	scholars	have	pointed	towards	a	misplaced	faith	in	restoration	ecology	
science,	 with	 the	multipliers	 designed	 to	 rectify	 the	 ‘time	 lags’	 between	 ecological	
losses	 and	gains	 as	well	 as	 the	 ‘uncertainty	 and	measurability	of	 value	being	offset’	
(Maron	 et	 al.	 2012).	 In	 short	many	 of	 these	 difficulties	 stem	 from	 the	 challenge	 of	
making	 different	 natures	 commensurable13	(Robertson	 2006).	 What’s	 more,	 ‘path	
dependent	 time	 lags’,	ecological	non-linearity	and	climate	change	are	also	expected	
to	 reduce	 the	 predictabilities	with	which	 offsetting	 and	 restoration	 ecology	 can	 be	
enacted	with	confidence	(Sullivan	2017:	230).		
Walker	et	al.	(2009)	synthesise	empirical	reviews	of	BDO	and	show	a	weak	evidence	
base	 for	 its	 success	 in	 delivering	 biodiversity	 gains	 in	 practice.	 They	 say	 that	 these	
reviews	 tend	 to	 blame	 failures	 on	 inadequate	 assessment	 currencies,	 disregard	 for	
exchange	 restrictions	 and	 poor	 enforcement.	 Some	 even	 propose	 that	 NNL	 is	
fundamentally	 impossible	 to	 achieve	 in	 reality	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 data	 on	 populations,	
species	 and	 ecosystems	 and	 the	 difficulties	 of	 collecting	 new	 data	 (Gardner	 et	 al.	
2013).	As	a	 result,	Walker	et	al.	 (2009)	surmise	 that	BDO	in	practice	 is	 in	 fact	 little	
more	 than	 a	 symbolic	policy	used	by	 regulators	with	 limited	 interest	 in	 addressing	
the	wider	causes	of	biodiversity	loss.	Yet,	for	the	most	part	policy-oriented	technical	
literatures	 of	 BDO	 continue	 to	 present	 these	 theoretical	 and	 practical	 problems	 as	
being	 resolvable.	 Improved	 scientific	 techniques	 and	 resources,	 the	 refinement	 of	
political	and	administrative	capacities	(Gardner	et	al.	2013)	or	more	and	better	policy	
guidance	 (Pilgrim	 et	 al.	 2013)	 are	 referenced	 as	 the	 means	 by	 which	 BDO	 can	
overcome	its	technical	challenges.		
To	 return	 to	 Li’s	 (2007a)	 ‘practices	 of	 assemblage’,	 the	 spirit	 of	 ‘refinement’	 that	
continually	 affirms	 BDO’s	 potential	 typifies	 strategies	 of	 ‘rendering	 technical’	 and	
‘managing	 failures’.	 The	 ecological	 and	 policy	 literatures	 referenced	 above	 (often	
authored	 by	 members	 of	 the	 epistemic	 community	 entangled	 in	 the	 BBOP	
																																																						
13	The	 processes	 through	 which	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 attempts	 to	 achieve	 ecological	
equivalence	between	habitats	lost	and	gains	is	addressed	later	in	this	chapter.	
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assemblage	discussed)	do	not	fundamentally	question	the	internal	logic	of	BDO	and	
NNL,	 nor	 their	 appropriateness	 to	 address	 the	 scale	 of	 challenge	 for	 reversing	 the	
decline	of	species	and	habitat	loss.	Instead,	the	papers	incline	towards	narratives	that	
re-affirm	 and	 reproduce	 the	 basic	 axioms	 of	 aggregate	 rules	 and	 market	 based	
instruments.	This	stabilisation	of	BDO’s	‘enabling	assumptions’	is	consistent	with	the	
expectations	of	assemblage	theory	in	general.	In	this	respect,	questions	of	agency	are	
credited	to	‘situated	subjects	who	do	the	work	of	pulling	together	disparate	elements	
without	 attributing	 to	 them	 a	 master-mind	 or	 a	 totalising	 plan’	 (Li	 2007a:	 265).	
Instead,	 Li	 articulates	 that	 actors’	 contributions	 and	 actions	 are	 orientated	 around	
‘habit,	 accretion	 and	 bricolage’	 (ibid:	 265)	 meaning	 that	 substantive	 assumptions	
tend	 to	 go	 unchallenged.	 	 Indeed,	 a	 germane	 question	 critical	 social	 scientists	 are	
now	 investigating,	 is	 how	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 has	 become	 so	 popular	 when	 its	
empirical	foundations	are	so	weak?	(Benabou	2014,	Calvet	et	al.	2014)		
This	 chapter	 proposes	 that	 one	 answer	 lies	 in	 the	 accretion,	 normalisation	 and	
adoption	of	powerful	conceptual	technologies.	These	technologies	frame	aggregated	
sums	 of	 environmental	 totals	 permitting	 the	 idea	 of	 substitutability	 and	 exchange	
between	kinds	and	 types	of	 environmental	 goods	and	bads,	necessarily	obfuscating	
any	 specificities	or	differences	of	 the	 things	 to	be	 exchanged.	 I	have	used	 the	 term	
conceptual	technologies,	to	try	and	capture	how	it	is	that	they	can	colonise	thinking	
patterns	 to	 circumscribe	 certain	 technical	 (and	 measurable)	 solutions	 over	
alternatives.	I	wish	to	emphasise	that	this	process	also	tends	towards	occluding	wider	
debate	 about	 the	 systemic	 drivers	 of	 biodiversity	 loss	 in	 the	 first	 instance.	 It	 is	 in	
these	ways	that	NNL	and	the	mitigation	hierarchy	are	performative	of	BDO	and	the	
kinds	of	values	that	it	is	interested	in.	In	addition,	I	have	proposed	that	the	political	
economy	of	 environmental	 regulations	and	conservation	 rendered	 such	governance	
interventions	 compatible	 with	 capitalism.	 The	 contexts	 in	 which	 these	 conceptual	
technologies	 were	 conceived,	 deployed	 and	 continue	 to	 circulate,	 shape	 how	 they	
emerged	as	effective	agents	in	making	BDO	‘thinkable’.		
As	well	 as	 a	 conceptual	 technology,	NNL	 and	 BDO	have	 also	 been	 simultaneously	
imbued	with	a	moral	 imperative	and	aligned	 to	an	ethical	 framework	 for	action.	 In	
particular,	 this	 ethical	 framework	 is	 achieved	 through	 being	 juxtaposed	 against	 a	
‘business	as	usual’	trajectory	to	validate	BDO	as	‘better	than	nothing’.	The	forming	of	
the	 assemblages	 through	 which	 these	 conceptual	 technologies	 have	 emerged	 and	
circulated	 over	 the	 past	 40	 years	 serves	 to	 render	 BDO	 as	 a	 potent	weapon	 in	 the	
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arsenal	 of	 techniques	 ready	 to	 present	 economic	 growth	 compatible	 with	
conservation	policy	and	practice.	This	is	the	compelling	logic	of	the	‘green	economy’.	
But	 this	 is	 not	 to	 overplay	 the	 smoothness	 with	 which	 BDO	 appears	 or	 can	 be	
implemented	in	national	legislatures.	The	following	section	moves	the	discussion	to	
the	emergence	of	BDO	as	a	proposed	pilot	study	in	2011	within	English	planning	and	
environmental	policy	to	illustrate	how	the	assemblages	re-scaled	within	this	context.	
In	 this	 section	 I	 highlight	 how	 the	 social,	 political	 and	 ideological	 factors	 that	
converged	 to	 give	 rise	 to	 BDO	 in	 the	 first	 place	 were	 also	 ultimately	 factors	 that	
belied	 its	 ability	 to	 establish	 itself	 in	 any	 formal	 sense	 beyond	 the	 pilot	 studies	 of	
2012-2014.	This	is	a	paradox	that	I	will	return	to	in	chapter	9.	
4.4	The	‘greenest	government	ever’:	NNL	and	biodiversity	
offsetting	in	England	
Articulations	 of	 the	 ‘green	 economy’	 through	 a	 discourse	 of	 biodiversity	 and	
ecosystem	valuation	were	strengthening	at	national	as	well	as	international	scales	in	
2010	when	the	new	UK	Conservative–Liberal	Democrat	coalition	government	came	to	
power.	Later	that	year,	at	the	UN	CBD’s	10th	Conference	of	Parties	(CoP)	in	Nagoya,	
92	countries	affirmed	that	the	 ‘values	of	nature’	should	be	taken	 into	account	at	all	
levels	of	government.	These	discourses	and	their	 institutional	contexts	coalesced	 in	
2011	amid	a	unique	political	moment	as	the	new	government	initiated	a	formal	pilot	
study	into	biodiversity	offsetting	in	England.	In	what	would	later	become	a	promise	
that	 lay	 in	 tatters	 following	 a	 virulent	 programme	 of	 austerity,	 de-regulation	 and	
dominant	 pro-growth	 ‘economic	 recovery’,	 the	 new	 British	 prime	 minister,	 David	
Cameron	announced	that	his	would	be	‘greenest	government	ever’.		
In	 the	 UK,	 a	 flood	 of	 reports,	 white	 papers	 and	 studies	 emerged,	 invigorating	
England’s	 biodiversity	 strategies	 to	meet	 2011-2020	 conservation	 goals	 that	 the	 UK	
had	signed	up	to	under	Nagoya.	The	Coalition	Government	published	England’s	new	
biodiversity	strategy;	Biodiversity	2020:	A	strategy	for	England’s	wildlife	and	ecosystem	
services.	This	strategy	replaced	the	UK	Biodiversity	Action	Plan	(UKBAP)	framework	
that	had	been	operational	since	 1994,	after	 the	UK	had	 first	 ratified	the	CBD	at	 the	
Rio	 Earth	 Summit.	During	 this	 upheaval,	NNL	 and	 offsetting	 found	 their	way	 into	
and	 fixed	 in	 place	 within	 English	 biodiversity	 and	 planning	 policy	 inscription	 and	
into	various	reports	at	different	levels	of	government,	including	Biodiversity	2020.		
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Two	 major	 studies	 into	 the	 state	 of	 biodiversity	 in	 England	 partly	 shaped	 the	
scientific	 and	 policy	 context	 in	 which	 BDO	materialised.	 The	 previous	 incumbent	
Labour	Government	initiated	the	first:	The	Lawton	Review	(Lawton	et	al.	2010),	which	
was	 an	 independent	 review	 of	 England’s	 wildlife	 sites	 and	 ecological	 networks	
chaired	by	Professor	John	Lawton.	The	Review	presented	an	arresting	assessment	of	
England’s	‘fragmented	and	isolated’	wildlife	habitats	that	were	correlated	with	50	per	
cent	 declines	 in	 well-known	 species.	 The	 report	 concluded	 that	 the	 state	 of	
biodiversity	protection	in	England	was	found	woefully	lacking	and	resolutely	failed	to	
deliver	a	 ‘coherent	and	resilient	ecological	network’.	In	calling	for	 ‘more,	bigger	and	
better	space	for	nature’,	Lawton	advocated	for	a	‘step	change’	in	biodiversity	policy	to	
improve	 conservation	 outcomes	 in	 England.	 Within	 this	 spatially	 determined	
programme	of	work	 for	 efforts	 to	 restore	England’s	 ecological	network,	 the	Lawton	
Review	 recommended	 a	 system	 of	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 to	 be	 tested	 via	 pilot	
schemes.		
One	 year	 later	 in	 2011,	 Government	 published	 its	 National	 Ecosystem	 Assessment	
(UK	NEA),	as	the	first	national	evaluation	of	the	state	of	the	natural	environment	in	
terms	 of	 ecosystem	 services	 as	 benefits	 to	 society.	 The	 NEA	 (2011)	 hinged	 on	
economic	 valuation	 frameworks	 with	 a	 view	 to	 reconciling	 the	 functionality	 of	
ecosystems	and	habitats	with	social	(largely	economic)	needs.	In	this	way,	the	study	
was	 positioned	 to	 complement	 the	 ecosystem	 services	 framework	 of	 TEEB	 and	
priorities	for	recognising	biodiversity	values	that	emerged	from	Nagoya	and	the	post	
2010	 conservation	 landscape	 generally	 (Apostolopoulou	 and	 Adams	 2015).	 Building	
on	both	 the	NEA	and	recommendations	 from	the	Lawton	Review,	Biodiversity	 2020	
subsequently	put	 forward	a	comprehensive	suite	of	recommendations	 for	terrestrial	
and	marine	 ecosystems	and,	 as	 a	priority	 action;	 to	 establish	biodiversity	offsetting	
pilots	 through	 a	 two-year	 test	 phase	 (DEFRA	 2011a).	 	 Biodiversity	 2020	 articulated	
Government’s	 intentions	 to	 reform	 what	 was	 perceived	 to	 be	 a	 costly	 and	 overly	
centralised	planning	system	to	help	deliver	homes	and	business	infrastructures,	while	
simultaneously	 introducing	 the	 objective	 for	 a	 ‘no	 net	 loss	 of	 biodiversity’	 (DEFRA	
2011a:	27).	
	In	 addition	 to	 Biodiversity	 2020,	 DEFRA	 also	 produced	 the	 first	 natural	
environmental	 white	 paper	 (NEWP)	 for	 20	 years	 entitled	 The	 Natural	 Choice:	
Securing	the	Value	of	Nature	(DEFRA	2011b).	The	NEWP	was	published	in	June	2011	to	
build	on	the	findings	of	the	NEA,	which	was	released	in	the	same	month	and	invoked	
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a	strong	discursive	commitment	to	the	economistic	rationales	for	building	the	‘green	
economy’.	 	 Along	 with	 announcements	 for	 a	 two-year	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 pilot	
study	 to	 get	 underway	 in	 2012,	 the	 NEWP	 presented	 a	 range	 of	 other	 neoliberal	
initiatives	 for	 market	 and	 business	 led	 conservation	 practices	 that	 would	 further	
deepen	and	institutionalise	ecosystem	valuation	and	market	based	conservation.	This	
included	the	formation	of	the	Natural	Capital	Committee	(NCC),	a	Government	body	
set	 up	 to	 report	 directly	 to	 the	Treasury	with	 a	 remit	 to	 ‘put	natural	 capital	 at	 the	
centre	 of	 economic	 thinking	 and	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 way	 we	 measure	 economic	
progress’	 (DEFRA	 2011b:	 4).	 Lifting	 from	 the	World	Bank’s	Wealth	Accounting	 and	
the	 Valuation	 of	 Ecosystem	 Services	 (WAVES)	 approach,	 the	 NCC	 was	 formed	 to	
produce	 a	 set	 of	 ‘green	 accounts	 for	 UK	 Plc.	 ‘showing	 where	 our	 economy	 has	
withdrawn	from	nature’s	bank	balance’	(DEFRA	2011e).	Other	initiatives	included	the	
creation	 of	 an	 Ecosystems	 Market	 Task	 Force	 (EMTF)	 to	 expand	 UK	 business	
opportunities	for	a	trade	in	green	goods	and	environmental	services	(DEFRA	2011b).	
Government	 released	 its	 Biodiversity	 Offsetting	 Green	 Paper	 in	 September	 2013,	 as	
part	of	a	customary	consultation	process	to	solicit	feedback	from	inside	and	outside	
of	 Government	 over	 proposed	 policies	 and	 legislation.	 Unease	 about	 the	 potential	
burdens	and	additional	costs	BDO	could	present	for	developers	is	one	of	the	reasons	
why	 DEFRA	 only	 recommended	 a	 permissive	 rather	 than	 a	 mandatory	 regulatory	
system	of	BDO	in	the	Green	Paper	(Duke	and	ten	Kate	2014).	The	Green	Paper	noted:	
Government	will	only	introduce	an	offsetting	system	if	it	is	satisfied	it	will	
...avoid	additional	costs	to	businesses.	This	will	ensure	it	is	consistent	with	
Government’s	commitments:	not	to	increase	net	burdens	on	housing	
developers	over	the	Spending	Review	2010	period;	and	to	one-in,	two-out	on	
all	regulatory	burdens	(DEFRA	2013:	8)	
Perhaps	September	2013	was	a	 strange	 time	 for	Government	 to	hold	a	Green	Paper	
consultation,	 seven	 months	 before	 the	 2012-2014	 pilot	 studies	 had	 even	 been	
completed.	Director	of	Conservation	at	the	RSPB	Martin	Harper	suggested	that	one	
reason	might	have	been	the	desire	to	‘assess	the	evidence	base	for	the	potential	cost	
savings	before	the	December	regulatory	review’	(Harper	2014,	no	page).	Harper	was	
referencing	DEFRA’s	 Smarter	 Environmental	 Regulatory	 Review	 that	 was	 underway	
between	 July	 2012	 and	March	2014,	 through	which	DEFRA	would	need	 to	 report	 to	
the	Treasury	and	demonstrate	that	their	policies	were	consistent	with	Government’s	
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de-regulation	agenda	 (further	discussed	below).	 The	premature	 timing	 therefore	of	
the	 Green	 Paper	 indicates	 how	 BDO	 was	 primarily	 being	 assessed	 in	 terms	 of	 its	
economic	 implications	 rather	 than	 waiting	 to	 see	 what	 the	 ecological	 and	
conversation	outcomes	of	the	pilot	might	show.		
Certainly,	 the	Green	Paper	 invoked	a	dominant	discursive	orientation	 to	 appeasing	
the	 development	 lobby	 through	 emphasising	 that	 BDO	 would	 make	 planning	
‘quicker,	cheaper	and	easier	for	developers’	(DEFRA	2013)	and	the	‘business	case’	for	
the	policy	more	generally.	 	Putting	 forward	an	 idealistic	narrative	of	 ‘something	 for	
everyone’	the	Green	Paper	described	a	catalogue	of	overlapping	‘wins’	available	from	
BDO.	 A	 series	 of	 counter	 claims	 emerged	 from	 concerned	 academics,	 NGOs,	
ecologists	and	civil	society	disputing	the	simplistic	advantages	BDO	was	promised	to	
deliver	(Sullivan	and	Hannis	2015).	Many	of	these	concerns	noted	the	 incongruence	
between	DEFRA’s	 emphasis	on	biodiversity	goals	 and	 the	wider	political	 context	of	
‘economic	 growth	 at	 any	 cost’	 (Harper	 2014	 pers.	 comm)	 in	which	BDO	was	 being	
introduced.	 Among	 other	 complaints	 that	 made	 up	 a	 sizable	 body	 of	 critical	
responses	 to	 the	 Green	 Paper	 and	 subsequent	 Environmental	 Audit	 Committee	
Enquiries	 (see	 Sullivan	 and	 Hannis	 2015	 and	 chapter	 8),	 one	 emphasised	 that	 far	
greater	 gains	 could	 be	 achieved	 for	 biodiversity	 in	 the	 planning	 system	 through	
strengthening	 planning	 officials’	 authority	 and	 capacity	 for	 meeting	 their	 existing	
biodiversity	 duties	 under	 the	 National	 Environment	 and	 Rural	 Communities	 Act	
(NERC)	 (Friends	 of	 the	 Earth	 2014).	 Very	 few	 LPA	 ecologists	 have	 a	 working	
knowledge	or	capacity	to	enforce	the	mitigation	hierarchy	framework	(Oxford	2013)	
and	in	house	ecology	teams	remained	scattered	and	poorly	resourced	(Friends	of	the	
Earth	2014,	NGO1-TLP	Jan	2016,	NGO01	Jan	2016).		
Although	 BDO	 was	 actually	 realised	 under	 the	 coalition	 government’s	 wave	 of	
strategic	biodiversity	 and	planning	 reforms,	 it	was	not	 conceived	by	 them.	Prior	 to	
2010,	 DEFRA,	 under	 the	 Labour	 Government,	 had	 already	 commissioned	 and	
published	a	scoping	study	for	the	possibility	of	using	biodiversity	offsets.	Released	in	
2009,	 the	 extensive	 scoping	 report	 led	 by	 independent	 consultant	 ecologist	 Jo	
Treweek	 presents	 the	 intellectual	 roots	 of	 BDO	 originating	 from	 the	 distinction	
between	strong	and	weak	sustainability	principles	outlined	by	Pearce	and	Atkinson	
(1995)	(Treweek	et	al.	2009).	Premised	upon	biological	analogies	to	capital,	the	report	
capitulates	to	economic	logics	and	states	that:	
106  
biodiversity	is	increasingly	seen	as	a	form	of	capital	that	contributes	to	a	
country’s	welfare	via	the	production	of	ecosystem	goods	and	services.	Using	
a	capital	analogy,	the	depletion	of	natural	assets	or	in	this	case	species	and	
their	habitat	can	be	likened	to	a	form	of	depreciation	to	a	capital	stock.	
(Treweek	et	al.	2009:	11)		
Taken	to	be	axiomatic	to	the	study,	Treweek	et	al.	juxtapose	environmental	economic	
theories	with	the	Government’s	development	aspirations	articulated	through	its	2007	
Housing	 Green	 Paper	 for	 the	 delivery	 of	 3	 million	 new	 homes	 before	 2020.	 The	
report’s	 authors	 therefore	 recommend	 mechanisms	 that	 can	 meet	 biodiversity	
commitments	 ‘in	 conjunction	 with	 housing	 growth	 and	 delivery	 of	 associated	
infrastructure…’	 (Treweek	 et	 al.	 2009:	 9).	 The	 recommendations	 from	 the	 scoping	
report	 arrive	 at	 a	 system	 of	 biodiversity	 offsets	 and	 reference	 inspiration	 from	
international	 examples	 such	 as	 the	US	wetland	 compensatory	mitigation	 since	 the	
1970s,	 and	 active,	 ‘well	 established’	 BDO	 schemes	 at	 federal	 and	 state	 levels	 in	
Australia.	The	DEFRA	2013	Green	Paper	draws	on	these	precedents	as	demonstration	
projects	and	thus	validation	for	BDO,	and	in	so	doing	glosses	over	the	weak	empirical	
evidence	for	their	success	mentioned	above.		Through	an	in	depth	case	study	of	the	
Network	 Rail	 BDO	 arrangements,	 chapter	 7	 illustrates	 how	 the	 construction	 of	
evidence	to	use	as	legitimation	case	studies	is	a	circular	process.	Much	of	this	scoping	
report	 was	 subsequently	 recycled	 into	 the	 technical	 guidance	 over	 the	 use	 of	 the	
DEFRA	metric	in	determining	the	‘currency’	within	BDO	(Treweek	et	al.	2010),	which	
I	discuss	in	the	following	section.	
Revolving	doors	
Despite	the	strengthening	of	ecosystem	valuation	discourses	prior	to	the	election	and	
the	commissioning	of	a	2009	scoping	report,	BDO	had	so	far	only	garnered	a	vague	
interest	 from	 central	 government.	 Yet	 David	 Hill,	 founder	 and	 director	 of	 private	
environmental	 service	 brokering	 firm,	 The	 Environment	 Bank,	 had	 been	 actively	
lobbying	 for	 the	 introduction	of	BDO	and	habitat	banking	systems	since	2007.	The	
Environment	 Bank	 had	 positioned	 itself	 as	 a	 broker	 seeking	 20	 per	 cent	 of	 the	
compensation	fee	for	every	offset	that	it	enabled	(OB1-WCS	300714).	Luckily	for	the	
Environment	Bank,	things	were	starting	to	move	in	the	run	up	to	the	2010	election.	
By	 Hill’s	 own	 admission,	 when	 2009	 came	 around	 and	 the	 shadow	 Conservative	
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cabinet	were	actively	‘looking	for	new	ideas’,	he	found	that	he	was	suddenly	‘pushing	
at	an	open	door’	(Kenny	no	date).		
An	 un-qualified	 programme	 of	 ‘conservation	 credits’	 thus	 appeared	 in	 the	
Conservative	Manifesto	2010,	along	with	assurances	for	a	Natural	Environment	White	
Paper	after	the	election.	Offsetting	shot	up	the	political	agenda	for	biodiversity	along	
with	 other	 economistic	 or	 natural	 capital	 approaches	 in	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	
Coalition	 Government.	 Biodiversity	 offsetting	 started	 to	 appear	 as	 a	 number	 one	
priority	in	a	number	of	key	policy	documents.	Notably,	a	small	coterie	of	individuals,	
already	with	a	direct	 interest	 in	offsetting	authored	many	of	 these	documents.	 In	a	
similar	way	to	the	transnational	scale,	it	was	the	role	of	key	visionary	individuals	that	
shaped	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 business	 and	 biodiversity	 alignments	 in	 England	
(MacDonald	 and	 Corson	 2012,	 Benabou	 2014,	 Wilshusen	 and	 MacDonald	 2015).	
Indeed,	some	of	these	individuals	like	Kerry	ten	Kate	demonstrably	transversed	tiers	
of	 international	 governance	 and	 directly	 contributed	 towards	 BDO’s	 adoption	 in	
England.	 David	 Hill	 for	 example,	 also	 became	 a	 central	 figure	 in	 the	 expert	
assemblages	 shaping	 knowledge	 around	 business	 and	 biodiversity	 in	 the	 UK	 from	
2010	 onwards.	 Hill	 made	 up	 one	 of	 ten	 members	 of	 the	 Prime	 Minister’s	 newly	
appointed	Ecosystem	Markets	Taskforce	(EMTF)	announced	through	the	NEWP.	In	
its	 final	 report	 in	 March	 2013	 (while	 the	 pilots	 were	 still	 underway)	 the	 EMTF	
recommended	as	the	number	one	priority	out	of	22	key	opportunities	a	 ‘mandatory	
programme	 of	 biodiversity	 offsetting’	 within	 local	 government	 planning	 policy	
(Ecosystems	Market	Taskforce	2013).		
In	addition,	Hill	navigated	varied	institutional	contexts	wearing	different	caps	while	
promoting	 the	 need	 for	 a	mandatory	 system	 of	 offsets.	 For	 example,	 for	 the	 eight	
years	 between	 2007	 and	 2015,	 except	 one	 year	 in	 2006,	 Hill	 held	 the	 twin	
appointments	of	Chair	and	co-founder	for	The	Environment	Bank	as	well	as	deputy	
chair	 of	 Natural	 England.	 As	 the	 government’s	 statutory	 environment	 advisory	
service,	 Natural	 England	 was	 thus	 the	 consultative	 authority	 to	 local	 planning	
departments	 over	 the	 applicability	 of	 biodiversity	 offsetting.	 This	 apparent	
professional	conflict	of	interest	was	reiterated	by	the	permanent	secondment	of	two	
Environment	 Bank	 programme	 officers	 (offset	 brokers)	 directly	 into	 the	 Essex	 and	
Warwickshire	 local	 government	 planning	 departments	 embarking	 on	 the	 DEFRA	
pilot	study.		
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A	 senior	 ecologist	 at	 Natural	 England	 summarised	 the	 situation	 succinctly	 and	 is	
therefore	worth	quoting	at	length.	
The	main	push	at	the	moment	from	the	Defra	point	of	view	is	that	the	
Minister	has	a	big	interest	in	this.	You	know	it's	a	key	policy,	but	if	
something	else	where	to	come	along	that	was	more	important	then	our	
interests	would	wain	probably.	Therefore,	having	an	organisation	out	there	
that	is	driving	and	keeping	this	going	and	lobbying	and	so	on…	And	you	
know	David	Hill	has	done	some	great	work	lobbying.	He	can	get	to	talk	to	
people	and	he	has	moved	this	discussion	forward	and	I	don’t	think	we	
should	in	anyway,	ignore	the	fact	that	offsets	are	where	they	are	at	the	
moment	because	of	the	work	David	has	done	with	lobbying	and	talking	to	
people	around	it.	(NE01	150613)	
The	Environment	Bank’s	 influence	extended	further	into	government	science-policy	
assemblages	through	other	notable	positions	held	by	its	directors	resulting	in	a	flurry	
of	 recommendations	 for	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 as	 among	 Government’s	 top	
conservation	 priorities.	 For	 example,	 Tom	 Tew,	 Chief	 Executive	 and	 shareholding	
director	 of	 The	 Environment	 Bank	 Ltd,	 was	 one	 of	 fourteen	 panel	 members	 that	
made	up	the	Lawton	Review,	which	had	recommended	BDO	as	the	primary	priority	
for	restoring	England’s	ecological	network.	Meanwhile,	Guy	Duke,	who	since	2010	has	
held	the	position	of	Director	for	Europe	and	Research	at	The	Environment	Bank	Ltd,	
led	the	research	 initiative	that	the	EMT	had	commissioned	the	Valuation	of	Nature	
Network	 (VNN)	 to	 undertake.	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 commission	 was	 to	 inform	 key	
priorities	 for	 biodiversity	 and	 business	 programmes	 in	 2012.	 	 The	 results	 of	 this	
research	again	positioned	BDO	as	first.	Kerry	ten	Kate	was	among	the	team	of	eight	
team	 members	 that	 constituted	 this	 VNN	 research	 initiative.	 The	 environmental	
economist,	Ian	Dickie	of	eftec	was	another	participant	with	whom	ten	Kate	had	also	
co-authored	 (amongst	 others)	 a	 few	 years	 earlier,	 a	 technical	 report	 on	 habitat	
banking	for	the	European	Commission	Director	General	of	Environment	(eftec,	IEEP	
et	al.	2010).		
Together,	Duke	and	ten	Kate	were	latterly	commissioned	by	DEFRA	in	2013	to	gather	
evidence	 from	 a	 range	 of	 offset	 schemes	 in	 the	 US	 and	 Australia	 to	 advise	 the	
Department	specifically	on	the	economic	implications	associated	with	introducing	a	
new	regulatory	 framework	of	BDO	(Duke	and	 ten	Kate	2014).	The	emphasis	of	 this	
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study	was	squarely	on	the	economic	costs	and	benefits	of	offsetting	systems	(rather	
than	biodiversity	concerns).		The	governing	rationale	of	this	was	to	assess	economic	
impacts	on	developers	and	house	builders,	to	whom	the	Coalition	Government	in	its	
Conservative	 Manifesto	 had	 promised	 in	 no	 ambiguous	 terms,	 a	 thorough	 going	
programme	of	de-regulation.		
Entanglements	 between,	 and	 influence	 from,	 situated	 and	 charismatic	 individuals	
were	 not	 limited	 to	 independent	 consultants	 or	 policy	 entrepreneurs.	 An	 equally	
distinctive	coalition	of	market	oriented	policy	NGOs	and	governmental	actors	were	
steering	 strongly	 towards	 a	 system	 of	 offsetting.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 enthusiastic	
support	BDO	was	receiving	from	the	actors	and	reports	detailed	above,	it	also	found	
an	 animated	 advocate	 in	 DEFRA’s	 Secretary	 of	 State	 Owen	 Paterson	 (c.f.	 DEFRA	
2013).	Paterson	vigorously	endorsed	the	approach	in	a	speech	to	the	right	wing	think	
tank	Policy	Exchange	in	November	2013.	Paterson	noted:		
It’s	incredibly	apt	that	I’m	speaking	here	at	Policy	Exchange,	the	think	tank	
that	through	its	Nurturing	Nature	report	has	put	offsetting	on	the	political	
agenda	and	highlighted	the	real	contribution	it	could	make	to	our	natural	
environment.	(Paterson	2013)	
Policy	Exchange’s	 report	Nurturing	Nature	 (Newey	 et	 al.	 2012)	was	 released	 in	 2012	
and	with	an	emphasis	on	efficiency	and	market	discipline	throughout	recommended	
as	 a	 priority,	 as	 with	 the	 other	 reports	 previously	 mentioned,	 a	 mandatory	
programme	of	offsetting.	A	month	after	his	speech	to	Policy	Exchange,	Paterson	duly	
appointed	 its	 treasurer	 -	 a	 prolific	 house	 developer,	 investment	 banker	 and	 also	
Conservative	Party	donor,	Andrew	Sells,	as	chairman	for	Natural	England	(Monbiot	
2013).	The	neoliberal,	organisational,	professional	and	ideological	ties	formatting	the	
policy	arena	for	BDO	in	England	from	2010	were	therefore	unequivocal.	
Convergence	of	neoliberal	political	imperatives	shaping	the	context	of	English	
biodiversity	offsetting	
Following	 through	 on	 its	 manifesto	 promise	 to	 reform	 and	 unblock	 the	 planning	
system	 that	 was	 perceived	 to	 act	 as	 a	 ‘barrier	 to	 growth	 and	 wealth	 creation’,	 the	
coalition	Government	(Department	of	Communities	and	Local	Government,	DCLG),	
under	 the	 guise	 of	 its	 ‘localism’	 agenda	 at	 this	 time	 also	 initiated	 the	 National	
Planning	Policy	Framework	(NPPF).	The	DCLG	released	a	draft	NPPF	in	July	2011	and	
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the	 final	 version	 in	 March	 2012	 (DCLG	 2012).	 The	 objective	 of	 the	 NPPF	 was	 to	
simplify	thousands	of	pages	of	planning	guidance	to	just	25	different	Planning	Policy	
Statements	(Newey	et	al.	2012).	Through	re-drafts	to	specific	language	and	concepts,	
the	 NPPF	 laid	 the	 policy	 scaffolding	 for	 BDO	 by	 incorporating	 the	 conceptual	
technologies	 inherited	from	US	environmental	policy	histories	I	described	earlier	 in	
this	 chapter.	 The	 mitigation	 hierarchy	 was	 emphasised	 through	 strengthening	
compensation	as	a	‘last	resort’	and	–	most	importantly	-	the	language	of	a	biodiversity	
‘no	net	loss’	(NNL)	and	‘net	gain’	(NG)	(DCLG	2012:	3)	appeared	for	the	first	time	in	
English	 planning	 guidance.	 Although	 other	 types	 of	 ecological	 compensation	 in	
English	 planning	 existed	 prior	 to	 BDO,	 this	 represented	 a	 dramatic	 shift	 since	 it	
proposed	that	gains	must	measurable,	denoted	through	metrics	and	proxy	scores	and	
sustained	over	time	(DEFRA	2013).		NNL	and	NG	replaced	the	prior	Planning	Policy	
Statement	 9	 (PPS9)	 Biodiversity	 and	Geological	 Conservation	 policy	 that	 until	 this	
point	required	development	to	have	‘minimal	impacts’	and	enhancements	‘wherever	
possible’.		
The	 NPPF	 also	 included	 the	 pervasive	 ideological	 re-formulation	 in	 which	 a	
‘presumption	 in	 favour	 of	 sustainable	 development’	 became	 the	 golden	 thread	
running	 through	 planning.	 	 Noted	 for	 its	 resemblance	 to	 the	 Thatcher	 era	White	
Paper	 ‘Lifting	 the	 Burden’,	 the	 ‘presumption	 in	 favour	 of	 sustainable	 development’	
reinforced	 the	message	 that	planning	should	become	 focussed	upon	delivering,	not	
restraining	development	(Hannis	and	Sullivan	2012).	This	emphasis	chimed	with	the	
political	priorities	of	the	moment,	in	seeking	to	streamline	and	de-regulate	planning	
restrictions	to	get	Britain	building,	and	squared	the	circle	with	the	largely	economic	
based	justifications	for	BDO	in	the	2013	Green	Paper	and	the	‘green’	growth	outlined	
in	the	NEWP.		
Neoliberal	technologies;	austerity	and	de-regulation	
Layered	 over	 these	 various	 factors,	 a	 deepening	 project	 of	 austerity	 further	
underscored	 a	 glaring	 mismatch	 between	 the	 energised	 rhetoric	 of	 the	 ‘greenest	
government	ever’	and	the	fiscal	retreat	in	the	opposite	direction.	In	the	post-GFC	era	
of	 austerity	 programmes,	 Government	 spending	 cuts	 spelled	 reductions	 to	 all	
government	 departments	 except	 initially	 for	 the	 Dept.	 of	 Defence,	 the	 Dept.	 for	
International	Development	and	the	National	Health	Service.	DEFRA	lost	29	per	cent	
of	 its	 budget	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 coalition	 government	 from	 2010-2015	 (HM	
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Treasury	2010).	By	the	end	of	2019,	overall	planned	cuts	for	DEFRA	are	estimated	to	
be	57	per	cent	in	real	terms	with	5000	estimated	redundancies	from	the	Department	
(Howard	 2015).	 Dramatic	 spending	 reductions	 for	 local	 government	 also	 saw	 the	
shrinking	of	ecological	teams	and	the	capacity	of	local	planning	authorities	in	general	
(Oxford	2013).	These	cuts	to	LPA	ecological	capacity	came	on	top	of	what	was	already	
a	 somewhat	 enfeebled	 subdivision	of	 local	 government.	Policy	Exchange	 (Newey	et	
al.	2012)	supports	analysis	 that	only	35	per	cent	of	 local	authorities	even	had	an	 in-
house	 ecologist	 in	 2012,	 reinforcing	 the	 incongruity	 between	 aspirations	 and	
ambitions	 set	 out	 in	 the	NEWP	and	 the	diminishing	 availability	 of	 LPA’s	 ability	 to	
meet	them.	One	of	 the	authors	of	DEFRA’s	official	evaluation	of	 the	pilot	proposed	
that	 in	terms	of	conservation	spending,	disproportionate	gains	could	be	made	from	
directing	what	 funds	had	been	made	available	after	the	NEWP	to	 local	government	
ecologists	to	help	them	enforce	the	LPA’s	biodiversity	duties.	My	interviewee	stated:		
I	was	part	of	the	monitoring	and	evaluation	team	of	the	Nature	
Improvement	Areas	and	they	had	£12m	and	did	a	lot	of	great	stuff,	but...you	
know	what’s	the	counter	factual	for	£12m?	You	can	buy	a	lot	of	ecologists	
and	you	would	probably	get	a	lot	better	biodiversity	outcomes	if	you	had	
county	ecologists	in	these	areas	(NGO01	280116).			
It	was	within	this	political	climate,	that	the	Royal	Society	for	the	Protection	of	Birds	
(RSPB)	in	their	2010	report	Financing	Nature	in	the	Age	of	Austerity	declared	BDO	to	
be	the	 ‘top	priority’	 for	new	innovative	sources	of	 funding	(Comerford	et	al.	2010)14.	
The	growing	alignment,	furthermore,	between	a	stabilising	neoliberal	consensus	over	
ecosystem	 valuation	 and	 markets	 to	 stimulate	 innovate	 sources	 of	 funding	 for	
conservation	in	the	dual	age	of	austerity	and	the	‘green	economy’	dovetailed	with	an	
economic	 ‘recovery’	 agenda	 characterised	 by	 deregulation.	 The	 Coalition	
Government,	 upon	 coming	 to	 power	 in	 2010	 introduced	 a	 programme	 of	 de-
regulation	 for	 business	 known	 as	 the	 ‘one	 in,	 two	 out	 rule’	 (UK	 Dept.	 Business,	
Innovation	and	Skills	2010)	as	the	first	rule	of	its	kind	to	seemingly	provide	an	overall	
‘net	loss’	in	regulation.	In	2015,	this	policy	was	stepped	up	to	a	one	in,	three	out	rule	
expected	to	‘cut	a	further	ten	billion	pounds	of	red	tape’	(Dept.	Business	Innovation	
																																																						
14	Others	sources	of	funding	included	environmental	taxes,	NGO	sector	funding,	and	
private	payment	for	ecosystem	services	(PES)	schemes.		
112  
and	Skills	et	al.	2015).	The	Cabinet	office	maintains	a	website	called	Cutting	Red	Tape	
emblazoned	with	a	logo	illustration	of	red	tape	being	cut	by	scissors	to	emphasise	the	
point15.		
The	DEFRA	pilot	evaluation	 report	was	expected	 to	emerge	by	 the	 summer	of	2014	
following	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 two	 year	 study	 period.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	
introductory	chapter	to	this	thesis,	DEFRA,	together	with	BBOP	and	the	ZSL,	hosted	
the	first	global	summit	of	its	kind,	To	No	Net	Loss	of	Biodiversity	and	Beyond,	in	June	
of	 that	 year,	 which	was	 expected	 to	 coincide	 with	 the	 evaluation	 results.	 And	 yet,	
following	 Owen	 Paterson’s	 conspicuous	 absence	 from	 the	 conference	 despite	 his	
scheduled	plenary	address,	the	understanding	was	that,	following	the	fulcrum	of	the	
Green	 Paper,	 and	 the	 apparent	 unfavourable	 results	 from	 the	 pilot	 study	 showing	
that	 at	 all	 levels	BDO	would	 cost	more	not	 less,	 the	political	 context	 for	BDO	had	
changed	(ten	Kate	pers	comm).	In	summary,	despite	the	apparent	thrust	and	political	
appetite	for	BDO	articulated	through	the	flurry	of	reports	that	I	traced	in	the	opening	
of	 this	 section,	 the	 wider	 political	 economy	 under	 which	 BDO	 was	 initiated	
ultimately	prioritised	de-regulation	over	meaningful	shifts	in	conservation	policy.	As	
one	 of	 my	 interlocutors,	 who	 had	 been	 closely	 involved	 in	 putting	 together	 the	
evaluation	report,	described:	
The	main	reason	why	offsetting	isn’t	going	to	happen	and	we	are	not	going	
to	have	mandatory	system	and	why	DEFRA	haven’t	said	anything	for	a	
while,	and	the	reason	why	my	organisation	see	offsetting	as	a	medium	term	
thing	that	we	have	to	approach	very	obliquely,	indirectly	and	discretely	-	is	
that	HMRC	and	DCLG	don't	want	it.	The	reason	they	don’t	want	it	is	
because	of	what	the	evaluation	of	the	pilot	said	very	explicitly,	which	is	
when	you	use	the	metric	and	you	see	the	harm	people	are	doing,	you	realise	
that	the	vast	majority	of	applications	are	resulting	a	net	loss	of	biodiversity.	
But	the	vast	majority	of	them,	and	I	really	do	mean	the	vast	majority	of	
them	aren’t	doing	any	kind	of	on	or	offsite	compensation.	We’re	just	no-
where	near	to	being	able	to	get	a	net	gain.	(NGO01	280116)	
																																																						
15	https://cutting-red-tape.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/	(Accessed	February	10th	2017)	
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The	economic	as	well	as	the	political	costs	of	imposing	biodiversity	compensation	to	
reverse	 this	 trend	 were	 simply	 not	 tenable	 for	 the	 Coalition	 Government,	 and	
certainly	 not	months	 before	 a	 general	 election	 in	 2015.	 Following	 the	 election,	 the	
new,	and	wholly	Conservative	Government	allowed	BDO	to	quietly	fade	out	of	sight	
and	mind	and	the	policy	cycle	to	move	on.	Nevertheless	BDO	continued,	and	indeed	
arguably	 accelerated,	 with	 recourse	 only	 to	 the	 NNL	 policy	 contained	 within	 the	
NPPF	 and	 the	 calculative	 technology	 -	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 -	 available	 for	 use	 by	
motivated	planners	 diligently	 pursuing	 this	 policy.	 It	 is	 towards	 the	DEFRA	metric	
that	the	discussion	now	turns.	
4.5	An	iconic	calculative	device:	the	DEFRA	metric	
In	 2012,	 DEFRA	 introduced	 its	 now	 iconic	 (Sullivan	 2013b)	 metric	 as	 a	 calculative	
device	for	constructing	a	‘value’	for	biodiversity	as	a	numerical	surrogate.	The	metric	
is	 the	principal	 calculative	device	poised	 to	 shift	 ecological	 impact	 related	decision	
making	 processes	 to	 a	 quantitative	 methodology	 under	 the	 offsetting	 pilot.	 As	
iterated	 in	 chapter	 2,	 calculative	 devices	 undertake	 ‘processes	 of	 classification,	
clustering	 and	 sorting	 that	makes	 products	 both	 comparable	 and	different’	 (Callon	
and	Muniesa	 2005:	 14).	 The	 promise	 of	 the	metric,	 therefore	 lay	 in	 its	 capacity	 to	
measure	 and	 numerically	 account	 for	 each	 step	 of	 the	 mitigation	 hierarchy	 and	
determine	 any	 resultant	 compensation	 required	 through	 biodiversity	 offsets.	 This	
‘measurability’	 permits	 comparisons	 using	 a	 common	 metric	 between	 losses	 with	
gains	made	elsewhere	with	a	view	to	achieving	 the	calculations	of	a	 ‘no	net	 loss’	of	
biodiversity.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	metric’s	 main	 power	 lay	 in	 its	 ability	 to	 engineer	
commensurability	between	biotic	assemblages	at	sites	of	impact	with	those	proposed	
to	be	created	at	offset	sites.	In	other	words,	the	metric	acts	to	‘make	things	the	same’	
(MacKenzie	2009).		
The	 DEFRA	 metric	 (shown	 in	 Table	 6)	 was	 developed	 by	 Natural	 England	 in	
consultation	with	a	 range	of	external	consultants	and	advisors	 (see	also	Treweek	et	
al.	2009,	2010).	As	the	basis	for	the	BDO	‘currency’	of	biodiversity	‘units’,	the	metric	
combines	ecological	value	with	a	spatial	area.	This	combined	approach	was	adapted	
from	the	habitat	hectares	(Parkes	et	al.	2003)	methodology	employed	in	BioBanking	
and	 Bushbroker	 systems	 of	 offsetting	 in	 Australia	 and	 legitimated	 and	 popularised	
through	 its	 incorporation	 into	 the	 BBOP	 2009	 Handbook	 (see	 above).	 The	
methodology	was	nevertheless	modified	to	offer	a	bespoke	fit	with	the	conservation	
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policy	 frameworks	 and	 biological	 and	 habitat	 assemblages	 of	 England	 drawing	
heavily	from	the	scoping	study	provided	by	Treweek	at	al.	2009,	2010	(DEFRA	2011d),	
discussed	above.	 ‘Habitat-hectares’	is	a	compound	metric	(Bull	et	al.	2013)	approach	
to	 include	 spatial	 area	 (hectares)	 against	 two	 other	 ecological	 indicators	 across	
habitat	 condition	 and	 distinctiveness.	 The	 combination	 of	 these	 three	 values	
produces	 a	matrix	 against	which	 a	 single	 unit	 score	 as	 surrogate	 can	 be	 produced.	
Land	 area	 is	 an	 integral	 component	 of	 biodiversity	 value	 made	 through	 habitat	
hectares.	 Treweek	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 propose	 that	 spatial	 metrics	 are	 essential	 for	 a	
comparative	 purposes	 of	 biodiversity	 losses	 and	 gains	 where	 land-use	 change	 is	
concerned.	As	 its	name	suggests,	habitat	hectares	 therefore	 formed	an	entirely	new	
ecological	 indicator	 in	 England	 as	 a	 ‘scientific’	 unit	 with	 spatial	 values	 embedded	
within	 it.	 As	 will	 become	 clear	 in	 the	 discussion	 below,	 the	 spatial	 component	 of	
these	units	is	partly	what	enables	practices	of	commensuration	under	offsetting.		
Table	6	The	DEFRA	biodiversity	metric	(matrix)	
Source:	Author	adapted	from	DEFRA	2011c	
	
The	 advantages	 of	 using	 habitats	 as	 an	 indicator	 and	 basis	 for	 developing	 the	
currency	 of	 ‘biodiversity	 units’	 is	 that	 this	 biotic	 scale	 can	 accommodate	 species	
populations	 as	 a	 secondary	 indicator	 (Treweek	 et	 al.	 2009).	 The	 application	 of	 the	
habitat	as	the	conservation	unit	of	interest	reflects	what	is	elsewhere	referred	to	as	a	
‘coarse	 filter’,	 rather	 than	 ‘fine	 filter’	 that	 would	 pick	 up	 individual	 species	
populations	 (Kiesecker	 et	 al.	 2009)	 (echoing	 the	 etymology	 of	 the	 word	 ‘net’	 that	
opened	this	chapter).	As	its	architect	explained,	‘habitat	hectares’	aims	to	provide	an	
integrated	view	of	the	habitat	 for	all	 the	 indigenous	species	that	may	reasonably	be	
Matrix	showing	distinctiveness	
and	condition	
	
Habitat	Distinctiveness	
	 Low	(2)	 Medium	(4)	 High	(6)	
	
	
Habitat	
Condition	
Good	(3)	 6	 12	 18	
	
Moderate	(2)	 4	 8	 12	
	
Poor	(1)	
	
2	 4	 6	
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expected	to	use	a	site,	but	not	its	suitability	for	a	single	species	(Parkes	et	al.	2003),	
unlike	species	banking	(Pawliczek	and	Sullivan	2011).	As	such,	Treweek	et	al.	(2009)	
explains	it	is	favoured	for	‘lending	itself	to	the	concept	of	aggregating	offsets	at	sub-
regional	level’	and	for	being	able	to	be	applied	to	develop	offsets	as	a	mechanism	for	
delivery	 of	 national	 and	 local	 Biodiversity	 Action	 Plans	 (BAPs),	 which	 are	 habitat	
based.	 It	 is	 further	 justified	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 when	 ‘compared	 with	 species	
populations,	habitats	are	relatively	stable	over	time,	can	be	adequately	described	with	
fewer	types	and	are	normally	used	as	the	primary	focus	of	biodiversity	conservation’	
(Treweek	et	al.	2010:	29).	I	explore	the	experience	of	this	feature	of	the	metric	and	the	
implications	 for	 the	 tensions	 it	 produces	 between	habitat	 and	 species	 conservation	
policies	in	chapter	6.		
To	 use	 the	 metric,	 as	 a	 first	 step,	 development	 and	 offset	 sites	 must	 be	 spatially	
mapped	to	produce	habitat	parcels.	These	parcels	are	then	assessed	according	to	the	
three	attributes	(values)	 that	make	up	the	habitat	hectare	calculations;	spatial	area,	
habitat	 distinctiveness	 and	 condition.	 DEFRA	 provides	 a	 gridded	 matrix	 for	 these	
attributes	so	as	to	allocate	one	of	three	banded	scores	for	different	indicator	grades	in	
distinctiveness	and	condition.	Distinctiveness	grading	follows	habitat	types	allocated	
to	 bands	 of	 priority	 habitats	 defined	 against	 the	 benchmark	 of	 ‘naturalness’	 under	
Section	 41	 of	 Natural	 Environmental	 Rural	 Communities	 (NERC)	 Act	 2006 16 .	
Parameters	include	species	richness,	diversity,	rarity	(at	local,	regional,	national	and	
international	scales)	and	the	degree	to	which	a	habitat	supports	species	rarely	found	
in	 other	 habitats	 (Treweek	 et	 al.	 2010,	 DEFRA	 2011d,).	 ‘High’	 habitat	 band	
																																																						
16 	The	 metric	 was	 designed	 to	 be	 compatible	 with	 how	 biodiversity	 targets	 are	
articulated	 in	 the	 UK	 Biodiversity	 Action	 Plan	 (UKBAP).	 Given	 that	 the	 system	 of	
offsetting	is	intended	to	provide	a	means	for	securing	compensation	in	impact	areas	
falling	 outside	 of	 the	 EU	 Habitats	 Regulations	 designated	 Natura	 2000	 sites,	 and	
most	 of	 these	 fall	 within	 BAP	 designations	 the	 metric	 speaks	 directly	 to	 this	
framework	 (Treweek	 et	 al.	 2009).	 However	 as	 already	mentioned,	 the	 UKBAP	was	
succeeded	 by	 new	 the	 Biodiversity	 Framework	 published	 in	 July	 2012	 according	 to	
new	 international	 priorities	 defined	by	 the	CBD	Aichi	Targets,	 to	 be	 carried	out	 at	
devolved	 country	 level.	 The	 UKBAP	 statutory	 lists	 of	 priority	 species	 and	 habitats	
however,	formed	the	basis	for	those	that	are	protected	under	each	separate	country.	
England’s	 legislation	 is	 set	out	 in	 the	Natural	Environment	and	Rural	Communities	
(NERC)	Act	2006.	http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-5705	(Accessed	March	29th	2017).		
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distinctiveness	relates	to	priority	habitats	as	defined	under	the	NERC	Act17;	medium	
distinctiveness	 relates	 to	 ‘semi-natural’	 habitat;	 and	 low	 distinctiveness	 conveys	 a	
landscape	 made	 through	 intensive	 management	 such	 as	 high	 input	 agriculture	 or	
intensive	 grazing.	 Scores	 of	 6,	 4	 and	 2	 designate	 these	 bands	 respectively.	 DEFRA	
provided	 a	 list	 of	 common	 habitats	 pre-allocated	 to	 distinctiveness	 bands	 in	
Appendix	1	to	the	metric’s	technical	paper	(DEFRA	2011d).		
The	 habitat	 condition	 grades	 are	 adapted	 from	 the	Higher	 Level	 agri-environment	
Scheme	 (HLS)	 Farm	 Environment	 Plan	 Manual	 (FEP).	 DEFRA	 selected	 this	 as	 an	
alternative	 methodology	 to	 the	 more	 commonly	 known	 system	 provided	 in	 the	
Common	 Standards	 Monitoring	 (CSM)	 used	 for	 assessment	 of	 Sites	 of	 Special	
Scientific	 Interest	 (SSSIs).	 This	 CSM	 methodology	 is	 designed	 to	 give	 a	 specific	
output	 that	 categorises	 sites	 into	 three	 states	 namely	 ‘favourable’,	 ‘favourable	
recovering’,	 and	 ‘unfavourable’	 (DEFRA	 2011d).	 DEFRA	 claim	 the	 FEP	 condition	
assessment	tool	‘better	meets	the	design	criteria	for	our	approach	to	offsetting’	since	
it	 ‘is	 based	 on	 habitat	 condition,	 rather	 than	management,	 and	 the	 categories	 are	
spread	 evenly	 in	 a	way	 that	 fits	with	 the	 design	 of	 the	 offsetting	metric’	 (ibid.:	 6).	
DEFRA	 propose	 that	 the	 FEP	manual	 offers	 ‘clear	 and	 transparent	methods	 which	
divides	 condition	 into	 one	 of	 three	 categories’,	 across	 good,	 moderate,	 poor	 with	
scores	as	3,	2,	1	respectively.	
A	 range	 of	 tensions	 sit	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 DEFRA	metric.	 Such	 tensions	 originate	
from	 its	 need	 to	 be	 many	 things	 to	 many	 people	 and	 thereby	 strike	 a	 balance	
between	ease	of	use,	scientific	precision	as	well	as	delivering	economic	efficiency.	For	
example,	the	official	BDO	scoping	report	by	Treweek	et	al.	(2009:	118)	recognises	that	
‘a	larger	matrix	might	give	a	closer	fit	to	reality	but	would	be	less	straightforward	to	
apply	in	practice’.		
Calculating	risks	through	exchange	rules	and	multipliers	
DEFRA’s	 exchange	 rules	 determine	 that	 offsets	 for	 the	 most	 part	 do	 not	 have	 to	
deliver	a	 ‘like	for	like’	trade	for	exactly	the	same	habitat	 ‘types’	or	sizes	of	impact	in	
spatial	terms	(DEFRA	2011d).		However,	they	do	require	that	restoration	or	expansion	
																																																						
17http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140711133551/http://www.naturalenglan
d.org.uk/ourwork/conservation/biodiversity/protectandmanage/habsandspeciesimp
ortance.aspx	last	(Accessed	29th	March	2017)	
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should	 only	 target	 habitats	 in	 the	 medium	 and	 high	 distinctiveness	 categories.	
Offsets	should	never	down-trade	from	a	higher	distinctiveness	band	to	compensation	
provision	in	a	lower	one	(ibid.).		
Inherent	 in	 any	 offset	 conservation	 and	 restoration	 works	 are	 myriad	 risks	 and	
uncertainties;	these	are	associated	with;		
1)	delivery	risks,	such	as	the	difficulty	of	creating	habitat,		
2)	 spatial	 risks	 relating	 to	 the	 geographical	 distance	 between	 loss	 and	 the	 new	
strategic	 placement	 of	 the	 offset	 affecting	 the	 integrity	 of	 regional	 ecological	
distribution	and	networks,	
3)	and	temporal	 risks	associated	with	the	time	to	target	condition	and	any	possible	
time	lag	between	impact	and	offset.		
The	 DEFRA	 offset	 model	 attempts	 to	 account	 for	 these	 risks	 numerically	 with	
multipliers	 that	 augment	 and	enlarge	 the	offset	 credit	provision	 requirements	 (and	
the	 subsequent	price	 to	 the	developer	 through	compensation).	Delivery	 risks	 relate	
to	 the	uncertainty	around	the	effectiveness	of	 the	restoration	and	reflect	 that	some	
habitats	will	be	more	difficult	 than	others	 to	 ‘deliver’	as	an	offset.	The	delivery	 risk	
multipliers	 can	 enfold	 separate	 values	 from	 quantity	 (number	 of	 hectares)	 with	
quality	(habitat	type	or	condition)	by	requiring	that	a	 ‘difficulty’	multiplier	score	be	
awarded.	 This	 score	 is	 seen	 to	 act	 as	 insurance	 against	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	
restoration	or	expansion	efforts	not	working.		
Much	 like	 the	 distinctiveness	 and	 condition	 scores,	 the	 difficulty	 multipliers	 are	
banded	into	different	categories	of	low,	medium	and	high	and	very	high	with	values	
of	1,	1.5	and	3	and	10	respectively.	For	example,	a	broadleaf	woodland	plantation	that	
is	deemed	to	be	of	medium	difficulty	to	create	is	thus	awarded	a	score	of	1.5.	Putting	
aside	the	time	it	would	take	to	reach	target	condition	and	maturity	(of	more	than	32	
years),	 this	 principle	 operates	 by	 assuming	 that	 in	 creating	 an	 extra	 50	 per	 cent	 of	
woodland	 in	 spatial	 terms	 (through	 a	 1.5	multiplier),	 even	 if	 one	 third	 of	 the	 total	
offset	provision	failed,	over	the	32	years	expected	to	target	condition	there	would	be	
‘no	 net	 loss’	 of	 biodiversity	 as	 the	 extra	 ‘units’	 provide	 an	 ‘insurance’	 mechanism.		
Multipliers	increase	the	number	of	units	necessary	for	compensation	and	in	so	doing	
they	 actually	 divide	 the	 unit	 value	 previously	 available	 for	 spatial	 areas.	 Chapter	 7	
provides	empirical	examples	for	how	this	works	in	practice.	
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Despite	 this	 apparent	 technical	 reassurance,	 DEFRA	 (2012a)	 reference	 a	 BBOP	
consultation	paper	by	Biodiversity	Consultancy	director,	John	Ekstrom,	which	argues	
that	 exchange	 multipliers	 typically	 have	 not	 worked	 well.	 Ecological	 science	 has	
shown	that	where	they	are	used	they	need	to	be	very	high	(Moilanen	et	al.	2009),	and	
often	much	higher	than	is	considered	palatable	for	business	actors.	So	as	to	arrive	at	
a	workable	system	in	England,	DEFRA	chose	to	overlook	this	evidence	and	adjusted	
the	 multipliers	 into	 levels	 that	 they	 claim	 are	 ‘practical’	 and	 ‘reasonable’	 for	
developers	(DEFRA	2011d).		
Since	 BDO	 is	 proposed	 to	 act	 as	 a	 spatial	 rationalisation	 and	 consolidation	 of	
England’s	ecological	network	 (Lawton	et	al.	 2010),	 a	 central	design	principle	 is	 that	
offsets	 be	 strategically	 placed	 according	 to	 local	 biodiversity	 priorities.	 DEFRA	
guidance	for	regulators	seeks	to	ensure	that	the	delivery	of	offset	habitat	is	located	in	
a	place	not	‘less	favourable’	than	the	development	site	(DEFRA	2012a).	To	account	for	
these	 risks,	 this	 time	 ‘spatial	multipliers’	 reduce	 the	value	of	biodiversity	units	 that	
are	delivered	in	less	favourable	areas	(I	illustrate	and	discuss	the	ways	this	works	in	
practice	 in	chapter	5).	Local	biodiversity	spatial	 frameworks	are	 therefore	necessary	
so	as	to	overlay	maps	onto	strategic	organisation	of	biodiversity	losses	and	gains	and	
use	 these	 to	 determine	 the	 values	 of	 impacts	 and	 offsets.	 Spatial	 multipliers	 fall	
across	three	bands	with	scores	of	1,	2,	3.	The	score	of	1	makes	no	change	to	the	units	
available	 since	 it	 would	 indicate	 the	 offset	 is	 to	 be	 located	 in	 an	 optimal	 strategic	
biodiversity	location.		
Time	 lags	 are	 the	 final	 risk	 category	 that	 the	 metric	 tries	 to	 account	 for.	 Habitat	
banks	(Briggs	et	al.	2009,	Bekessy	et	al.	2010,	DEFRA	2011d)	that	provide	‘off	the	shelf’	
biodiversity	 units,	 are	 deemed	 to	 be	 able	 to	 overcome	 these	 temporal	 risks	 by	
eliminating	the	gaps	in	time	between	impact	and	gain.	In	cases	where	the	creation	of	
habitat	banks	are	not	possible	(as	in	the	case	of	the	two	year	DEFRA	pilot	study)	time	
lags	 also	 require	 multiplier	 scoring	 practices	 so	 as	 to	 mitigate	 for	 risks	 around	
compromising	biodiversity	values	into	the	future.	Rather	than	an	ecological	basis	for	
multipliers	 in	 the	 case	 of	 difficulty	 and	 spatial	 risks	 mechanisms	 above,	 time	 lag	
multipliers	were	adapted	from	economic	principles	of	discount	rates.	DEFRA	propose	
that	the	discount	rate	 is	 ‘used	to	compare	costs	and	benefits	 that	occur	 in	different	
time	 periods	 based	 around	 the	 principle	 that,	 generally	 people	 ‘prefer	 to	 receive	
goods	and	services	now	rather	than	later’	(DEFRA	2011d:	11).		
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While	DEFRA	 recognise	 that	 this	 is,	 somewhat	 counter-intuitively	 a	 fundamentally	
anthropocentric	 principle	 and	 the	 ‘ecological	 basis	 for	 it	 is	 more	 complex’,	 they	
nonetheless	revert	to	the	economic	standard	through	using	the	Treasury	Green	Book	
methodology	 of	 a	 3.5	 per	 cent	 discount	 rate.	 The	 Treasury	 says	 the	 3.5	 per	 cent	
discount	rate	 ‘reflects	the	value	society	attaches	to	 ‘consumption’	(i.e.	enjoyment	of	
goods	and	services)	at	different	points	of	time’.	Using	five	year	increments	of	time	to	
determine	the	bands	for	a	multiplier	score	derived	from	a	3.5	per	cent	discount	rate,	
DEFRA	 put	 forward	 7	 possible	 scores	 for	 time	 lag	 risks	 starting	 at	 five	 years	 and	
ending	 at	 32	 years.	 Planning	 officials	 or	 ecologists	 engaged	 in	 the	 process	 are	
required	to	‘estimate	time	it	will	take	a	habitat	to	reach	the	pre-agreed	target	quality’	
(DEFRA	2011d:	13).		
Throughout	this	engagement	with	the	DEFRA	metric,	I	have	been	highlighting	some	
of	the	tensions	associated	with	striking	an	appropriate	balance	between	market	and	
environmental	logics.	DEFRA	(2011d)	alludes	to	these	tensions	while	describing	their	
thinking	 for	 hedgerows	 in	 the	 technical	 guidance	 document.	 They	 outline	 the	
balance	of	values	this	mechanism	must	incorporate	in	stating:	
It	is	necessary	to	come	up	with	a	mechanism	to	account	for	hedgerows	in	
our	system	of	offsetting	that	both	recognises	their	unique	contribution	to	
biodiversity	whilst	at	the	same	time	meeting	our	guiding	principle	for	
simplicity.	(DEFRA	2011d:	35)	
Much	like	‘species’,	the	metric	does	not	‘see’	hedgerows,	but	on	account	of	their	very	
high	biodiversity	value	and	of	being	a	 feature	 ‘almost	unique	to	 the	UK’	hedgerows	
are	 treated	 separately	 under	 their	 own	 mechanism	 (DEFRA	 2011d).	 Much	 like	 the	
general	DEFRA	metric,	the	hedgerow	valuation	mechanism	awards	simple	grades	of	
condition	according	to	linear	spatial	(metres)	multipliers.	
I	examine	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	metric	 is	deployed	 in	situ	across	my	 three	studies	
where	these	practices	of	commensuration	are	brought	to	life.	In	so	doing	I	illuminate	
the	strategies	actors	employ	so	as	to	manage	these	tensions	in	practice,	and	expand	a	
discussion	 around	 the	 layers	 of	 commensuration	 that	 occur	 through	 it.	 Of	 central	
importance	 here	 are	 the	 ambitions	 for	 the	 calculative	 technology	 in	 the	metric	 to	
defuse	 perceived	 incompatibilities	 between	 economic	 and	 ecological	 rationales.	
While	BDO	as	an	 instrument	promises	to	deliver	on	this	aspiration,	the	metric	at	a	
micro	level	seeks	to	achieve	this	through	providing	what	Latour	(2013)	would	label	as	
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a	 ‘crossing’	between	divergent	 ‘modes’.	 I	propose	 these	 ‘modes’	 -	or	orders	of	 value	
(Boltanski	 and	 Thévenot	 2006)	 translate	 into	 the	 distinct	 but	 compatible	
representational	 abstractions	 of	 economic	 and	 ecological	 data.	 Morgan	 Robertson	
(2006)	 captures	 this	 dynamic	 in	 the	 oft-quoted	 observation	 that	 offsetting	metrics	
such	create	a	‘nature	that	capital	can	see’.	
4.6	Conclusion	and	summary	
This	chapter	has	traced	the	origins	and	journey	of	prominent	elements	constituting	
the	BDO	assemblage	through	a	historical	lens.	Figure	6	summarises	some	of	the	key	
moments	of	this	process.	The	chapter	opened	with	the	appearance	of	aggregate	rules	
in	US	environmental	policy	and	concluded	with	the	deployment	of	NNL	and	BDO	in	
English	planning	processes	40	years	 later.	 I	have	attempted	 to	 illuminate	 the	mesh	
like	nature	-	or	lattice	work	of	elements	that	have	facilitated	this	translation	of	NNL	
across	 time	 and	 space.	 Such	 elements	 include	 a	 variety	 of	 institutional	 alignments	
between	 business,	 economic	 theory	 and	 biodiversity	 conservation;	 persuasive	
discourses	 enacted	 through	 influential	 individuals;	 the	 stabilisation	 of	 dominant	
imaginaries	 (particular	 quantitative	 framings	 biodiversity	 and	 associated	 ethical	
frameworks);	and	the	specific	convergences	in	ideological	and	political	circumstances	
in	which	such	ethical	frameworks	appear	coherent	and	convenient.	
Throughout	 this	 chapter,	 I	 have	 highlighted	 the	 immutable	 character	 of	 the	
conceptual	schema	of	a	NNL	of	biodiversity	and	the	mitigation	hierarchy.	No	net	loss	
acquired	a	potency	and	essence	that	has	enabled	it	to	 ‘translate	without	corruption’	
(Latour	 1986:	 8).	 In	 addition	 to	 its	material	 consequences	 for	 biodiversity	 habitats,	
NNL	 also	 consolidates	 a	 popular	 imaginary	 of	 biodiversity’s	 ‘state	 based	 ontology’	
(Maier	 2012)	 that	 I	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 2.	 NNL	 serves	 to	 ‘recursively	 amplify’	
(Sullivan	2017)	a	 logic	that	ten	Kate	et	al.	(2004)	express	as	the	 ‘offset	mindset’,	but	
elsewhere	 is	 labelled	 the	 ‘offset	 ideology’	 (Seagle	 2012).	 Immutable	mobiles	 refer	 to	
the	 circulation	 and	 agency	 of	 inscriptions	 across	 time	 and	 space.	 Through	 the	
account	 of	 its	 history,	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 NNL	 is	 the	 means	 through	 which	 such	
inscriptions	 can	 appear.	 NNL	 is	 the	 theoretical	 scaffolding	 that	 in	 its	 very	 nature	
requires	 a	 material	 calculative	 device	 such	 as	 the	 DEFRA	 metric,	 into	 which	
biodiversity,	as	data,	as	universal	equivalents,	may	be	inscribed.	This	device,	in	turn	
offers	a	grid	into	which	actors	quantitatively	process	biodiversity	data	with	the	view	
to	 securing	 (net)	 positive	 outcomes	 in	 the	 end.	 ‘No	 Net	 Loss’	 of	 biodiversity	 is	
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generally	 seen	as	a	good	 thing.	 It	 is	an	 increasingly	popular	 idealised	standard	that	
conservationists	now	tend	 to	 invoke	as	 the	goal	of	conservation	generally.	Yet,	as	a	
policy	 standard,	 NNL	 is	 the	 defining	 feature	 of	 balance	 sheet	 logic	 within	
environmental	 value	 making	 in	 biodiversity	 conservation.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 way	 that	
Robertson	 (2012:	 386)	 suggests	 that	 NNL	 and	 the	 technologies	 of	 measurement	 it	
precipitates,	 permits	 planners	 to	 ‘arrive	 at	 ecosystems	 already	 encountered	 in	
commodity	form’.	‘No	net	loss’	frames	and	performs	exchange	values	of	biodiversity.	
It	is	emphatically	not,	therefore,	a	trivial	or	neutral	development.	
I	 described	 how	 NNL	 was	 actively	 promoted	 by	 various	 influential	 actors	 and	 in	
particular	through	BBOP	and	how	the	idea	consequently	gained	traction	in	extractive	
industry	 sector	 voluntary	 contexts	 in	 the	 early	 2000s.	 In	 so	 far	 as	 BBOP	 and	 its	
founders	 enabled	 and	 actively	 promoted	 these	 translations	 to	 new	 institutional	
contexts,	 I	 identify	 these	 actors	 to	 be	 market	 makers,	 embroiled	 in	 processes	 of	
enrolment	and	marketisation	 (Çalışkan	and	Callon	2010).	A	notable	 strategy	 in	 this	
process	was	the	telling	of	powerful	stories	(largely	dependent	on	the	ethical	potency	
of	 NNL)	 to	 neutralise	 perceived	 antagonisms	 between	 business	 and	 environment	
logics	-	‘to	transcend	trade-offs’	as	ten	Kate	et	al.	(2004)	put	it.		
The	Oxford	English	Dictionary	(2017c)	defines	the	word	transcend,	‘to	pass	over	or	go	
beyond’.	Thus,	BDO	was	framed	as	something	able	to	make	tractable	that	which	was	
previously	 intractable	 -	 to	 forge	 a	 new	 space	 of	 congruence	 and	 harmony	 between	
economic	 growth	 and	 ecological	 flourishing.	 For	 all	 of	 its	 promises	 to	 be	 able	 to	
deliver	 such	 settlements,	 more	 than	 a	 decade	 in,	 a	 steadily	 growing	 number	 of	
accounts	of	BDO’s	practical	implementation	belie	that	such	resolutions	are	possible.	
Indeed,	while	writing	 this	 very	 chapter,	 the	Nature	Conservation	Council	 (NCC)	of	
New	 South	 Wales	 (NSW)	 (2016)	 in	 Australia	 published	 findings	 pertaining	 to	
assessments	of	a	decade	of	offsetting	in	the	state.	The	summary	conclusions	showed	
empirical	evidence	of	BDO’s	biodiversity	outcomes	to	range	from	‘disastrous’,	‘poor’,	
and	 very	 occasionally	 ‘adequate’	 (NCC	 NSW	 2016).	 None	 of	 the	 outcomes	 were	
deemed	 to	 be	 ‘good’.	 Biodiversity	 offsetting,	 the	 authors	 concluded,	 was	 ‘adding	
extinction	pressures	to	the	very	species	and	communities	it	was	designed	to	protect’	
(NCC	NSW	2016:	31).		
Business’	 adoption	 of	 NNL	 emerged	 as	 a	 strategy	 to	 incorporate	 external	 critique	
through	inverting	a	primarily	defensive	position	into	an	offensive	one	and	advancing	
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BDO	 as	 a	 practical,	 pragmatic	 strategy	 (Benabou	 2014).	 Indeed,	 this	 putatively	
political	strategy	of	‘disciplining	dissent’	is	a	recognisable	feature	of	the	related	shifts	
associated	with	 the	neoliberalisation	of	 conservation	more	generally	 (Büscher	et	al.	
2012).	 Through	 offsetting,	 the	 extractive	 sector	 was	 able	 to	 capture	 and	 re-frame	
environmental	discourses	in	their	favour	(Nyberg	and	White	2013).	The	objective	was	
to	maintain	the	possibility	for	flexibly	attuned,	but	voluntarily	enacted	solutions	that	
ultimately	enabled	the	trade	or	displacement	of	the	problem.		
Part	 of	 this	 re-framing	 exercise	 draws	 upon	 narratives	 of	 pragmatism.	 Strongly	
foretelling	the	overriding	justification	discourse	of	BDO	in	England,	pragmatism	as	a	
companion	ideal	to	 ‘efficiency’,	was	ever	present	through	the	historical	trajectory	of	
this	 chapter.	 Pragmatism	 means	 acting	 in	 ways	 according	 to	 what	 is	 considered	
achievable,	 rather	 than	 ideal.	 It	 is	 therefore	 manifestly	 a	 ‘pessimistic’18	approach,	
rather	than	a	hopeful	or	ambitious	ideal	for	conservation	professionals	to	be	adopting	
in	droves.	The	invention	of	emission	reduction	credits	under	the	CAA	was	an	overtly	
pragmatic	 compromise	 between	 economic	 growth	 and	 environmental	 goals.	
Pragmatism	 was	 the	 reason	 why	 regulatory	 innovations	 ushered	 in	 a	 new	 era	 of	
‘environmentally	 attuned	 development’	 that	 more	 or	 less	 permitted	 industry	 to	
continue	business	as	usual.	The	translations	of	the	aggregate	rules	to	other	areas	of	
environmental	 policy	 were	 enacted	 in	 the	 name	 of	 efficiency	 and	 pragmatism.	 As	
Pawliczek	 and	 Sullivan	 (2011)	 point	 out,	 under	 these	 conditions,	 conservation,	
counter-intuitively,	 becomes	 ‘development	 led’.	 Funding	 for	 biodiversity	 protection	
or	enhancements	becomes	bound	to	the	spatial,	temporal	and	financial	dynamics	of	
infrastructural	or	 residential	developments.	 I	 return	 to	 this	 idea	 in	 the	case	 studies	
below	where	I	identify	that,	in	contrast	to	its	alleged	rationale	for	 ‘making	space	for	
nature’	(Lawton	et	al.	2010),	BDO,	in	fact,	counter	intuitively	works	to	make	space	for	
development.		
In	 summary,	 BDO	 thus	 emerged	 within	 a	 co-evolutionary	 relationship	 between	
conservation	 and	 social	 and	 ideological	 dynamics,	 or	 sociological	 ‘values’,	 in	 the	
sense	 that	 David	 Graeber	 (2001)	 discusses,	 as	 well	 as	 micro	 scale	 histories	 of	
individuals	 negotiating	 at	 different	 moments.	 The	 convergence	 of	 political	 and	
																																																						
18	Environmental	 philosopher	 Mike	 Hannis	 made	 this	 point	 during	 a	 debate	 with	
Pavan	 Sukhdev,	 author	 of	 TEEB,	 around	 the	 ethics	 of	 natural	 capital	 accounting	
during	the	World	Forum	for	Natural	Capital	2015	in	Edinburgh.			
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economic	technologies	(de-regulation,	austerity)	according	to	an	ideological	moment	
when	the	Conservative	led	Coalition	came	to	power	in	2010,	shaped	the	rise	of,	and	
ultimately	 the	 contradictory	 character	 of	 BDO.	 From	 origins	 to	 theory	 and	
implementation,	 BDO	 is	 riddled	 with	 paradoxes	 and	 tensions.	 We	 will	 observe	 a	
number	 of	 these	 struggles	 in	 grounded	 efforts	 to	 develop	 BDO	 in	 practice	 within	
pilot	 sites	 of	 the	 DEFRA	 study.	 It	 is	 to	 this	 scale	 and	 the	 detailed	 empirical	
engagements	with	the	pilot	sites	that	the	discussion	now	turns.		
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Figure	6	A	time	line	of	policy	innovations	leading	to	BDO	
Source:	Author	drawn	from	multiple	sources	
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PART	3	
CHAPTER	5	
IN	SEARCH	OF	A	‘GOOD	BIODIVERSITY	YIELD	PER	HECTARE’:	
THE	WARWICKSHIRE,	COVENTRY	AND	SOLIHULL	PILOT	
	
5.1	Introduction		
This	 chapter	moves	 the	 focus	of	 the	discussion	 to	 the	 finer	 scale	of	BDO	and	presents	
details	 from	 an	 in	 depth	 empirical	 engagement	 with	 the	Warwickshire,	 Coventry	 and	
Solihull	(WCS)	arm	of	the	DEFRA	pilot	study.	The	chapter	explores	the	practices	of	value	
making	 through	 BDO,	 in-situ.	 	 The	 chapter	 is	 organised	 in	 five	 parts.	 Following	 the	
chapter’s	 introduction,	 I	 explore	 the	 background	 to	 WCS’s	 local	 government	
environmental	and	planning	policy	context	and	its	machinery.	I	also	present	some	of	the	
material	 devices	 that	 assisted	 in	 bridging	 biodiversity	 and	 development	 plans	 through	
the	 deployment	 of	 detailed	 spatial	 data	 with	 a	 calculative	 device	 named	 the	 ‘Habitat	
Biodiversity	 Audit’	 (HBA).	 This	 section	 partly	 answers	 the	 first	 research	 question	 by	
highlighting	the	assortment	of	actants	that	enabled	WCS	to	gather	some	wind	in	its	sails	
during	the	DEFRA	pilot.	The	differences	between	this	pilot	site	and	the	others	indicate	
that	 these	 elements	 are	 pre-requisites	 for	 BDO	 to	 stabilise.	 The	 third	 section	 of	 the	
chapter	presents	the	working	through	of	a	specific	BDO	contract	in	WCS.	In	particular	it	
focuses	 on	 the	 practices	 of	 value	 making	 using	 the	 DEFRA	 metric.	 Here	 I	 provide	
detailed	empirical	data	illuminating	the	practical	and	messy	task	of	re-interpreting	biotic	
networks	 and	 relationships	 through	 the	 frame	 of	 a	 universal	 biodiversity	 unit,	 and	
demonstrate	 real	 examples	 of	 ecological	 commensuration	 that	 occur.	This	 section	 also	
explores	 how	 the	 scores	 and	 the	 compensation	 costs	 attributed	 to	 habitat	 impacts	 are	
actively	negotiated	and	struggled	over	by	different	actors	in	the	process.		
The	 fourth	 section	 investigates	 the	 shifts	 underway	 pulling	 the	 whole	 BDO	 project	
towards	a	model	of	habitat	banking.	Market	pressures	for	delivering	economies	of	scale	
in	 offset	 provision	 in	 combination	 with	 the	 specific	 expertise	 and	 interests	 of	 the	
intermediaries	 involved	 indicates	 a	 re-positioning	 of	 conservation	 in	 line	 agricultural	
production	and	growth	narratives	according	to	a	‘good	biodiversity	yield	per	hectare’.	As	
soon	 as	 the	material	 and	 conceptual	 infrastructure	 of	 BDO	 is	 assembled,	 some	 actors	
disproportionately	 shaping	 the	 arrangements,	 envisage	 biodiversity	 to	 be	 able	 to	 be	
harvested	from	land,	much	like	other	agricultural	or	ecosystem	commodities.			
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The	 chapter	 closes	 by	 summarising	 the	main	 findings	 and	 expanding	 the	 discussion	
around	each,	principally	reflecting	on	the	shifts	to	conservation	policy	and	practice	that	
BDO	 is	 engendering	 within	 this	 county.	 The	 fact	 that	 WCS	 was	 so	 successful	 and	
displayed	almost	perfect	organisational	 capacity	 for	 realising	BDO	simply	 emphasises	
the	 significance	 for	 these	 findings	 and	 their	 associated	 implications	 for	 biodiversity	
considerations	within	 the	 local	 government	 planning	 processes.	 It	 is	 to	 this	 enabling	
context	and	wider	contextual	factors	of	this	assemblage	that	the	chapter	now	turns.		
5.2	Enabling	policy	structures	and	wider	context	-	becoming	
‘bottom	up’	
The	sub	region	of	Warwickshire,	Coventry	and	Solihull	(WCS)	applied	to	participate	in	
the	DEFRA	pilot	in	2011	and	was	accepted	into	the	study	on	the	basis	of	that	it	would	be	
coordinated	 by	 the	 ecology	 department	 at	 Warwickshire	 county	 council	 (WCC).	
Warwickshire,	Coventry	and	Solihull	proved	to	lead	the	most	successful	of	all	the	DEFRA	
pilot	sites	(in	terms	of	gaining	experience)	for	a	variety	of	reasons	that	I	discuss	below.	
One	 factor	was	perhaps	 attributable	 to	policy	 changes	 already	underway	 at	WCC.	The	
county	 council	 had	 independently	 embraced	 NNL	 as	 a	 new	 standard	 in	 county	 and	
district	 council	planning	and	environmental	policy	documents.	 It	 took	 its	 lead	directly	
from	 Westminster	 following	 the	 appearance	 of	 NNL	 in	 the	 NEWP,	 the	 NPPF	 and	
Biodiversity	2011-2020	over	2011	and	2012.	As	such,	WCC	were	able	to	go	further	and	faster	
with	introducing	the	DEFRA	metric	(as	the	only	available	calculative	means	for	meeting	
NNL)	and	BDO	more	generally.		
WCC	had	 an	 ambitious	 ecology	unit	within	 a	 Local	 Planning	Authority	with	 a	 highly-
motivated	leader	driven	to	make	a	tangible	difference	to	the	natural	environment	in	the	
county.	This	energy	is	captured	in	statements	such	as	the	one	below:	
The	biggest	driver	I	have	is	living	within	planetary	boundaries.	Nationally	and	
internationally	we	are	losing	biodiversity	hand	over	fist.	No	net	loss	is	not	an	
option	anymore	we	need	net	gain	to	try	and	recover	our	planet.	This	is	my	
biggest	issue	and	I	am	going	to	do	all	that	I	can	to	resolve	this	issue	before	I	pop	
my	clogs.	(LPA1-WCS	130217)	
So	as	to	be	taken	into	the	heart	of	local	plan	making	procedures,	BDO	was	written	in	to	
the	WCS	Sub-Regional	Green	Infrastructure	Strategy	(WCS	SRGIS).	The	WCS	SRGIS	was	
formally	adopted	 in	2013	 (one	year	after	 the	pilot	 started)	and	sets	out	 the	countywide	
ambitions	to	deliver	strategic	long-term	benefits	in	the	natural	environment.	Referred	to	
as	 the	 ‘centre	 piece	 of	 local	 government	 environmental	 policy’,	 the	 SRGIS	 informs	 the	
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environmental	 basis	 for	 spatial	 planning	 across	 all	 district	 and	 borough	 councils	 in	
Warwickshire.	The	SRGIS	‘provide[s]	evidence	for	the	preparation	of	plans,	policies	and	
strategies	relating	to	Green	Infrastructure	(GI)	at	a	sub-regional	level	and	at	a	local	level’	
(SRGIS	 2013:	 3) 19 .	 This	 part	 is	 crucial.	 The	 SRGIS	 covered	 the	 entire	 sub-region,	
incorporating	all	 six	district	 councils	 in	Warwickshire	and	 the	 two	county	boroughs	of	
Coventry	and	Solihull,	across	what	is	known	as	the	two-tier	system.		
WCC	had	a	uniquely	strong	relationship	with	the	lower	tier	district	councils.	The	Head	
of	Ecology	mentioned	that	while	it	was	typical	at	other	counties	for	the	two	tiers	to	not	
‘see	 eye	 to	 eye’	 he	 explained,	 ‘they	 trust	me,	we	 have	 a	 very	 good	 relationship’	 (LPA1-
WCS	130217).	Through	SRGIS,	therefore	the	standard	of	net	gain	and	BDO	was	captured	
in	both	tiers	of	local	government	planning	at	once.	On	account	of	these	policy	changes,	
BDO	was	much	more	than	simply	a	‘pilot	study	phase’	antecedent	to	formal	adoption.	If	
anything,	 it	 was	 the	 other	 way	 around.	 Policy	 was	 written	 so	 as	 to	 enable	 BDO.	 This	
capacity	and	the	WCC’s	ambitions	to	leverage	changes	set	at	national	level	are	what	lead	
the	Head	 of	 Ecology	 to	 refer	 to	 the	DEFRA	metric	 as	 a	 ‘gift’	 from	 central	 government	
(LPA1-WCS	 130217).	 Government’s	 endorsement	 of	 a	 biodiversity	 metric	 assisted	 this	
programme	of	work,	but	in	many	ways,	WCC’s	pilot	was	a	‘bottom	up’	approach	(LPA1-
WCS	130217).		
As	 well	 as	 ambitious	 approaches	 for	 reversing	 trajectories	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 habitat	
decline	 in	 the	 county	 at	 leadership	 level,	 the	WCC	had	uniquely	 strong	organisational	
and	data	competencies	for	an	LPA	ecology	unit.	The	team	was	made	up	of	fifteen	people,	
which	is	very	high	compared	to	most	local	authorities,	which	often	only	have	one	person	
if	 any	 (NGO1	 280116).	 Perhaps	 crucially,	 they	 are	 also	 an	 entrepreneurial	 department.	
LPA1-WCS	130217	explains	‘we	are	an	income	generating	unit,	we	don’t	get	anything	from	
tax	payer	 and	 that	 is	 one	 challenge’.	 But	 this	 is	 in	part	why	 they	were	 able	 to	 take	 an	
Environment	Bank	employee	on	secondment	directly	into	the	department.	Warwickshire	
County	 Council	 formed	 one	 of	 the	 two	 DEFRA	 LPA	 pilot	 sites	 that	 embarked	 on	 the	
study	 period	 in	 partnership	 with	 the	 offset	 brokering	 company.	 The	 partnership	 has	
remained	 exclusively	 in	 place	 at	 this	 site	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 pilot	 in	 2014.	 The	 other	
Environment	Bank	project	officer	was	placed	in	Essex	County	Council	between	2012-2014	
																																																						
19	Green	infrastructure	is	defined	as	‘a	network	of	multifunctional	green	space,	both	new	
and	existing,	both	rural	and	urban,	which	supports	the	natural	and	ecological	processes	
and	is	integral	to	the	health	and	quality	of	life	of	sustainable	communities’	(WCS	SRGIS	
2013:	3).	
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but	 went	 on	 to	 become	 the	 Biodiversity	 Offset	 Programme	 Manager	 at	 the	 London	
Wildlife	 Trust,	 acting	 as	 the	 conservation	 delivery	 partner	 to	Network	Rail’s	 offsetting	
programme	(chapter	7).	
Within	 the	 WCS	 pilot,	 The	 Environment	 Bank’s	 project	 officer	 (coded	 henceforth	 as	
‘offset	 broker’	 OB1-WCS)	 worked	 to	 align	 and	 stimulate	 the	 market	 players	 so	 as	 to	
mobilise	the	cogs	of	a	fledgling	BDO	market.	Markets	require	supply	and	demand,	and	
while	the	LPA	was	able	to	stimulate	demand	from	developers	for	offset	credits	(through	
its	 ‘carrot	shaped	stick’	 in	the	planning	application	process),	 the	supply	side	for	credits	
was	 not	 forthcoming.	 OB1-WCS	 was	 therefore	 engaged	 with	 soliciting	 both	 private	
landowners	and	NGO	conservation	partners	as	potential	receptor	sites	and	biodiversity	
unit	 vendors.	 	 OB1-WCS	 also	 actively	 refined	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 and	 helped	 with	 its	
interpretation	 in	 practice.	 What	 later	 became	 known	 as	 the	 ‘Biodiversity	 Impact	
Assessment,’	 (BIA),	 the	DEFRA	metric	 represented	 a	 significant	 shift	 to	 the	 traditional	
ecological	surveying	and	EIA	requirements.		For	the	BIA	to	be	successfully	adopted,	local	
consultant	 ecologists	 needed	 to	 ‘upgrade’	 their	 professional	 working	 knowledge	 and	
translate	 this	 across	 to	 the	BIA	methodology.	 	 In	 a	 general	 sense,	OB1-WCS	 sought	 to	
mainstream	 BDO	 throughout	 the	 county’s	 ecology	 and	 planning	 private	 sector	
consultancies	 and	 NGOs	 by	 providing	 guidance,	 advocacy,	 training	 and	 seminars	 for	
these	 stakeholders.	 As	 such	 OB1-WCS	 was	 a	 lively	 and	 influential	 actor,	 aligning	 and	
smoothing	 connections	 between	 people	 and	 devices.	 The	 role	 was	 principally	 one	
engaged	with	 ‘making	translations’	between	an	old	system	and	a	new	one	-	before	and	
after	 the	 introduction	 of	 BDO	 policies.	 In	 addition	 to	 technical	 translations	 to	 a	 new	
system,	OB1-WCS’s	work	was	also	one	of	winning	hearts	and	minds.	This	effort	involved	
promoting	 BDO	 for	 its	 potential	 to	 deliver	 promising	 conservation	 outcomes	 through	
harnessing	 the	powerful	multiple	win	 rhetoric	of	DEFRA’s	2013	BDO	Green	Paper.	The	
laborious	work	of	mainstreaming	BDO	and	making	it	familiar	to	users	that	would	take	it	
forward,	was	a	core	part	of	the	Environment	Bank’s	business	model.	As	a	company,	they	
would	 benefit	 directly,	 since	 it	 was	 set	 to	 take	 a	 20	 per	 cent	 fee	 for	 every	 sum	 of	
biodiversity	 offset	 compensation	 that	 it	 brokered	 through	 the	 local	 planning	 authority	
(OB1-WCS	241114).		
A	spatial	dimension	to	the	values:	The	Habitat	Biodiversity	Audit	
In	combination	with	the	rapid	re-scaling	of	national	policy	at	the	local	government	level,	
the	presence	of	rich	biological	data	records	also	permitted	WCS	to	promptly	enact	BDO.	
Warwickshire	County	Council	had	what	they	considered	to	be	probably	the	‘best	habitat	
data	 in	 the	 country,	 if	 not	 Europe,	 if	 not	 the	world!’	 (LPA01-WCS	 130217)	 LPA01-WCS	
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explained	that,	‘Warwickshire’s	data	is	something	we	are	blessed	with,	it	underpins	every	
decision	 that	we	make’	 (LPA1-WCS	 130217).	 This	 statement	 refers	 to	 the	Warwickshire	
Biological	 Records	 Centre	 (BRC)	 made	 up	 of	 Geographic	 Information	 System	 (GIS)	
informed	data	records	and	maps	of	priority	habitat	areas	within	the	county.	The	BRC	has	
been	operational	since	 1974	and	contains	records	of	over	 15,000	species	and	2,400	sites	
(LPA1-WCS	130217).	Crucially,	for	BDO’s	spatial	plan	making,	it	also	includes	something	
called	 a	 ‘Habitat	 Biodiversity	 Audit’	 (HBA).	 	 The	HBA	 is	made	 up	 from	 polygon	 data	
derived	from	every	single	field	and	hedge	in	the	county,	which	is	surveyed	by	20	per	cent	
every	 year	 to	 produce	 a	 complete	 and	 rolling	 ‘audit’	 of	 spatial	 habitat	 indicators	 every	
five	years.	As	an	archival	resource	created	through	an	on-going	partnership	managed	by	
the	local	Wildlife	Trust	in	collaboration	with	the	University	of	York,	the	HBA	represents	
core	 habitat	 areas	 and	 provides	 an	 aerial	 picture	 of	 the	 habitat	 connectivity	 and	
functionality	 within	 the	 county	 drawn	 from	 Moilanen	 and	 Nieminen	 (2002).	 This	
includes	 habitat	 connectivity	 for	 woodland,	 grassland	 and	 wetland	 habitat	 categories	
(Figures	7	and	8	illustrate	these	for	woodland	and	grassland).	These	maps	are	based	on	a	
1km	range	dispersal	of	species	and	habitat	distinctiveness	mapping.		
The	HBA	provides	a	cartographic	data	 infrastructure	compatible	with	BDO	approaches	
since	 it	 identifies	 and	 delineates	 sub	 regional	 ‘biodiversity	 assets’	 and	 categorises	
biodiversity	 strategic	 areas	 within	 the	 region.	 The	 layering	 of	maps	 with	 databases	 of	
biological	records	echoes	what	Latour	(1987)	and	Callon	and	Muniesa	(2005)	refer	to	as	a	
‘metrological	 network’.	 Configurations	 of	 data	 practices	 stabilise	 the	 ordering	 and	
valuing	of	 ecological	 spaces	as	 ‘assets’	 and	 ‘targets’	 and	 in	 so	doing	provide	a	mapping	
facility	 as	 the	basis	 for	BDO’s	 spatial	habitat	placement	 strategy.	Using	 the	SRGIS,	 the	
WCC	 seeks	 to	 connect	 the	 green	 infrastructure	 assets	 together	 to	 form	 core	 areas	
creating	 larger	 functional	 clusters	 of	 woodland,	 wetland	 and	 grassland	 habitats.	 	 The	
goal	 is	 to	build	up	 in	 increasing	scale	of	habitat	connectivity	by	connecting	these	 large	
functional	 ecological	 areas	 together	 (Sub	Regional	Green	 Infrastructure	 Strategy	 2013).	
Using	the	SRGIS	and	the	HBA,	BDO	is	afforded	a	spatial	rationalising	logic	in	seeking	to	
improve	 habitat	 connectivity	 across	 the	 county.	 The	 goal	 is	 for	 BDO	 to	 maximise	 its	
potential	to	spatially	order	the	development	driven	biodiversity	compensation.	The	HBA	
was	considered	to	be	an	essential	tool	for	this	process.	In	particular,	it	shapes	the	value	
calculations	for	biodiversity	investments	in	different	places	according	to	their	proximity	
to	 or	 overlaps	 with	 the	 core	 habitat	 priority	 areas.	 	 For	 example,	 if	 an	 offset	 is	 to	 be	
delivered	within	a	non-strategic	area	according	to	the	HBA	map	then	the	metric’s	spatial	
risk	multipliers	would	de-value	 the	offset	 site	by	a	 factor	of	 three.	The	consequence	of	
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this	de-valuation	would	mean	that	the	offset	site	itself	would	need	to	deliver	three	times	
the	 number	 of	 units	 to	 meet	 the	 credit	 unit	 requirements	 as	 compensation	 for	 the	
impact.	Usually	the	easiest	way	of	achieving	this	was	to	simply	expand	the	physical	area	
by	a	factor	of	three.		
So	 that	an	 increase	 in	 spatial	 area	 (as	one	attribute	of	 the	DEFRA	metric)	 can	act	as	a	
biodiversity	value	compensation,	a	commensuration	translation	occurs	so	that	multiple	
value	 fields	appear	as	equivalent	standards.	 I	examine	this	practice	of	commensuration	
across	the	different	value	units	-	between	hectares	and	biodiversity	units	in	more	detail	
in	the	next	section	of	this	case	study.	Similarly,	if	the	LPA,	broker	or	developer	can	find	a	
receptor	site	for	an	offset	within	the	habitat	priority	zones	outlined	in	the	HBA,	then	the	
reverse	 is	 true.	 In	 these	circumstances,	 a	 smaller	 spatial	 area	 in	hectares	will	 suffice	as	
compensation	since	it	can	offer	a	higher	number	of	units	per	hectare.	The	value,	or	‘yield’	
of	this	strategically	placed	site	will	be	larger.		
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Figure	7	Sub	Regional	core	area	map	of	grasslands	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source:	Warwickshire	Coventry	and	Solihull	Sub-Regional	Green	Infrastructure	Strategy	2013	
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			Figure	8	Sub	Regional	core	area	map	of	woodland	
Source:	Warwickshire	Coventry	and	Solihull,	Sub-Regional	Green	Infrastructure	Strategy	2013	
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Mapping	of	ecological	 ‘assets’	with	an	 ‘audit’	helps	planners	decide	where	development	
and	nature	 should	be	within	 the	 county	 council	 boundaries.	 The	HBA	priority	 habitat	
framework	 imposes	a	value	grid	 that	penalises	 less	 favourable	placements	and	 rewards	
alignment	 with	 its	 target	 locations.	 This	 spatial	 resource	 forms	 WCS’s	 unique	
methodological	and	strategic	capacity	for	undertaking	BDO.	It	informs	the	decisions	that	
planners	and	ecologists	need	to	make	so	as	to	allocate	where	nature	impacts	and	gains	
could	be	strategically	placed	as	well	as	development	driven	land	use	changes.	This	spatial	
planning	 capacity	 is	 a	 vital	 facet	 of	 the	 WCS	 approach.	 It’s	 implications	 for	 spatial	
rationalisation	is	something	that	I	return	to	in	the	discussion	section	of	this	chapter.	
Planning	context	and	development	pressures	
The	county	faces	significant	development	pressures	over	the	next	25	years	in	part	due	to	
its	relatively	flat	and	therefore	developable	topography,	geographical	location	in	England	
and	demographic	and	economic	trends	(NGO1-WCS	241114).	For	this	reason,	the	county	
was	particularly	susceptible	to	the	pro-development	planning	reforms	delivered	from	the	
new	Coalition	Government.		The	‘presumption	in	favour	of	sustainable	development’,	re-
interpreted	through	local	government	strategy	Local	Plans	as	the	‘golden	thread	running	
through	plan	making’	(DCLG	2012:	4)	aligns	with	Government’s	expectations	that:	
the	planning	system	does	everything	it	can	to	support	sustainable	economic	
growth.	Therefore,	significant	weight	should	be	placed	on	the	need	to	support	
economic	growth	through	the	planning	system.	(DCLG	2012:	6)		
For	example,	one	of	the	county’s	district	council’s	Local	Plans	2011-2029	states	that:	
	When	considering	development	proposals,	the	Council	will	take	a	positive	
approach	that	reflects	the	presumption	in	favour	of	sustainable	development	
contained	in	the	National	Planning	Policy	Framework.	It	will	work	proactively	
with	applicants	to	find	solutions	which	mean	that	proposals	can	be	approved	
wherever	possible,	and	to	secure	development	that	improves	the	economic,	
social	and	environmental	conditions	in	the	area…	it	is	important	that	the	
planning	system	does	everything	possible	to	support	economic	growth	and	
sustainable	development.	(Warwick	District	Local	Plan	2011-2029:	17-18)	
The	 delivery	 of	 houses	 and	 house	 building	 is	 central	 to	 the	 vision	 for	 ‘sustainable	
development’.	 The	 2013	 Warwickshire	 and	 Coventry	 Strategic	 Market	 Housing	
Assessment	 (WCS	 SMHA)	 review	 provides	 the	 targets	 for	 local	 authority	 housing	
delivery	between	2013	and	2031	across	all	 six	district	council	 local	planning	authorities.	
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This	 assessment	 sets	 out	 the	 need	 for	 the	WCC	 to	 deliver	 somewhere	 between	 67,500	
and	 73,000	 new	 residential	 dwellings	 over	 an	 eighteen	 year	 period	 (WCS	 SMA	 2013).	
According	to	figures	from	the	Campaign	to	Protect	Rural	England	(CPRE)	and	Housing	
Foresight	 (Burroughs	 2015),	 the	 average	 residential	 dwelling	density	 in	 2011	 in	England	
was	 42/	 ha.	 This	 number	 of	 new	 houses	 then	 might	 equate	 to	 1700	 hectares	 (almost	
seven	 square	 miles)	 of	 land	 use	 change	 subject	 to	 residential	 development	 over	 the	
period.	 	 Alongside	 house	 building,	 a	 full	 spectrum	 of	 employment	 and	 commercial	
developments,	major	mixed	developments,	national	infrastructure	projects	and	minerals	
extractions	 also	make	 up	 planning	 applications	 for	 proposed	 spatially	 driven	 land	 use	
changes	submitted	and	administered	by	the	council	planning	departments.			
Spatial	strategies	
Space,	it	seems	then,	is	at	the	heart	of	both	development	and	environmental	agendas	at	
national	as	well	as	 local	government	 levels.	For	example,	a	diagnosis	of	 the	causes	and	
solutions	 for	 biodiversity	 loss	 in	 the	 UK	 has	 been	 laid	 squarely	 within	 a	 spatial	
framework	 encapsulated	 by	 the	 pithy	 but	 powerful	 campaign	 for	 ‘more,	 better,	 bigger	
and	better	connected	space	 for	nature’	within	 the	2011	Lawton	Report	 that	goes	by	 the	
same	name;	Making	Space	for	Nature	(Lawton	et	al.	2010).	The	goal	to	improve	ecological	
connectivity	and	reduce	fragmentation	is	one	of	the	drivers	underlying	the	promotion	of	
BDO	 to	 organise	 spatial	 placements	 of	 habitat.	 In	 line	 with	 this	 thinking,	 the	 WCC	
problematises,	 specifically	 in	 spatial	 terms,	 the	dismal	 state	of	biodiversity	 and	habitat	
indicators	 within	 the	 county	 against	 the	 CBD	 biodiversity	 habitat	 area	 targets	 and	
standards.	In	their	application	to	become	one	of	the	50	government	backed	Local	Nature	
Partnerships	proposed	in	the	NEWP	in	2011,	WCC	states:		
Our	area	of	around	2	per	cent	of	high	quality	wildlife	assets	is	woefully	short	of	
the	Nagoya	Commitment	aspiration	of	17	per	cent.	Using	this	measure	to	
estimate	what	is	required,	approximately	38,200	hectares	of	high	quality	natural	
habitat	will	be	needed	to	redress	the	balance	between	semi-natural	vegetation	
and	other	uses.	Our	highly-fragmented	landscape	is	currently	unlikely	to	deliver	
the	ecosystem	services	set	out	in	the	Natural	Environment	White	Paper.’	
(Warwickshire	Local	Nature	Partnership	application	2012)	
WCS’s	spatially	driven	environmental	planning	is	set	out	in	the	SRGIS	and	described	as:		
	where	wildlife	thrives	alongside	humans	within	a	resilient	landscape;	where	
land	and	buildings	are	managed	positively	for	biodiversity,	and	where	
135  
biodiversity	enhancements	are	embedded	into	development,	contributing	to	
the	extension	and	joining	up	of	existing	biodiversity	assets.’	(Sub	Regional	
Green	Infrastructure	Strategy	2013:	19).	
The	SRGIS	proposes	that	for	the	purposes	of	identifying	and	managing	its	‘assets’,	green	
infrastructure	here	is	divided	into	what	it	refers	to	as	‘three	disciplines’	(or	mechanisms	
for	delivery)	 -	 ‘Landscape’,	 ‘Accessibility’	 and	 ‘Planning’.	 Planning	 is	disproportionately	
emphasised	 over	 the	 others.	 Within	 planning,	 BDO	 is	 presented	 as	 the	 leading	
mechanism	 for	 meeting	 biodiversity	 priorities	 within	 the	 county	 planning	 processes.	
Therefore,	 for	 all	 the	 variety	 of	 governance	 approaches	 for	 conservation	 within	 local	
government,	planning	is	the	main	 ‘discipline’	and	within	that,	BDO	is	paramount.	This	
hierarchy	 of	mechanisms	 therefore	 supports	 theoretical	 perspectives	 that	 conservation	
under	BDO	is	primarily	and	counter-intuitively	a	 ‘development	led’	strategy	(Pawliczek	
and	Sullivan	2011,	Sullivan	and	Hannis	2012).		
The	 combination	 of	 influential	 individuals,	 institutional	 capacity,	 its	 partnership	 with	
the	Environment	Bank	and	powerful	devices	 such	as	 the	Habitat	Biodiversity	Audit	 all	
played	 central	 explanatory	 roles	 in	 accelerating	 BDO	 at	 WCS.	 This	 combination	 of	
elements	therefore	destined	the	pilot	here	to	achieve	significantly	more	experience	than	
the	 others	 in	making	 a	 transition	 towards	 a	 BDO	 approach.	 In	 relation	 to	 this,	 LPA1-
WCS	also	uniquely	transcended	county	borders	to	participate	in	wider	BDO	assemblages	
at	 national	 and	 international	 scales.	 For	 example,	 LPA1-WCS	 frequently	 appeared	 at	
international	 meetings,	 conferences	 and	 provided	 webinars	 for	 an	 international	
audience.	 This	 included	 the	 Chartered	 Institutite	 for	 Ecological	 and	 Environmental	
Management	 (CIEEM)	 Spring	 Conference	 on	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 in	 2014 20 .	
Furthermore,	LPA1-WCS	was	also	 the	only	LPA	pilot	 leader	 to	participate	as	 a	 speaker	
and	panellist	at	the	BBOP,	DEFRA	and	ZSL	summit	Towards	a	No	Net	Loss	of	Biodiversity	
and	 Beyond	 in	 June	 2014.	 More	 latterly	 LPA1-WCS	 hosted	 an	 international	 BBOP	
community	of	practice	webinar	 in	February	2017.	The	enactment	of	BDO	at	an	English	
LPA	 level	 is	 an	 important	 resource	 for	 BBOP	 to	 share	 with	 the	 wider	 international	
community.	 It	proved	to	be	such	a	 rich	source	of	evidence,	 that	over	half	of	 the	entire	
official	 DEFRA	 evaluation	 study	 on	 the	 LPA	 pilot	 sites	 is	 dedicated	 to	 the	WCS	 pilot	
(Baker	 et	 al.	 2014b).	 The	 contrasts	 between	 the	 ways	 this	 case	 study	 is	 therefore	
																																																						
20	CIEEM	 Spring	 Conference	 2014;	 Biodiversity	 offsetting:	 from	 theory	 to	 practice	 in	
Birmingham.	
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presented	 in	 official	 accounts,	 my	 research	 and	 those	 in	 BBOP	 and	 DEFRA’s	 is	 also	
potentially	 illuminating	 for	 further	 appreciating	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 epistemic	
communities	filter	accounts	for	different	audiences.	I	will	return	to	this	idea	in	chapter	
8.	 	 For	 now,	 though,	 the	 discussion	moves	 on	 to	 present	 an	 actual	 exercise	 in	 valuing	
biodiversity	through	the	offsetting	mechanism,	and	in	particular	-	the	application	of	the	
DEFRA	metric.	
5.3	Practices	of	commensuration:	a	case	study		
This	planning	application	and	associated	attempts	to	secure	compensation	through	BDO	
was	one	of	the	comparatively	advanced	attempts	to	develop	a	full	offset	exchange	from	
the	 local	 government	pilots	within	 the	DEFRA	 study21.	 Even	 so,	 over	 the	 course	of	my	
research	 period	 (April	 2013	 -	 April	 2016),	 the	 county	 council	 had	 not	 successfully	
managed	 to	 deliver	 a	 complete	 offset.	 The	 biggest	 barriers	 to	 progress	 for	 the	
development	of	BDO	in	England	have	been	the	identification	and	preparation	of	suitable	
receptor	sites	for	the	offsets	(also	noted	by	the	evaluation	report,	Baker	et	al.	2014a).		All	
the	 same,	 the	 case	 study	 reflects	 an	 anomalous	 progression	 in	 applying	 calculative	
processes	 and	 aligning	 social	 actors	 to	 establish	 the	 shape	 and	 design	 of	 an	 offset	
between	a	development	and	receptor	site.	Here,	I	present	a	case	where	the	development	
site	was	subjected	to	the	DEFRA	metric,	a	receptor	site	was	identified,	calculations	were	
prepared	for	the	issuance	of	credits	and	a	30	year	ecological	management	plan	designed	
and	costed	thereby	offering	the	price	of	the	offset.	Notably	however,	the	developer	then	
rejected	 this	 offset	 site	 in	 favour	 of	 developing	 an	 offset	 arrangement	with	 the	 farmer	
issuing	the	land	for	development	in	the	first	place.	The	new	arrangement	was	agreed	at	
the	end	of	2015	and	no	further	data	were	collected	in	relation	to	this.	The	case	study	here	
nevertheless	 is	 valuable	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 application	 of	 the	metric	 to	 development	
and	receptor	sites	to	illustrate	the	social	and	material	practices	shaping	the	production	
of	biodiversity	values.	
The	development	
																																																						
21 The	 empirical	 research	 within	 this	 chapter	 forms	 the	 basis	 for	 a	 published	 journal	
paper	 and	book	chapter	 that	 is	 currently	under	 review,	both	of	which	are	 co-authored	
with	Professor	Sian	Sullivan.	The	journal	article	entitled,	 'How	economic	contexts	shape	
calculations	 of	 'yield'	 in	 biodiversity	 offsetting'	 was	 published	 in	 Conservation	 Biology	
(Carver	 and	 Sullivan	 2017).	 The	 book	 chapter,	 Creating	 conservation	 values	 under	
DEFRA’s	biodiversity	offsetting	pilot	and	the	pragmatics	of	a	using	a	calculative	device	is	a	
chapter	 within	 the	 collected	 Routledge	 edition	Creating	 Values	 that	 Matter:	 valuation	
systems	 in	 development,	 environment	 and	 conservation	 (Carver	 and	 Sullivan	
forthcoming). 
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The	case	study	follows	a	planning	application	subject	to	BDO	compensation	payments	in	
line	 with	 the	 calculated	 value	 of	 impacted	 biodiversity	 at	 a	 development	 site.	 The	
planning	application	was	for	the	delivery	of	236	residential	properties	along	with	a	new	
football	 stadium,	eight	playing	 fields	and	bowls	club	across	 thirteen	hectares	of	 largely	
agricultural	 fields.	 The	 ecological	 survey	 produced	 by	 the	 developer’s	 consultant	
ecologists	show	that	the	baseline	habitats	of	the	development	site	consist	of	amenity	and	
improved	 grasslands,	 hedgerows,	 scattered	 tall	 ruderal	 vegetation	 and	 four	 ponds,	 one	
with	great	crested	newts,	which	are	protected	under	the	UK’s	Conservation	of	Habitats	
and	Species	Regulations	2010.		
The	 site	 is	 bounded	 to	 the	 north	 by	 an	 industrial	 and	 residential	 development,	 with	
roads	bordering	the	west	and	east	side	of	the	site	and	open	countryside	beyond.	It	forms	
the	 south-western	 fringe	 of	 a	 small	 medieval	 market	 town	 and	 civil	 parish	 with	 a	
population	 of	 around	 6,500	 recorded	 in	 2011	 (Warwickshire	 Observatory	 2011).	 The	
development	planning	application	was	submitted	in	March	2013	to	the	district	council	by	
the	 existing	 owners,	 the	 local	 football	 and	 bowls	 club	 in	 conjunction	 with	 a	 large	
national	residential	developer	who	would	oversee	the	bulk	of	the	planning	process	and	
through	whom	the	 residential	properties	would	be	built,	marketed	and	 sold.	This	 case	
study	 reflected	 one	 of	 the	 many	 development	 sites	 that	 was	 subjected	 to	 calculated	
losses	of	biodiversity	over	the	course	of	the	DEFRA	pilot	period	at	WCS	with	the	view	to	
sourcing	equivalent	gains	at	a	development	site	to	produce	the	complete	offset.	As	such	
the	 local	 planning	 authority	 requested	 that	 the	 planning	 application	 be	 supplemented	
with	 a	 further	 habitat	 evaluation	 compatible	 with	 technical	 guidance	 of	 the	 DEFRA	
metric,	now	referenced	locally	as	the	Biodiversity	Impact	Assessment	(BIA).	The	purpose	
was	 to	 assess	 the	 impacts,	mitigation	measures	 and	 to	 inform	necessary	 compensation	
for	the	development.		Figure	9	illustrates	the	aerial	view	of	the	development	site	with	the	
BIA	habitat	codes	prior	to	and	proposed	transformation	post	development.	
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Figure	9	Maps	of	development	site	before	and	after	proposed	developments	
 
	
Source:	Consultant	ecology	Ecological	Assessment	Report.	March	2013,	available	
publicly	at	WCS	online	planning	application	archives	
	
	
139  
Calculating	values	with	the	Biodiversity	Impact	Assessment	
As	 is	 customary	 with	 the	 submission	 of	 a	 planning	 application,	 the	 developers’	
consultant	 ecologists	 completed	primary	habitat	 surveys	 as	 the	basis	 for	 preparing	 the	
Ecological	 Impact	 Assessment	 report	 (EIA).	 To	 supplement	 the	 survey	 data,	 the	
consultants	drew	from	secondary	existing	records	derived	from	earlier	surveys	of	the	site.	
Subsequently,	 the	 contents	 of	 the	 EIA	 were	 translated	 into	 the	 Biodiversity	 Impact	
Assessment	(BIA)	by	a	LPA	ecologist	with	assistance	from	the	Environment	Bank	officer	
(OB1-WCS).	 The	 ‘translation’	 was	 a	 desk	 based	 exercise	 seeking	 to	 establish	 the	 site’s	
biodiversity	baseline	and	mitigation	unit	values	in	a	format	necessary	for	BDO	under	the	
DEFRA	 pilot.	 The	 BIA	 was	 an	 Excel	 spread	 sheet	 that	 the	 WCC	 had	 created	 and	
specifically	formatted	to	capture	the	attributes	and	exchange	rules	of	the	DEFRA	metric.		
The	 largely	 qualitative	 habitat	 data	 contained	 in	 the	 EIA	 was	 coded	 into	 this	 spread	
sheet.	 The	 BIA	 calculator	 categorised	 spatial	 areas	 of	 the	 development	 site	 across	 the	
separate	rows	of	the	worksheet.	Each	row	on	the	worksheet	denoted	a	separate	parcel	of	
habitat	(shown	as	codes	on	the	top	image	in	Figure	9).	Along	these	rows,	each	parcel	was	
scored	a	corresponding	column	value	denoting	the	habitat	type,	the	habitat	code	relating	
to	 this,	 size	 in	 hectares,	 and	 numerical	 category	 scores	 for	 habitat	 distinctiveness	 and	
condition	(see	Table	7	and	Figure	10).		
The	 BIA	 spread	 sheet	 performs	 three	 stages	 of	 calculation	 to	 arrive	 at	 the	 scores	 of	
residual	net	losses	or	potential	gains.	The	calculation	first	(Table	7	rows	15-28)	generates	
a	 ‘Habitat	 Impact	Score’	 (HIS)	as	 the	baseline,	which	 is	 the	total	scored	habitat	on	site	
prior	to	the	development,	in	this	case	46.68	biodiversity	units	(cell	O53).	It	is	named	the	
Habitat	Impact	Score	because	the	design	of	the	metric	assumes	that	all	existing	habitats	
(comprising	the	whole	baseline	score)	are	lost	to	development	prior	to	on	site	works	to	
mitigate	these	impacts.		
The	second	step	(Table	7	rows	59-70)	calculates	the	Habitat	Mitigation	Score	(HMS),	to	
denote	 the	 total	number	of	biodiversity	units	 that	will	be	 restored	or	created	onsite	 to	
‘mitigate’	 or	 minimise	 the	 projected	 losses.	 The	 HMS	 score	 on	 the	 calculator	 for	 this	
development	 is	 16.78	units	 (Table	7	O89).	The	process	of	calculating	the	HMS	entailed	
overlaying	 the	existing	habitat	 site	map	and	 those	of	proposed	onsite	 ecological	works	
(mitigation)	 to	 be	 completed	 as	 part	 of	 the	 development.	 Through	 comparing	what	 is	
lost	 and	gained	onsite	 and	coding	 the	differences	as	habitat	 target	 values	according	 to	
size,	 distinctiveness	 and	 condition,	 the	 LPA	 ecologist	 could	 identify	what	 the	 residual	
‘net	 loss’	 would	 be	 and	 how	 much	 compensation	 work	 would	 be	 required	 as	 an	
investment	 in	 additional	 and	measurable	 biodiversity	 unit	 value	 at	 an	 offset	 site.	 This	
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sum	 comprising	 the	 net	 loss	 or	 gain	 value	 is	 the	 Habitat	 Biodiversity	 Impact	 Score	
(HBIS)	(cell	O91).	The	final	calculation	to	establish	the	biodiversity	loss	at	a	development	
site	seeking	compensation	is	as	follows:	
Habitat	Mitigation	Score	(HMS)-	Habitat	Impact	Score	(HIS)	
=	Habitat	Biodiversity	Impact	Score	(HBIS)	
16.78	units	(habitat	creation)	-	46.68	units	(baseline	habitats)	
=	-	31.90	units	(net	loss	of	habitat)	
The	HBIS	produced	 a	 calculated	net	 loss	 of	 31.90	biodiversity	 units	 (Table	 7,	 cell	O91)	
that	 required	 an	 offset	 to	 satisfy	 the	 mitigation	 and	 compensation	 requirements	 for	
impacted	biodiversity		
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Table	7	Biodiversity	Impact	Assessment	spread	sheet	reproduction		
(version	17.4,	draft	1)	used	in	biodiversity	impact	assessments	to	calculate	the	residual	losses	of	biodiversity	from	development	impacts	
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Source:	Author	adaptation	from	original	BIA	shown	as	Figure	10.	
a	Numbers	across	rows	15-28	are	multiplied	to	produce	the	habitat	biodiversity	value	for	each	coded	area	subject	to	development.	Numbers	are	rounded	to	
2	decimal	places	and	as	such,	if	calculated	manually	here	may	produce	different	results.	The	sum	of	the	values	in	column	O	for	rows	15-28	(shown	in	cell	
O53)	is	the	biodiversity	baseline	of	the	habitat	impact	score	(HIS).	In	rows	59-70	numbers	across	rows	are	multiplied	to	produce	the	habitat-mitigation	
score	(HMS)	(cell	O89),	which	is	the	value	of	habitats	that	will	be	restored	or	created	onsite	so	as	to	mitigate	or	minimise	projected	biodiversity	losses.		
b	T	note	refers	to	the	‘target’	area	as	habitat	parcels	subject	to	impacts	coded	on	the	development	maps.		
c	Left	empty	on	original	BIA	
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	Figure	10	Original	Biodiversity	Impact	Assessment	spread	sheet	
Source:	OB1-WCS	241114
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The	receptor	site	
Established	 conservation	 NGOs	 and	 Wildlife	 Trusts	 are	 often	 preferred	 partners	 in	
delivering	compensatory	conservation	to	mitigate	development	impacts	as	they	typically	
possess	the	right	‘experience	and	expertise	to	ensure	delivery’	(LPA1	-	020714),	as	well	as	
being	 familiar	 and	 experienced	 with	 this	 type	 of	 contracted	 management	 for	 habitat	
creation.	 The	 offset	 site	 in	 this	 case,	 was	 a	 site	 owned	 and	 managed	 by	 a	 local	
conservation	NGO,	which	acquired	it	in	2013.	The	site	was	a	5ha	grassland	meadow	5km	
northeast	 of	 the	 development,	 and	 had	 been	 identified	 by	 the	 Environment	 Bank	 at	
WCC	 for	 the	 supply	 of	 offset	 credits	 equivalent	 or	 greater	 to	 the	 31.90	units	 produced	
through	 the	 HBIS.	 	 The	 meadow	 was	 species	 rich,	 semi-improved	 grassland	 in	 close	
proximity	to	a	local	Site	of	Special	Scientific	Interest	(SSSI),	and	currently	home	to	five	
species	 of	 orchid	 including	 the	 largest	 population	 of	greater	 butterfly	
orchid	(Plantanthera	chlorantha)	in	the	county.	It	also	contained	four	of	the	county’s	six	
rare	farmland	butterflies,	three	of	these,	the	grizzled	skipper	(Pyrgus	malvae),	the	dingy	
skipper	(Erynnis	tages)	and	the	white-letter	hairstreak	(Satyrium	w-album)	are	nationally	
designated	 as	 biodiversity	 priority	 species	 under	 the	 2007	UK	 BAP.	 It	 was	 hoped	 that	
with	 the	correct	 interventions	 that	 two	other	 rare	 farmland	butterflies,	also	designated	
nationally	as	biodiversity	priority	species,	could	establish	colonies	in	this	field.		
The	 meadow	 was	 acquired	 by	 the	 wildlife	 and	 conservation	 NGO	 because	 of	 the	
excellent	ecological	enhancement	potential	it	demonstrated.	Although	the	NGO	bought	
the	 site	 for	 this	 reason,	 it	 did	 so	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 performing	 only	 minimal	
conservation	work	due	to	a	shortage	of	available	funding.	The	work	to	be	completed	over	
and	above	these	primary	conservation	activities	by	the	NGO,	and	facilitated	through	the	
offset	 payment	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 biodiversity	 ‘additionality’	 stipulated	 as	 a	 BDO	
design	 principle.	 The	 NGO	 intended	 to	 bring	 the	meadow	 grassland	 into	 a	 moderate	
condition,	but	with	the	offset	money	they	would	‘return	it	to	fully	favourable	condition	
of	national	 importance’	 (Biodiversity	Offset	Management	Plan	2014:	6).	 In	 line	with	 its	
ecological	 profile	 and	 the	 site’s	 aesthetic	 qualities,	 the	 wildlife	 conservation	 NGO	
promote	 this	nature	 reserve	as	 a	one	of	 the	 top	 five	meadow	walks	 in	 the	county,	 and	
would	receive	money	from	the	development	compensation	finance	over	a	30	year	offset	
period.	
Pricing	the	offset	and	trading	biodiversity	‘value’	
So	 as	 to	 match	 units	 of	 gain	 against	 ones	 of	 loss,	 the	 final	 calculative	 stage	 of	 the	
procedure	entailed	using	the	BIA	metric	to	perform	the	equivalent	category	and	coding	
148  
work	 on	 the	 plot	 allocated	 to	 be	 a	 receptor	 or	 offset	 site.	 The	 conservation	 NGO	
quantified	this	proposed	biodiversity	gain	or	 ‘yield’	and	enumerated	the	expected	costs	
of	producing	it	according	to	a	biodiversity	offset	management	plan	(BOMP).	The	BOMP	
was	written	by	a	conservation	officer	at	the	NGO.	The	costs	of	providing	the	credit	value	
for	offsets	 typically	derive	 from	 labour,	materials	and	capital	or	 lease	payments	 for	 the	
land	 itself	 (NGO2-WCS	280115).	The	purchase	of	 the	 land	did	not	apply	here	 since	 the	
NGO	 had	 already	 bought	 the	 site	 the	 previous	 year.	 The	 BOMP,	 therefore	 outlined	 a	
series	 of	 labour	 costs	 based	 on	 the	 combined	 workforce	 of	 the	 NGO	 volunteers,	
conservation	 staff	 and	 external	 contractors	 (NGO2-WCS	 280115).	 It	 also	 contained	 the	
long	term	visions,	management,	objectives	and	strategy	for	each	compartment	of	habitat	
of	 the	 site.	 	 Furthermore,	 it	 outlined	 a	 series	 of	 quality	 indicators	 of	 success	 and	 the	
management	 prescriptions	 and	monitoring	 requirements.	 The	 predicted	 budget	 for	 30	
years	of	management	at	the	grassland	meadow	offset	site	was	£204,076,	of	which	£98,030	
would	 come	 from	 the	 conservation	 NGO	 budget	 and	 £106,046	 from	 the	 biodiversity	
offset	 payment	 made	 by	 the	 developers	 (BOMP	 2014).	 In	 surplus	 to	 these	 costs,	 the	
developer	 would	 have	 to	 pay	 an	 additional	 20	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 offset	 compensation	 as	
broker	fees,	which	would	go	to	the	Environment	Bank	(OB1-WCS	241114),	plus	legal	fees	
for	arranging	the	contracts	between	parties	(NGO2-WCS	280115).		
The	BIA	the	county	council	were	using	at	 this	stage	was	version	18.4,	but	 it	was	hoped	
that	 the	 next	 version	 of	 the	 BIA	 from	 version	 19	 onwards	 would	 include	 stabilised	
estimates	 and	 calculations	 for	 the	 expected	 costs	 associated	with	 activities	 required	 to	
deliver	the	types	of	habitats	that	are	sought	as	compensation.	During	the	course	of	the	
fieldwork	 the	 county	 council	 were	 working	 on	 assembling	 what	 they	 termed	 ‘more	
realistic	information	for	management	costs’	(LPA1-WCS	020714)	so	that	this	information	
could	synchronise	with	the	results	of	the	BIA	revealing	the	net	loss	at	the	development	
site.	The	benefits	 of	having	 these	management	 costs	 accessible	 and	produced	up	 front	
would	 be	 to	 eliminate	 the	 need	 for	 a	 management	 plan	 to	 be	 produced	 by	 an	 offset	
provider	at	all	and	therefore	speed	up	the	process.	Bespoke	management	plans	to	inform	
prices	could	not	easily	be	produced	in	a	time	frame	compatible	with	the	planning	system	
nor	provide	the	much	coveted	‘certainty’	around	costs	for	the	developer	(NGO1	280114).		
‘Something	we	can	live	with’;	establishing	a	balance	of	values	through	the	‘right’	
numbers	
Tracing	over	time	the	successive	adjusted	calculations	for	the	HMS,	HIS	and	HBIS	value	
scores	reveals	that	the	final	net	loss	calculation	of	31.90	units	was	in	fact	the	outcome	of	
negotiations	 between	 stakeholders	 rather	 than	 a	 neutral	 technical	 process.	 These	
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negotiations	entailed	adjustments	 to	 the	category	designations	and	 therefore	 the	 input	
values	on	the	BIA	spread	sheet.	Over	the	course	of	the	planning	process,	the	calculated	
baseline	 value	 of	 the	 development	 site	 had	 been	 reduced	 by	 almost	 48	 per	 cent	 from	
48.68	 (BIA	 draft	 1)	 (c.f.	 Table	 7)	 to	 25.52	 units	 in	 the	 second	 draft	 through	 making	
category	 changes	 to	 the	 condition	 of	 existing	 habitats	 onsite.	 This	 downward	
recalculation	 of	 habitat	 value	 occurred	 through	 making	 category	 changes	 to	 the	
condition	of	existing	habitats	thereby	adjusting	the	numerical	unit	outcomes	of	assigned	
habitat	values	 (Table	8).	Modifications	 regarding	anomalous	 local	 level	category	values	
(for	 example,	 concerning	 what	 value	 scattered	 trees	 should	 have)	 can	 be	 made	 in	
anticipation	 of	 the	 numerical	 and	 financial	 outcomes	 that	 will	 arise	 through	 the	
multiplication	 or	 division	 effects	 of	 these	 modifications	 on	 biodiversity	 loss	 (Habitat	
Impact	Score)	or	onsite	mitigation	(Habitat	Mitigation	Score).	In	other	words,	the	ability	
of	 these	 modifications	 to	 either	 enlarge	 or	 shrink	 the	 final	 compensation	 costs	 of	
development	 planning	 applications	 has	 been	 built	 into	 prior	 understanding	 of	 the	
numerical	 adjustments	 that	 have	 followed.	 	 Other	 iterations	 to	 the	 metric	 over	 the	
course	of	 the	pilot	 study	 included	adding	category	values	 to	 the	BDO	metric	 (Table	6,	
chapter	 4)	 with	 the	 odd	 numbers	 1,	 3	 and	 5	 for	 local	 habitat	 types	 that	 have	 greater	
regional	 than	 national	 distinctiveness	 and	 rarity	 (NGO1-WCS	 241114),	 and	 extensive	
formatting	 changes	 and	 editions	 to	 make	 the	 calculator	 more	 ‘user-friendly’	 and	
manageable	(OB1-WCS	050114).	
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BIA	Habitat	
Area	Code	
Habitat	
description	
Area	
(ha)	 Distinctiveness	 Condition	
Original	unit	
value	-		
draft	1	
New	unit	value	-
draft	2	
Reduction	in	
unit	value	
	 	 	 Category	change	
Score		
change	
Category	
change	
Score	
change	 	 	 	
F1	 Improved	grassland	 1.78	 None	 None	
Moderate	
to	poor	 2	to	1	 7.12	 3.56	 50%	
P1	
Wetland-	
standing	
water	
0.01	 None	 None	 Good	to	moderate	 3	to	2	 0.14	 0.01	 93%	
F2	 Improved	grassland	 3.10	 None	 None	
Moderate	
to	poor	 2	to	1	 12.40	 6.20	 50%	
F2	 Tall	Ruderal	 0.18	 None	 None	 Moderate	to	poor	 2	to	1	 0.70	 0.35	 50%	
The	Bowling	
green	
Amenity	
grassland	 0.12	 None	 None	 None	 None	 0.24	 0.24	 0%	
F6	 Amenity	grassland	 0.97	 None	 None	 None	 None	 1.94	 1.94	 0%	
West	of	
football	grid	
Improved	
grassland	 0.08	 None	 None	
Good	to	
moderate	 3	to	2	 0.48	 0.32	 33%	
F3	 Improved	grassland	 4.88	 None	 None	
Moderate	
to	poor	 2	to	1	 19.52	 9.76	 50%	
Slurry	pit	 Standing	water	 0.01	
High	to	
low	 6	to	2	 None	 None	 0.05	 0.02	 60%	
Part	of	F4	and	
F5	
Improved	
grassland	 1.52	 None	 None	
Moderate	
to	poor	 2	to	1	 6.08	 3.04	 50%	
Total	 	 	 	 	 	 	 48.68	 25.52	 48%	
Table	8	Changes	in	calculated	biodiversity	baselines	between	Biodiversity	Impact	Assessments	drafts	1	and	2	after	negotiation	
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Table	8	shows	the	changes	made	to	the	condition	values	 in	each	parcel	of	 the	baseline	
habits	at	the	development	site	and	the	effects	of	their	adjustment	on	the	calculated	value	
outcomes.	 I	 compiled	 this	 table	 through	 comparing	 different	 drafts	 of	 the	 BIA	 excel	
sheets	and	combined	this	numerical	and	spread	sheet	analysis	with	interviews	with	the	
district	 council	 ecologist	 (LPA2-WCS	300714),	 the	offset	broker	 (OB1-WCS	300714)	and	
the	 developer	 (DEV1-WCS	 100215).	 Changes	 made	 to	 the	 spread	 sheets	 over	 time	
included	 lowering	the	perceived	condition	of	7	out	of	 10	habitat	parcels	making	up	the	
development	site.	The	greatest	score	changes	of	these	adjustments	arose	from	the	larger	
habitat	parcels.	The	largest	habitat	parcel	is	highlighted	in	the	table	and	shows	how	the	
4.88	ha	patch	of	 improved	grassland	on	 the	development	 site	was	downgraded	 from	a	
baseline	condition	score	of	‘moderate’	to	‘poor’.	The	outcome	of	this	adjustment	reduced	
the	baseline	value	of	this	habitat	parcel	from	19.52	units	on	(shown	on	Table	7	cell	O26)	
to	9.76	units.	Due	to	this	parcel’s	size,	this	single	modification	created	an	almost	20	per	
cent	overall	reduction	to	the	baseline	biodiversity	value	for	entire	site.	The	same	process	
was	also	applied	to	improved	grasslands	in	different	compartments	in	habitat	area	codes	
F1	and	F2.		
While	WCC	was	 comparatively	 well	 resourced	 in	 comparison	with	 other	 LPA	 ecology	
units,	 there	 was	 still	 no	 way	 that	 every	 development	 site	 could	 be	 visited	 by	 council	
ecologists	to	iron	out	these	kinds	of	uncertainties	in	habitat	condition.	Only	a	handful	of	
development	sites	are	visited	and	verified	by	a	county	ecologist	(LPA2-WCS	241114).	It	is	
expected	that	this	difficulty	would	be	even	more	acute	elsewhere	due	to	the	widespread	
shortage	of	ecological	expertise	within	local	governments	more	generally	(NGO1	290116).	
Often	 the	 ecological	 data	 is	 assembled	 and	 cross-referenced	 remotely.	 Local	 authority	
ecologists	will	use	the	data	within	the	EIA	report	submitted	in	support	of	the	planning	
application	and	draw	on	GIS	derived	biological	and	historical	archives	held	on	file	at	the	
council	offices	at	the	district	council’s	Biological	Records	Centre.		
Underlying	this	overall	downwards	recalculation	of	the	development	site’s	baseline	value	
from	48.68	to	25.52	units	was	a	view	that	the	first	calculation	was	deemed	to	create	too	
large	 a	 future	 compensation	package,	 thereby	 threatening	 the	 financial	 viability	 of	 the	
residential	development	(DEV1-WCS	060315).	The	initial	calculation	for	the	biodiversity	
offset	 compensation	 package	 was	 £300,000.	 During	 the	 course	 of	 an	 hour	 and	 a	 half	
meeting	between	the	developer	and	the	local	planning	authority,	and	at	the	instigation	
of	 the	 development	 firm,	 the	 baseline	 habitat	 condition	 assessments	 for	 many	 areas	
onsite	were	adjusted	downwards	to	produce	the	new	figure	of	25.52	biodiversity	units	in	
the	 second	 draft.	 This	 led	 to	 a	 revised	 cost	 for	 the	 final	 compensation	 package	 of	
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somewhere	around	£120,000.	The	developer	described	this	new	adjusted	figure	to	me	as	
‘something	 we	 could	 live	 with’	 (DEV1-WCS	 060315).	 The	 revenue	 that	 the	 developer	
could	 expect	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 these	 234	 houses	 would	 nevertheless	 be	 many	 tens	 of	
millions	of	pounds.			
Commensurating	‘fields’	of	value		
In	addition	to	accommodating	adjustments	and	obscuring	these	as	 technical	decisions,	
the	BIA	also	renders	equivalent	otherwise	incommensurable	orders	of	value	in	dissimilar	
units	of	measurement.	Practices	of	commensuration	permitted	the	translation	of	spatial	
measurements	 as	 hectares	 into	 biodiversity	 ‘value’	 measurements	 as	 units.	 This	
equivalence	is	achieved	through	quantification,	which,	as	discussed	in	chapter	2,	acts	to	
create	a	flat	system	of	value.		In	doing	so,	these	commensuration	practices	also	facilitate	
an	 exchange	 of	 biodiversity	 loss	 for	 gain	 premised	 on	 the	 commensuration	of	 discrete	
habitats	that	are	different	not	only	in	type	but	also	size.		
Following	the	downward	adjustment	of	the	development	site’s	baseline	value	discussed	
above	 (step	 1	 in	 the	 BIA),	 the	 second	 calculative	 stage	 of	 the	 BIA	metric	 assesses	 the	
onsite	mitigation	works.	This	stage	provides	another	opportunity	to	adjust	calculations	
so	 as	 to	 appease	 the	 developers.	 For	 the	 proposed	 development	 in	 the	 case	 study	
outlined	here,	almost	40	per	cent	of	 the	onsite	mitigation	work	 (that	 is,	onsite	habitat	
creation	 to	 ‘mitigate’	 the	 ecological	 loss	 imposed	 through	 development)	 was	 to	 be	
delivered	 through	 the	 creation	 of	 ten	 football	 pitches	 of	 varying	 sizes.	 	 The	 football	
pitches	were	calculated	as	contributing	 significant	amounts	of	on-site	biodiversity	unit	
value	and	constituted	the	largest	habitat	spatial	value	of	all	the	mitigation	activities.	The	
football	 fields’	 overall	 mitigation	 value	 was	 to	 be	 achieved	 by	 attributing	 biodiversity	
value	to	the	amenity	grassland	of	the	pitches	themselves	(Table	7	cell	O63)	and	through	
allowing	 their	 perimeters	 to	 develop	 into	 long	 grassy	 margins	 as	 ‘semi-improved	
grassland’	 (Table	 7	 cell	 O70),	 as	 recommended	 in	 the	 EIA	 Report	 made	 by	 the	
developers’	 consultant	 ecologist.	 As	 size	 acts	 as	 a	 value	 input	 into	 the	 calculation	 of	
overall	 biodiversity	 unit	 value	 on	 the	 BIA,	 the	 spatial	 area	 of	 the	 football	 pitches	 and	
their	margins	compensated	38	per	cent	in	total	unit	value	for	otherwise	low	biodiversity	
habitat	 scores	 in	 mitigation	 value.	 Although	 receiving	 low	 habitat	 scores	 for	 both	
distinctiveness	 (2)	 and	 habitat	 condition	 (1),	 the	 size	 of	 the	 football	 pitches	 amenity	
grassland	meant	that	in	five	years	this	aggregate	spatial	area	was	calculated	to	contribute	
4.07	units	and	after	fifteen	years	the	grassy	margins	would	contribute	a	further	2.29	units	
thereby	allowing	the	football	pitches	to	make	up	6.36	units	of	biodiversity	value	out	of	
16.78	units	(38	per	cent)	of	total	onsite	mitigation	and	habitat	creation.		
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The	 scored	 values	 for	 the	 football	 fields’	 mitigation	 functionality	 thus	 reduced	 the	
perceived	 total	 biodiversity	 impact	 of	 the	 development	 accordingly	 and	 decreased	 the	
offset	unit	requirements	by	this	amount.	Questions	arise	here,	such	as	how	a	sports	pitch	
matures	to	become	a	biodiversity	habitat,	in	particular	in	contrast	with	6.36	units	of	high	
quality	grassland	habitat	supporting	a	range	BAP	species	proposed	at	the	offset	site.	The	
proposed	mitigation	value	provided	through	these	sports	pitches,	measured	as	habitats	
of	 low	distinctiveness	and	poor	condition,	 is	achieved	principally	through	acting	as	the	
largest	 ‘habitat	 type’	 within	 the	 development,	 and	 thus	 illustrates	 the	 function	 of	
numerical	 abstractions	 to	 commensurate	 distinct	 biota	 of	 very	 different	 qualities	
(Sullivan	2013;	Carver	2015	(see	Figure	11).		
The	design	principles	of	UK	BDO	(discussed	in	chapter	4)	mean	that	large	habitat	areas	
of	 low	 biodiversity	 value	 can	 be	 treated	 as	 equivalent	 to	 small	 habitat	 areas	 of	 high	
biodiversity	value.	Categorising	 football	pitches	as	 ‘habitats’	 for	onsite	mitigation	saves	
considerable	financial	compensation	value	from	the	final	offset	calculations.		
154  
Figure	11	One	football	field	can	have	many	‘fields’	of	value	
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5.4	Translating	value	from	the	(field)	margins	
So	 far,	 I	have	presented	an	 in-depth	case	 study	 that	examines	 the	dynamic	alignments	
forming	 assemblages	 of	 BDO	 as	 a	 governance	 technology	 at	 a	 single	 locale	 within	
England’s	pilot	study.	I	have	explored	the	processes	through	which	the	metric	produces	
and	 formats	 an	 individuated	 ‘biodiversity	 unit’	 as	 a	 currency	 destined	 to	 circulate	
between	actors	within	this	system.	I	have	also	explored	how	users	deploy	this	device	in	
practice.	I	have	outlined	the	performative	elements	of	WCS’s	BDO	assemblage	as	well	as	
some	of	the	tensions	inherent	in	the	application	of	the	metric.	As	previously	discussed,	
one	of	the	most	prominent	tensions	or	frictions	within	this	market	making	assemblage	is	
the	recalcitrance	of	supply	side	actors	(landowners)	to	furnish	the	emergent	demand	of	
biodiversity	offset	credits.	This	challenge	was	an	overwhelming	feature	of	the	both	pilot	
sites	 generally	 and	 was	 noted	 in	 DEFRA’s	 official	 pilot	 evaluation	 report	 (Baker	 et	 al.	
2014a).		
I	 have	 already	 established	 that	 conservation	 NGOs	 and	 Wildlife	 Trusts	 are	 often	
preferred	 partners	 for	 offset	 delivery	 since	 they	 typically	 possess	 the	 right	 ‘experience	
and	expertise’	(LPA1-WCS20714)	as	well	as	being	familiar	and	experienced	with	this	type	
of	contracted	management	for	habitat	creation.	However,	the	long-term	vision	for	BDO	
in	 England	 according	 to	 the	 Environment	 Bank	 and	 the	 WCS	 pilot	 is	 one	 that	 is	
principally	comprised	of	diverse	private	landowning	offset	providers.		
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Despite	 the	 partnership	 with	 the	 Environment	 Bank	 who	 acted	 as	 brokers,	 progress	
towards	establishing	this	network	of	private	credit	providers	had	still	proved	elusive.	In	
2013,	the	Environment	Bank	took	the	step	to	strategically	partner	with	another	brokerage	
firm.	 This	 new	 sub-broker	 was	 a	 supply	 chain	 sustainability	 consulting	 arm	 and	
subsidiary	of	a	publically	listed	agricultural	commodities	corporation.	The	parent	arm	of	
this	new	broker,	OB2-WCS	(interviewees	here	denoted	here	as	OB2.1	and	OB2.2)	was	a	
multinational	 food,	 ingredients	 and	 retail	 corporation	 operating	 across	 50	 countries	
worldwide	with	an	annual	revenue	of	£13.4b.	The	website	advertises	that:	
It	is	our	unique	role	up	and	down	the	food	chain	and	our	breadth	of	reach	
within	agriculture	that	make	[us]	uniquely	positioned	to	deliver	solutions	which	
drive	value	and	profit	for	a	wide	range	of	businesses.	(OB2-WCS	website)	
The	new	broker	envisaged	leveraging	their	database	of	75,000	farms	across	the	UK	and	
Ireland	to	create	a	pipeline	of	private	credit	providers	in	a	strategic	partnership	with	the	
Environment	Bank.	 Echoing	 the	happenstance	 arrangements	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 4	 in	
the	early	days	of	mitigation	and	species	banking	in	the	US,	the	individual	(OB2.1-WCS)	
acting	 as	 head	 of	 business	 development	 at	 the	 consultancy	 ‘happened	 to	 fall	 into	
conversation’	 with	 the	 Environment	 Bank	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2013.	 A	 ‘mutual	 contact’	 at	
Natural	England	had	made	the	introduction	between	the	two	parties.	OB1.2	told	me:	
We	wanted	to	look	at	what	we	could	say	that	was	happening	on	farms	that	was	
more	constructive,	so	these	brands	had	something	to	‘say’.	So,	in	terms	of	
looking	at	what	other	people	were	saying	about	‘how	you	value	habitat	etc.’	that	
got	us	involved	in	the	Environment	Bank,	and	they	had	all	the	mechanisms	and	
packages	and	ways	of	going	about	it.	(OB2.1	020315).		
The	 drive	 for	 brands	 to	 say	 something	 ‘green’	 was	 strategically	 aligned	 with,	 and	
incorporated	 the	 language	 from	 the	 DEFRA	White	 Paper	 about	 ‘valuing	 habitat’.	 The	
potency	of	the	‘valuation’	narrative	here	is	unambiguous.	BDO	and	habitat	banking	were	
being	brought	to	life	through	moments	of	chance,	coincidence,	and	crucially,	carried	by	
new	allegiances	kindled	through	professional	networks.			
And	yet,	even	with	a	data	facility	comprising	thousands	of	farms,	identifying	landowners	
with	 the	 correct	 legal	 and	 management	 capacities	 to	 act	 as	 offset	 providers	 was	 still	
proving	problematic.	OB2.1-WCS	found	that	it	was	frequently	too	complicated,	expensive	
and	 time	 consuming	 to	 identify	 and	work	with	 landowners	 as	 providers	 for	 individual	
offsets	as	and	when	they	come	through	the	planning	system	(OB2.1-WCS	020315).	This	is	
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in	part	because	of	the	legal	requirements	required	to	qualify	landowners	and	farmers	as	
eligible	offset	providers.	OB2.1	 used	 a	 screening	 system	 to	 eliminate	 farms	 that	did	not	
have	security	of	tenure	for	at	least	30	years	or	a	clear	succession	plan.	These	administrative	
requirements	led	OB2.1-WCS	(020315)	to	the	view	that	preparing	receptor	sites	on	a	case-
by-case	basis	was	simply	‘not	worth	the	hassle’.	
Efficiencies	 and	 pragmatism	 were	 therefore	 pushing	 OB2.1-WCS	 during	 2014,	 towards	
establishing	 relationships	 with	 fewer	 but	 larger	 landowners.	 The	 goal	 was	 to	 develop	
habitat-banking	sites	that	could	provide	the	credits	for	multiple	offsets,	associated	with	a	
collection	of	developments	over	a	longer	period	of	time.	The	ideal,	they	reported,	would	
be	 five	or	 so	 large	 farms	of	a	minimum	of	40	ha	within	 the	county	boundaries	 (OB2.1-
WCS	020315)22.	The	proposed	budget	for	each	habitat	bank	would	be	a	potential	supply	
of	240	credits	over	a	three	year	period.	Over	the	course	of	this	timeframe	OB2.2	would	
work	 to	 establish	 the	 next	 batch	 of	 landowners	 to	 bring	 in	 habitat	 banks	 ‘six,	 seven,	
eight’	 so	 that	 the	 pipeline	 of	 credits	was	 ready	 to	 go,	 ‘there	 on	 the	 shelf’	 (OB2.2-WCS	
080116).	OB2.1-WCS	(020315)	mentioned	that	in	respect	to	landowners,	they	had	a	‘long	
list	and	short	list,	and	there	is	enough	there	to	give	us	confidence	we	can	fill	the	demand	
for	some	time	to	come’.	Towards	 the	end	of	 the	 fieldwork	research	period,	OB2.1-WCS	
achieved	what	they	believed	to	be	the	‘first	commercial	offset	in	England’.	Although	the	
offset	was	considered	small	at	‘just	five	or	six	credits’	across	1	ha	of	land,	the	potential	at	
this	particular	habitat	bank	was	expected	to	be	able	to	provide	up	to	400	credits	over	80	
ha	of	land	(OB2.1-WCS	080116).		
As	 well	 as	 streamlining	 the	 administrative	 efficiencies	 of	 securing	 landowners,	 OB2.1-
WCS	were	under	pressure	to	arrange	things	so	that	the	whole	exercise	was	commercially	
worthwhile	 for	 their	 own	 organisation	 as	 well	 as	 being	 financially	 attractive	 to	
landowners.	For	example	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 first	point,	OB2.1-WCS	were	anxious	 to	 see	
whether	brokering	biodiversity	offsets	 through	private	habitat	banks	could	become	the	
core	part	of	their	business	model.	
																																																						
22	The	 extent	 to	 which	 this	 either	 contradicts	 or	 complements	 Lawton	 principles	 of	
‘Making	Space	 for	Nature’	 (Lawton	et	 al.	 2010)	warrants	 further	 research.	 	The	Lawton	
Review	of	England’s	wildlife	sites	and	ecological	network	emphasised	that	the	future	of	
conservation	 in	England	must	prioritise	habitat	connectivity	and	strategic	 allocation	of	
habitats	in	the	landscape.	These	sites	may	or	may	not	happen	to	align	with	the	economic	
and	market	priorities	and	practicalities	of	finding	appropriate	farms	for	habitat	banks.	
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‘We	do	believe	that	it	will	happen	it	will	just	take	time	for	it	to	happen	and	the	
big	question	is	will	we	still	be	at	the	table	when	it	will	happen?	It’s	taken	a	lot	
longer	than	we	expected,	we	have	put	quite	a	bit	of	resource	into	it,	we	see	quite	
a	big	business	opportunity	in	it	should	it	come	about	and	think	it’s	worth	still	
sticking	with	it.’	(OB2.1-WCS	020116)	
OB2.1-WCS	was	enthusiastic	to	prove	the	concept	in	Warwickshire	first	and	then	roll	out	
habitat	 banking	 nationally.	 Indeed,	 OB2.1-WCS’s	 job	 title	 was	 subsequently	 changed	
from	 Business	 Development	 Manager	 to	 Operations	 Manager	 for	 Environmental	
Services.	Part	of	this	wider	market	research	and	preparation	entailed	undertaking	‘supply	
and	 demand	 mapping’	 of	 potential	 biodiversity	 debits	 and	 credits	 across	 the	 UK	 and	
Ireland.	Finding	and	commissioning	landowners	to	act	as	habitat	banks	was	something	
that	 OB2-WCS	 claims,	 as	 an	 organisation,	 they	 had	 become	 ‘reasonably	 good	 at’.	 To	
leverage	their	existing	database	asset,	OB2.1-WCS	had	started	to	show	these	credit/land	
supply	 maps	 to	 other	 LPAs	 in	 surrounding	 counties	 to	 encourage	 them	 to	 follow	
Warwickshire’s	 lead.	 OB2.1-WCS	 hoped	 LPAs	 would	 assess	 the	 potential	 demand	 for	
biodiversity	unit	compensation	over	a	period	of	time	using	forecasts	of	development	and	
spatial	biological	record	data	as	WCC	had	done.		Only	then,	would	Ob2.1-WCS	be	able	to	
calculate	the	size,	type,	 location	and	variety	of	habitat	banks	required	for	the	provision	
of	units	in	other	counties.	
It	 was	 envisaged	 that	 Natural	 England	 would	 be	 able	 to	 assist	 in	 this	market	making	
process.	The	Environment	Bank	invited	Natural	England’s	CEO,	James	Cross	to	visit	and	
walk	 around	 the	 first	 commercial	 offset	 mentioned	 above,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2015.	 Cross	
confirmed	 that	 he	 was	 ‘on	 board	 and	 happy	 to	 help	 where	 he	 could’	 (OB2.2-WCS	
080116).	 A	 forthcoming	 letter	 from	 Natural	 England	 to	 LPAs	 across	 England	 was	
expected	 to	 subsequently	 make	 ‘conversations	 with	 various	 authorities	 a	 lot	 easier’	
(OB2.1-	WCS	080116).		
OB2.1	and	OB2.2-WCS	were	conscious	that	to	successfully	bring	private	 landowners	on	
board	they	would	need	to	make	it	financially	attractive	to	them,	and	thus	economies	of	
scale	are	further	underlined,	such	that:	
In	order	to	provide	the	developer	with	a	reasonable	cost	of	credit,	and	
something	that	is	interesting	enough	to	the	landowner	to	do	all	the	thinking	
and	legal	and	all	of	that	stuff,	it	has	to	be	a	fair	size	site....	(OB2.1-WCS	010316)		
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This	facet	was	reflected	in	the	official	evaluation	report	(Baker	et	al.	2014a)	which	noted	
that	 based	 on	WCS	 data,	 an	 offset	 generating	 less	 than	 £5,000	 per	 annum	 (a	 total	 of	
£150,000	 over	 30	 years	 without	 adjusting	 for	 inflation)	 would	 not	 be	 economically	
worthwhile	for	the	provider.	
However,	 farmers	 and	 landowners	 also	 exhibited	 a	 patchwork	 of	 motivations	 for	
embarking	on	a	habitat	banking	business	and	securing	land	against	this	 for	30	years	or	
more,	the	brokers	told	me	that:	
We	are	finding	there	is	a	great	deal	of	difference	within	and	amongst	the	
commercial	farmers	as	well.	We’ve	got	one	who	owns	400	hectares	or	whatever	
it	might	be	but	he’s	more	of	a	business-man	than	a	farmer	as	he’s	got	several	
commercial	enterprises	outside	of	farming	like	pharmaceuticals	and	things	like	
that	so	he	has	some	very	different	ways	of	thinking	about	it	to	some	of	the	other	
landowners	we	are	working	with.	Some	of	the	other	landowners	have	been	on	
that	land	for	four	generations	and	are	now	looking	at	securing	it	as	a	nice	piece	
of	Shropshire	countryside.	(OB2.1-WCS	010316)	
Intuitively	 one	might	 expect	 that	 a	 higher	 number	 of	 habitat	 banks	 distributed	 across	
the	county	would	be	favoured	for	ecological	connectivity	(and	accessibility)	over	fewer,	
larger	concentrated	banks.	Indeed,	where	OB2.1-WCS	noted	that	WCC	would	ideally	like	
at	 least	 ten	habitat	banks,	 the	 realities	of	delivering	 these	 in	accordance	with	 requisite	
economies	 of	 scale	 for	 the	 operational	 and	market	 needs	 described	 above,	means	 that	
they	are	only	looking	at	 ‘somewhere	between	three	and	eight’	(OB2.1-WCS	010316).	The	
concentration	 of	 offset	 units	 in	 habitat	 banks	 thus	 indicates	 that	 BDO	will	 become	 a	
conservation	 practice	 that	 is	 spatially	 uneven	 and	 further	 exacerbates	 separation	
between	 society	 and	 spaces	 for	 nature	 (Apostolopoulou	 2016,	 Apostolopoulou	 and	
Adams	 2015).	 Furthermore,	 there	 are	 class	 and	 social	 equity	 implications	 to	 these	
trajectories	of	spatial	distribution	of	lost	and	gained	wildlife	sites	under	habitat	banking.	
These	implications	point	towards	the	consolidation	of	and	capturing	of	the	biodiversity	
as	 well	 as	 financial	 value	 by	 large	 landowners	 and	 perversely,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	
biodiversity	 impacts	 and	 urbanisation	 elsewhere.	 Once	 again,	 the	 market	 efficiencies	
dictating	 the	 need	 for	 fewer	 but	 large	 habitat	 bank	 sites	 -	 rather	 than	 democratic	 or	
conservation	ideals	will	shape	the	direction	and	character	of	the	conservation	and	social	
outcomes	into	the	future.			
Blending	BDO	markets	with	farming	business	models	
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The	turn	towards	habitat	banking	with	farmers	drew	on	economies	of	scale	by	grouping	
strategically	 situated	 habitat	 locations.	 It	 was	 also	 expected	 that	 large	 commercial	
landowners	 would	 be	 more	 economically	 astute	 and	 therefore	 able	 to	 supply	
competitively	priced	offset	credits	to	form	the	basis	of	a	developing	a	market	(OB1-WCS	
020315).	It	was	this	combination	of	commercial	outlook;	farming	experience	and	habitat	
management	 that	 makes	 the	 corporate	 broker	 partnering	 with	 the	 county	 council	
confident	 that	 with	 this	 approach	 they	 can	 produce	 a	 ‘good	 biodiversity	 yield	 per	
hectare’	(OB1-WCS	020315).		
The	biodiversity	productivity	 ‘yield’	will	determine	how	large	the	banks	will	need	to	be	
since	 highly	 ‘productive’	 land	would	 require	 fewer	 hectares	 to	 produce	 the	 equivalent	
number	of	biodiversity	units.	The	habitat	bank	offering	the	first	commercial	offset	noted	
above,	offered	‘yields’	of	an	around	five	units	(credits)	per	hectare.	However,	OB2.1-WCS	
believes	 that	 fifteen	 units/ha	 is	 possible	 in	 some	 circumstances.	 A	 ‘good’	 biodiversity	
yield	 would	 see	 a	 single	 hectare	 bear	 ten	 units	 and	 a	 ‘poor’	 one	 only	 two	 or	 three.	
Therefore	 land	 with	 a	 low	 biodiversity	 baseline	 offers	 the	 greatest	 scope	 for	 ‘value’	
improvements	and	is	thus	financially	superior	since	it	can	yield	the	greatest	biodiversity	
‘return	on	investment’.		It	is	no	coincidence	that	the	vocabulary	here	is	shifting	towards	
agricultural	economics	 since	 this	 frame	constitutes	 the	calculative	 logic	 through	which	
OB2-WCS	 are	 establishing	 the	 habitat	 banks	 in	 Warwickshire.	 OB2.1-WCS	 proposes	
there	is	an	important	difference	to	providing	offsets	in	a	commercial	agricultural	context	
rather	than	through	a	conservation	NGO:	
We	are	commercial	operation	managers	that	understand	farmers,	not	a	bunch	
of	hippies	that	want	to	turn	it	into	a	wildlife	park...[BDO]	has	been	advertised	
from	eco	companies	not	with	a	farming	spin	and	they	talk	a	different	
language…I	think	a	handful	of	offsets	have	been	written	with	NGOs.	So,	when	
the	farmers	look	at	it	they	think	about	delivering	the	objectives	of	the	Wildlife	
Trusts	on	common	land	rather	than	meeting	the	needs	for	their	farms	and	the	
farming	communities.	(OB2.1-WCS	010315)	
OB2.1-WCS	suggests	 it	 is	 the	 ‘unique	value’	 they	bring	as	brokers	not	only	through	the	
valuable	 database	 of	 farmers	 and	 landowners	 but	 also	 through	 their	 expertise	 and	
commercial	 farming	nous.	Brokers	act	as	 ‘translators’	 for	 the	 location	and	extraction	of	
value	 through	 turning	 otherwise	 unproductive	 parcels	 of	 land	 into	 productive	 ones	
(Tsing	2015).	OB2.1-WCS	told	me:	
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There	are	various	things	that	have	to	come	together	to	get	a	really	high	credit	
yield	but	if	you	know	what	you	are	looking	for	then	you	can	pick	the	right	piece	
of	land	with	the	right	plan	and	create	much	more	credits	than	you	would	
otherwise.	So	I	think	and	our	view	is	what	our	competitive	advantage	should	be,	
should	this	take	off,	is	that	actually	we’re	quite	good	at	that.	We	can	provide	an	
attractive	payment	to	the	farmer	and	still	deliver	a	developer	with	an	attractive	
credit	price.	(OB2.1-WCS	010316)	
The	biodiversity	value	chain	
To	summarise,	the	landowner	sells	biodiversity	value	by	the	hectare	and	receives	a	yearly	
rent	for	the	service.	The	developer	purchases	biodiversity	compensation	by	the	unit	in	a	
one	off	down	payment,	which	the	Environment	Bank	administers	as	initial	brokers	and	
intermediaries	of	the	deal.	The	Environment	Bank’s	fee	is	kept	in	a	secure	client	account	
rather	 than	being	 subsumed	 into	a	bigger	pool	of	 capital.	The	 interest	 that	 accrues	on	
the	initial	offset	down	payment	(which	could	be	anywhere	between	tens	to	hundreds	of	
thousands	of	pounds)	would	be	put	into	an	insurance	scheme	in	the	event	that	the	offset	
work	does	not	achieve	the	proposed	habitat	conditions	and	therefore	credit	values	(OB1-
WCS	241114).	It	was	not	clear	how	much	of	every	transaction	OB2-WCS	takes	or	how	this	
additional	‘middle	man’	fits	in	with	the	Environment	Bank’s	business	model.	Echoing	the	
spatial/	unit	value	conversion	illustrated	through	the	commensurating	properties	of	the	
BIA	 in	 the	 contract	 above,	 a	 translation	 process	 must	 occur	 through	 the	 value	 chain	
between	 landowner	 and	 developer.	Much	 like	 assigning	 football	 pitches	 as	 polyvalent	
repositories	 for	 different	 fields	 of	 value,	 the	 spatial	 size	 of	 offset	 sites	 determines	 the	
value	that	landowners	can	extract	in	BDO	markets.	Conversely,	the	developer	may	have	
no	 interest	 in	 the	 size	 of	 the	 spatial	 area	 of	 the	 offset	 area	 or	 habitat	 bank	 they	 are	
buying	 from.	 The	 economics	 of	 BDO	 means	 developers	 will	 simply	 seek	 credits	 that	
reflect	the	‘best	value	for	money’.	OB2.1-WCS	is	mindful	of	the	need	to	pay	landowners	
according	to	hectares	‘tied	up’,	which	they	propose	encourages	the	farmer	to	concentrate	
or	intensify	biodiversity	yield	per	hectare	to	maximise	return	from	finite	land.	Figure	12	
illustrates	the	biodiversity	value	chain	through	the	habitat	bank	model.		
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Figure	12	Warwickshire’s	habitat	banking	value	chain	
	
The	 production	 (farming)	 of	 biodiversity	 units	 cannot	 yet	 compete	 economically	 with	
agricultural	commodities.	Biodiversity	offsetting	and	associated	habitat	banking	is	not	in	
a	 position	 where	 this	 can	 spatially	 displace	 food	 production,	 nor	 would	 it	 likely	 be	
politically	 expedient	 for	 it	 do	 so.	 OB2.1-WCS	 (051116)	 reported	 that	 they	 are	 ‘working	
with	 farmers	 to	use	 their	difficult	 to	 farm	pieces	of	 land	 -	we	are	not	 looking	 for	good	
quality	 high	 yielding,	 grassland	 or	 certainly	 not	 arable	 land’.	 The	 brokers	 use	 their	
commercial	 agricultural	 expertise	 to	 select	 the	margins	 of	 otherwise	 productive	 farms,	
which	 might	 comprise	 ‘lower	 agricultural	 value	 land,	 that	 is	 more	 slopey,	 difficult	 to	
farm,	 lower	yield	etc.’	but	where	 farmers	still	wish	to	 ‘drive	an	 income	from	that	bit	of	
land’	 (OB2.1-WCS	050116).	Under	offsetting,	 landowners,	with	 the	assistance	of	brokers	
and	 intermediaries	 are	able	 to	 convert	marginally	productive	agricultural	 land	 towards	
economic	uses	within	an	emergent	market	for	biodiversity	units23.	OB2-WCS	is	pleased	
																																																						
23 	BDO	 is	 not	 compatible	 with	 Higher	 Level	 Stewardship	 (HLS)	 at	 the	 moment	
because	 HLS	 is	 geared	 towards	 species-specific	 enhancements	 rather	 than	 habitat	
management.	Nevertheless,	OB2.1-WCS	anticipated	 that	 in	 the	 long	 run	 farmers	will	
be	able	to	access	a	blend	of	HLS	and	BDO	funding	on	the	same	land.	The	future	of	EU	
Stewardship	 scheme	 funding	 such	 as	HLS	 and	Entry	 Level	 Stewardship	 (ELS)	 under	
the	Common	Agricultural	Policy	(CAP)	payments	in	relation	to	economic	valuation	of	
biodiversity	warrants	further	research.	This	point	is	made	even	more	pronounced	due	
to	the	EU	exit	 referendum	result	 in	 June	2016	and	the	uncertainty	over	 the	 future	of	
farming	 and	 environmental	 subsidies	 beyond	 2020.	 Advocates	 for	 natural	 capital	
approaches	 are	 discussing	 reform	 of	 the	 subsidy	 system	 and	 exploring	 whether	
markets	 in	environmental	services	could	take	over	 from	Government’s	commitments	
OB2 
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to	 establish	 this	 new	 commercial	 channel	 for	 landowners	 through	 an	 emerging	
biodiversity	market,	in	part	because	they	are	able	to	extract	value	from	the	transactions.	
But	perhaps	without	due	concern	and	significant	interest,	the	foundations	are	being	laid	
for	 biodiversity	 within	 habitat	 banks	 to	 be	 ‘harvested’	 or	 farmed	 according	 to	 growth	
narratives	of	economic	agricultural	discourse.	Brokers	here	create	new	economic	value	in	
two	senses.	OB2-WCS	are	 leveraging	 their	own	business	assets	 through	extracting	new	
value	from	their	databases	of	farms	as	well	as	securing	value	from	marginal	agricultural	
lands	they	are	soliciting	to	become	enrolled	within	these	new	market	assemblages.			
5.8	Discussion	
Making	 biodiversity	 values	 through	 BDO	 demands	 that	 many	 things	 converge	
simultaneously	(Li	2014).	Warwickshire’s	actants,	as	we	will	come	to	see	 in	comparison	
with	 the	 other	 case	 studies,	 were	 unusually	 strong	 and	 combined	 to	 enact	 BDO	 in	
practice.	Whether	BDO	gains	traction	and	how	it	takes	shape	at	local	government	level	
is	 therefore	 thoroughly	contingent	on	 the	character	and	nature	of	 alignments	between	
these	actants.	In	this	case	study,	we	encountered:	
• A	 large,	 financially	 independent,	 entrepreneurial	 and	 motivated	 ecology	
department	at	county	council	level,	
• A	close	working	relationship	with	district	councils,		
• Exceptional	 biological	 data	 records	 and	 cartographic	 devices	 with	 associated	
biodiversity	spatial	strategies,		
• An	in	house	Environment	Bank	biodiversity	‘offset	broker’.		
As	 a	 consequence	 of	 these	 factors	 we	 also	 saw	 the	 rapid	 re-scaling	 of	 NNL	 into	 local	
policy	to	provide	a	‘carrot	shaped	stick’	as	the	enabling	policy	environment	for	BDO.	The	
availability	of	 a	 government	 endorsed	 calculative	device	 like	 the	DEFRA	metric	 simply	
made	things	easier	 for	Warwickshire	 to	become	what	 they	referred	 to	as	a	 ‘bottom	up’	
pilot	 site.	Nevertheless,	 even	with	 this	unique	 combination	of	 elements	 in	place,	 there	
was	 friction	 (Tsing	 2005)	 in	 actively	 assembling	 the	 values	 of	 Warwickshire’s	
biodiversity.	 Despite	 the	 growing	 demand	 for	 biodiversity	 units	 as	 compensation	 for	
losses	there	was	no	easy	way	of	matching	these	debits	with	credits	from	offset	suppliers.	
The	metric	was	used	on	numerous	sites	subject	to	development	application.	Biodiversity	
																																																																																																																																																														
to	 match	 EU	 agricultural	 subsidies	 until	 2020,	 which	 currently	 constitute	 annual	
payments	of	£3.2b	to	British	landowners	(Helm	2017). 	
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losses	 (as	 negative	 values)	 were	 being	 accounted	 for	 and	 made	 visible	 to	 planners.	
Occasionally	these	were	being	translated	into	financial	sums	and	payments	to	the	county	
council	through	section	106	(s106)	agreements24	if	offset	providers	were	not	secured.		But	
the	market	 was	 not	 simply	 there	waiting	 to	 happen.	 Elusive	 landowners,	 burdensome	
administrative	 and	 legal	 frameworks	 and	 the	 pragmatics	 of	 building	 a	 market	
infrastructure	all	prohibited	the	easy	assembling	of	BDO	frameworks.	
Such	 frictions	 were	 partly	 attributable	 to	 the	 immaturity	 of	 BDO	 and	 the	 challenges	
associated	with	translating	the	old	ways	of	addressing	biodiversity	issues	under	planning	
to	a	new	one.	Translations	 included,	 for	example,	the	need	to	upgrade	the	professional	
ecological	 survey	 methods,	 to	 bring	 people	 along	 on	 the	 journey,	 to	 construct	 new	
frameworks	and	devices	 for	envisioning	nature	 -	new	ways	of	 framing	and	acting	upon	
biodiversity	(Apostolopoulou	and	Adams	2017).	Other	translations	involved	conversions	
to	 data	 units	 that	 made	 biodiversity	 amenable	 to	 being	 processed	 through	 BDO’s	
calculative	 methodologies	 (I	 return	 to	 the	 processes	 of	 commensuration	 below).	 The	
most	important	actors	performing	these	translations	in	Warwickshire	were	the	brokers.	
Brokers	 acted	 to	 smooth	 and	align	different	 elements.	The	Environment	Bank	was	 the	
first	 on	 the	 scene	 but	 as	 they	 encountered	 friction,	 they	 enrolled	 new	 brokers.	
Biodiversity	brokers	helped	to	translate	previously	economically	sterile	 land	 into	newly	
productive	uses	 in	 line	with	an	emergent	market	 in	biodiversity	 ‘production’,	 that	 they	
were	themselves,	active	in	creating.	Brokers	also	translated	these	new	biodiversity	values	
from	the	offset	providers	to	the	buyers	in	the	market	along	the	BDO	value	chain	(Figure	
12).	I	return	to	the	importance	of	brokers	and	other	intermediaries	in	chapter	8.			
Whether	or	not	BDO	would	in	fact	deliver	a	 ‘no	net	loss	of	biodiversity’	the	metric	was	
already	 having	 important	 effects	 on	 biodiversity	 considerations	 within	 planning	
processes.	 Local	 authority	 and	 NGO	 ecologists	 revealed	 that	 application	 of	 the	 BIA	
frequently	 produced	 biodiversity	 values	 (as	 numbers)	 that	 would	 simply	 have	 been	
overlooked	 in	planning	decisions	prior	 to	 this	new	 legibility.	Deploying	 the	metric	was	
saying	new	 things	 about	 habitats	 through	 the	 production	 of	 hard	numbers,	which	 the	
old	system	did	not	have	the	language	for.		Sometimes	these	numerical	representations	of	
loss	 empowered	 planners	 to	 demand	 more	 mitigation	 work	 from	 developers	 in	 their	
plans,	 or	 even	 refuse	 applications	 entirely	 (LPA2-WCS	 300714).	 These	 are	 important	
material	effects,	which	highlight	some	contextual	utility	of	a	new	calculative	technology.	
																																																						
24	Section	106	agreements	outline	planning	conditions	set	by	the	LPA	that	the	developer	
must	observe	and	were	being	used	as	a	means	of	collecting	the	BDO	offset	payments.		
164  
Still,	there	are	other	longer-term	implications	to	these	translations.	Whether	or	not	BDO	
shows	 signs	 of	 fulfilling	 aspirations	 for	 the	 no	 net	 loss	 of	 biodiversity,	 it	 is	 worth	
reflecting	on	the	wider	shifts	to	conservation	practice	that	it	may	be	engendering	in	this	
county.	Indeed,	it	is	perhaps	because	Warwickshire	had	such	a	strong	array	of	elements	-	
almost	perfect	institutional	and	technical	arrangements	for	BDO,	that	it	makes	it	such	a	
potent	 case	 study	 to	 explore.	 I	 identify	 four	 key	 shifts	 to	 conservation	 practice	 in	
particular.	
1. Values	that	people	struggle	over	
This	case	study	makes	apparent	that	the	model	of	BDO	is	envisaged	to	produce	a	neutral	
calculative	 framework,	 but	 in	 fact	 it	 creates	new	 things	 that	 people	 struggle	 over.	 The	
metric	 (as	 a	 calculative	 device)	 for	 deciding	 biodiversity	 values	 at	 development	 and	
receptor	 sites	was	 generating	 numerical	 values	 that	were	 subsequently	 negotiated	 and	
adjusted.	 Instead	 of	 being	 an	 impartial	 and	 objective	 calculation,	 the	 new	 metrics	
associated	with	BDO	were	used	 in	creative	ways,	as	users	attempted	to	strike	the	right	
balance	of	values.		As	predicted	in	theory	(Walker	et	al.	2009),	and	observed	in	empirical	
accounts	of	BDO	elsewhere	(Sullivan	2013),	it	is	noticeable	that	the	nexus	of	competing	
development,	 conservation	 and	 LPA	 interests	 can	 mean	 that	 biodiversity	 values	
calculated	 through	 the	 metric	 are	 adjusted	 downwards	 so	 as	 to	 facilitate	 cheaper	
compensation	 for	 developers.	 This	 seems	 consistent	 with	 the	 Coalition	 Government’s	
political	 commitments	 to	 house-builders	 and	 developers	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Conservative	
Manifesto,	which	I	discussed	in	chapter	4,	and	with	the	emphasis	on	market	values	for	
conservation	more	generally.	Concealed	within	these	technical	processes	are	additional	
value	judgments	and	also	struggles	to	arrive	at	the	perceived	‘right’	numerical	values	in	
the	end.	What	this	empirical	case	has	shown	therefore,	is	that	through	the	application	of	
a	 calculative	 device,	 biodiversity	 and	 economic	 values	 are	 being	 negotiated.	 The	
valuation	 outcomes	 are	 adjusted	 such	 that	 they	 can	 straddle	 competing	 value	 systems	
and	simultaneously	be	presented	as	being	economically	palatable,	politically	pragmatic	
as	well	as	ecologically	coherent.	It	is	likely	that	more	often	than	not,	the	latter	may	easily	
be	 subjugated	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 prior	 two	 dimensions.	 In	 so	 doing,	 this	 case	
illustrates	 that	 BDO	 will	 likely	 simply	 reflect	 or	 entrench	 rather	 than	 overturn	 prior	
configurations	of	power	and	influence	in	the	English	planning	system.		
2. Commensuration	
Second,	the	case	history	provides	empirical	material	to	illustrate	the	working	in	practice	
of	 commensuration	 processes	 that	 arise,	 as	 different	 habitats	 are	 made	 equivalent	
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through	the	application	of	BDO	metrics.	Numerical	signifiers	form	proxies	for	qualitative,	
ecological	 assemblages,	 calculated	 with	 the	 aid	 of	 the	 DEFRA	 biodiversity	 metric,	 as	
represented	by	the	BIA	Excel	spread	sheet	formulae	presented	in	this	chapter	(Table	7	and	
Figure	 10).	Sometimes	 these	 commensuration	processes	 generate	 unintuitive	 outcomes	
(Pawliczek	and	Sullivan	2011).	For	example,	in	this	case	it	is	unclear	how	exactly	a	sports	
pitch	can	mature	to	become	a	biodiversity	habitat,	or	if	sports	pitches	can	really	be	said	
to	 be	 maintaining	 6.36	 units	 of	 biodiversity	 value	 at	 the	 development	 site,	 compared	
with,	 say,	 the	 6.36	 units	 of	 high	 quality	 grassland	 habitat	 supporting	 a	 range	 of	 BAP	
species	 proposed	 at	 the	 offset	 site.	 The	 proposed	 mitigation	 value	 provided	 through	
sports	 pitches,	 measured	 as	 habitats	 of	 low	 distinctiveness	 and	 poor	 condition	 is	
achieved	principally	through	acting	as	the	largest	‘habitat	type’	within	the	development	
and	 thus	 illustrates	 the	 function	 of	 numerical	 abstractions	 to	 commensurate	 distinct	
biota	through	making	them	interchangeable	(Sullivan	2013,	Carver	2015)	(see	Figure	11).		
Not	only	have	different	habitat	‘types’	been	made	equivalent	but	different	sizes	of	habitat	
appear	 equivalent	 in	 terms	 of	 biodiversity	 ‘value’.	 The	 act	 of	 constructing	 biodiversity	
unit	 values	 constitutes	 the	 translation	 of	 nature	 or	 representations	 of	 nature	 i.e.	
qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 ecological	 data	 into	 a	 universal	 and	 accepted	 unit	 as	 a	
surrogate,	 such	 that	 it	 is	 commensurable	 and	 comparable	 along	 a	 uniform	 scale.	 The	
resultant	 values	 are	 flat	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 appear	 on	 a	 continuous	plane;	 they	 are	
interchangeable.	The	abstraction	to	units	unshackles	representations	of	material	natures	
from	 their	 geographic,	 temporal	 or	 qualitative	 specificity.	BDO	 functions	by	 creating	 a	
flat	ontology	of	nature.	This	idea	echoes	the	discussion	I	outlined	in	chapter	2	in	respect	
to	the	making	of	biodiversity	according	to	unit	measurements,	whether	those	are	species	
or	 habitat	 categories	 or	 numbers	 in	 databases.	 Units	 act	 as	 a	 prelude	 to	 their	
commodification	under	BDO	(Turnhout	et	al.	2011,	Fredriksen	2017).	 	 	 In	my	case	study,	
multiple	fields	of	value	have	been	collapsed	into	a	single	material	football	field.	An	actual	
football	 field	 is	 classed	 as	 both	 a	 qualitative	 habitat	 type	and	 a	 numerical	 biodiversity	
value.	The	football	field	straddles	different	categories	of	value	across	spatial	area,	habitat	
type	 and	 biodiversity	 unit	 score,	 offering	 a	 different	 value	 field	 within	 each.	 	 The	
exchange	of	value	between	sites	of	loss	and	gain	is	facilitated	by	the	ways	in	which	these	
different	value	fields;	spatial,	habitat	and	biodiversity	flow	and	collapse	into	one	another	
through	 functionally	 and	 spatially	 abstracted	 numerical	 proxies	 (Robertson	 2000,	
Castree	2003).	This	underpins	the	exchangeability	of	different	values	that	are	subsumed	
and	obscured	within	quantitative	continuums	(in	this	case,	a	sports	pitch).		
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The	reduction,	across	divergent,	heterogeneous	objects	to	one	fluid	unit	scale	makes	the	
idea	 of	 net	 gains	 and	 losses	 of	 biodiversity	 coherent.	 Indeed,	 the	 conjuring	 of	 a	
comparative	 relational	 quality	 between	 unrelated	 entities	 permeates	 the	 rationale	 and	
appeal	 of	BDO	 in	policy	 circles,	 and	underlines	 the	 central	 idea	 that	 the	 approach	can	
reconcile	development	with	conservation	through	the	replacement	of	the	 loss	of	X	with	
creation	 of	 Y.	 	 The	 idea	 of	 ‘reconciliation’,	 leads	 me	 to	 my	 third	 observation	 for	 the	
practices	of	BDO	in	Warwickshire,	where	the	calculative	approach	towards	biodiversity	is	
facilitated	 and	 enabled	 through	 a	 spatial	 grid	 of	 field-scale	 habitat	 data.	 Biodiversity	
offsetting	in	Warwickshire	is	being	mobilised	as	a	way	of	actively	optimising	the	placing	
of	nature	 and	 infrastructural	development	across	 the	 county.	 In	 this	 respect,	 I	 consider	
BDO	 to	 be	 constituted	 by	 a	 drive	 for	 spatial	 rationalisation	 between	 different	 users	 of	
land,	i.e.	across	development,	farming	and	biodiversity	conservation.			
3. Spatial	rationalisation	
Land	use	demands	in	Warwickshire	are	reflected	through	struggles	over	space.	The	case	
study	also	shows	that	biodiversity	loss	too,	is	framed	as	a	spatial	problem.	To	rationalise	
space	 would	 mean	 making	 it	 manageable	 and	 ordered	 -	 to	 deploy	 reason,	 logic	 and	
modern	 technical	 values.	 According	 to	 the	 Oxford	 English	 Dictionary	 (2017c),	 to	
‘rationalise’	 is	 also	 to	 justify	 -	 to	make	 clear	 the	 reasons	 behind	 something.	 Technical	
values	 therefore	 help	 perform	 rationalisation	 as	 justification,	 since	 they	 neutralise	 the	
politics	 of	 such	 decision-making	 processes.	 Li	 (2007a)	 refers	 to	 this	 de-politicising	
process	as	 ‘rendering	technical’,	since	numbers	 ‘justify’	(Porter	1995).	The	fabrication	of	
uniform	units	of	nature	provides	the	mathematical	building	blocks	of	this	endeavour.		
By	deploying	an	analytical	lens	of	assemblage,	I	have	accentuated	the	role	of	devices	as	
actants	 in	 performing	 biodiversity	 values.	 Where	 the	 previous	 two	 discussion	 points	
emphasised	 the	role	of	 the	DEFRA	metric	as	 the	calculative	device,	my	third	relates	 to	
the	 role	 of	 the	 WCC’s	 Habitat	 Biodiversity	 Audit	 (HBA)	 and	 associated	 inscription	
devices	 of	 databases	 (both	 of	 biological	 records	 and	 also	 potential	 credit	 supplying	
landowners),	maps	and	spatial	technologies.	The	HBA	is	important	to	the	production	of	
value	as	it	acts	as	a	spatialised	grid	that	interacts	with	the	BIA	(through	determining	the	
application	 of	 space	 based	 exchange	 rules).	 For	 example,	 the	 HBA	 determines	 how	
geographically	 specific	 habitats	 are	 valued	or	devalued	 according	 to	 their	 location	 and	
proximity	to	its	‘priority	areas’.	The	HBA,	like	the	other	devices	is	a	technology	of	spatial	
management.	 The	 pixelated	 grid	 of	 data	 as	 spatial	 representations	 of	 graded	 habitats	
thereby	 informs	 Local	 Plan	 making	 through	 land	 allocation	 as	 well	 as	 the	 strategic	
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placement	of	biodiversity	offsets	(in	so	far	as	these	are	compatible	with	the	other	legal,	
commercial	and	practical	requirements	shaping	the	placement	of	private	habitat	banks).		
I	 emphasised	 the	 role	 that	 the	DEFRA	metric	 plays	 as	 a	 calculative	device	 to	 facilitate	
commensuration	 across	 divergent	 fields	 of	 value	 in	 the	 preparation	 for	 its	
commodification.	 Sometimes	 the	 valuation	 of	 biodiversity	 amounts	 only	 to	 translating	
emplaced	ecologies	into	universal	 ‘biodiversity	units’	amenable	to	being	exchanged	and	
does	 not	 necessarily	 entail	 full	 monetary	 pricing	 and	 exchange.	 These	 processes	 have	
therefore	 less	 to	 do	 with	 direct	 capital	 accumulation	 from	 the	 growth	 of	 biodiversity	
markets,	where	actors	are	able	to	capture	relative	surplus	values	(even	if	this	is	becoming	
more	 likely	as	BDO	shifts	gear	towards	habitat	banking	and	potential	revenues	emerge	
for	 landowners).	 In	 other	 words,	 BDO,	 while	 partly	 about	 making	 money	 for	 some	
actors,	 is	 as	much	 if	 not	more	 to	 do	with	what	 Foucault	 (1977)	 labels,	 creating	 ‘docile	
minds	and	bodies’	 -	of	making	 land	and	nature	compliant	with	 the	spatial	demands	of	
economic	 growth	 vis	 a	 vis,	 infrastructural	 development.	 Biodiversity	 offsetting	
introduces	a	geographic	and	temporal	flexibility	to	the	spatial	frictions	of	conservation	in	
a	 landscape	 where	 there	 is	 a	 competition	 across	 different	 uses;	 residential	 and	
infrastructural	 development,	 pastoral	 and	 livestock	 farming,	 wildlife	 and	 so	 called	
‘natural’	 landscapes.	 The	 following	 case	 study	 provides	 further	 empirical	 content	 in	
relation	to	this	final	point.		
In	 chapter	 2,	 I	 discussed	 how	 the	 fetishised	 principles	 of	 efficiency	 and	 flexibility	
underscored	 the	 emergence	 of	 aggregate	 rules	 and	 exchangeability	 in	 the	 1970s.	
Aggregate	 rules	 and	 NNL	 were	 deliberately	 conceived	 to	 offer	 compatibility	 with	
commercial	logics	and	neoliberal	economic	ideology.	This	avowed	intention	of	aggregate	
rules	and	accounting	based	frameworks	is	just	as	relevant	to	BDO	in	England	today.	To	
put	 it	 simply,	 BDO	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 about	 ‘making	 space	 for	 development’	 even	
while	it	is	primarily	framed	as	‘making	space	for	nature’	(Lawton	et	al.	2010).	
Spatial	 technologies	 were	 also	 mobilised	 to	 assist	 actors	 in	 building	 a	 market	 in	 the	
absence	of	forthcoming	receptor	sites.	Using	‘supply	and	demand	mapping’	and	farmer/	
landowner	 databases,	 OB2.1	 and	 2.2-WCS	 acted	 as	 translators,	 working	 to	 convert	
economically	 marginal	 spaces	 into	 productive	 ones	 through	 creating	 ‘yields	 of	
biodiversity’.	 Anna	 Tsing	 (2015)	 uses	 the	 expression	 ‘salvage	 capitalism’	 to	 account	 for	
the	generative	process	that	seeks	to	creatively	incorporate	the	‘margins’	or	the	‘edges’	of	
non-capitalist	 values	 and	 entities	 into	 capitalist	 value	 and	 characterises	 these	 as	 value	
‘translations’.	 As	well	 as	 contesting	 the	 seemingly	misplaced	 positive	 inflection	 to	 this	
term,	 Sullivan	 (2017b)	 questions	 whether	 ‘salvage’	 is	 a	 useful	 amelioration	 to	 Marx’s	
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concept	of	primitive	 accumulation,	 as	Tsing	 so	 intends.	Whether	 salvage	 capitalism	or	
primitive	 accumulation,	 this	 example	 illustrates	 how	 BDO	 shapes	 the	 conversion	 of	
actually	existing	(field)	margins	as	the	productive	frontiers	of	agricultural	value	making	
into	new	sources	of	rent	in	the	form	of	habitat	banks.		
4. Value	for	money	and	the	production	of	a	good	yield	per	hectare		
Space	and	scale	matter	to	value	making	and	the	functioning	of	markets	as	this	case	study	
illustrated.	 Actors	 were	 searching	 for	 economies	 of	 scale	 in	 habitat	 provision	 so	 that	
BDO	could	establish	 itself	according	to	market	efficiency	 logics.	High	transaction	costs	
from	 receptor	 site	 identification,	 preparation	 and	 legal	 fees	 were	 encouraging	 the	
combination	 of	 fostering	 economies	 of	 scale	 by	 grouping	 strategically	 situated	 habitat	
locations	 with	 the	 economically	 astute	 ways	 that	 large	 commercial	 landowners	 can	
manage	their	farms	(OB2.1-WCS	020315).	This	was	expected	to	result	in	a	good	supply	of	
offset	 credits	 from	 newly	 formed	 ‘habitat	 banks’	 that	 can	 underscore	 the	 basis	 of	
developing	a	market.	Due	to	 these	pressures	and	because	of	 the	expertise	of	 the	actors	
engaged,	 BDO	 is	 becoming	 further	 aligned	 with	 commercial	 agricultural	 productivity	
agendas	that	emphasise	efficiencies	and	scale	of	production	through	concepts	of	 ‘yield’.	
Thus,	my	final	discussion	point	related	to	this	this	case	study	indicates	that	the	pressure	
of	creating	‘value	for	money’	in	compensation	strategies	for	conservation	may	be	pushing	
BDO	in	particular	directions	that	favour	the	growth	of	market	values	and	exchanges	for	
offset	units	 (Hannis	and	Sullivan	2012;	Dauguet	2015)	with	 implications	 for	biodiversity	
conservation	in	practice.		
This	 chapter	 has	 introduced	 some	 of	 the	 political	 implications	 for	 the	 trajectories	 of	
habitat	banking	under	BDO.	Where	others	have	pointed	out	 the	potential	 for	 spatially	
and	 socially	 uneven	 outcomes	 of	 BDO	 (Apostolopoulou	 and	 Adams	 2015,	
Apostolopoulou	2016,),	this	case	study	has	provided	empirical	evidence	for	the	ways	that	
habitat	 banking,	 as	 an	 extension	 to	 BDO	 arrangements,	 is	 actually	 fulfilling	 this	
expectation.	I	described	the	spatially	uneven	and	unequal	distribution	of	the	placements	
of	biodiversity	habitats	as	bank	sites,	and	the	parallel	capture	of	financial	rental	streams	
from	 this	 process.	 The	 fact	 that	 both	 of	 these	 benefits	 will	 flow	 to	 certain	 actors	 on	
account	 of	 their	 existing	 large	 landholdings	 as	 asset	 bases	 and	 at	 the	 expense	 of	
disappearing	 biodiversity	 habitats	 elsewhere	 seems	 politically	 and	 morally	 perverse.	
Furthermore,	these	arrangements	point	towards	the	exclusion	of	traditional	non-private	
conservation	actors	 such	as	 conservation	NGOs.	 	The	need	 for	 large	 consolidated	 land	
holdings	 to	 provide	 an	 economy	 of	 scale	 in	 habitat	 banking	 is	 something	 that	 NGOs	
typically	cannot	bring	to	the	table.	As	such,	the	empirical	evidence	presented	within	this	
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chapter	indicates	that	BDO	and	its	market	requirement	for	habitat	banking	is	a	system	
that	 will	 drive	 conservation	 towards	 a	 concentrated	 smaller	 number	 of	 large	 private	
protected	 areas,	 while	 simultaneously	 being	 development	 led	 (Pawliczek	 and	 Sullivan	
2011).		
Consideration	 of	 the	 broader	 implications	 for	 the	 political	 economy	of	 land	 subject	 to	
biodiversity	offsetting	and	theories	of	value	making	are	an	apt	place	to	bring	this	chapter	
to	a	close.	This	 is	a	 theme	that	 reappears	 in	 the	next	case	study	example	based	on	the	
South	Devon	pilot	site	of	the	DEFRA	study,	and	one	that	I	expand	in	the	final	discussion	
and	 conclusion.	 The	 following	 chapter	 highlights	 a	 range	 of	 sometimes	 overlapping	
themes	 resembling	 this	 chapter’s	 but	 also	 illuminates	 interesting	 differences.	 The	
divergences	 further	 expand	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 empirical	 nuances	 of	 practicing	
BDO.	 In	 particular	 it	 illustrates	 the	 emergence	 of	 ‘hybrid’	 arrangements	 as	 the	 BDO	
assemblage	collides	with	other	extant	conservation	assemblages	oriented	around	certain	
flagship	species.	Species	units	present	a	problem	for	BDO	as	detailed	 in	chapter	4,	 the	
DEFRA	metric	was	not	designed	to	‘see’	them.		
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CHAPTER	6	
RE-ASSEMBLING	AT	THE	LOCAL	FRONTIER:	BIODIVERSITY	
OFFSETTING	IN	SOUTH	DEVON	
6.1	Introduction	and	chapter	outline	
Exploring	 the	 situated	 practices	 of	 BDO	 in	 South	 Devon	 provides	 further	 clarity	 over	
how	biodiversity	values	are	made	in	practice.	This	chapter	follows	the	structural	format	
of	 the	 prior	 case	 study	 in	 that	 it	 starts	 by	 exploring	 the	 professional,	 political	 and	
institutional	 context	 of	 the	 pilot	 site	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	 these	 factors	 shaped	how	
BDO	was	enacted	and	unfolded.		
After	setting	the	scene	of	the	case	study,	I	present	the	detailed	BDO	processes	pertaining	
to	 the	 compensation	 requirements	 for	 a	 residential	 development	 for	 255	 houses.	 This	
case	 study	 examines	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 BDO	 came	 to	 serve	 a	 specific	 function	 for	
planners	 faced	 with	 intractable	 conflicts.	 Planners	 faced	 struggles	 associated	 with	 the	
pressure	 to	 deliver	more	 houses	 in	 a	 challenging	 landscape	 topography	 and	 few	 other	
options	 for	placing	 the	development.	 In	 this	 sense,	 I	 illustrate	 the	ways	 in	which	BDO	
was	 imbricated	with	 contradictory	demands	on	 finite	 space,	planning	 time	 frames	 and	
developer	budgetary	allocations.	For	example,	I	highlight	how	BDO	is	generally	expected	
by	its	advocates	to	‘transcend	trade-offs’	(ten	Kate	et	al.	2004)	within	development,	but	
in	fact	opens	up	additional	and	unforeseen	value	conflicts.	The	example	shows	how	BDO	
came	 to	 be	 framed	 by	 the	 developers	 as	 an	 option	 that	 the	 LPA	 could	 enforce	 at	 the	
expense	of	complying	with	minimum	quotas	for	provision	of	affordable	housing.		
The	 chapter	 travels	 to	 various	 locations	 and	moments	 wherein	 the	 biodiversity	 offset	
contract	 in	 South	 Devon	 played	 out.	 One	 of	 these	 locales	 was	 the	 planning	 appeal	
committee	meeting	in	the	district	council	offices	in	July	2014	where	BDO	was	discussed	
in	 the	 context	 of	 objections	 to	 the	 ecological	 impacts	 of	 the	 development.	 In	
methodological	 similarity	 to	 the	 prior	 chapter,	 this	 case	 study	 also	 charts	 the	
development	 of	 various	 adjustments	 to	 the	 scoring	 practices	 during	 the	 negotiations	
between	 planners	 and	 consultant	 ecologists	 over	 biodiversity	 impact	 and	 mitigation	
values.		
The	chapter	then	turns	to	examine	the	geographical	specificities	that	shape	the	making	
of	 a	 BDO	 hybrid.	 I	 have	 referred	 to	 this	 process	 as	 a	 hybridisation	 since	 prior	
conservation	 policy	 assemblages,	 such	 as	 the	 importance	 of	 conservation	 of	 flagship	
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species	 and	 other	 additional	 compensation	 frameworks	 determine	 both	 the	 nature	 of	
value	units	produced	as	well	as	the	compensation	arrangements	that	were	undertaken.		
In	 summary	 the	 chapter	highlights	 five	overall	 themes	 that	 the	 case	 study	 illuminates.	
These	findings	relate	to	the	incongruities	and	disjuncture	between	the	idealised	rhetoric	
of	 BDO	 as	 a	 means	 of	 delivering	 standardised	 biodiversity	 values	 and	 the	 situated	
enactments	 of	 the	 policy.	 The	 discussion	 explores	 the	 practical	 ways	 in	 which	 actors	
tinkered	with	DEFRA’s	 guidelines	 to	 translate	 value	 between	 different	 ecological	 units	
(habitats	and	species).	It	also	discusses	the	institutional	dynamics	shaping	how	BDO	was	
being	 enacted.	 Such	 dynamics	 included	 commercial	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 and	 the	
neoliberal	 ideology	permeating	English	development	policy	and	planning	 (discussed	 in	
chapter	 4).	As	 an	 enduring	 theme	 throughout	 all	 of	 the	 case	 studies,	 this	 chapter	 also	
illustrates	 how	 the	 impact	 and	 mitigation	 valuations	 were	 precarious	 constructions,	
whose	instability	was	concealed	through	the	potency	of	finalised	numerical	inscriptions	
in	 documents.	 The	 resultant	 numbers	 were	 thus	 imbued	 with	 political	 agency	 that	
enabled	 planners	 to	 neutralise	 civil	 society	 opposition	 to	 the	 development.	 Finally,	 as	
already	 indicated,	 the	 final	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 opens	 up	 a	 discussion	 over	 the	
relationship	between	biodiversity	values	and	land	values.		
6.2	Case	study	context:	BDO	at	the	district	council		
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 strong	 cohort	 of	 influential	 well-resourced	 individuals	 and	 policy	
foundations	that	enabled	BDO	to	gain	traction	in	Warwickshire,	aligning	these	factors	in	
Devon	was	more	of	a	patchwork	exercise.	South	Devon	formed	one	leg	of	the	three-part	
sub-pilot	 approach,	 also	 comprising	 North	 and	 East	 Devon.	 The	 three	 Devon	 district	
councils	were	independent	from	each	other,	but	where	there	were	overlaps,	South	Devon	
was	proactive	in	moving	things	forward.	Like	the	other	LPA	sites	within	the	overall	pilot,	
Devon	 had	 struggled	 to	 establish	 progress	 at	 trialling	 BDO	 due	 to	 financial,	 staff	 and	
time	capacity	 limitations.	BDO	was	slow	coming	-	 it	was	only	starting	to	penetrate	 the	
wider	planning	processes	at	the	county	and	district	council	towards	the	close	of	the	pilot	
study	in	spring	2014.	The	experience	these	actors	did	manage	to	achieve	was	more	or	less	
related	 to	 the	persistence	of	one	 individual	working	 largely	 in	 their	 lunch	break.	 	As	a	
researcher,	 I	 was	 given	 the	 impression	 that	 apart	 from	 this	 individual,	 who	 was	 the	
Green	Infrastructure	Officer	and	pilot	lead	for	South	Devon	(denoted	here	as	LPA1-SD),	
the	 two	 biodiversity	 officers	 comprising	 the	 district	 council’s	 ecology	 team	 (LPA2-SD,	
LPA3-SD)	 were	 not	 engaged	 with	 the	 trial.	 LPA1-SD	 was	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘expert	
working	 on	 it’	 (LPA2-SD	 25016)	 -	 the	 others	 didn’t	 feel	 they	 had	much	 to	 add	 to	my	
research.	LPA1-SD’s	efforts	to	identify	suitable	development	applications	on	which	to	try	
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BDO	 with	 willing	 developers	 and	 not	 already	 entangled	 with	 other	 conservation	
designations	 incompatible	with	BDO,	 appeared	 therefore	 to	 be	 somewhat	 of	 a	 solitary	
struggle.	
This	 uncoordinated	 effort	 was	 largely	 why	 the	 BDO	 strategy	 and	 associated	 policy	
frameworks	 had	 not	 emerged	 during	 the	 two	 year	 window.	Where	Warwickshire	 was	
able	to	fall	back	on	certain	policy	positions	to	encourage	developers	to	use	the	metric,	in	
South	Devon	the	slow	coming	of	a	county	wide	or	systematic	approach	backed	up	with	
policy	 had	 ‘stalled	 things’	 (LPA2.3	 150216).	 The	 District	 Council	 Local	 Plan	 2013-2033	
mentions	BDO,	which	is	considered	to	form	some	function	as	a	‘black	and	white	part	of	
policy’	 (LPA1-SD	270115).	 It	 also	 refers	 to	goals	 for	 a	 ‘net	 gain’	 of	biodiversity	under	 its	
policy	 ‘EN8’.	 Furthermore	 LPA1-SD	 (270215)	 told	 me	 he	 had	 managed	 to	 ‘sneak’	 a	
paragraph	on	BDO	into	the	South	West	Exeter	Development	Framework	(2014)	under	a	
heading	on	‘other	guiding	principles’	for	biodiversity	concerns	that	reads:	
It	is	expected	that	SWE1	will	achieve	a	net	gain	for	biodiversity	in	line	with	
Policies	EN8	and	EN9.	Assessments	of	loss	and	gain	should	be	carried	out	to	
recommended	methodologies,	such	as	the	Defra	biodiversity	offsetting	metric.	
Where	the	development	will	result	in	unavoidable	habitat	loss,	compensation	
and	enhancement	will	be	required.	This	can	be	achieved	as	part	of	onsite	green	
space	provision,	through	the	restoration	and	creation	of	habitats,	for	example	
cirl	buntings.	Where	onsite	measures	are	insufficient	to	achieve	a	net	gain,	
offsite	measures	may	be	required.	(South	West	Exeter	Development	Framework	
2014:	21)		
It	 took	a	 further	year	and	a	half	 for	 the	pilot	site	 to	produce	a	biodiversity	offset	Local	
Strategy	and	Guidance	document	that	included	a	spatial	strategy	for	offset	provisions.	As	
well	as	the	lack	of	policy	and	organisational	alignment,	South	Devon	also	had	a	unique	
combination	 of	 barriers	 that	made	 the	 translation	 from	 normal	 planning	 processes	 to	
BDO	 arrangements	 as	 described	 in	 chapter	 5,	 especially	 difficult.	 These	 frictions	
included	 various	 difficulties	 in	 applying	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 and	 devising	 offsetting	
around	 existing	 statutory	 conservation	 designations	 associated	 with	 Special	 Areas	 of	
Conservation	SACs	under	 the	EU	Habitat’s	Directive	and	the	county’s	 ‘flagship	species’	
conservation	priorities.	
In	 respect	 to	 other	 conservation	 priorities	 associated	 with	 the	 EU	 Habitats	 Directive,	
BDO	came	 to	 clash	with	a	different	 conservation	compensation	 framework	 levelled	on	
developers	 in	 the	 form	 of	 ‘suitable	 alternative	 natural	 green	 space’	 (SANGS).	 Natural	
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England	requires	LPAs	to	solicit	financial	compensation	for	the	provision	of	SANGS	as	a	
form	 of	 statutory	 mitigation	 to	 account	 for	 the	 increased	 number	 of	 residential	
properties	leading	to	recreational	impacts	on	nearby	SACs	and	Special	Protection	Areas	
(SPAs).	 SANGS	 is	 delivered	 through	 the	 Community	 Infrastructure	 Levy	 (CIL)	
mechanism	 and	 typically	 calculated	 as	 a	 £350	 contribution	 per	 dwelling.	 Due	 to	 its	
connection	 to	European	Union	Habitats	Regulations,	which	 are	 statutory	 conservation	
requirements,	 this	 form	 of	 compensation	 is	 prioritised	 over	 the	 generally	 unprotected	
habitats	DEFRA	specified	as	‘offsettable’	in	their	BDO	guidelines.	LPA1-SD	(290714)	told	
me	that	guidance	to	achieve	the	 ‘no	net	 loss’	of	habitats	recognised	by	the	UK	BAP		 ‘is	
just	policy’,	rather	than	a	legal	directive.	
	The	 detailed	 examination	 of	 efforts	 to	 use	 the	 metric	 and	 negotiate	 biodiversity	
compensation	for	a	residential	development	illustrates	some	of	the	ways	in	which	BDO	
in	South	Devon	adapted	to	and	converged	with	other	existing	conservation	assemblages.		
An	additional	barrier	emerged	from	the	importance	of	cirl	buntings	(Emberiza	cirlus)	as	
conservation	priorities.	Cirl	buntings	are	‘a	scarce	and	localised	breeding	bird	in	the	UK,	
confined	almost	entirely	to	South	Devon’	(Baker	et	al.	2014b).	They	are	protected	under	
the	EU	Directive	on	the	Conservation	of	Wild	Birds	79/409/EEC,	under	Part	1	of	the	UK	
Wildlife	 and	 Countryside	 Act	 1981.	 Due	 to	 the	 RSPB’s	 programme	 of	 work	 in	 South	
Devon,	 cirl	 bunting	 considerations	 were	 incorporated	 into	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 local	
offsetting	 approach,	 even	 though	 DEFRA’s	 design	 is	 based	 on	 the	 measurement	 and	
valuation	of	habitats,	rather	than	species.	The	following	extract	is	taken	from	the	South	
Devon	BDO	Guidance:	
Cirl	Buntings	favour	an	extensively	managed	mosaic	of	mixed	farmland,	with	
fields	typically	of	2ha	and	smaller.	They	nest	in	dense	cover	provided	by	
particularly	thick	hedgerows	or	scrub,	typically	foraging	within	250m	of	the	nest	
in	summer	and	rarely	more	than	2km	in	winter.	In	the	summer	months	they	
rely	on	unimproved	or	rough	grassland	and	field	margins	for	the	invertebrates,	
particularly	grasshoppers	and	bush-crickets,	needed	to	feed	growing	chicks.	In	
the	winter	and	spring	they	feed	on	small	seeds	favouring	spring-sown	cereal	
crops,	particularly	barley,	and	weedy	over-winter	stubbles.	Offset	design	should	
ensure	a	suitable	mix	of	these	summer	and	winter	foraging	and	nesting	habitats,	
taking	into	account	the	local	context.	(South	Devon	Biodiversity	Offsetting	
Guidance,	October	2014:	31)	
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These	 existing	 conservation	 frameworks	 came	 to	 bear	 on	 how	 BDO	 processes	 could	
value	habitats	 lost	 through	 the	development.	 	 It	 is	 to	 the	detailed	contract	negotiation	
that	I	will	now	turn.		
6.3	Attempts	to	enact	a	biodiversity	offset	in	practice	
The	development	site	
The	 BDO	 agreement	 outlined	 below	 relates	 to	 efforts	 to	 secure	 biodiversity	
compensation	requirements	for	the	habitat	loss	associated	with	a	planning	application	to	
build	255	houses.	The	proposed	site	is	located	on	a	steeply	sloping,	ten	hectare	parcel	of	
land	 situated	 on	 a	 green	 crest	 at	 the	 north-western	 fringe	 of	 Teignmouth	 in	 South	
Devon.		Teignmouth	is	the	second	largest	town	in	the	district	with	a	population	of	15,300	
and	 growing	 demographic	 pressures	 from	 in-migration	 (Teignmouth	 Local	 Plan	 2013-
2033).	It	is	a	coastal	town	with	a	cherished	undulating	rural	green	belt	hinterland.	While	
the	 topography	 is	 celebrated	 for	 its	 natural	 beauty,	 it	 presents	 a	 severe	 restriction	 to	
expanding	urban	fringe	development	and	construction.	The	town	is	also	adjacent	to	the	
north	bank	of	 the	 river	Teign,	which	 limits	 residential	 expansion	opportunities	 further	
in-land,	 to	 the	 north	 and	west.	 These	 landscape	 features	meant	 that	 it	 was	 becoming	
increasingly	 difficult	 for	 planners	 to	 allocate	 housing	 development	 sites	 in	 practical	
locations.		
As	well	as	being	amenable	to	the	pragmatics	of	actual	construction,	proposed	sites	would	
need	 to	 balance	 a	 range	 of	 other	 features.	 For	 example,	 developments	 are	 typically	
subject	 to	 an	 assortment	 of	 ancillary	 planning	 values	 and	 conditionalties	 through	 s106	
agreements,	 such	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 affordable	 transport	 infrastructure,	 education	
facilities	and	minimum	quotas	for	affordable	housing	targets,	not	to	mention	the	spatial	
overlaps	with	 buffer	 zones	 of	 the	 SAC	 and	 SPAs.	All	 of	 these	 factors	were	 required	 to	
align	 with	 the	 commercial	 ‘viability	 assessments’	 set	 by	 the	 developers,	 which	 were	
thought	to	to	be	a	20	per	cent	profit	margin	(LPA1-SD	150714)	but	in	reality	are	entirely	
arbitrary	 and	 lacking	 transparency	 for	 the	 LPA	 (NGO1	 280116).	 The	 emphasis	 on	
developers’	 viability	 assessments	 is	 a	 central	 theme	 throughout	 this	 case	 study.	 This	
nexus	 of	 competing	 social,	 ecological	 and	 economic	 values	 and	 interests	 dramatically	
shaped	 the	 way	 that	 BDO	 unfolded	 as	 it	 hybridised	 with	 other	 assemblages	 already	
animated	in	this	setting.	The	development	site,	although	heavily	contested	by	the	local	
population,	 was	 relatively	 uncontroversial	 from	 a	 planning	 perspective.	 The	 site	 had	
been	 considered	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Strategic	Housing	 Land	Availability	 Assessment	 (2009)	
175  
and	allocated	in	the	District	Council’s	Local	Plan	for	2013-	2033	for	250	houses,	of	which	a	
minimum	of	25	per	cent	were	to	be	made	‘affordable’.		
The	 proposed	 development	 site	 lay	 at	 the	 head	 of	 a	 local	 nature	 reserve	 but	was	 also	
nearby	 to	 other	 designated	 sites	 including	one	 Site	 of	 Special	 Scientific	 Interest	 (SSSI)	
and	two	special	areas	of	conservation	(SACs).	One	SAC	was	under	a	kilometre	away	and	
another,	 ten	 kilometres	 away.	 Therefore	 the	 location	 of	 this	 development	 triggered	
statutory	 protection	 mechanisms	 associated	 with	 a	 European	 protected	 species	 and	
SANGS.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 possible	 impacts	 associated	 with	 increased	 recreational	
users	of	the	SAC	formed	the	primary	ecological	impact	concerns	for	planning	advisors	at	
Natural	England.			
The	 development	 site	 (shown	 in	 Figures	 13,	 14	 and	 15)	 is	 comprised	 of	 a	 wildflower	
grassland	hay	meadow	and	habitat	 to	a	 range	of	 invertebrates,	made	up	of	 small	 fields	
flanked	by	 traditional	hedgerows	and	winter	corn	stubble	 that	provides	habitat	 for	cirl	
buntings	that	had	been	using	it	as	a	breeding	ground.	The	plans	propose	a	green	buffer	
along	the	southern	edge	to	protect	the	amenities	of	nearby	houses	and	the	watercourses	
of	the	bordering	nature	reserve.	The	development	site	is	ringed	to	the	north	by	a	busy	B	
road	and	to	the	west	by	open	fields	and	hedgerows.		To	the	south-eastern	edge,	against	
the	outer	western	threshold	of	the	existing	town,	lie	Frobisher	woods,	a	mixed	woodland	
copse	much	loved	by	local	residents	to	which	its	very	own	Facebook	page	attests.	In	the	
Facebook	posts,	local	community	members	describe	varied	sightings	and	soundings	of	a	
variety	 of	 cherished	 species	 of	 birds,	 plants	 and	 insects	 such	 as	 greater	 spotted	
woodpeckers,	 bullfinches,	 slow	 worms	 and	 butterflies.	 The	 residents	 also	 used	 this	
facility	 to	 celebrate	 seasonal	 changes	 or	 make	 observations	 of	 particular	 species	
individuals.	 The	 site,	 in	 other	 words	 was	 a	 treasured	 green	 space	 and	 biodiversity	
habitat.		
A	 single	breeding	pair	 of	 cirl	 buntings	was	noted	during	 a	 reptile	 survey	 and	 included	
within	the	EIA	submitted	by	the	consultant	ecologist	in	February	2014.	The	RSPB	picked	
up	on	this	since	cirl	buntings	fell	under	the	RSPB’s	conservation	priorities	of	the	region.	
For	this	reason,	the	LPA	in	dialogue	with	the	RSPB,	decided	that	the	compensation	for	
the	 habitat	 impacts	 at	 this	 development	 would	 deliver	 a	 cirl	 bunting-specific	 mix	 of	
grassland	habitat.	
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Figure	13	Development	site	subject	to	offsetting	
	
Source:	From	top	clockwise,	author,	author,	Consultant	Ecologist	Ecological	Impact	Assessment	
Report
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Figure	14	Draft	development	layout	plans	
Source:	Peter	Brett	Associates	2014	
Figure	15	Baseline	habitat	mapping	and	BIA	codes	
Source:	Consultant	Ecologist	Ecological	Impact	Assessment	Report		
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The	site	had	been	owned	and	managed	since	the	1960s	by	a	consortium	of	house	builders	
called	Hallbaron	Ltd	(PC1-SD	050216).	Hallbaron	submitted	and	won	the	 initial	outline	
approval25	for	 255	 homes	 at	 a	 public	 committee	 meeting	 in	 July	 2014	 following	 an	
application	 rejection	 and	 subsequent	 appeal.	 Just	 over	 a	 year	 later,	 in	 October	 2015,	
Hallbaron	Ltd.	sold	the	land	to	Devon	County	Homes	to	actually	build	the	houses	since	
they	 had	 been	 ‘banking’	 it	 in	 preparation	 for	 obtaining	 planning	 permission	 (PC1-SD	
050216).	The	landowners	thus	sold	the	site	for	a	vastly	greater	value	than	it	would	have	
had	prior	to	achieving	this	outline	approval.	Government	guidance	(DCLG	2015)	around	
the	 post-permission	 value	 of	 land	 for	 the	 Teignbridge	 County	 provides	 a	 sale	 value	
estimate	 of	 £1,950,000	 per	 hectare.	 It	 is	 therefore	 reasonable	 to	 expect	 that	 this	 sale	
achieved	 an	 extraordinary	 market	 value	 of	 £19,500,000	 for	 the	 ten	 hectare	 parcel	 of	
development	land.	According	to	the	estimates	of	agricultural	land	value	used	as	the	basis	
for	BDO	compensation	 costs,	 the	 approximate	 value	of	 agricultural	 land	 in	 the	 county	
would	be	only	£8000/	ha	(or	£80,000	 for	 the	ten	hectare	parcel).	The	post-permissions	
value	of	the	development	land	is	approximately	250	times	that	of	land	prior	to	achieving	
residential	planning	permission.			
The	 development	 was	 subject	 to	 an	 experimental	 and	 early	 attempt	 within	 the	 LPA’s	
BDO	 pilot	 study.	 The	 s106	 agreement	 stipulating	 the	 planning	 conditions	 for	 outline	
approval	 included	clauses	 for	provisions	of	general	 financial	 sums	 in	compensation	 for	
residual	biodiversity	impacts	after	the	metric	had	been	used.	Notably,	the	total	financial	
sum	 was	 left	 open	 ended	 since	 application	 submission	 and	 award	 was	 only	 for	 the	
outline	 approval.	 The	 s106	 instead	 provided	 a	 methodology	 for	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	
final	amount	based	on	the	total	number	of	units	that	would	require	compensation.	This	
flexibility	was	possible	since	the	council	would	calculate	the	final	figure	on	a	per	hectare	
basis	 rather	 than	 the	 delivery	 of	 biodiversity	 units.	 South	 Devon’s	 BDO	 guidance	
stipulated	that	offset	compensation	may	have	to	be	delivered	to	specifically	benefit	cirl	
buntings.	The	s106	therefore	needed	to	provide	a	translation	between	biodiversity	units	
and	cirl	bunting	hectares,	further	details	of	which	are	provided	below.	The	final	unit	of	
measurement	therefore	was	a	spatial	one,	mirroring	the	species	and	wetland	mitigation	
banking	methods	in	the	US.	The	concluding	BDO	conditions	would	be	established	when	
permission	 for	 the	 reserved	 matters	 was	 granted	 and	 the	 development	 layout	 was	
																																																						
25	Outline	 approval	 refers	 to	 a	 planning	 permission	 on	 the	 general	 principles	 of	 how	 a	
site	 can	 be	 developed.	 Further	 details	 of	 layout,	 scale,	 appearance	 of	 buildings	 and	
landscaping	of	the	site	are	subject	to	conditions	that	would	require	subsequent	approval	
as	‘reserved	matters’.		
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finalised	 to	 establish	 final	 residual	 losses	 in	 terms	 of	 biodiversity	 units.	 This	 second	
planning	 application	 now	 being	 undertaken	 by	 Devon	 County	 Homes	 is	 presently	
underway	 to	 determine	 the	 final	 layout	 and	 designs,	 where	 new	 biodiversity	 offset	
calculations	will	be	completed	according	to	the	final	impacts	and	residual	losses.	I	trace	
the	layers	of	negotiation	to	arrive	at	this	BDO	outcome	in	the	sections	that	follow.		
Intractable	values:	biodiversity	offsetting	and	‘transcending	trade-offs’	
Biodiversity	offsetting	was	introduced	into	a	relatively	complex	planning	application	that	
was	 already	 entangled	 with	 a	 tightly	 woven	 nexus	 of	 competing	 value	 agendas.	 	 This	
nexus	consisted	of	contradictory	demands	on	finite	space,	time	and	developer	budgetary	
allocations.	 The	 site	 was	 considered	 essential	 for	 new	 houses	 in	 Teignmouth	 but	
planners	were	beset	with	challenges	to	account	for	various	irreconcilable	factors.	Officers	
at	the	LPA	were	trying	to	find	a	balance	between	targets	to	meet	25	per	cent	quotas	of	
affordable	housing,	sustainable	and	affordable	transport	provision,	which	did	not	overly	
compromise	 the	 existing	 green	 infrastructure	 of	 the	 site,	 developer’s	 ‘viability	
assessments’	and	also	complied	general	habitat	 impact	avoidance	and	mitigation.	BDO	
as	 a	 new	 calculative	 framework	 attributing	 financial	 values	 to	 biodiversity	 habitats	
interacted	with	these	other	considerations	in	unpredictable	ways.		
The	 size	 of	 the	 proposed	 residential	 development	 had	 already	 been	 scaled	 back	 from	
1000	 to	 255	 dwellings	 due	 to	 transport	 and	 habitat	 impact	 concerns	 on	 cirl	 buntings.	
Even	so,	the	proposal	for	the	smaller	housing	development	was	still	extremely	unpopular	
with	 the	 local	 community.	The	existing	 residents	contested	 the	development	on	 traffic	
grounds	and	the	destruction	of	unique	and	characterful	landscape	features	and	resident	
wildlife.	Yet,	this	location	represented	the	only	possible	site	for	residential	development	
in	the	town,	at	least,	for	the	time	being.		In	2012,	the	development	site	was	one	of	three	
major	 allocations	 for	 housing	 in	 the	 town,	 but	 the	 other	 two	 were	 deleted	 from	 the	
submission	to	the	 local	plan	as	they	were	considered	 ‘undeliverable’.	The	developers	 in	
their	public	board	at	a	consultation	in	2013	announced	‘TE3	is	the	substantive	deliverable	
residential	development	for	Teignmouth’	(emphasis	added)		
The	 district	 council’s	 planning	 department	 estimates	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 delivering	more	
houses	 in	 a	 difficult	 landscape	 topography	 and	 geography	 has	 simply	 been	 postponed	
until	 a	 later	 date	 (LPA2-SD	 250116).	At	 some	point,	 the	 LPA	would	need	 to	 produce	 a	
supplementary	planning	document	(SPD)	as	part	of	a	review	of	the	local	plan	2013-2033	
that	 was	 expected	 to	 outline	 the	 need	 for	 more	 land	 to	 be	 freed	 up	 for	 housing	
developments	 (LPA2-SD	250116).	 The	pressure	 for	 planners	 to	deliver	more	housing	 to	
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satisfy	the	quantitative	requirements	set	out	in	the	Strategic	Market	Housing	Assessment	
(SMHA)	 meant	 they	 were	 under	 sustained	 review	 by	 the	 planning	 Inspectorate.	 This	
external	pressure	from	central	government	came	directly	into	conflict	with	the	reality	of	
severe	physical	and	economic	planning	constraints	 in	the	 landscape.	Something	had	to	
give.		
In	 so	 far	 as	BDO	offers	mobile	 compatibilities	with	planning	 constraints	 around	other	
valued	but	non-negotiable	features	such	as	topography	and	transport	requirements,	it	is	
a	 spatial	 solution	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 ‘smooth’	 planning	 tensions	 (discussed	 in	 the	
previous	 chapter).	 For	 this	 reason	 it	 emerged	 as	 a	 resolution	 to	 ameliorate	 habitat	
concerns	in	the	context	of	limited	options	to	adjust	other	features	of	the	development.	In	
other	 words,	 biodiversity	 impacts	 are	 deemed	 resolvable	 because	 they	 can	 be	 moved	
elsewhere,	 whereas	 other	 problems,	 intrinsic	 in	 the	 location,	 cannot.	 Biodiversity	
offsetting	 is	useful	 for	planners	precisely	because	 it	abstracts,	dis-embeds	and	alienates	
biodiversity	from	land.	Offsetting	makes	nature	portable,	and	as	such,	in	a	similar	way	to	
Warwickshire,	 BDO	 acts	 as	 a	 spatial	 rationalisation	 strategy	 ‘making	 space	 for	
development’.	
	Although	BDO	is	apparently	attractive	 for	being	able	 to	 ‘transcend	 tradeoffs’	 (drawing	
on	an	expression	we	encountered	in	chapter	4),	it	nevertheless	still	makes	a	claim	on	the	
financial	resources	of	developers.	With	an	explicit	 financial	value,	BDO	is	subsequently	
now	 positioned	 along	 side	 the	 other	 ‘public	 good’	 planning	 contributions	 stipulated	
through	the	s106	agreement.	On	these	grounds,	the	landowner	Hallbaron	Ltd.	contested	
the	requisite	provision	of	 the	25	per	cent	quota	 (already	reduced	 from	50	per	cent)	 for	
affordable	 housing	 in	 light	 of	 an	 additional	 biodiversity	 offset	 compensation	 ‘burden’	
that	 had	 emerged.	 BDO	 compensation	 and	 affordable	 housing	 quotas	 now	 find	
themselves	 in	 conflict	 with	 one	 another,	 thereby	 threatening	 the	 profitability	 for	 the	
land	sale	and	development.		LPA1-SD	informed	me	that:	
They	couldn’t	come	to	a	decision	on	affordable	housing	without	full	details	of	
biodiversity	and	transport	costs,	because	those	are	the	costs	that	would	impact	
what	you	can	do	with	affordable	housing	because	of	the	viability	of	the	project.	
So,	me	and	their	consultant	had	to	try	and	come	up	with	a	way	of	satisfying	
their	biodiversity	stuff,	so	we	calculated	their	level	of	biodiversity	loss	and	we	
were	proposing	to	put	it	in	the	s106	that	they	needed	to	deliver	x	units	of	
biodiversity	and	that	could	go	up	or	down	depending	on	the	site	layout	and	the	
design	which	would	be	determined	at	reserved	matters.	They	needed	and	our	
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planning	officer	needed	some	certainty	around	how	much	that	would	cost	
otherwise	they	couldn’t	come	up	with	the	affordable	housing	figures.	(LPA1-SD	
240714)		
The	timing	at	which	BDO	is	introduced	to	the	process	is	therefore	crucial	and	but	one	of	
many	practical	 challenges.	The	LPA	officer	overseeing	 the	pilot	 told	me	 that	 if	BDO	 is	
introduced	 too	 late	 in	 the	 process	 it	 makes	 it	 easy	 for	 developers	 to	 contest	 on	 the	
grounds	of	financial	viability	targets,	which	it	seems	the	local	authorities	are	expected	to	
show	due	 concern	 for.	The	 landowner’s	 commercial	 expectations	 and	 those	of	 the	 site	
promoter	 facilitating	 the	 land	 sale	 further	 heighten	 this	 conflict.	 All	 actors	 vie	 over	
maximising	the	value	yields	of	a	finite	piece	of	land.	LPA1-SD	told	me	that:	
if	you	start	off	at	the	very	end	of	the	pipeline	and	go	up	to	the	beginning	of	the	
process	you	realise	that	so	many	of	these	problems	are	stitched	up	in	the	
agreement	between	the	site	promoter,	the	landowner	and	the	developer.	The	
landowner	has	very	high	expectations	for	what	they	can	get	for	their	
land…absolutely	outrageous	fortunes	for	doing	absolutely	nothing!	They’ve	got	
some	land	and	one	day	its	worth	£25,000	per	hectare	and	the	next	day	its	worth	
£500,000	and	the	change	in	value	has	nothing	to	do	with	anything	that	
landowner	has	done	to	the	land	but	probably	reduced	the	biodiversity	value	of	
it	in	anticipation....The	site	promoter	will	be	pushing	as	hard	as	possible	for	top	
value	for	that	land	on	behalf	of	the	landowner	and	his	own	pocket	and	suddenly	
you’ve	got	minimum	affordable	housing,	minimum	biodiversity	and	minimum	
everything	because	the	landowner	says	my	viability	can’t	afford	it!		
And	what	we’re	doing	is	tinkering	at	the	end	of	the	process	with	the	scraps.	
We’re	seen	to	be	adding	financial	burden	to	developers	because	they	haven’t	
considered	it	from	the	outset,	and	meanwhile	the	landowner	is	in	the	Bahamas!	
(LPA1-SD	240714)	
The	bottom	line	here	is	that	land	values	in	England	have	been	spiralling	for	many	years	
and	 this	 is	 arguably	what	 shapes	 the	 economics	 of	 biodiversity	 considerations	 and	 the	
ability	of	LPA’s	to	obtain	financial	sums	of	compensation.	Land	in	England	has	long	been	
treated	 as	 an	 investment	 asset	 especially	 since	 it	 dovetails	 with	 a	 hugely	 speculative	
housing	market	and	increasingly	financial	interests	in	agriculture.	Due	to	the	enormous	
economic	 value	 disparity	 between	 agricultural	 or	 other	 non-development	 and	
development	 land,	 land’s	 value	 is	 largely	 dormant	 until	 the	moment	 it	 can	 liquidated	
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through	 a	 sale,	 as	 the	 post-permission	 land	 value	 figures	 from	 DCLG	 (2015)	 provided	
above	attest.	I	return	to	this	in	the	discussion	points	of	this	chapter.		
Furthermore,	 my	 interviewee	 at	 Natural	 England	 and	 three	 separate	 LPA	 officers	
mentioned	 that	 it	 is	 not	 unusual	 for	 landowners	 to	 deliberately	 destroy	 biodiversity	
habitats	on	site	before	they	apply	for	planning	so	as	to	reduce	potential	ecological	hold	
ups	 or	 attract	 compensation	 costs.	 The	 point	 here	 is	 that	 landowners	 now	 have	 an	
explicit	economic	incentive	to	‘trash’	biodiversity	before	they	submit	a	site	for	planning	
permission.	 In	 economic	 theory	 this	 would	 be	 a	 called	 a	 ‘perverse	 incentive’	 and	
indicates	that	making	an	‘asset’	out	of	nature	to	incentivise	landowners	to	nurture	it	can	
produce	directly	 the	opposite	effect.	This	point	bears	 relevance	 to	some	of	 the	original	
rationales	 underpinning	 the	 idea	 of	mitigation	markets	 explored	 in	 chapter	 4	 through	
the	Safe	Harbour	Principle.		
Neutralising	opposition	
The	 development	was,	 and	 at	 the	 time	 of	writing	 still	 is	 fiercely	 contested	 by	 existing	
local	 residents	 on	 a	 variety	 of	 different	 grounds,	 but	 most	 strongly	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
beauty	of	 the	 landscape	and	the	mature	specimens,	diverse	species	and	rich	habitats	 it	
contains.	During	 the	 planning	 committee	meeting	 in	 July	 2014,	 the	 local	 chairman	 for	
the	 Campaign	 to	 Protect	 Rural	 England	 (CPRE)	 provided	 a	 testimony	 against	 the	
development	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 adverse	 impacts	 it	 would	 level	 on	 the	 landscape	
character:		
Building	255	houses	on	this	elevated	site	will	have	an	overbearing	dominating	
effect	on	the	landscape	and	detrimental	effect	on	the	Teign	Estuary	landscape	
and	area.	At	the	moment	the	views	across	the	Estuary	are	typical	of	the	rural	
setting.	There	is	green	crest	that	enhances	the	character	of	the	town.	The	
attractiveness	and	tranquility	of	the	Coombe	Valley	will	be	affected	by	this	large	
development.	These	unwelcome	intrusions	will	detract	from	tourism,	which	is	a	
vital	industry	in	this	area.	(Peter	Finch,	CPRE	240714)	
The	CPRE	was	not	a	lone	voice.	The	district	council’s	online	planning	document	archive	
showed	 that	 a	 total	 of	 67	 letters	 of	 objection	 and	 four	 letters	 of	 complaint	 were	
registered	 during	 official	 consultation	 period.	 The	 July	 planning	 appeal	 committee	
meeting	was	a	heated	affair,	as	local	residents	and	the	authors	of	these	objections	filled	
the	 spectator	 galleries	 at	 the	 district	 council	 offices.	During	much	 jeering,	 booing	 and	
clapping	the	Councillor	chairing	the	meeting	threatened	to	‘clear	the	gallery’	should	the	
spectators	not	quieten	down	for	proceedings	to	peacefully	play	out.		
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Towards	the	end	of	the	meeting,	in	a	somewhat	irritable	manner	the	Head	of	Planning	at	
the	 district	 council	 eventually	 shut	 down	 the	 debate	 and	 sharply	 rebuked	 an	 objector	
contesting	 the	 environmental	 impacts	 of	 the	 development.	 	 By	 drawing	 on	 the	
expression	 of	 ‘net	 gain’	 the	 planning	 official	 was	 able	 to	 assert	 definitively	 that	 there	
simply	was	no	ecological	impact.	The	promise	of	‘no	net	loss’	had	been	taken	literally	to	
nullify	 the	 actual	 loss.	 Objections	 to	 biodiversity	 loss	 were	 irrelevant	 given	 the	
agreement	 to	 perform	biodiversity	 offsetting	 through	 the	 conditional	 requirements	 for	
compensation	that	would	be	set	out	under	the	s106.	Wholly	disregarding	any	technical	
uncertainty,	 the	 Head	 of	 Planning	 illustrated	 the	 potency	 of	 NNL	 as	 conceptual	
mechanism.	 Although	 the	 committee	 meeting	 was	 allowed	 to	 run	 to	 the	 end	 where	
ecological	 evidence	 was	 disputed	 between	 parties	 throughout,	 the	 technology	 of	 ‘net	
gain’	 was	 eventually	mobilised	 as	 a	 discursive	 strategy	 by	 pressurised	 in	 situ	 decision	
makers	faced	with	intractable	complexity	of	reaching	expedient	planning	verdicts.		
The	introduction	of	a	BDO	system	that	promises	to	provide	a	measurable	way	to	deliver	
compensation	 for	 residual	 losses	 served	 to	 neutralise	 opposition	 to	 the	 biodiversity	
impacts	of	the	site.	Theoretical	expectations	of	BDO,	anticipate	that	as	a	mechanism,	it	
will	have	a	tendency	to	weaken	environmental	protections	through	offering	a	‘license	to	
trash’	through	skipping	over	the	mitigation	hierarchy	towards	compensation	if	and	when	
contexts	call	for	it	(Clough	2014).	Here	the	premise	of	the	planner’s	enthusiasm	for	BDO	
to	 smooth	 decision-making	 processes	 was	 an	 unquestioned	 faith	 in	 the	 ecological	
restoration	 science	 as	 well	 as	 a	 tendency	 to	 ignore	 the	 spatial,	 biological	 and	 social	
specificities	of	existing	habitats	under	question.		This	phenomenon	is	reflected	elsewhere	
as	the	local	branch	of	the	RSPB	described	to	me.	In	negotiation	over	the	identification	of	
sites	 for	 the	 future	delivery	of	properties	during	 the	working	up	of	 the	Local	Plan,	my	
interviewees	at	the	RSPB	told	me	the	Planning	Inspector	was	generally	‘relaxed’	towards	
the	 impacts	 of	 historic	 cirl	 buntings	 territories	 because	 he	 perceived	 that	 there	 was	
mechanism	 in	 place	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 habitat.	 They	 reported	 ‘he	
effectively	 said	 this	 is	 not	 an	 issue	 I	 need	 to	 deal	 with	 or	 be	 concerned	with	 because	
you’ve	got	an	agreed	approach	in	place.’	(NGO1-	SD	0411214).	
Biodiversity	 offsetting’s	 technicians	 and	 theoretical	 architects	 such	 as	 eftec,	 IUCN	 and	
BBOP	(described	in	chapter	4)	maintain	that	the	main	barriers	to	success	in	BDO	will	be	
judicious	 observation	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	 design	 principles	 and	 associated	
thresholds.	And	yet	 there	 is	a	disjuncture	between	the	 intended	audiences	of	 technical	
guidance	 reports	 and	 those	 that	 eventually	 take	 planning	 decisions	 over	 development	
applications.	For	the	most	part,	an	ecologist’s	 input	 into	planning	decisions	 is	no	more	
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than	advisory.	The	final	decision	rests	with	officials	from	the	planning	department	who	
are	adjudicating	between	numerous	areas	of	 social	and	environmental	planning	policy.	
Even	if	the	planning	official	was	an	expert	in	BDO	theory	and	practices,	the	temptation	
to	bend	rules	for	expedience	if	an	increasingly	costly	and	pressurised	planning	resolution	
was	proving	elusive,	is	consistent	with	the	wider	political	economy	of	planning	discussed	
throughout	this	thesis.		Taken	to	be	a	literal	negation	of	biodiversity	impact,	on	the	face	
of	 it,	 ecological	 compensation	 solves	 the	 problem	 of	 restricted	 and	 otherwise	 difficult	
locations	for	the	forward	supply	of	more	houses.		
In	 reality,	 planning	 inspectors	 and	 other	 decision	makers	 will	 be	 not	 be	 specialists	 in	
BDO	technicalities.	They	are	unlikely	even	to	have	a	superficial	grasp	of	BDO	theory	and	
its	 safeguards	 detailed	 in	 the	 technical	 literature.	 	 The	 temptation,	 as	 this	 example	
shows,	will	no	doubt	be	to	embrace	offsetting	and	no	net	loss	as	a	‘heuristically	powerful’	
(Sullivan	 2017b)	mechanism	 to	 fit	 around	 and	 facilitate	dominant	political	 agendas	 (as	
‘valuing	habitat’	was	 for	 one	of	 the	 clients	 of	 the	 sub-brokers	 outlined	 in	 the	previous	
chapter).	 Theoretical	 principles,	 protocols	 and	 thresholds	 that	 may	 be	 methodically	
worked	out	in	design	and	theory	in	practice	can	instead	be	found	to	be	characterised	by	
attrition,	slippage	and	flexibility	through	the	local	interpretation	to	fit	existing	agendas.	
This	appears	to	be	a	pertinent	theme	in	the	adoption	of	BDO	at	a	local	level	where	it	is	
re-worked	according	to	wider	network	of	factors	that	shape	it	as	a	local	hybrid.	There	is	a	
re-scaling	 issue	 from	 its	 conceptualisation	 in	 theory	 to	 interaction	 with	 other	 values	
(Ong	and	Collier	2008)	
Negotiating	values	with	the	Biodiversity	Impact	Assessment	
Corresponding	 to	 the	 negotiations	 of	 BIA	 values	 described	 in	 chapter	 5,	 the	 actors	
involved	 in	this	contract	made	adjustments	to	the	 input	scores	as	a	way	to	 fit	with	the	
wider	 economic	 and	 political	 context	 of	 the	 planning	 application.	 Mirroring	 the	
experience	 at	Warwickshire,	 these	 amendments	 derived	 from	 ecological	 incertitude	 in	
relation	to	the	baseline	habitats.	
The	 ecological	 basis	 for	 the	 development	 itself	 was	 already	 heavily	 disputed.	 Natural	
England	told	me	there	were	lots	of	holes	in	the	application	and	lots	of	aspects	that	were	
inadequate	 from	a	biodiversity	perspective.	 In	particular,	Natural	England	 felt	 that	 the	
impacts	 on	 priority	 species	 habitats	 had	 been	 overlooked,	 which	 the	 officer	 said	 was	
disappointing:		
Some	of	the	species	there	were	quite	rare	and	it	was	a	nice	mixture	of	different	
habitats	as	well,	lowland	meadow	and	woodland	and	wet	grassland	species	rich	
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meadow,	you	know	it’s	all	the	component	parts	that	forms	a	rich	habitat	
structure	and	interest.	(NE1-SD	241114)	
Although	the	BIA	scored	values	fluctuated	over	the	course	of	these	negotiations,	the	LPA	
officer	 acted	 to	 eventually	 increase	 the	 level	 of	 compensation	 the	 developer	would	 be	
liable	 for.	 Time	 was	 pressurised,	 there	 was	 just	 a	 four	 month	 window	 between	 the	
submission	 of	 the	 consultant	 ecologist’s	 latest	 ecological	 assessment	 in	 February	 2014	
(containing	 the	 BIA)	 and	 the	 planning	 appeal	 committee	meeting	 in	 July.	 	 All	 parties	
needed	to	reach	a	conclusion	over	the	biodiversity	calculations	so	that	they	could	agree	
on	 the	 final	 quotas	 for	 affordable	 housing.	 Yet	 the	 processes	 of	 translating	 ecological	
data	 from	 a	 phase	 1	 habitat	 survey	 to	 EIA	 report	 and	 finally	 into	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	
calculations	 was	 complex	 and	 messy.	 Through	 successive	 re-interpretations	 with	 the	
assistance	of	aerial	maps,	site	design	drawings	and	other	textual	inscriptions,	the	parties	
finally	 arrived	 at	 a	 set	 of	 stabilised	 values	 and	 associated	 agreement	 over	 the	 net	
biodiversity	 losses	 of	 the	 development.	 At	 least	 these	 looked	 like	 sensible	 calculations	
that	parties	could	agree	over	in	time	for	the	final	committee	meeting	in	July.		
In	contrast	 to	 the	process	at	Warwickshire	where	a	sizable	 team	of	LPA	ecologists	and	
the	resident	Environment	Bank	officer	translated	the	contents	of	the	EIA	into	the	BIA	-	
in	Devon,	the	consultant	ecologist	(CE1-SD)	undertook	this	work	in	the	first	instance.	As	
a	desk	based	exercise,	the	developer’s	ecologist	re-interpreted	the	qualitative	narrative	of	
the	 Ecology	 Report	 into	 the	 metric’s	 codes.	 Spatial	 boundaries	 of	 habitat	 type,	
distinctiveness	 and	 condition	 were	 assigned	 and	 incorporated	 into	 the	 Excel	 spread	
sheet	version	of	the	DEFRA	metric.	Significantly	simpler	than	the	equivalent	BIA	being	
used	at	 the	Warwickshire	pilot	 site,	 the	consultant	 supplied	 this	evidence	as	a	cut	and	
paste	image	of	the	spread-sheet	in	an	appendix	occupying	the	final	two	and	a	half	pages	
of	a	125	page	report	covering	the	qualitative	ecological	evidence	in	February	2014	(shown	
in	Figure	16).	Although	Devon’s	actors	did	not	refer	to	the	metric	as	the	 ‘BIA’,	 it	seems	
practical	 to	 refer	 to	 it	 as	 such	within	 this	 account	 so	 that	 it	 is	 easier	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	
Warwickshire	 and	 Devon	 cases	 comparatively.	 As	 I	 have	 already	 mentioned,	 like	
Warwickshire,	 the	 valuation	 of	 biodiversity	was	 a	 negotiated	 process.	 The	 calculations	
travelled	 through	 three	 overall	 versions	between	 the	 consultant	 ecologist	 and	 the	LPA	
before	 a	 final	 version	 was	 agreed	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 committee	 meeting.	 The	
iterative	stages	are	described	below.	
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Figure	16	Development	site	baseline	and	mitigation	calculations	included	in	the	S106	
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Source:	Consultant	Ecology	Ecological	Impact	Assessment	2013	
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Version	1	–	consultant	ecologist’s	calculations,	February	2014	
The	 first	 calculations	 performed	 by	 Hallbaron’s	 consultant	 ecologist	 presented	 the	
biodiversity	 baseline	 as	 comprising	 37.90	 units.	 As	 mitigation	 works,	 the	 consultant	
ecologist	 proposed	 the	 onsite	 creation	 of	 35.99	 units	 (the	 difference	 in	 between	 these	
two	numbers	is	the	residual	net	loss	at	1.9).	Three	hectares	of	lowland	meadow	creation	
would	act	as	this	mitigation.	Lowland	meadow	has	the	highest	distinctiveness	score,	and	
in	 the	good	 condition	 that	 they	proposed	 they	would	 create,	 offered	 the	highest	 value	
habitat	 creation	 possible.	 The	 scale	 of	 this	 proposed	 grassland	 creation	meant	 that	 in	
terms	 of	 biodiversity	 units,	 it	 would	 replace	 almost	 all	 the	 units	 that	 were	 to	 be	 lost	
through	 the	 development.	 On	 looking	 closely	 at	 the	 plans,	 the	 developer	 and	 their	
consultant	 ecologist	 had	 allocated	 practically	 every	 square	 metre	 that	 wasn’t	 a	 road,	
house	or	garden	as	a	lowland	meadow	to	act	as	biodiversity	mitigation.	LPA1-SD	found	
this	 to	be	 an	overly	 ambitious	 assessment	of	 onsite	mitigation	 and	produced	a	 second	
version.		
Version	2	-	changes	to	baseline	valuation	and	mitigation	proposal,	April	2014	
Two	months	after	receiving	the	initial	consultant	ecologist's	application,	the	LPA	made	
several	 corrections	 and	 recommendations	 in	 response.	 These	 included	 a	 marginal	
increase	 to	 the	 site’s	 overall	 biodiversity	 baseline	 and	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	 the	
number	 of	 credits	 proposed	 as	 mitigation.	 LPA1-SD	 drew	 attention	 to	 the	 incorrect	
inclusion	 of	 multiple	 condition	 step	 changes	 between	 baseline	 and	 target	 mitigation	
works.	To	assume	that	all	biodiversity	on	site	would	be	lost	(as	the	BIA	does	so)	and	then	
a	highly	distinctive	habitat	in	good	condition	could	be	created	in	five	years	was	literally	
(in	the	metric’s	terms)	a	couple	of	steps	too	far.	The	 ‘upgrading’	of	 improved	grassland	
with	a	low	condition	(score	1)	to	a	lowland	meadow	in	good	condition	(score	3)	within	a	
five-year	period	was	contrary	to	DEFRA	guidance.	Five	years	is	too	short	a	time	frame	for	
such	a	dramatic	habitat	category	improvement.		
The	 officer	made	 adjustments	 to	 the	 baseline	 through	 changing	 the	 sizes	 of	 proposed	
habitat	 impacts	as	well	as	adjusting	the	allocations	of	particular	habitat	categories.	For	
example,	the	habitat	parcel	code	SIN3	occupies	the	first	row	of	the	developer’s	calculator	
metric	 showing	a	 score	of	 22.54	units	 in	version	 1.	Under	version	2	 the	officer	 reduced	
this	baseline	score	to	15.41	mainly	through	reducing	the	overall	size	of	habitat	impacted	
(by	almost	half	a	hectare	-	0.4	ha).		Other	changes	included	corrections	to	an	erroneous	
habitat	distinctiveness	categorisations.	This	error	had	resulted	in	the	‘under-valuation’	of	
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the	 poor	 semi-improved	 grassland	 (Excel	 reference	 PSI).	 This	 correction	 served	 to	
produce	an	increase	by	8.44	baseline	units	(from	10.02	in	version	1	to	18.46	in	version	2).		
The	officer	reduced	the	proposed	mitigation	scores	by	reducing	the	distinctiveness	score	
from	(6	 to	2)	of	 the	very	 large	area	of	proposed	 lowland	meadow.	He	also	 re-classified	
the	mitigation	as	a	wildflower	lawn	with	a	moderate	condition	score	of	2	(from	good,	3).	
This	 adjustment,	 due	 to	 its	 size	 reduced	 the	 mitigation	 scores	 for	 this	 category	 from	
27.24	 to	 8.17	 units.	 Overall,	 the	 LPA	 reduced	 the	mitigation	 score	 from	 35.99	 to	 11.27	
units	from	the	first	version	submitted	in	February	to	the	second	that	was	returned	to	the	
consultants	in	April.	Meanwhile,	the	baseline	was	slightly	increased	from	37.90	units	in	
February	 to	 41.35	 units	 in	 April.	 However,	 an	 error	 that	 the	 LPA	 officer	made	 on	 the	
Excel	spread	sheet	equation	erroneously	omitted	three	of	 the	cells	of	 the	Total	column	
(noted	in	summary	Table	9	below).	Thus	the	baseline	was	mistakenly	communicated	to	
be	38.41	units	until	it	was	later	corrected	in	the	third	version	of	the	BIA.	The	omission	of	
these	 three	cells	 resulted	 in	a	 shrunken	credit	value	 to	compensate	 the	 impact	by	2.94	
units,	 which	 according	 to	 the	 pricing	 methodology	 they	 were	 using,	 could	 have	
translated	into	roughly	£30,000	of	compensation.	Overall,	the	score	changes	between	the	
first	 and	 second	 versions	made	 the	 ambitious	mitigation	measures	 look	more	 realistic	
and	comply	more	closely	with	DEFRA’s	technical	guidance	on	habitat	valuations.	
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Table	9	Summary	of	changes	to	metric	calculations	over	time	
(All	units	are	‘biodiversity	units’	unless	otherwise	noted)		
	 V1	February	2014	 V2	April	2014	 V3	July	2014	
	 	
Consultant	ecologist	
	
LPA	response	
	
Final	at	outline	
permission	
Impact	(baseline)	 37.90	 38.41		(41.35)*	 47.41	
	
Creation	
(mitigation)	
35.99	 11.27	 23.93	
Net	loss	 1.90	 27.14	 23.93	
	
Hedgerows	Net	
Gain	
-638.333	(m)	 -638.33	(m)	 -638.33	(m)	
Number	of	hectares	
supporting	habitat	
mitigation	
3.15	 2.97	 3.94	
*This	is	the	actual	value	but	the	excel	formula	had	erroneously	omitted	to	sum	cells	N14-16	
thereby	artificially	reducing	the	total	value	on	site.		
	
Version	3-	changes	to	the	baseline,	July	2014	
The	 final	 BIA	 version	 was	 agreed	 in	 July	 2014,	 immediately	 before	 the	 planning	
committee	 meeting.	 In	 this	 draft,	 the	 baseline	 value	 was	 stabilised	 to	 be	 47.41	 units.	
Although	 the	 LPA	 had	 lowered	 the	 mitigation	 scores	 between	 February	 and	 April,	
between	April	and	July	2014	(versions	2	and	the	final	version	3)	a	decision	was	taken	to	
include	 two	 additional	 parcels	 of	 land	 adjacent	 to	 the	 development	 site	 -	 a	 small	
rectangular	 field	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 development	 and	 a	 larger	 triangle	 to	 the	 west	
(observable	 in	 the	 different	 aerial	 depictions	 between	 Figures	 13	 and	 14	 and	 15).	 These	
additional	parcels	represented	an	extension	of	the	overall	mitigation	work	and	had	not	
been	allocated	within	the	original	zoned	design	of	the	Local	Plan.	The	extra	sections	of	
land	 were	 included	 so	 as	 to	 meet	 Natural	 England’s	 requirements	 for	 SANGS	 as	
compensation	 for	potential	 recreational	pressures	on	 the	nearby	SACs.	However,	 these	
supplementary	 hectares	 also	 ended	 up	 doubling	 up	 as	 BDO	mitigation	 and	 therefore	
reducing	 the	 net	 loss	 of	 the	 development	 accordingly.	 LPA1-SD	 informed	 me	 that	
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increasingly	 SANGS	 is	being	merged	with	biodiversity	offsetting	 requirements.	Natural	
England	 would	 now	 accept	 SANGs	 as	 a	 form	 of	 biodiversity	 gain	 classed	 as	 onsite	
mitigation.	 The	 two	 compensation	 requirements	 in	 combination	 were	 considered	 by	
Natural	 England	 to	 prove	 too	 punitive	 for	 developers	 (LPA1-SD	 270215).	 Natural	
England’s	consideration	for	the	developer’s	bottom	line	simply	echoes	a	comment	that	a	
Natural	 England	 officer	 made	 to	 me	 and	 reflects	 the	 wider	 political	 emphasis	 on	
economic	growth	discussed	in	chapter	4.	My	interviewee	at	Natural	England	said,	‘at	the	
moment	 there	 is	 a	 big	 emphasis	 on	 growth	 and	 as	 an	 organisation	 we	 have	 a	
responsibility	to	look	for	solutions	ensuring	that	the	environment	is	not	in	conflict	with	
that’	 (NE1-SD	 241114).The	 addition	 of	 these	 parcels	 of	 land,	 totalling	 almost	 a	 hectare,	
provided	 the	much-needed	extra	onsite	habitat	creation	of	 lowland	meadow	habitat	 to	
improve	(mitigate!)	the	now	relatively	low	mitigation	score.	The	BDO	mitigation	scores	
under	the	third	version	jumped	from	11.27	to	23.93	units.		
Within	 the	 process	 I	 have	 described,	 every	 single	 one	 of	 the	 equation’s	 attributes	
(habitat	area,	distinctiveness,	condition)	fluctuated.	Indeed,	the	format	of	the	calculator	
itself	evolved	for	improved	clarity	and	detailed	representations.	As	the	researcher	trying	
to	make	 comparisons	 across	different	 layers,	 this	made	my	 job	 tantamount	 to	 forensic	
(biodiversity)	 accounting.	 I	was	 trying	 to	 see	how	value	 translations	had	occurred	 and	
where	they	had	been	adjusted.		None	of	the	biodiversity	(baseline	nor	mitigation)	scores	
was	 a	 stable	 representation.	 As	 BIA	 versions	 progressed,	 uncertainties	 increased	 with	
each	 successive	 layer	 of	 abstraction,	 resulting	 in	massive	 flux	 to	 value	 scores.	 Yet	 the	
scores	 latterly	 appeared	 as	 scientific	 technicalities	 within	 the	 planning	 committee	
meeting	 in	 July,	 whereupon	 the	 council’s	 planning	 official	 could	 proclaim	 that	 there	
simply	 ‘was	 no	 ecological	 impact’.	 This	 development	 had	 produced	 a	 ‘net	 gain’	 for	
biodiversity	and	the	prior	negotiations	disappeared	from	view.			
In	 South	 Devon,	 BDO	 underwent	 various	 hybridisations.	 I	 have	 described	 the	 first	
whereby	 the	 mitigation	 procedures	 of	 the	 offsetting	 had	 been	 subsumed	 to	 other	
ecological	 compensation	 mechanisms	 such	 as	 SANGS.	 The	 second	 relates	 to	 ways	 in	
which	 BDO’s	 wholly	 habitat	 focus	 was	 modified	 to	 account	 for	 the	 prevalence	 of	
protected	species	requirements	in	the	area.	 	This	hybridisation	was	related	to	efforts	to	
account	for	the	RSPB’s	existing	regional	conservation	priorities.	The	overwhelming	focus	
of	these	priorities	were	on	cirl	buntings	as	a	small	farm	bird	restricted	almost	wholly	to	
this	area	of	South	Devon.	This	is	the	focus	of	the	following	section.		
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6.4	Assemblage	convergences;	making	a	biodiversity	offset	
hybrid	
The	absent	supply	side	
Like	Warwickshire,	 the	 pilot	 study	 encountered	 a	 general	 paucity	 of	 receptor	 sites.	 	A	
receptor	 site	 had	 not	 been	 secured	 during	 the	 period	 of	 fieldwork	 although	 two	 sites	
were	being	considered.		One	option	would	be	land	supplied	by	the	RSPB	and	the	other	
one	 from	 land	owned	by	 the	county	council.	The	county	council	 site	was	 the	 favoured	
candidate	but	to	be	furnished	with	RSPB	advisory	services	(LPA1-SD	270215).	The	county	
site	was	located	just	3km	to	the	north	west	of	the	development	and	was	a	grassland	and	
low	 input	 arable	 field.	 With	 some	 specific	 interventions,	 it	 offered	 potential	 for	 the	
summer	and	winter	foraging	habits	for	the	population	of	cirl	buntings.	Although	the	site	
was	council	owned,	it	was	a	tenanted	farm.	The	farmer	was	old	and	likely	to	soon	retire	
and	the	opportunity	for	a	new	lease	was	therefore	probable.	Under	these	circumstances,	
LPA1-SD	 thought	 that	 any	 new	 tenancy	 could	 be	 modified	 to	 require	 certain	 land	
management	 approaches	 specifically	 to	 benefit	 cirl	 buntings.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 county	
council	receptor	site	was	not	available,	since	the	council	itself	was	reluctant	to	commit	it	
to	a	BDO	‘in	perpetuity’.	The	LPA1-SD,	informed	me	that	it	was	probable	that	in	the	end	
the	overall	compensation	would	be	split	across	three	receptor	sites	due	to	not	being	able	
to	find	one	that	was	big	enough.		
The	LPA1-SD	had	considered	whether	the	district	council	should	themselves	be	investing	
in	land	to	provide	biodiversity	offset	credits.	The	idea	was	apparently	unfeasible.	Council	
owned	land	would	be	accounted	for	under	the	local	authority	asset	register,	and	in	times	
of	hardship	would	need	to	be	sold	(LPA1-SD	240714).	At	the	same	time,	both	the	district	
council	and	the	RSPB	say	that	it	would	be	preferable	to	own	the	land	so	that	they	would	
have	better	control	over	the	offset	delivery	process.	This	is	a	feature	of	the	arrangements	
that	 reappears	 strongly	 in	 the	 following	 case	 study	 and	 that	 other	NGOs	 encountered	
with	attempting	offsetting.	A	ready	supply	of	land	was	envisaged	to	also	help	direct	and	
deploy	 collected	 compensation	 funds	 quickly	 with	 benefits	 for	 the	 time	 lags	 between	
impact	and	gains,	in	many	ways	reflecting	the	habitat	banking	model	introduced	above	
in	chapter	5.	As	I	have	already	established,	however,	land	is	an	expensive	capital	cost	for	
the	purposes	of	conservation.	Even	if	this	 land	becomes	economically	productive	and	a	
source	of	rent	for	biodiversity	offset	markets,	there	is	a	still	a	substantial	upfront	outlay	
and	considerable	uncertainty	over	future	revenue	streams	for	biodiversity	units.		
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Regardless	of	who	actually	owned	the	land,	it	was	envisaged	that	the	RSPB	would	play	a	
central	 role.	 Indeed,	 it	 had	 been	 their	 pricing	 methodology	 developed	 through	 their	
unofficial	 form	 of	 cirl	 bunting	 compensation	 that	 had	 stood	 in	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	
other	alternative.	The	idea	was	to	translate	the	(generic	DEFRA	scored)	habitat	loss	into	
a	cirl	bunting	species-specific	gain.		
Translations	from	one	unit	to	another	
For	the	decade	prior	to	2012,	the	RSPB	had	been	developing	their	own	unofficial	version	
of	 biodiversity	 compensation	 but	 specifically	 in	 relation	 to	 cirl	 buntings.	 The	 RSPB	
wanted	 to	 ‘get	 something	 back’	 for	 cirl	 buntings	 since	 the	 incremental	 losses	 were	
leading	 to	population	 scale	 impacts	on	 the	 species	of	bird	 that	was	 in	 the	 recent	past,	
close	to	extinction.	As	such,	the	RSPB’s	priorities	for	cirl	bunting	conservation	had	been	
retained	such	that	they	were	now	morphing	with	the	BDO	approach	within	the	pilot.			
In	 the	 spirit	 of	 pragmatism	 under	 time	 constraints	 and	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 other	
available	 method	 for	 pricing	 the	 financial	 value	 of	 the	 units,	 the	 LPA	 used	 the	 RSPB	
compensation	pricing	method	(LPA-SD	270215).	The	drafting	of	a	financial	sum	in	time	
for	 the	 committee	 meeting	 in	 July	 2014	 so	 that	 it	 could	 be	 included	 within	 the	 s106	
conditions	was	urgent.	Additionally,	 the	development	 site	 described	 in	 this	 case	 study	
was	thought	to	be	being	used	by	cirl	buntings	and	a	single	pair	was	picked	up	during	a	
reptile	survey	in	the	consultant	ecologists’	EIA	(but	invisible	to	the	generic	abstractions	
of	the	BIA).	The	RSPB	were	therefore	eager	to	ensure	that	compensation	would	directly	
benefit	the	species	(if	not	the	individuals	to	be	affected).		
As	 such,	 in	conjunction	with	 the	RSPB,	 the	LPA	agreed	 that	 the	 ‘residual	 loss’	of	23.93	
biodiversity	units	 to	be	delivered	 as	 an	offset	would	be	 compensated	with	 cirl	 bunting	
specific	 agricultural	 grassland.	 The	 trouble	was	 -	 how	 to	make	 ‘biodiversity	 units’	 into	
‘cirl	bunting	units’	 for	the	practical	purposes	of	costing	the	compensation?	How	does	a	
biodiversity	 unit	 become	 equivalent	 to	 one	 hectare	 of	 cirl	 bunting	 habitat?	 The	 value	
fields	 were	 incommensurable	 and	 the	 methodologies	 of	 calculation	 were	 entirely	
different.	Much	like	the	single	attribute	of	acreage	currencies	used	in	wetland	mitigation	
banking	 in	 the	US,	 cirl	 bunting	 compensation	 relies	wholly	 on	 spatial	 area	 (ha)	 as	 the	
primary	unit.	This	measurement	stands	in	contrast	to	the	DEFRA	metric’s	compounding	
of	generic	habitat	indicators	of	distinctiveness	and	condition	that	are	then	multiplied	by	
spatial	area.		
194  
The	translation	process	highlighted	in	the	s106	text	stipulates	that	one	biodiversity	unit	
is	proposed	to	translate	to	0.14	cirl	bunting	hectares.	Conversely,	one	cirl	bunting	hectare	
is	 worth	 6.9	 (grassland)	 DEFRA	 biodiversity	 units.	 The	 development	 was	 thought	 to	
produce	a	residual	loss	of	23.93	units	of	grassland,	as	the	third	version	of	the	negotiated	
scores.	The	compensation	requirements	in	the	cirl	bunting	hectares	therefore	translated	
into	3.46ha.	The	workings	are	shown	in	the	equation	below.	
0.14	cirl	bunting	hectares	=	1	biodiversity	unit		
or		
1.0	cirl	bunting	hectare	=	6.9	biodiversity	units	
∴	
23.93	biodiversity	units	/	6.9	biodiversity	units	=	3.46	cirl	bunting	hectares	
In	 some	 respects,	 it	 was	 simply	 pragmatic	 for	 the	 LPA	 to	 incorporate	 elements	 of	 a	
calculative	and	habitat	costing	approach	that	had	been	under	development	since	2005.	
But	 the	 RSPB	 had	 their	 own	 reasons	 for	 amalgamating	 their	 approach	 with	 DEFRA’s.	
Conservation	 officers	 at	 the	 NGO	 were	 extremely	 concerned	 about	 the	 risks	 to	 their	
established	 conservation	 priorities	 for	 cirl	 buntings.	 The	DEFRA	metric,	 being	 habitat	
focussed,	 simply	did	not	 ‘see’	or	 value	cirl	buntings	as	 a	 species.	What’s	more,	 since	 it	
functioned	 by	 subsuming	 habitat	 mosaics	 and	 diversity	 into	 a	 single	 number	 and	
permitted	 the	 replacement	 of	 alternative	 types	 of	 habitat	 for	 the	 equivalent	 numerical	
value	 (see	 commensuration	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter),	 any	 specific	 focus	 on	
directed	 conservation	 priorities	 of	 species	 would	 be	 lost.	 The	 RSPB	 anticipated	 that	
should	 BDO	 be	 adopted	 as	 a	 new	 conservation	 standard,	 the	 cirl	 bunting	 habitat	
specificities	would	disappear	within	a	habitat	offset	that	was	completely	unrelated	to	the	
birds’	needs	but	instead	emphasised	perceived	equivalent	numeric	values.		
Cirl	 bunting	 habitat	 is	 comprised	 of	 particular	 patterns	 of	 shrub	 and	 stubble	 crop	
formation,	 adequate	 open	 space	 and	 distance	 from	 residential	 areas	 (LPA1-SD	 201113).	
None	of	 these	peculiarities	would	appear	as	 input	or	output	values	on	the	BDO	metric	
nor	 would	 be	 captured	 by	 generic	 habitat	 types.	 	 As	 such,	 the	 RSPB	 enthusiastically	
engaged	with	 the	 local	DEFRA	 pilot	 study	 so	 that	 they	would	 be	 ‘at	 the	 table’	 and	 to	
ensure	 that	 the	 introduction	 of	 BDO	 did	 not	 weaken	 their	 existing	 work	 with	 cirl	
buntings.	 The	 RSPB	 were	 at	 pains	 to	 emphasise	 that	 their	 enrolment	 to	 the	 BDO	
approach	was	simply	a	 ‘pragmatic’	response	to	a	political	situation	largely	unfavourable	
to	 protected	 species	 conservation	 designations.	 They	 discussed	 how	 Ramsar	 sites	 and	
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SSSI’s	are	frequently	built	over	anyway	with	little	recourse	to	meaningful	compensation	
or	 political	 will	 to	 observe	 protection	 policies.	 	 In	 general	 terms,	 my	 interlocutors	 at	
RSPB	 were	 not	 in	 favour	 of	 compensation	 at	 all	 since	 it	 simply	 indicated	 that	 the	
planning	system	was	failing	to	meet	biodiversity	commitments	through	meaningful	land	
planning	and	protection.	The	individuals	I	spoke	with	at	the	RSPB	felt	nevertheless,	that	
this	was	the	only	option	to	get	‘something	good	for	cirl	buntings’.	With	this	in	mind	they	
were	very	 clear	 that	 they	were	not	 administering	 the	 compensation	money,	nor	would	
the	developer	be	‘passing	a	brown	envelope’	to	the	RSPB.		
Even	 so	 my	 respondents	 also	 questioned	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 their	 existing	 offsetting	
system	as	they	had	received	so	little	actual	funding	to	date.	They	said		
If	the	approach	works	and	it	is	effective	then	there	should	be	no	net	impact,	but	
it	is	a	big	if…	so	we	taking	a	bit	of	a	leap	of	faith,	but	as	I	said	our	reality	is	that	
in	the	absence	of	this	sort	of	approach	the	development	would	proceed	anyway,	
and	cirl	buntings	would	lose	out.	(RSPB-SD	241114)	
‘Problems	of	measurement’	and	pricing	the	offset	
Valuation	 begins	 with	measurement	 and	 classification	 -	 what	 Bowker	 and	 Star	 (2000)	
call,	 ‘sorting	 things	out’	 so	as	 to	 isolate	within	dynamic	ecological	 assemblages	 ‘who	 is	
doing	 what	 to	 whom’	 (Yusoff	 2011).	 In	 this	 respect,	 Robertson	 (2000)	 discusses	 the	
difficulties	 regulators	 faced	 in	 settling	 over	 what	 exactly	 constituted	 a	 ‘wetland’	 as	 a	
stabilised	 category	 against	 which	 a	 standard	 spatial	 area	 of	 wetland	 could	 be	 made	
coherent.	 In	 this	 example	 with	 cirl	 buntings,	 ecologists	 and	 planning	 officers	 faced	
similar	problems	in	seeking	agreement	over	what	exactly	could	be	defined	as	one	hectare	
of	cirl	bunting	habitat.	
Like	an	Excel	spread	sheet,	neat	boundaries	are	fundamental	to	the	calculative	drive	of	
BDO.	 So	 as	 to	 be	 calculated,	 something	must	 first	 be	 calculable.	 Callon	 and	Muniesa	
(2005:	 14)	 propose	 that	 this	 process	 entails	 the	 singularisation	 of	 goods	 through	 their	
‘extraction,	 translation	 and	 (re)formatting’.	 As	 Callon	 argues,	 goods	 involved	 in	
calculations	 must	 be	 disentangled	 and	 framed	 (2006:	 186	 emphasis	 added).	 Castree	
(2008)	 labels	 this	 process	 individuation	 and	 is	 central	 to	 commodification.	 The	
production	of	 framed	or	 individuated	units	 subject	 to	being	quantified,	monitored	and	
rendered	 equivalent	 to	 other	 one-hectare	 units	 elsewhere	 is	 therefore	 essential	 to	 the	
making	of	a	market	good	out	of	habitat.	The	LPA’s	draft	cirl	bunting	approach	informed	
by	 the	 RSPB	 seeks	 to	 eventually	 aggregate	 enough	 single	 hectare	 compensation	
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payments	to	create	an	entire	habitat	for	a	cirl	bunting	pair.	But	first	the	substantive	units	
must	be	established.	The	economic	framing	requires	suppressing	inconvenient	scientific	
uncertainties.	In	an	interview,	the	local	planning	officer	notes:		
There	are	question	marks	as	to	what	the	trigger	is	for	that	one	hectare.	A	
breeding	territory	is	a	250m	radius	from	a	singing	male,	who	will	generally	be	
singing	fairly	near	or	within	a	250m	radius	of	his	nest.	The	problem	is	that	when	
you	record	him,	he	may	be	on	the	250m	mark	away	from	his	nest.	We	then	put	
a	theoretical	250m	buffer	zone	around	this	singing	male	and	say	that	is	his	
breeding	territory.	A	250m	radius	creates,	I	think	it’s	about	a	19	or	21-hectare	
area,	so	if	you	lose	five	per	cent	of	that	area	that	equates	to	about	1	hectare.	
(LPA1-SD	201113)		
The	 pricing	methodology	 for	 the	 offset	was	 therefore	 based	 on	 hectares	 gained	 rather	
than	 the	delivery	of	biodiversity	units.	The	 s106	 agreement	outlines	 the	 financial	 costs	
associated	with	the	per	hectare	compensation	for	cirl	buntings:	
The	biodiversity	offsetting	contribution’	means	the	financial	contribution	of	
£61,475	per	hectare	of	habitat	(or	pro	rata	where	less	than	a	full	ha	is	required)	
to	provide	compensatory	alternative	off	site	habitat	in	accordance	with	
paragraph	6	of	the	Third	Schedule.	(S106	October	2014:	4)			
The	cirl	bunting	offsetting	process	developed	by	the	RSPB	valued	compensatory	habitat	
to	be	£61,475	per	hectare	for	breeding	pair	of	cirl	buntings.	The	local	authority	draft	cirl	
bunting guidance	 furnished	 by	 the	 RSPB	 advice	 sought	 to	 aggregate	 the	 spatial	 units	
(single	 hectares)	 of	 loss	 over	 time	 in	 order	 to	 pool	 the	 funds	 to	 create	 a	 larger	 cirl	
bunting	nature	 reserve	elsewhere	 to	be	delivered	 in	partnership	with	 the	RSPB	 (LPA1.1	
Nov	2013).	The	RSPB	cirl	bunting	calculations	did	not	include	risk	multipliers	but	if	they	
had	 been,	 they	 would	 have	 likely	 resulted	 in	 a	 much	 higher	 figure	 than	 £61,475	 by	
reflecting	the	temporal	disjuncture	between	habitat	loss	and	creation.		
Various	 cost	 lines	make	 up	 the	 total	 figure	 of	 £61,475/	 cirl	 bunting	 hectare.	 The	 sum,	
however,	 reflects	 the	 average	between	 two	plausible	 scenarios,	one,	which	necessitates	
land	 purchase,	 and	 the	 other	 that	 doesn’t.	 The	 annual	 habitat	 management	 costs	 for	
either	scenario	hover	around	£2,500	a	year.	 	This	includes	nine	days	of	council	time	for	
monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 along	 with	 various	 landscape	 management	 works	 such	 as	
hedge	laying	every	eight	years	and	other	general	management,	grass	topping	and	cereal	
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planting.	 In	 seeking	 to	 adhere	 to	 a	 principle	 of	 ‘in	 perpetuity’	 such	 that	 the	
compensation	 money	 achieved	 for	 this	 single	 hectare	 is	 not	 stripped	 over	 time	 to	
manage	the	annual	costs,	the	LPA	devised	a	financialised	means	of	procuring	an	annual	
flow	of	income	as	interest	on	a	capital	sum	as	an	endowment.	The	capital	sum	deemed	
necessary,	 based	on	 the	 assumption	of	 a	 five	per	 cent	 return	 (amounting	 to	 £2560	per	
annum)	was	extrapolated	to	£52,600.	In	a	scenario	that	required	the	soliciting	of	land	in	
the	 first	place,	 there	would	also	be	 the	price	of	 the	 land,	 legal	 fees	and,	 the	 initial	up-
front	 costs.	 	 Buying	 land	would	 cost	 an	 additional	 roughly	 £15,000	made	 up	 from	 the	
market	value	of	agricultural	land	(£8000),	solicitor’s	fees	and	council	staff	time.		
The	 two	 cost	 scenarios	 for	 a	 single	 hectare	 of	 cirl	 bunting	 habitat	 are	 either	 £52,600	
(without	 land	 purchase)	 or	 £70,349	 (with	 land	 purchase).	 The	 figure	 of	 £61,475	 is	 the	
average	of	the	two	sums	since	the	absence	of	identified	offset	sites	means	it	is	often	not	
known	whether	land	will	need	to	be	purchased	for	the	purpose.	The	RSPB	put	together	
this	calculation	for	compensation	per	cirl	bunting	hectare	in	2005.	The	sum	calculations	
were	 based	 on	what	 they	 felt	 it	would	 cost	 them	 to	 buy	 land	 for	 cirl	 bunting	 habitat,	
make	 capital	 improvements	 and	 manage	 it	 going	 forward.	 More	 recently,	 during	 the	
BDO	 pilot	 period,	 the	 overall	 figure	 was	 increased	 to	 £72,000	 as	 the	 original	 value	 of	
£61,475	was	not	inflation	adjusted.	
Emerging	tensions	between	different	conservation	compensation	frameworks	
The	 divergences	 in	 these	 alternative	 regulatory	 frameworks	 (BDO,	 SANGS	 and	 EU	
Habitats	 Regulations)	 and	 associated	 environmental	 ‘goods’	 to	 which	 they	 correspond	
triggered	a	core	 tension	 in	 the	valuation	process.	Since	BDO	mitigation	activities	were	
encapsulated	 under	 SANGs,	 the	 land	 provided	 needed	 to	 be	 directly	 adjacent	 to	 the	
development	 so	 that	 it	 constituted	 practical	 alternative	 green	 space	 that	 the	 new	
residents	 could	 use.	And	 yet,	 in	 our	 interview,	 the	RSPB	 emphasised	 that	 cirl	 bunting	
compensation	needs	 to	 be	 located	offsite	 and	 entirely	 separate	 from	 the	 development.	
The	RSPB	proposed	there	is	no	evidence	of	effective	on-site	mitigation	for	cirl	buntings	
apart	from	in	very	rare	cases	with	‘an	awful	lot’	of	RSPB	support	(RSPB1-SD	241114).	Prior	
experience	has	 shown	 that	 cirl	 buntings’	 habitat	 needs	 can	not	 be	 reconciled	with	 the	
needs	of	 the	human	population	given	 that	 they	have	 come	 to	depend	on	 corn	 stubble	
fields	 in	 arable	 landscapes.	 Furthermore,	 they	 often	 suffer	with	 dog	 and	 cat	 predation	
from	 local	 residential	 populations	 (RSPB1-SD	 241114).	 This	 issue	 was	 emphasised	 by	 a	
principal	planning	officer	at	the	district	council,	who	suggested	that	for	BDO	to	work	for	
cirl	bunting,	the	offsets	would	need	to	be	far	enough	away	from	all	development,	to	save	
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them	 from	 encroaching	 urbanisation	 over	 the	 years.	 The	 tensions	 between	 onsite	
mitigation	and	urban	development	are	likely	to	be	felt	in	other	ways	too	that	will	likely	
bare	 relevance	 for	 policy	 efforts	 to	 enforce	 the	 mitigation	 hierarchy.	 Frequently	 the	
biological	 needs	 of	 non-human	 populations	 are	 incommensurate	 with	 the	 aesthetic	
preferences	of	human	populations:	
The	RSBP	agree	that	small	patches	of	on-site	stuff	don’t	necessarily	guarantee	
the	viability	of	that	species	because	of	the	highly	specific	way	that	habitats	have	
to	be	managed	to	benefit	them.	So,	you	need	rough	tussocky	grasslands	that	are	
invertebrate	rich	with	shaggy	fat	tall	hedges,	and	that	doesn’t	really	look	nice	in	
a	new	development!	(LPA1-SD	201113)	
6.5	Discussion		
Following	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 pilot	 study,	 South	 Devon	 has	 retained	 BDO	 as	 an	
approach	saying	that	the	‘processes	and	tools	remain	a	valuable	mechanism	for	securing	
biodiversity	 compensation	 under	 planning	 policy’	 (South	 Devon	 Guidance	 on	 BDO	
October	 2014).	 Valuable	 as	 the	mechanism	may	 be,	 or	 indeed	may	 become	 (given	 the	
overall	paucity	of	actual	offset	arrangements	during	the	pilot)	more	than	anything,	this	
case	 study	 has	 illustrated	 how	 difficult	 it	 can	 be	 to	 ground	 BDO	 in	 some	 contexts,	
especially	where	it	collides	with	existing	arrangements.		
In	comparison	with	Warwickshire,	Devon	struggled	to	establish	BDO	more	widely	in	the	
district	and	county	council	planning	processes	and	therefore	enact	BDO	in	practice.	The	
chapter	 opened	 by	 considering	 the	 context	 of	 the	 pilot	 site.	 It	 followed	 the	 unique	
arrangement	of	actors	there	and	much	like	the	previous	case	study,	identified	the	work	
that	one	individual,	through	a	belief	in	the	prospect	of	BDO	to	deliver	better	biodiversity	
outcomes,	 largely	pushed	things	forward.	Perhaps	an	important	difference	between	the	
sites	was	the	institutional	context	and	relative	authority	of	the	actors	leading	the	pilots.	
The	South	Devon	pilot	was	being	driven	at	the	district	council	level	and	not	by	the	Head	
of	 Ecology	 at	 the	 county	 council,	 with	 implications	 for	 the	 associated	 respective	
influence	that	these	two	positions	might	wield.				
In	 conclusion,	 this	 chapter	 highlights	 five	 significant	 findings	 for	 the	 development	 of	
BDO	 and	 making	 of	 biodiversity	 values	 within	 local	 government	 processes	 detailed	
below.		
1. Re-scaling	and	muddling	through:	the	incongruities	between	the	idealism	and	
realism	of	BDO	
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Ong	 and	 Collier	 (2008)	 propose	 that	 ‘global	 forms’	 are	 rather	 articulations	 of	 specific	
situations	and	territorialised	assemblages	since	they	are	comprised	of	collective	material	
and	 discursive	 relationships	 here.	 As	 a	 socio-technical	 practice	 that	 depends	 on	 the	
coming	 together	of	many	different	 things	at	once,	 this	 case	 study	 illustrates	how	BDO	
collides	 with	 other	 assemblages	 in	 specific	 circumstances	 and	 sparks	 situated	
enactments.	 The	 hybrid	 arrangements	 belie	 efforts	 to	 standardise	 biodiversity	 values	
under	offsetting	and	therefore	compromise	the	development	of	biodiversity	accounting	
frameworks.		As	Li	(2014:	589)	has	noted	in	respect	to	the	assembling	of	land	as	resource,	
‘it	 can	wax	and	wane	or	morph	as	 technologies	 are	 added,	 values	 change	and	material	
qualities	shift’.	This	chapter	has	highlighted	some	of	the	in	situ	aspects	that	shaped	how	
BDO	and	the	values	of	biodiversity	were	made	in	practice	at	a	local	site	with	anomalous	
features.	 The	 fissures	 that	 this	 re-scaling	 opens	 up,	 point	 toward	 the	 incongruence	
between	 the	 ideal	 of	 BDO	 and	 local	 realities	 in	 which	 it	 must	 ground	 itself.	 This	
disjuncture	 subsequently	 leads	 to	various	 forms	of	hybrids,	or	as	Deleuze	and	Guattari	
(1987:	157)	articulate,	‘monstrous	crossbreeds’	on	which	I	expand	in	the	discussion	below.		
This	incongruence	pertains	also	to	the	disjuncture	between	the	theoretical	and	idealised	
frames	of	the	 ‘green’	economy,	and	actors’	motivations	for	embracing	BDO	as	a	market	
based	instrument	in	the	first	place.	In	Devon,	actors	in	the	LPA	and	wildlife	NGOs	were	
enrolled	 into	 the	 assemblage,	 but	 their	 reasons	 for	 becoming	 so	 were	 grounded	 in	 a	
pragmatic	 sense	 of	muddling	 through,	 of	 ‘making	 the	 best	 of	 a	 bad	 situation’.	 For	 the	
RSPB,	this	meant	joining	in	with	BDO	simply	not	to	be	‘left	out’	and	so	actors	within	the	
NGO	could	monitor	the	implications	of	the	new	approach	for	their	existing	conservation	
priorities	 and	 strategies.	 In	 so	 far	 as	 the	 logic	 of	 BDO	 is	 reproduced,	 sometimes	
unwittingly,	 actors	 here	 adopted	 and	 reproduced	 BDO’s	 substantive	 logics	 as	
‘economists	‘in	the	wild’	(Callon	and	Rabeharisoa	2003).	While	they	adopted	a	valuation	
rhetoric	uncritically,	actors	were	governed	by	the	organisational	values	of	their	specific	
context	 as	 well	 as	 normative	 objectives	 or	 professional	 ambitions	 (this	 is	 something	 I	
further	 develop	 in	 the	 following	 chapter	 in	 the	 Thameslink	 Programme).	 They	
sometimes	subverted	BDO’s	arrangements	to	advance	their	own	existing	agendas,	as	we	
saw	 the	 RSPB	 had	 successfully	managed	 to	 do	 with	 their	 cirl	 bunting	 strategy.	 These	
findings	 are	 significant	 because	 they	 show	 how	 BDO	 assembles	 through	 its	 ability	 to	
enrol	of	new	people	into	its	arrangements,	whether	or	not	they	believe	in	it	as	a	model.		
2. Making	a	hybrid	currency	and	building	bridges	between	units:	choosing	between	
habitats,	species	and	‘biodiversity’	units	
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As	well	as	the	unique	attributes	of	its	arrangements,	this	case	study	has	illustrated	how	
BDO	 in	 South	 Devon	 collided	 with	 existing	 conservation	 assemblages	 in	 relation	 to	
priorities	 for	 specific	 species	 and	other	EU	habitat	 regulations	 statutory	policies	under	
SANGS.		Biodiversity	values	are	thus	shaped	by	arrangements	at	local	sites.	Anna	Tsing	
(2015:	162)	has	recently	argued	that	‘the	units	one	uses	depends	on	the	story	one	wants	to	
tell’.	 In	 chapter	 2,	 I	 outlined	 some	 of	 the	 unit	 abstractions	 that	 function	 as	 ordering	
practices	 structuring	 the	 knowledge	 and	 practices	 of	 biodiversity	 conservation.	 These	
units	 include	 categories	 of	 habitats,	 species,	 or	 biological	 records	 of	 individuals	 as	
numbers	 in	 databases.	 Even	 the	 term	 ‘biodiversity’	 is	 its	 own	 meta	 unit	 or	 category	
(Maier	2012).	So	as	 to	observe	 the	effects	of	 these	 framings,	Fredriksen	 (2017)	helpfully	
labels	 the	 units	 comprising	modern	 conservation	 science	 and	practice	 as	 biodiversity’s	
‘non-market’	values,	but	semiotic	values	all	the	same	(c.f.	Graeber	2001).	In	chapter	2,	I	
discussed	scholarship	that	has	identified	how	these	non-market	values	predispose	their	
translation	into	market	values	reflected	in	price	(Turnhout	et	al.	2014,	Fredriksen	2017).	
Indeed,	the	first	steps	of	the	practical	process	of	making	a	commodity	are	its	abstraction	
to	 units,	 which	 can	 subsequently	 undergo	monetary	 pricing	 (Robertson	 2007,	 Castree	
2008,	Kosoy	and	Corbera	2010,	Pawliczek	and	Sullivan	2011).		
In	this	chapter,	we	encountered	complexities	in	constructing	BDO’s	unit	abstractions	in	
ways	 that	 bring	 Tsing’s	 (2015)	 observation	 to	 life.	 Habitat	 units	 collided	 with	 species	
units	 in	 the	 making	 of	 ‘biodiversity	 units’.	 So	 as	 to	 accommodate	 the	 conservation	
priorities	 of	 cirl	 buntings	 as	 a	 ‘flagship’	 species,	 the	 LPA	 officers	 overseeing	 the	 pilot	
enacted	 a	 unit	 translation	 from	 habitats	 to	 species.	 In	 order	 for	 the	 habitat-species	
currency	 hybrid	 to	 function,	 the	 users	 of	 the	 metric	 interpreted	 and	 translated	
biodiversity	units	(based	on	the	equation	for	habitat	hectares	made	up	of	generic	habitat	
attributes	 x	 spatial	 area)	 into	 cirl	 bunting	 habitat	 hectares	 (specific	 to	 species).	 As	
described	 in	chapter	4,	habitat	hectares	under	the	DEFRA	model	produces	biodiversity	
‘units’	 through	 a	 compound	 of	 generic	 habitat	 attributes	 and	 acts	 as	 a	 ‘coarse	 filter’	
(Kiesecker	et	al.	2009,	Treweek	et	al.	2009).		
DEFRA	recognises	that	the	metric	cannot	account	for	species,	nor	was	it	ever	supposed	
to.	 And	 yet	 the	 question	 over	 what	 LPA’s	 and	 developers	 should	 do	 on	 encountering	
protected	species	was	an	issue	that	remained	unresolved	following	the	pilot	period.	This	
issue	was	noted	by	pilot	stakeholders	at	various	stages	along	the	way,	 for	example	at	a	
mid	 pilot	 term	 meeting	 between	 the	 participants	 and	 DEFRA,	 and	 also	 in	 the	 final	
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evaluation	report	that	was	submitted	to	DEFRA	in	2014	and	eventually	released	in	April	
2016	(Baker	et	al.	2014a).		
	Given	 the	 level	 of	 technical	 and	 abstract	 fudging	 and	 overall	 ‘muddling	 through’	 we	
have	seen	the	application	of	the	BDO	metric	entails,	one	can	only	imagine	the	difficulties	
associated	with	developing	a	metric	that	simultaneously	values	the	generic	attributes	of	
habitat	 as	 well	 as	 the	 specific	 ones	 for	 particular	 ‘flagship’	 species.	 Indeed,	 economic	
sociologists	 have	 discussed	 the	 fallibilities	 of	 accounting	 systems	 that,	 through	 their	
drive	 to	 internalise	 everything,	 unavoidably	 create	 new	 outsides,	 in	 practices	 of	
‘perpetually	 incomplete’	 accounting	 (Lohmann	 2009).	 Should	 these	 two	 units	 be	
combined	 under	 one	 valuation	 technology	 or	 should	 they	 be	 separated?	 If	 they	 are	
separate,	how	should	users	decide	which	one	to	use	and	when?	In	chapter	4,	I	illustrated	
that	the	metric	was	designed	to	forge	a	compromise	between	pragmatism	and	precision.	
The	combination	of	 two	different	scales	of	units	would	require	an	even	more	technical	
methodology,	 different	 or	 incompatible	 exchange	 rules	 and	 even	more	 value	 inputs	 to	
the	 equations,	 ultimately	 only	 serving	 to	make	 the	 calculations	more	 complicated	 and	
unwieldy.	It	would	also	likely	result	in	further	scope	for	interference	and	adjustment	to	
the	 valuation	 scores	 by	 actors	 seeking	 expedient	 outcomes.	 There	 is	 thus	 an	 apparent	
tension	between	these	conservation	frameworks	that	‘see’	and	therefore	‘value’	different	
bits	of	and	(given	the	hierarchy	of	regulatory	frames)	prior	 ‘worths’	of	biodiversity.	The	
tension	reflects	one	aspect	of	the	arbitrary	 ‘cuts’	to	nature	(Apsotolopoulou	and	Adams	
2017)	that	BDO	performs	so	as	to	produce	a	value	for	biodiversity	by	actors,	in	practice.		
It	is	perhaps	apposite	to	reflect	briefly	on	other	value	assemblages	that	have	historically	
shaped	 conservation	 priorities.	 Some	 of	 these	 priorities	 value	 particular	 aspects	 of	
biodiversity,	or	various	species	over	others.	 Jamie	Lorimer	(2006)	 for	example,	 through	
exploring	the	history	of	the	UKBAP	framework,	and	the	framing	assemblages	of	which	it	
is	 itself	 composed,	 illuminates	 the	 contingent	 history	 of	 these	 extant	 biodiversity	
hierarchies	 that	 have	 stabilised	 within	 English	 conservation	 policies	 and	 traditions.	
Lorimer	 notes	 that	 the	 various	 taxa	 of	 the	 UK’s	 biodiversity	 are	 valued	 and	 generate	
unequal	conservation	attention	due	to	what	he	refers	to	as	the	‘grooving’	of	institutional	
imbalances	and	scientific	capacities	in	their	favour	(ibid.).	Some	species	have	historically	
been	more	detectable	and	thus	visible	to	surveying	and	data	collection,	others	have	been	
historically	 privileged	 due	 to	 their	 charisma	 (ibid.).	 Might	 the	 pragmatism	 of	 the	
habitat’s	 ‘coarse	 filter’	 therefore	 ‘groove’	 the	 direction	 of	 English	 conservation	 towards	
the	values	of	the	metric,	at	the	expense	of	other	species,	taxa	or	habitat	blends?			
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Lorimer’s	 insights	 are	 significant	 to	 this	 case	 study	 given	 the	 role	 of	 the	 RSPB	 in	 the	
process.	Conservation	NGOs,	Lorimer	argues,	tend	to	be	single	taxa	focused,	and	as	such,	
shape	conservation	priorities	(and	consequently	the	production	of	material	landscapes).	
NGO’s	use	their	‘strength	and	power’	to	champion	a	particular	species	which	is	reflected	
in	 conservation	 policy	 (Lorimer	 2006).	 It	 is	 this	 disproportionate	 attention	 that	 some	
species	 and	 taxa	 receive	 over	 others	 that	 prompts	 Lorimer	 to	 ask,	 ‘what	 about	 the	
nematodes?’		Indeed,	this	preoccupation	with	a	particular	species	in	conservation	value,	
and	the	translation	above	from	generic	biodiversity	units	into	cirl	bunting	units	reflects	
the	 wider	 inconsistencies	 and	 fallacies	 of	 equating	 specific	 species	 as	 proxies	 for	
biodiversity	more	generally	(Maier	2012).	The	tensions	over	the	appropriate	surrogate	to	
use	so	as	to	standardise	conservation	values	and	associated	actions	are	yet	to	be	resolved.	
These	 tensions	 are	 also	 indicators	 of	 the	 somewhat	 precarious	 and	 arbitrary	 basis	 on	
which	BDO	is	founded	and	is	enacted	and	adapted	by	users	in	situ.		
3. Conflicted	interests,	regulatory	oversight	and	institutional	arrangements	 
The	prospects	for	embracing	a	technical	metric	in	efforts	to	rationalise	decisions	over	the	
disposal	 of	 biodiversity	 must	 crucially	 be	 reviewed	 and	 assessed	 in	 light	 of	 the	
institutional	arrangements	in	which	it	is	used	(Walker	et	al.	2009,	Muradian	et	al.	2013).	
The	 majority	 of	 users	 will	 first	 and	 foremost	 be	 consultant	 ecologists	 in	 service	 to	
developers	as	 their	benefactors	and	clients.	Several	of	my	 interlocutors	noted	 the	well-
known	conflicts	of	interest	that	this	facet	of	conservation	through	planning	opens	up.	As	
consultants	under	contract	to	a	developer,	it	is	perhaps	unsurprising	that	the	net	impact	
and	mitigation	scores	are	being	‘calculated’	to	minimise	residual	losses	and	thus	financial	
compensation	 requirements	 for	 their	 clients.	 The	 LPA	 officer	 in	 this	 case	 study	 spent	
considerable	time	working	through	and	moderating	the	ambitious	mitigation	scores	the	
developer	 had	 proposed.	 But	 this	was	 a	 pilot	 experiment	 and	 not	 therefore	 a	 ‘normal’	
condition	for	a	planning	application.	As	such,	the	planning	case	was	given	very	detailed	
attention,	and	arguably	far	more	than	an	average	planning	case	would	normally	receive.	
It	 is	 hard	 to	 see	 how	 biodiversity	 officers	 and	 ecologists	 at	 LPAs,	 (who	 are	 already	
extremely	 time	poor)	will	have	capacity	 to	oversee	or	 scrutinise	metric	calculations	 for	
multiple	 developments	 as	 they	 come	 through	 the	 planning	 process.	 This	 case	 study	
illustrates	that	such	inspection,	nonetheless,	will	be	necessary	so	as	moderate	unrealistic	
BIA	scores.	
DEFRA	 envisaged	 that	Natural	 England	would	 provide	 independent	 oversight	 of	 these	
BDO	processes.	Although	in	South	Devon,	Natural	England	admitted	that,	even	after	the	
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end	of	the	pilot	period,	they	‘didn’t	really	understand	the	metric’	(NE1-SD	241114).	In	any	
case,	 the	Government’s	environmental	advisory	 service	 is	undergoing	 sustained	budget	
cuts	expected	to	reach	an	almost	30	per	cent	overall	 reduction	by	2020	(Vaughn	2016).	
Furthermore,	 Natural	 England	 acknowledges	 that	 going	 forward	 they	 will	 make	 only	
‘proportionate	use	of	 their	 regulatory	powers’	and	expect	 to	have	 to	 forge	partnerships	
with	 private	 clients	 (ibid.).	 In	 other	words,	Natural	 England’s	 income	will	 increasingly	
flow	 from	 client	 relationships	with	 private	 firms,	 the	 same	 firms	 they	 are	 expected	 to	
challenge	 on	 environmental	 impact	 grounds.	 Furthermore,	 the	 chapter	 illustrated	 that	
BDO	 was	 also	 being	 combined	 with	 or	 perhaps	 more	 accurately,	 subsumed	 under	
SANGS,	 as	 mitigation	 for	 potential	 impacts	 from	 visitors	 to	 the	 nearby	 SACs.	 The	
objective	 for	 combining	 BDO	 with	 SANGS	 was	 to	 achieve	 expedient	 outcomes	 that	
spared	developers	from	what	was,	curiously,	considered	by	Natural	England	to	be	overly	
punitive	compensation	of	 two	 frameworks	 in	concert.	This	point	 is	consistent	with	 the	
broader	 political	 economy	 around	 the	 introduction	 of	 BDO	 and	 the	 pro-development	
emphasis	flowing	from	central	government,	discussed	in	chapter	4.	
The	NPPF’s	‘presumption	in	favour	of	sustainable	development’	holds	as	much	sway	for	
Natural	 England	 as	 other	 civil	 sector	 environmental	 professionals.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	
emphasise	 strongly	 enough	 that	 this	 is	 the	broader	political	 reality	 in	which	BDO	was	
mobilised	 and	 tested,	 and	 continues	 therefore,	 to	 operate	 in	 England.	 	 Biodiversity	
offsetting	was	justified	by	DEFRA	on	the	grounds	of	making	planning	‘quicker’	and	more	
efficient.	 To	 pursue	 such	 a	 goal	 without	 acknowledging	 the	 existing	 disintegration	 of	
regulatory	capacity	and	thus	the	authority	to	which	metric	users	are	accountable,	seems	
only	 to	 point	 towards	 a	 system	 that	 is	 generally	 far	weaker	 for	 preventing	 impacts	 on	
biodiversity,	even	if	it	is	‘quicker’.	Much	like	many	other	observations	I	have	drawn	upon	
in	this	and	other	case	studies,	 this	 institutional	direction	of	 travel	does	not	seem	to	be	
consistent	with	the	proposed	‘step	change’	for	conservation	articulated	as	urgent	by	John	
Lawton	and	colleagues	in	2010.		
4. Precarious	calculations	and	black	boxes	
Far	from	being	anomalous	to	Warwickshire	(also	see	Sullivan	2013b),	valuations	in	South	
Devon	were	also	malleable	and	locally	configurable	rather	than	‘closed	facts’	(Blok	2011).	
While	 in	Warwickshire,	 the	 BIA	 numbers	 were	 adjusted	 at	 the	 explicit	 behest	 of	 the	
developers,	 in	 South	 Devon,	 the	 fluctuation	 was	 driven	 by	 efforts	 to	 moderate	 the	
extravagant	mitigation	 scores	 submitted	by	 the	consultant	ecologist.	The	difficulties	 in	
achieving	 scientific	 certainties	 over	 spatial	 habitat	 boundaries	 of	 impact,	 habitat	
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conditions	 and	 the	 exact	 habitat	 categories	 onsite	 also	 influenced	 the	 negotiated	
processes.		
Like	 Warwickshire,	 the	 contexts	 in	 which	 these	 decisions	 are	 worked	 through	 by	
stakeholders	 were	 crucial.	 The	 value	 outcomes	 of	 an	 algorithmic	 device	 will	 simply	
reflect	its	data	inputs.	As	this	and	the	previous	case	study	has	shown,	many	factors	come	
to	 bear	 on	 how	 those	 inputs	 are	 gathered	 and	 decided	 over.	 Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	
negotiation,	 biodiversity	 loss	 and	 gain	 was	 represented	 through	 qualitative	 categories,	
numerical	 scores	 and	 spatial	 areas	 of	 habitat	 parcels.	 Each	 of	 these	 representations	
travelled	 through	 increasingly	 abstract	 and	 theoretical	 stages	 of	 negotiation.	 This	
showed	that	what	tends	to	be	accepted	as	realist	representations,	are	instead	thoroughly	
mutable	 so	 as	 to	 fit	 around	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 contexts	 of	 the	 negotiation	
processes	 (and	 its	 pragmatic	 limitations).	 These	 textual	 representations	 as	 numerical	
scores	are	stabilised	over	the	metric	process,	such	that	it	is	not	clear	to	the	final	user	how	
they	have	 changed	 or	what	 their	 origins	were.	 The	numbers	 can	 be	 said	 to	 have	 been	
‘black	 boxed’	 (Callon	 and	 Latour	 1981,	 MacKenzie	 1990,	 2008)	 in	 ways	 that	 conceal	
uncertainties,	precariousness	and	politics	from	view.		
The	 implications	 for	 these	 black	 boxes	 are	 thus	made	 apparent	 in	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
other	 actors	 downstream	 to	 their	 calculations	 ‘consent	 to	 the	 adequacy	 of	 their	
representation’	 (Robertson	 2012:	 396).	 This	 is	 where	 the	 political	 work	 of	 BDO	 as	
calculation	practices	 start	 to	 become	 apparent.	We	 saw	 that	 in	 two	 separate	 incidents	
within	this	case	study,	where	planning	officers	and	inspectors	were	eager	to	embrace	the	
existence	of	these	calculated	scores	as	established	fact	so	as	to	fit	around	their	needs	at	
the	time.	It	is	precisely	the	ways	in	which	these	stabilised	numbers	move	through	wider	
networks	 of	 decision-making	 within	 planning	 processes	 that	 they	 are	 endowed	 with	
agency.	If	calculations	are	used,	planning	officers	and	inspectors	consider	the	outcomes	
to	be	rational	and	scientific	standards.	 Instead,	however,	 these	numbers	are	predicated	
on	various	concealments.		
Notably	in	addition	to	the	scientific	uncertainties,	the	missing	values	in	all	of	this	appear	
to	be	those	of	held	by	the	actual	people	who	reside	in	and	around	the	landscape	subject	
to	residential	developments.	These	local	values	of	aesthetic	and	spiritual	appeal	have	no	
way	of	being	accounted	for	within	such	calculations.	While	not	visible	in	the	calculative	
processes,	 these	 actors	 were	 not,	 nonetheless,	 silent	 witnesses	 to	 the	 process.	 	 They	
staged	an	active	and	on-going	campaign	to	resist	and	contest	the	development	and	the	
grounds	 on	 which	 it	 was	 being	 justified.	 Since	 concern	 over	 green	 spaces	 and	 nature	
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valued	by	local	people	is	largely	not	recognised	by	planning	policy	or	processes,	residents	
resorted	 to	 articulating	 their	 complaints	 in	 scientific	 or	 neutral	 terms	 according	 to	
bureaucratic	policy	frames	for	‘biodiversity’	values	in	general.		
Contesting	development	on	the	grounds	of	aesthetic,	cultural	or	social	value	of	nature,	
or	because	of	values	that	are	local	to	the	community	or	its	individuals,	at	least	at	higher	
levels	 of	 planning,	 is	 easily	 dismissed	 as	 a	 form	 of	 parochial	 ‘NIMBYism’	 (LPA1-SD	
240714).	 Such	 justifications	 are	 not	 commensurate	 with	 bureaucratic	 planning	 values	
because	 they	 fall	 under	 different	 orders	 of	 worth	 (Boltanski	 and	 Thévenot	 1999,	
discussed	further	 in	chapter	8).	But	 it	 is	precisely	the	translation	of	such	concerns	 into	
generic,	universal	standards	in	drawing	on	the	numbers	of	biodiversity’s	ascribed	values	
which	ostensibly	demonstrate	 a	 ‘no	net	 loss’,	 that	makes	 them,	 conversely,	 so	 easy	 for	
the	 planning	 officers	 to	 discharge.	 In	 this	 circumstance,	 the	 attribution	 of	 a	 value	 to	
biodiversity	made	 it	even	more	disposable	 than	before	(Bracking	et	al.	2014)	because	 it	
neutralised	 the	 grounds	 of	 contestation.	 The	 representations	 of	mitigation	 scores,	 and	
the	writing	 in	 of	 a	 compensation	 sum	 into	 the	 s106	 associated	with	 this	 development	
permitted	the	Head	of	Planning	to	assert	that	there	simply	was	no	biodiversity	impact.	In	
abstract	 terms,	 the	 books	 had	 balanced,	 even	 if	 the	 compensation	 was	 proposed	 to	
benefit	cirl	buntings	and	the	absence	of	a	readily	available	offset	location	would	probably	
mean	being	the	compensation	would	be	split	across	three	separate	sites.	The	specifics	of	
intact	and	in	situ	biotic	assemblages	and	the	broader	landscape	character	of	which	these	
were	a	part	were	eclipsed	in	the	ostensibly	rational	decision	making	processes.		
5. Valued	biodiversity	and	land	values	
Attributing	 an	 explicit	 financial	 value	 to	 biodiversity	will	 inevitably	 affect	 the	 value	 of	
the	 land	 on	 which	 it	 dwells.	 This	 case	 study	 shows	 how	 BDO	 has	 implications	 for	
changes	to	land	value	and	affects	the	way	landowners	will	subsequently	treat	it.	With	a	
plain	 economic	 value,	 biodiversity	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 either	 an	 asset	 or	 a	 liability,	
depending	on	one’s	 intentions	for	the	use	of	the	 land	and	entirely	dependent	on	wider	
land	market	 conditions.	 In	 respect	 to	 the	 first	 point,	 scored	biodiversity	 amounting	 to	
compensation	requirements	of	£100,000	translates	to	an	equivalent	reduction	in	value	of	
land	when	it	is	sold.	Valued	biodiversity	is	now	an	explicit	economic	liability	to	land	with	
development	 potential.	 In	 these	 circumstances,	 land	 with	 rich	 biodiversity	 in	 theory	
becomes	 less	 developable	 as	 it	 becomes	more	 expensive	 to	 do	 so.	 Such	 is	 the	 avowed	
goal	 of	 early	 offsetting	 design	 originating	 from	 innovations	 such	 as	 the	 Safe	 Harbour	
Principle,	which	I	discussed	in	chapter	4.	At	the	same	time,	this	land	(and	its	embedded	
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biodiversity)	 is	 envisaged	 to	 become	 an	 economic	 asset	 for	 which	 landowners	 are	
incentivised	 to	 cultivate	 so	 as	 to	 tap	 into	 income	 streams	 from	 producing	 and	 selling	
biodiversity	credits	as	a	form	or	rent	(such	as	the	habitat	banks	discussed	in	chapter	5).	
There	 are	 huge	 divergences	 in	 market	 values	 between	 the	 sale	 of	 biodiversity	 credits	
under	 offsetting	 and	 the	 windfalls	 expected	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 development	 land.	 It	 is	
unclear,	 therefore,	 how	 BDO	will	 not	 create	 potent	 perverse	 incentives	 for	 developers	
and	 landowners	to	deliberately	destroy	habitats	so	as	 to	mitigate	the	reduction	 in	 land	
value	 the	 biodiversity	 would	 signal.	 This	 activity	 is	 already	 a	 very	 real	 feature	 of	 the	
development-conservation	nexus	and	a	strategy	developers	employ	to	hasten	obtaining	
planning	permission.	One	LPA	officer	told	me	in	this	case	study,	‘there	is	nothing	we	can	
do	about	that’	(LPA2-SD	240216).	Thus	without	addressing	the	broader	dynamics	of	land	
valuation	 and	markets	 in	 England,	 BDO	 will	 likely	 exacerbate	 an	 existing	 flaw	 in	 the	
planning	system26.		
Furthermore,	 rendering	 biodiversity	 economically	 valuable	 simply	 subsumes	 it	 to	 the	
wider	 dynamics	 of	 land	 and	 housing	 markets.	 Both	 the	 landowner	 and	 developer’s	
expectations	 of	 profitability	 mean	 that	 biodiversity	 offset	 considerations	 become	 yet	
another	 compensation	 liability,	 which	 throws	 habitat	 mitigation	 into	 conflict	 with	
affordable	 housing	 (or	 any	 other	 social	 good	 stipulated	 by	 the	 council	 as	 a	 planning	
condition).	The	economic	conditions	of	land	in	England	are	such	that	it	is	being	treated	
increasingly	 as	 a	 financial	 asset	 and	 one	 subject	 to	 ‘banking’	 in	 line	 with	 the	 rapid	
appreciation	of	 equally	 financially	driven	housing	bubbles,	pushing	up	 land	prices	 and	
ostensibly	squeezing	developer’s	margins.	Without	acknowledging	this	broader	political	
economic	reality	of	the	use,	exchange,	valuation	and	financialisation	of	land	in	England,	
it	 is	 hard	 to	 see	 how	 ‘tinkering	 with	 scraps	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 process’	 in	 attributing	
economic	value	to	habitats	will	have	the	desired	effects.	Indeed	it	is	likely	to	have	exactly	
the	opposite	effect,	as	developers	and	landowners	find	new	ways	of	minimising	costs	and	
maximising	 profitability,	 which	 would	 not	 bode	 well	 for	 biodiversity.	 Arguably	 if	 a	
rejuvenation	 of	 biodiversity	 conservation	 in	 England	 really	 is	 about	 ‘making	 space	 for	
nature’,	much	closer	attention	needs	to	be	paid	to	 land	economy.	This	tension	of	BDO	
																																																						
26 Paradoxically,	 there	 is	 also	 increasing	 evidence	 that	 it	 is	 precisely	 the	 speculative	
nature	of	land	markets	in	England	that	is	contributing	to	the	housing	crisis	rather	than	
‘blockages	 in	 the	 planning	 system’.	 Through	 land	 banking	 developers	 keep	 demand	
artificially	high	through	limiting	the	number	of	dwellings	they	build	(Ryan	Collins	et	al.	
2017).		
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alone	 is	 worthy	 of	 potentially	 another	 doctorate	 sized	 investigation	 and	 is	 surely	 a	
fruitful	avenue	for	further	investigation.		
In	summary,	the	many	elements	of	this	pilot	site	that	either	resisted	BDO	gaining	much	
of	 a	 foothold	or	bound	BDO	to	other	 extant	 assemblages	 (conservation,	 land	markets)	
further	illustrates	how	the	practices	of	valuation	through	BDO	depend	on	a	diverse	array	
of	capacities,	knowledges	and	existing	arrangements.	Context	matters	to	the	processes	of	
valuing	biodiversity	and	this	chapter	has	shown	how	the	context	shaped	the	values	that	
such	practices	produce.		As	we	are	beginning	to	see	more	clearly,	biodiversity	values	do	
not	 just	 exist	 a	 priori,	 waiting	 to	 be	 captured	 with	 calculative	 devices	 or	 the	 correct	
economic	 incentives.	 People	 and	 things	 and	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 they	 operate	
shape	and	produce	these	values.	The	specificity	of	these	assemblages	has	material	effects	
and	 therefore	 consequences	 for	 conservation	 outcomes,	 both	 in	 the	 short	 and	 most	
probably	the	long	term.		
The	next	chapter	continues	with	the	themes	of	contingency	and	performativity	but	shifts	
the	 context	 radically	 in	 considering	 the	 voluntary	 corporate	 offsetting	 under	 the	
Thameslink	 Programme.	 In	 the	 following	 case	 study,	 we	 will	 get	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	
actual	delivery	of	the	habitat	in	conjunction	with	an	offset	arrangement.	Unlike	the	LPA	
experiences	 in	 the	 pilot,	 TLP	 was	 able	 to	 (and	 driven	 to)	 fast	 track	 arrangements	 to	
locate	and	initiate	an	offset	provider.	Staying	with	the	analytic	of	assemblage	I	highlight	
various	 significant	 implications	 arising	 from	 a	 growing	 uptake	 of	 NNL	 in	 corporate	
sustainability	agendas	in	England	and	elsewhere.	
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CHAPTER	7	
VOLUNTARY	‘NO	NET	LOSS’	AND	CORPORATE	SOCIAL	
RESPONSIBILITY:		BIODIVERSITY	OFFSETTING	WITHIN	THE	
THAMESLINK	PROGRAMME	
	
7.1	Introduction	
Throughout	the	previous	two	chapters,	I	have	traced	the	in	situ	attempts	to	use	BDO	in	
the	English	planning	system.	In	so	doing	I	have	illustrated	the	ways	in	which	biodiversity	
habitats	 are	 transformed	 into	 exchangeable	 commodities	 for	 trading	 and	 the	 broader	
shifts	in	conservation	arrangements	within	planning	processes	that	this	is	engendering.	
Throughout	 these	 empirical	 accounts,	 I	 have	 continually	 emphasised	 how,	 as	 a	
fundamentally	 social	 exercise,	 the	 wider	 social,	 political	 and	 institutional	 contexts	 of	
valuation	 dramatically	 shape	 the	 way	 that	 calculations	 are	 enacted	 in	 practice.	 I	 have	
shown	how	the	production	of	values	to	stimulate	trades	of	environmental	loss	for	gain	is	
a	process	that	is	frequently	concerned	with	striking	the	right	balance	of	values	according	
to	 wider	 priorities	 for	 development,	 expediency	 or	 existing	 dominant	 conservation	
assemblages.	The	example	presented	throughout	this	chapter	is	also	consistent	with	this	
finding.	
The	 final	case	study	of	BDO	within	this	research	project	 into	valuing	nature	under	 the	
DEFRA	pilot	 is	distinct	 from	the	prior	 two	 in	that	 it	derives	 from	a	voluntary	 initiative	
undertaken	 by	 Network	 Rail	 on	 the	 Thameslink	 Programme	 (TLP)	 rail	 construction	
project.	Network	Rail	 initiated	biodiversity	 offsetting	 as	 part	 of	 its	 ‘corporate	 strategy’,	
seeking	to	meet	sustainability	goals	 in	 their	corporate	responsibility	agenda.	The	move	
to	offsetting	was	therefore	neither	related	to	regulatory	compliance	nor	conditional	 for	
planning	 permission	 from	 the	 LPA.	 The	 chapter	 opens	 by	 briefly	 explaining	 the	 case	
study	context	and	outlining	how	the	practice	of	BDO	and	a	corporate	standard	of	NNL	
(quickly	 elevated	 to	biodiversity	net	 gain)	 came	about	 at	TLP,	propelling	 it	 to	become	
DEFRA’s	 official	 pilot	 demonstration	 project	 within	 the	 complementary	 arm	 of	 the	
study.	After	this	introductory	section,	the	chapter	explores	how	actors	actively	managed	
tensions	 and	polarising	 value	 systems	 intrinsic	 to	 the	 objective	 of	 reconciling	business	
values	with	biodiversity	values.	This	section	traces	some	of	the	discursive	strategies	that	
the	 key	 actors	 used	 as	 a	means	 for	 achieving	 such	 compromises	 between	 the	market-
green	 value	 systems	 (Boltanski	 and	 Thévenot	 1999),	 which	 also	 included	 the	 use	 of	
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imagery	 and	 graphical	 representations.	 Justification	 and	 legitimation	 are	 thus	 overt	
themes	 woven	 throughout	 the	 chapter.	 In	 particular,	 the	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 how	
different	justificatory	narratives	were	mobilised	for	different	audiences.	Audiences	were	
both	 internal	 to	Network	 Rail,	 and	 the	wider	 epistemic	 and	 professional	 communities	
external	 to	 the	 organisation.	 And	 yet,	 the	 chapter	 shows	 how	 the	 narratives	 of	
legitimation	 and	 justification	 in	 an	 organisational	 context	 are	 also	 entangled	 with	
personal	 convictions,	 professional	 ambitions	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 certain	 corporate	
subjectivities	of	those	enacting	the	processes.	The	chapter	therefore	sets	up	a	discussion	
over	 the	 individual	 agencies	 of	 actors	 involved	 with	 the	 practical	 realities	 of	 enacting	
BDO	 in	 preparation	 for	 the	 next	 chapter	 that	 explores	 the	 BDO	 dispute.	 The	 chapter	
highlights	how	the	production	of	new	corporate-environmental	 subjectivities	 is	 central	
to	 the	 realisation	 of	 BDO	 in	 corporate	 settings	 and	 sets	 the	 scene	 for	 chapter	 8	 that	
draws	 from	 the	 pragmatic	 sociology	 of	 critique	 in	 consideration	 of	 how	 actors	 try	 to	
make	sense	of	what	is	‘just’.		
After	exploring	the	ways	in	which	market-green	compromises	(Nyberg	and	White	2013)	
are	established	in	enactments	of	BDO,	the	chapter	moves	on	to	explore	a	specific	offset	
contract	as	it	played	out.	This	section	follows	the	structural	format	of	the	previous	two	
case	 studies.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	prior	 two	 examples	however,	 TLP	 actually	managed	 to	
reach	the	point	of	financial	transaction	for	compensation	and	subsequently	initiated	tree	
planting	 and	 woodland	 management	 as	 offsite	 biodiversity	 compensation.	 For	 this	
reason,	 a	 large	 focus	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 on	 the	 pragmatics	 of	 securing	 and	undertaking	
conservation	at	the	receptor	site.	Through	tracing	this	process,	I	discuss	various	practical	
features	and	difficulties	of	the	arrangements.	These	issues	related	to	the	site	selected	for	
the	 offset’s	 provision	 of	 units,	 reconfigurations	 to	 conservation’s	 institutional	
arrangements	 including	 the	 repositioning	 of	 conservation	 NGOs,	 practical	 problems	
with	 certifying	 ‘additionality’	 and	 features	 that	 are	 characteristic	 of	 the	 self-regulation	
that	a	voluntary	programme	entails.		
In	 uncovering	 these	 themes	 from	 the	 data,	 the	 chapter	 closes	 by	 expanding	 the	
discussion	of	each	and	reflecting	on	their	implications	for	the	spread	of	BDO	imaginaries	
and	the	performance	of	‘success’	in	other	corporate	voluntary	BDO	contexts	around	the	
world.	 One	 of	 the	 central	 implications	 for	 the	 developments	 of	 Network	 Rail’s	
commitment	 to	 offsetting	 is	 its	 capacity	 to	 normalise	 and	 further	 naturalise	 the	
offsetting	 trajectories	over	 alternative	 courses	 for	 action.	 In	 so	doing,	BDO	 locks	 in	 its	
substantive	 logics	 and	 frames	 of	 both	 conservation	 and	 nature	 (Apostolopoulou	 and	
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Adams	2017).		Indeed,	while	much	of	the	recent	scholarship	from	academia	and	activist	
circles	 concerning	 the	neoliberalisation	of	 conservation	 generally	 and	BDO	 specifically	
has	 focussed	on	empirical	examples	 from	the	global	south,	much	less	has	been	written	
about	actually	existing	empirical	examples	 in	 the	global	north	 (although	see	Pawliczek	
and	 Sullivan	 2011,	Dauguet	 2013,	Apostolopoulou	 2016,	 Sullivan	 2013b).	 This	 case	 study	
finds	 that	 although	 the	 social,	 political	 and	 ecological	 circumstances	 are	 different,	
critical	 scholarship	 on	 the	 neoliberalisation	 of	 conservation	 is	 still	 relevant	 and	
applicable	to	this	new	context,	even	if	there	are	some	divergences.	
Furthermore,	to	supplement	the	fruits	from	this	analysis,	I	situate	the	theoretical	lens	of	
the	 neoliberalisation	 of	 conservation	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 2,	 with	 the	 analytic	 of	
assemblage,	 to	 show	 how	 offsetting	 as	 a	 governance	 approach,	 its	 calculative	 devices,	
and	the	broader	imaginaries	of	NNL	are	assembled	through	mutually	circular	strategies	
of	 legitimation	 across	 scales	 and	 geographies.	 The	 latter	 analytical	 accounts	 for	 how	 a	
local,	anecdotal	case	study	in	London	bears	relevance	to	global	circuits	and	networks	of	
NNL	 and	BDO	 through	networks	 of	 individuals	 and	 organisations,	 financial	 flows	 and	
narratives	pertaining	to	 the	 ‘offset	 ideology’	 (Seagle	2012).	 In	so	 far	as	 there	 is	a	 ‘global	
BDO	assemblage’	then	TLP	came	to	occupy	an	important	node	within	this.		
Thus,	as	much	as	this	case	study	is	about	the	actual	material	trajectories	of	an	offset	in	
action,	 I	 close	 by	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 realities	 of	 the	 offset	
detailed	 contrast	 with	 the	 public	 representations	 of	 it.	 The	 disjuncture	 between	
performance	 and	 reality	 in	 the	 production	 of	 spectacle	 (Igoe	 2010)	 comprises	 its	 own	
legitimation	strategy	through	 ‘selling	success’	 (Büscher	2014).	However,	 it	also	parallels	
the	 disjunctive	 tendencies	 of	 offsetting,	 which	 can	 cleave	 open	 a	 space	 between	 the	
abstracted	representation	of	biodiversity	gains	and	actual	material	natures	 through	the	
production	 of	 fictitious	 conservation	 (Büscher	 2013)	with	 ‘paper	 offsets’	 (Quétier	 et	 al.	
2014).		
7.2	Case	study	context		
The	Thameslink	Programme	(TLP)	initiated	biodiversity	offsetting	in	the	summer	of	2013	
long	after	both	the	actual	TLP	works	and	the	DEFRA	pilot	study	had	begun.	Unlike	the	
other	 private	 sector	 complementary	 pilots	 exploring	 the	 use	 of	 the	 metric	 on	
retrospective	 hypothetical	 studies,	 TLP	 were	 undertaking	 an	 actual	 project	 to	 offset	
impacts	of	their	rail	infrastructure	developments.	As	such,	TLP	was	awarded	the	status	of	
a	‘DEFRA	demonstration	project’	with	the	view	that	its	scale	and	profile	could	assist	with	
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assessing	 offsetting’s	 potential	 for	 public-private	 sector	 development	 in	England27.	 The	
key	actors	involved	were	the	Environment	Manager	at	TLP	(denoted	as	DEV-TLP),	their	
consultant	ecologist	(formerly	at	Parsons	Brinkerhoff	and	now	with	Balfour	Beatty:	CE-
TLP),	 the	offset	delivery	partners	 (London	Wildlife	Trust	 in	partnership	with	Lambeth	
Council,	NGO1-TLP	and	LPA1-TLP)	and	local	residents	(LR-TLP)	within	the	Friends	and	
cooperative	groups	associated	with	two	of	the	London	parks	designated	as	offset	sites.		
The	 Thameslink	 Programme	 (henceforth	 TLP)	 is	 one	 of	 three	 of	 Network	 Rail’s	
initiatives.	The	other	two	consist	of	Cross	Rail	and	the	Maintenance	and	Special	Delivery	
Service.	At	the	time	of	research,	TLP	was	the	largest	rail	infrastructure	project	in	England	
undertaking	 extensive	 upgrading	 to	 the	 service	 by	 expanding	 stations	 that	 are	
compatible	with	 longer	and	more	 frequent	 trains	on	a	 track	 that	 runs	 from	Bedford	 to	
Brighton	 through	 central	 London	 on	 the	 UK’s	 busiest	 and	most	 congested	 commuter	
routes.	The	twelve-year	project	operates	with	a	budget	of	£4.6	billion.	It	started	in	2006	
when	 the	 TLP	 was	 awarded	 planning	 permission	 under	 the	 Transport	 and	Work	 Act	
(TWA)	Order.	
Objectives	and	higher	structuring	values	
The	unique	context	of	TLP	BDO	was	that	it	was	a	voluntary	as	opposed	to	a	compliance	
engagement.	 The	 personal	 and	 professional	 values	 of	 the	 main	 actors	 along	 with	 the	
wider	 institutional	and	organisational	 setting	of	 this	voluntary	case	study	are	therefore	
distinct	to	the	ones	at	play	within	residential	LPA	applications	in	chapters	5	and	6.	For	
these	 reasons,	 the	 TLP	 case	 study	 provides	 important	 inferences	 for	 other	 private,	
corporate	 social	 responsibility	 (CSR)	 voluntary	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 initiatives	 across	
infrastructure	and	extractive	industries	in	England.		
Looking	 to	 exceed	 its	 legal	 obligations	 to	biodiversity,	TLP	 set	 itself	 a	more	 ambitious	
sustainability	 strategy	 and	 developed	 ‘corporate	 drivers	 that	 feed	 into	 that’	 (DEV-TLP	
010813).	 In	 this	 respect,	 TLP’s	 sustainability	 strategy	 is	 framed	 as	 ‘delivering	 transport	
benefits	to	budget	that	represent	value	for	money	and	creating	an	overall	positive	effect	
																																																						
27	Upon	winning	the	election,	the	Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	Coalition	Government	
announced	the	UK’s	new	infrastructure	plan	setting	out	over	£200	billion	worth	of	public	
and	private	investment	as	part	of	the	economic	recovery	programme	following	the	global	
financial	crisis	in	2008.	Major	transport	investments	made	up	a	considerable	part	of	this	
figure,	 including	 proposals	 for	 the	 environmentally	 and	 politically	 controversial	 High	
Speed	 2	 rail	 line,	 as	 well	 as	 £14	 billion	 of	 public	 investment	 in	 Network	 Rail	 (HM	
Treasury	et	al.	2010).		
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on	the	community	and	 the	environment’	 (TLP	Sustainability	Development	Policy	cited	
by	 the	 BOMP	 2015).	 Within	 this	 vision,	 the	 firm	 developed	 twenty	 sustainability	
objectives,	 of	 which	 one	 committed	 to	 ‘maintain	 and	 enhance	 biodiversity’	 (TLP	
Sustainability	Strategy	cited	by	the	TLP	BOMP	2015)28.	In	addition	to	this	framework	and	
as	part	of	the	Thameslink	commitment	to	sustainable	development,	the	Programme	set	
itself	a	target	to	 ‘enhance	its	habitat	footprint	to	achieve	a	net	biodiversity	gain	via	the	
mitigation	hierarchy	in	line	with	The	TLP’s	Delivering	Biodiversity	Benefits	Policy’	 (TLP	
Biodiversity	Policy	cited	by	the	TLP	BOMP	2015).		
Embracing	 a	 target	 for	 ‘net	 gain’	 came	 about	 directly	 due	 to	 the	 strengthening	 of	 a	
professional	 partnership	 between	DEV-TLP	 and	CE-TLP.	 The	 consultant	 ecologist	was	
already	 leading	 on	 the	 Balfour	 Beatty	 complementary	 pilot	 and	 fell	 into	 conversation	
with	TLP	by	coincidence	in	2013.	CE-TLP	described	what	she	was	doing	at	Balfour	Beatty	
with	the	broader	DEFRA	pilot	and	was	subsequently	‘invited	to	come	and	talk	it	through	
with	 [TLP],	 and	 the	 conversation	 started	 that	way’	 (CE-TLP	010813).	DEV-TLP	 (010813)	
reported	 ‘we	 had	 a	 discussion	 about	 biodiversity,	 she	mentioned	 this	 calculation	 that	
DEFRA	 had	 so	 we	 decided	 to	 try	 it	 on	 Thameslink.’	 Such	 chance	 encounters	 are	
consistent	 with	 the	 discussion	 in	 chapter	 2	 in	 respect	 to	 the	 ad	 hoc	 and	 frequently	
serendipitous	 nature	 of	 developments	 that	 enable	 the	 circulation	 and	 stabilisation	 of	
NNL	into	policy	standards	and	practices.	
By	this	time	CE-TLP	was	 leaving	Chris	Britton	Consultancy	but	carried	the	partnership	
with	TLP	over	 to	a	new	 role	at	Parsons	Brinckerhoff,	 a	global	 engineering	professional	
services	firm	and	another	subsidiary	of	Balfour	Beatty.	So	as	to	meet	the	requirements	of	
the	NNL	 and	 the	 net	 gain	 goal,	 the	metric	 was	 required	 to	 quantify	 losses	 and	 gains;	
DEV-TLP	informed	me;	‘I	think	the	issue	we	had	when	we	set	ourselves	the	target	of	no	
net	loss	there	was	nothing	to	measure	it,	so	we	said	OK	we’ll	go	for	no	net	loss	but	what	
does	 that	 actually	mean	 to	 calculate	 in	 reality?’	 (DEV-TLP	010813).	TLP	 commissioned	
Parsons	Brinckerhoff	to	use	the	metric	for	calculating	the	biodiversity	unit	loss	at	each	of	
the	development	sites	along	the	rail	route.	Together,	they	decided	to	meet	a	no	net	loss	
target,	however,	upon	realising	they	couldn’t	replace	all	of	the	loss	within	the	‘Network’	
they	said	‘offsetting	came	in’	(CE-TLP	010813).		
																																																						
28	The	TLP	 Sustainable	Development	 Policy,	 Sustainability	 Strategy,	 Biodiversity	 Policy	
and	Biodiversity	 Procedure	 are	 referenced	 in	 the	 2015	 Biodiversity	Offset	Management	
Plan	but	the	year	is	not	included	and	these	are	not	publicly	available	documents.	
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The	partnership	between	these	two	professionals	proved	to	be	a	productive	collaboration	
that	featured	prominently	in	the	development	of	BDO	under	TLP	and	the	DEFRA	pilot	
study.	TLP	was	named	as	the	only	official	demonstration	project	for	the	DEFRA	pilot	and	
by	the	end	of	2014,	BDO	was	subsequently	being	prepared	for	‘roll	out’	across	the	other	
programmes	 across	 the	 whole	 of	 Network	 Rail	 (CE-TLP	 261114).	 The	 professional	
collaboration	 resembled	 the	 accidental	 assemblages	 of	 Warwickshire	 where	 a	 new	
brokerage	 firm	with	 unique	 attributes	 and	 resources	 had	 been	 enrolled	 into	 the	 BDO	
‘network’	 through	 chance	 conversations.	Thus,	what	had	been	originally	 born	out	 of	 a	
spontaneous	 encounter	 subsequently	 sparked	 a	 long-standing	 organisational	
collaboration	between	two	individuals	and	their	organisations.		
These	 two	 professionals	 were	 independently	 pioneering	 BDO	 within	 their	 respective	
organisations	 and	 as	 such,	 their	 separate	 endeavours	 were	 strengthened	 through	 this	
collaboration.	 The	 working	 relationship	 was	 reinforced	 by	 overlapping	 professional	
networks	 and	 interests	 as	 well	 as	 through	 a	 convivial	 and	 productive	 working	
relationship,	as	two	people	 ‘on	a	mission’.	This	ambition	extended	beyond	the	confines	
of	 Network	 Rail.	 Even	 from	 the	 early	 stages	 DEV-TLP	 had	 expressed	 personally	 held	
conviction	 that	 BDO	 offered	 the	 solution	 for	 all	 development	 related	 impacts	 on	
biodiversity.	For	example,	at	the	BBOP	BDO	summit	in	June	2014,	DEV-TLP	said	that	the	
‘key	 goal	 for	 TLP	was	 to	 formalise	 no	net	 loss	 and	 a	 net	 gain	 approach	 in	 the	English	
planning	 system’	 (emphasis	 added).	 Similarly,	 during	 a	 BBOP	 community	 of	 practice	
webinar,	DEV-TLP	conceded	that	the	work	was	driven	by	personal	as	well	as	professional	
commitments.	 As	 TLP	was	 a	 publically	 funded	 infrastructure	 initiative,	 she	 explained,	
there	 were	 therefore	 strong	 grounds	 for	 exceeding	 legal	 compliance	 (TLP	 171115).	 The	
normative	convictions	driving	the	adoption	of	BDO	and	NNL	at	TLP	also	therefore	came	
to	play	a	role	in	the	assemblage.		
Assessing	the	‘costs	and	benefits’	of	undertaking	the	approach	
	At	the	same	time	as	making	the	moral	argument	for	corporate	sustainability	objectives	
framed	 around	 delivering	 a	 ‘net	 gain’	 for	 biodiversity,	 these	 actors	 consistently	 also	
justified	 BDO	 as	 a	 ‘business	 solution’.	 The	 ‘business	 case’	 was	 repeatedly	 emphasised,	
aligning	 narratives	 based	 on	 mutual	 sustainability	 and	 corporate	 strategic	 objectives.	
Such	 alignments	 (Li	 2007a)	 mirror	 the	 stabilisation	 of	 green	 compromises	 discussed	
throughout	 this	 thesis	 and	 expanded	 in	 the	 summary	 section	 and	 in	 the	next	 chapter.	
Both	DEV-TLP	 and	CE-TLP	worked	hard	 to	maintain	 the	 right	 balance	 of	 justificatory	
narratives	 so	 as	 to	 uphold	 BDO’s	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 senior	 actors	 at	 TLP.	 For	
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example,	the	project	would	certainly	cost	the	company	more	money	than	a	‘business	as	
usual	 approach’ 29 .	 Part	 of	 the	 rationalisation	 for	 this	 additional	 investment	 in	
biodiversity,	therefore,	was	the	profile	and	industry	leader	status	that	it	might	earn.	The	
widespread	 negative	 press	 that	 BDO	 was	 attracting	 generally	 nevertheless,	 frustrated	
TLP’s	 ability	 to	 frame	 the	 approach	 as	 a	 progressive	 initiative	 and	 threatened	 the	
environmental	justification	on	which	it	was	based.		For	example,	DEV-TLP	described	the	
process	as	a	‘journey’,	implying	that	there	had	been	some	unexpected	twists.	Specifically,	
this	referred	to	the	negative	media	coverage	BDO	was	attracting.	In	addition,	there	was	a	
growing	 contestation	 from	civil	 society	 campaign	 groups	 such	 as	 Friends	 of	 the	Earth,	
Fern	International	and	Save	Our	Woods.	 In	October	2014,	 these	groups	had	written	an	
open	 letter	 signed	 by	 67	 organisations	 and	 9000	 people	 to	 Janez	 Potočnik,	 European	
Commissioner	 for	 the	 Environment	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 EU’s	 consultation	 on	 NNL.	 The	
message	 of	 the	 letter	 was	 to	 ‘Say	 no	 to	 biodiversity	 offsetting’	 (Lang	 2014).	 The	 Ends	
Report,	a	specialist	publication	for	environmental	professionals	issued	articles	with	titles	
such	 as	 ‘Rush	 to	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 ‘massively	 premature’	 (Evans	 2013)	 and	
‘Biodiversity	 offsetting	 attracts	 local	 opposition’	 (Marshall	 2013). 30 	During	 our	 first	
interview	in	2013,	DEV-TLP	held	up	a	photocopy	of	a	Guardian	newspaper	clipping	of	a	
piece	written	by	George	Monbiot	entitled	‘Unleashing	the	spirit	of	destruction	across	the	
countryside’	and	told	me	that:	
as	a	business	we	are	very	conscious	we	don’t	want	the	approach	we	are	taking	to	
be	deemed	as	negative	as	we	have	been	very	clear	about	why	we	are	doing	this.	
It’s	not	so	we	can	go	in	and	build	what	we	like	and	then	just	offset,	it’s	very	
much	a	business	solution	for	us.	So	we	spent	a	lot	of	time	going	away	thinking	
about	what	is	the	best	way	to	structure	this	to	ensure	we	were	doing	everything	
we	possibly	have	do	to	comply	with	legislation,	and	we	were	being	as	
																																																						
29	There	are	additional	financial	and	management	costs	to	offsetting	since	it	entails	going	
above	 and	 beyond	 customary	 biodiversity	 appraisals	 and	 compensation	 arrangements	
and	 in	 the	 short	 term;	 transition	 costs	 associated	 with	 installing	 new	 management	
systems	and	corporate	standards.	For	example	TLP	undertook	management	changes	to	
train	some	500	staff	with	BDO	habitat	classification	procedures	and	‘robust	processes’	so	
that	in	their	words	‘when	an	engineer	or	construction	management	or	designer	looks	at	
an	area	of	 the	 site	 they	have	 to	go	 through	a	 list	of	 tick	boxes	 to	make	sure	 they	have	
followed	the	rules’	(DEV-TLP	Aug	2013).			
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transparent	as	we	could	be	with	our	stakeholders	and	not	introducing	negative	
publicity	with	the	scheme	that	we’re	doing.	(DEV-TLP	010813).		
With	their	own	professional	reputations	at	stake,	DEV-TLP	and	CE-TLP	were	required	to	
navigate	 the	 tensions	 between	 the	 public	 criticism	 that	 BDO	 would	 fast	 become	 a	
‘license	 to	 trash’	and	 the	 stated	business	 rationale	 for	 taking	part.	DEV-TLP	 frequently	
said,	 ‘it’s	 a	 business	 solution	 for	 us’	 deliberately	 aligning	 the	 proposed	 future	 business	
benefits	 along	 with	 the	 authenticity	 of	 TLP’s	 interest	 in	 being	 an	 ecologically	
conscientious	developer.		The	business	solution	is	framed	as	‘delivering	our	strategy	and	
our	commitments	to	biodiversity’	but	also	‘reducing	our	risk	as	we	can	measure	it	so	we	
know	 what	 we	 need	 to	 replace’	 (DEV-TLP	 010813).	 The	 business	 case	 tended	 to	 be	
consistently	 and	 seamlessly	 conflated	 with	 a	 moral	 imperative	 and	 environmental	
rationale.	CE-TLP	told	me	that	since	their	approach	was	unrelated	to	planning	because	
they	already	had	permission	‘it	is	purely	driven	by	us	wanting	to	be	more	sustainable	and	
deliver	that’.	She	reiterates:	
Thameslink	are	different,	you	know	they	are	striving	for	excellence;	they	are	
striving	to	do	something	sustainable	for	the	long	term,	not	scraping	the	barrel	
and	doing	the	bare	minimum.	For	them	it	is	an	investment	for	what	drives	their	
business.	(CE-TLP	010813)	
While	 the	 statement	 ‘an	 investment	 that	 drives	 the	 business’	 is	 ambiguous,	 it	 does	
illustrate	 the	 discursive	 alignments	 appearing	 as	 powerful	 compromises	 between	
separate	 and	 historically	 conflicted	 agendas	 (Li	 2007a).	 As	 such	 BDO	 was	 re-named	
Delivering	 Biodiversity	 Benefits	 to	 maintain	 a	 commitment	 to	 its	 perceived	
environmental	 advantages	 yet	 distance	 the	 programme	 from	 the	 controversy	 of	 the	
approach.	 DEV-TLP	 tells	 me;	 ‘it’s	 part	 of	 the	 solution,	 it’s	 part	 of	 the	 mitigation	
hierarchy’	(DEV-TLP	010813).		
Another	 part	 of	 this	 business	 case	 was	 related	 to	 achieving	 a	 ‘return	 on	 investment’	
following	the	committing	of	resources	and	organisational	time	to	pilot	BDO.	Partly	this	
return	would	be	underpinned	by	a	 strong	public	 relations	 (PR)	programme	of	external	
communications.	 This	 PR	 and	public	 engagement	was	 partly	 damage	 limitation	 to	 the	
public	criticism	BDO	was	coming	under	(described	above)	and	partly	wider	promotion	
of	 the	 programme	 to	 a	 growing	 epistemic	 professional	 community.	 TLP	 wished	 to	 be	
seen	 to	 be	 an	 industry	 front-runner	 and	 leader	 in	 corporate	 sustainability	 to	 both	 the	
construction	but	also	the	wider	ecology	sector.	Towards	the	close	of	the	official	DEFRA	
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pilot	 period	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2013,	 TLP	 started	 speaking	 widely	 to	 industry	 and	 ecology	
professional	 communities:	 ‘as	we	want	 to	 be	 completely	 transparent,	 as	we	don’t	 have	
anything	 to	 hide’	 (DEV-TLP	 010813).	 	 They	 used	 their	 status	 as	 DEFRA	 official	
demonstration	project	 to	actively	engage	the	burgeoning	BDO	professional	network	by	
speaking	 at	 BDO	 relevant	 events	 at	 Construction	 Industry	 Research	 and	 Information	
Association	(CIREA),	as	well	as	to	ecology	professionals	at	the	Institute	of	Environmental	
Management	and	Assessment	(IEMA).	In	addition,	DEV-TLP	and	CE-TLP	became	active	
within	 BBOP	 and	 Forest	 Trends	 events,	 appearing	 as	 panellists	 in	 the	 2014	 London	
summit	along	with	other	Community	of	Practice	webinars	 in	2014,	2016	and	2017.	 	The	
two	professionals	widely	promoted	 their	work	using	BDO	on	the	 infrastructure	project	
through	industry	magazines	press	releases.	The	international	newsletter	MitMail	run	by	
Forest	 Trends	 and	 internal	 communications	 publications	 for	 the	 global	 community	
Parsons	 Brinkahoff,	 as	 well	 as	 many	 others,	 all	 featured	 accounts	 of	 this	 increasingly	
iconic	programme.	In	particular,	public	documents	drew	on	the	potent	image	of	DEFRA	
Secretary	of	State	Owen	Paterson,	wielding	a	spade	and	digging	the	ground	at	the	offset	
site	in	February	2014	within	‘London’s	first	biodiversity	offset’	(Figure	17).	
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Figure	17	DEFRA	minister	launching	London’s	first	biodiversity	offset	with	Network	Rail	and	
London	Wildlife	Trust	
	
	Source:	Construction	News31	
The	public	communications	tended	to	foreground	critique	so	as	to	confront	and	counter	
this.	 TLP’s	 strategy	 of	 legitimation	 entailed	 emphasising	 strict	 observance	 of	 the	
mitigation	 hierarchy	 and	 the	 inherent	 pragmatism	 of	 BDO	 as	 an	 approach	 to	 tackle	
residual	losses	resulting	from	essential	infrastructure	development.		
However,	 it	 became	 increasingly	 necessary	 to	 also	 direct	 these	messages	 internally	 to	
TLP	to	obtain	‘senior	buy	in	and	leadership	from	the	top’	of	Network	Rail.	DEV-TLP	and	
CE-TLP	described	how	quantification	methodologies	help	to	overcome	the	perception	of	
undertaking	 corporate	biodiversity	 ‘best	 practice’	 as	 a	 business	 cost	 through	making	 it	
transparent	 to	 decision	 markers	 and	 building	 it	 into	 the	 budget.	 This	 much	 was	
reiterated	in	the	official	DEFRA	evaluation	project’s	assessment	of	TLP	stating:	
Engagement	of	the	TLP	Executive	Board	was	critical.	This	was	facilitated	by	
changing	the	way	biodiversity	is	communicated	to	a	business	audience.	
																																																						
31https://www.constructionnews.co.uk/companies/sustainablebusiness/thameslink-upgrade-
uses-offsetting-to-boost-biodiversity/8658417.article	(Accessed	15th	June	2016)	
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Unavoidable	loss	of	biodiversity	and	the	roadmap	for	a	net-gain	was	illustrated	
in	numeric	scores,	by	using	the	Defra	metric,	from	which	the	Executive	Board	
could	more	easily	make	the	commitment	to	a	net	gain.	(Baker	et	al.	2014b:	2)	
However,	 CE-TLP	 also	 acknowledged	 that	 while	 numbers	 helped	 to	 enrol	 the	 Board,	
there	were	 limitations	 to	 this	 approach	 indicating	 that	 there	 is	 a	 time	and	place	when	
numbers	were	necessary	to	achieve	certain	things.	CE-TLP	emphasised	that	professional	
ecological	 expert	 judgements	 must	 always	 guide	 how	 the	 numbers	 are	 applied	 in	
practice.	She	stressed	 ‘[N]umbers	are	useful	management	tools’	but	only	 ‘effective	after	
understanding	biodiversity’	(emphasis	added)	(CE-TLP	010813).	The	distinction	between	
purely	technical	justifications	and	nuanced	professional	judgments	is	yet	another	tension	
these	 actors	 navigated.	 The	 logic	 of	 ‘horses	 for	 courses’	 (NE1	 150613)	 demands	 the	
instrumentalised	 translation	 of	 knowledges	 into	 audience	 friendly	 formats.	 This	 facet	
reflects	a	mere	microcosm	of	the	wider	institutional	tensions	the	DEFRA	metric	creates	
and	the	directions	it	is	pulling	conservation	practice	and	theory.		
In	summary,	efforts	to	establish	TLP	in	a	voluntary	context	required	internal	persuasive	
advocates	 to	 steer	 a	 course	 through	a	 range	of	polarising	 tensions.	These	 included	 the	
need	to	appeal	to	the	interests	of	senior	TLP	management	(necessitating	simple,	friendly	
and	 compelling	 communications)	 as	 well	 as	 mitigating	 reputational	 risk	 factors	 and	
maintaining	a	strong	public	programme	of	engagement.	Significant	for	TLP’s	role	in	the	
assemblages	of	BDO	more	widely	is	that	its	reach	through	organisational	influences	and	
PR	channels	is	potentially	enormous.	The	two	individuals	comprising	this	collaboration	
are	situated	 in	expansive	corporations	with	considerable	networks	 in	the	 infrastructure	
and	ecology	 sectors	more	widely	 in	 the	UK	and	 internationally.	Furthermore,	Network	
Rail	 is	 the	 fourth	 biggest	 landowner	 in	 England	 owning	 over	 30,000	 hectares	 of	 land	
including	Sites	of	Special	Scientific	Interest	(SSSI),	Areas	of	Outstanding	Natural	Beauty	
(AONB)	and	many	other	statutory	and	locally	designated	nature	reserves	(Beneke	2014)	
meaning	that	it	would	not	be	surprising	if	it	engaged	with	providing	the	offsets	itself	or	
to	other	developers.	Network	Rail	is	also	one	of	the	biggest	infrastructure	bodies	in	the	
UK	and	joined	BBOP	as	a	member	in	2015.	Balfour	Beatty	disposed	of	Parsons	Brinkahoff	
in	2014,	but	CE-TLP	took	up	a	new	role	as	Biodiversity	Technical	Specialist	at	the	parent	
company	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 delivering	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 on	 major	 infrastructure	
projects.	Balfour	Beatty	 is	a	British	plc.	with	over	36,000	staff	operating	across	 the	UK,	
North	America,	Canada	and	South	East	Asia.	Ripple	effects	in	both	of	these	organisations	
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could	 see	 exponential	 uptake	 as	 the	 language,	 standards	 and	 expertise	 is	 developed	
across	new	projects	and	consensus	stabilises.			
7.3	The	biodiversity	offset	
The	development	
TLP	development	work	consists	of	two	‘key	outputs’.	The	first	entailed	the	construction	
and	significant	expansion	of	London	Bridge	and	Farringdon	stations.	The	second,	and	to	
which	 the	 biodiversity	 impacts	 were	 recorded	 and	 compensation	 sought,	 involved	 a	
massive	upgrading	of	track	and	signalling	equipment	along	the	length	of	the	Thameslink	
route	from	Bedford	to	Brighton.	The	bulk	of	this	work	involved	building	new	depots	and	
stabling	sites	as	well	as	 installing	new	railway	sidings	to	house	the	trains	overnight.	As	
with	 many	 infrastructure	 projects,	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 the	 construction	 and	
associated	 environmental	 disturbance	 was	 necessary	 only	 for	 temporary	 works	 that	
facilitated	another	part	of	the	development.		
Calculating	the	impacts		
Seven	 sites	 along	 the	TLP	 route	 showed	biodiversity	 losses	with	 an	 initial	 total	 loss	 of	
48.9	 units	 (DEV-TLP	 010813)	 (Figure	 18).	 For	 unclear	 reasons,	 this	 sum	 was	 later	
downwards	recalculated	to	be	42	units	(BOMP	2015)32.	Forty-two	units	therefore	required	
compensation	and	a	 ‘net	gain’	 in	 terms	of	unit	delivery	 at	 an	offset	 site.	 	Of	 the	 seven	
sites	with	biodiversity	loss	along	the	route,	the	one	with	the	highest	recorded	impact	was	
at	a	site	called	Selhurst,	located	just	outside	a	railway	station	in	south	London.	Here,	an	
area	of	rail	locked	silver	birch	woodland	was	cleared	to	make	space	for	temporary	railway	
sidings	 for	 over-night	 train	 storage	 while	 London	 Bridge	 station	 was	 being	 upgraded.	
The	 baseline	 and	 loss	 calculations	 undertaken	 by	 CE-TLP	 showed	 that	 Selhurst	 unit	
losses	totalled	23.9	units	(CE-TLP	201113)	of	a	baseline	value	of	24	units.	The	development	
needed	 to	 remove	 99	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 woodland	 at	 this	 site.	 Onsite	 replacement	 was	
impossible	due	 to	 an	 absence	of	 space	or	 land	 around	 the	 rail	 tracks	 and	wider	urban	
fabric	in	which	it	was	embedded.	Since	woodland	habitat	comprised	the	greatest	loss	in	
terms	 of	 units,	 TLP	 sought	 a	 ‘like	 for	 like’	 offset	 made	 up	 of	 woodland	 to	 reflect	 the	
Selhurst	impacts.	Aggregating	the	calculations	of	residual	loss	from	the	other	sites	along	
the	TLP	 route	provided	 the	 total	number	of	units	making	up	 the	biodiversity	 loss.	For	
																																																						
32	Unlike	the	local	planning	authority	case	studies	in	chapters	5	and	6,	I	was	not	able	to	
obtain	specific	details	about	how	this	impact	was	downwards	calculated.		
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the	most	part,	these	impacts	were	predominantly	associated	with	habitats	awarded	low	
distinctiveness	 and	 poor	 condition	 (DEV-TLP	 010813)	 from	 relatively	 marginal,	
brownfield	urban	sites.	
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Figure	18	‘Impacted	biodiversity	units	as	a	‘statistical	picturing	device’	used	in	public	
communications	
Source:	TLP	Presentation	to	CIEEM	15th	November	2014	
Central	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	 using	 the	 DEFRA	metric	 on	 a	multi	 sited	 project	 was	 the	
necessity	of	 training	 the	many	different	ecological	 consultants	 to	perform	calculations.	
For	this	purpose,	CE-TLP	made	a	 ‘translation	spread	sheet’	to	convert	the	conventional	
Phase	 1	 habitat	 classifications	 into	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 categories	 and	 values	 so	 as	 to	
produce	consistent	and	uniform	results	(CE-TLP	BBOP	webinar	191115).	In	contrast	to	the	
translations	underway	 at	Warwickshire,	where	 the	Environment	Bank	broker	provided	
training	 seminars	 for	 ecologists,	 at	TLP,	 a	 spread	 sheet	 device	 enabled	 this	 knowledge	
conversion.	 Amongst	 other	 difficult	 translation	 processes,	 TLP	 discovered	 that	 the	
habitat	 condition	 assessment	 methodologies	 of	 the	 Farm	 Environment	 Plan	 (FEP)	
proposed	in	the	DEFRA	guidance	(discussed	in	chapter	4)	were	broadly	shaped	around	
agri-environment	schemes	and	were	not	 therefore	relevant	 to	urban	contexts.	The	FEP	
was	in	CE-TLP’s	words	‘clunky	and	clearly	written	by	people	who	spend	a	lot	of	time	in	
the	country-side’	(CE-TLP	201113).		
TLP	 emphasised	 that	 they	 ‘always	 follow	 the	 rules,	 the	 first	 of	which	 is	 the	mitigation	
hierarchy’	 (DEV-TLP	 010813).	 For	 TLP,	 mitigation	 had	 included	 where	 possible	 and	
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practical,	the	relocation	of	sub	stations	to	avoid	the	removal	of	vegetation	or	disturbance	
protected	species.	In	these	cases,	the	legal	compliance	always	comes	first	meaning	they	
must	 follow	 statutory	 wildlife	 legislation	 for	 protected	 species	 (DEV-TLP	 010813).	
Although,	the	provision	of	on-site	enhancements	is	central	to	the	mitigation	hierarchy,	it	
was	not	always	appropriate	for	the	railway	environment.	CE-TLP	was	keen	to	counter	the	
notion	that	on-site	mitigation	is	always	preferable:	
Sorry	to	butt	in,	but	you	know	sometimes	it	doesn’t	make	sense	if	you	are	going	
to	do	something	that	is	useful	for	biodiversity,	I	just	think	it’s	wrong	to	
encourage	animals	right	next	to	a	railway	line.	The	best	you	can	do	is	put	back	
something	interesting	like	wildflowers	or	native	species	but	if	you’re	really	
going	to	create	good	woodland	habitat	that	something	like	dormice	are	going	to	
use,	don’t	put	it	next	to	a	railway	line!	It’s	just	going	to	be	disturbed.	The	
amount	of	vandalism	and	the	amount	of	rubbish	that	builds	up	along	railway	
lines...	you	know	you	have	to	put	it	somewhere	decent.	(CE-TLP	010813).		
In	 addition,	 the	 railway	 context	 of	 the	 TLP	 construction	 meant	 that	 there	 were	 also	
health	 and	 safety	 issues	 associated	 with	 woodland	 proximity	 to	 the	 track	 so	 that	
offsetting	is	put	forward	as	a	unique	solution	to	the	railway	environment	because:		
You	can’t	physically	re-plant	along	the	railway	line	and	if	you	did	the	first	thing	
that	would	happen	is	that	people	would	complain	when	there	are	leaves	on	the	
line!	And	the	train	stops	running,	the	place	is	filled	with	rubbish	and	with	
animals	on	the	line...	it’s	horrible!	(CE-TLP	010813).	
On	site	enhancements	that	follow	the	mitigation	hierarchy	are	further	compromised	by	
the	probable	future	expansion	of	the	railways,	reaffirming	the	idea	that,	 in	this	context	
the	mitigation	hierarchy	and	onsite	replacements	may	be	better	evaluated	on	a	case	by	
case	basis	and	potentially	skipped	altogether	in	favour	of	offsite	offsetting.		
Offset	partners	for	the	delivery	of	the	sites	
By	 the	 Autumn	 of	 2013	 TLP	 had	 managed	 to	 secure	 an	 offset	 delivery	 partner	 in	 the	
London	Wildlife	Trust	(LWT).	Prior	to	this	agreement	however	TLP	had	been	talking	to	
other	 conservation	 bodies,	 including	 the	 Woodland	 Trust.	 The	 Woodland	 Trust,	
however,	 was	 not	 prepared	 to	 publicly	 state	 that	 they	 were	 participating	 in	 the	 TLP	
offsetting	project.	Yet,	 this	was	a	key	criterion	for	 the	partnership,	due	to	the	publicity	
surrounding	the	DEFRA	demonstration	project.	The	LWT	came	forward	in	the	end	‘with	
their	 house	 in	 order’	 over	 offsetting	 realising	 they	 ‘can’t	 sit	 on	 the	 fence’	 (DEV-TLP	
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201113).	DEV-TLP	(201113)	said	that	the	Wildlife	Trust	‘could	see	the	benefits	of	it	for	their	
organisation	 as	 well	 as	 ours’.	 In	 respect	 to	 brokers,	 TLP	 preferred	 not	 to	 use	 the	
Environment	Bank,	but	instead	a	conservation	partner	that	they	considered	to	be	a	‘well	
established’	body	that	‘will	have	the	experience’	they	needed	for	the	approach	to	remain	
squeaky	 clean	 (DEV-TLP	 010813).	 	 TLP	were	 further	 discouraged	 from	partnering	with	
the	organisation	as	 they	 considered	 this	might	be	 taken	 to	be	 an	 indication	 they	were	
dispensing	of	their	responsibility.	DEV-TLP	said:		
We	wanted	it	to	be	about	biodiversity	rather	than	putting	money	into	the	bank,	
and	that	being	perceived	as	negative,	so	not	putting	a	cheque	to	the	problem	
but	actually	delivering	it	with	a	partner.	(DEV-TLP	010813)		
In	relation	to	the	particular	legitimisation	strategies	emphasising	the	moral	imperative	of	
BDO,	TLP	were	focussed	on	engaging	with	biodiversity	as	a	cause,	and	this	was	not	felt	
to	 be	 complementary	 with	 a	 third-party	 bank/brokerage	 entity	 that	 cleans	 up	 the	
problem	 for	 a	 fee.	 Limiting	 the	 process	 to	 financial	 compensation	 was	 deemed	 to	 be	
open	to	criticism	of	green-washing	the	development	 instead	of	a	genuine	commitment	
to	corporate	sustainability	and	delivering	a	‘net	gain’	for	biodiversity.	At	the	same	time,	
value	 was	 identified	 in	 the	 prospect	 of	 undertaking	 the	 actual	 conservation	 work	 in-
house	as	TLP	positioned	BDO	as	an	opportunity	for	staff	engagement.	For	TLP,	choosing	
their	own	offset	partner	was	essential	to	this	latter	point:		
	What	Thameslink	has	been	really	strong	on	is	that	they	want	staff	engagement	
so	they	want	the	staff	to	go	out	and	help	the	planters,	and	you	don’t	get	that	if	
you	give	a	cheque	to	someone.	(CE-TLP	010813)	
Spatial	tensions	
Like	 the	 other	 case	 studies	 from	 prior	 chapters,	 TLP	 encountered	 problems	 with	
identifying	receptor	sites.	The	company	wanted	the	offset	to	be	as	close	to	the	impacts	as	
possible.	However,	as	the	biodiversity	loss	derived	from	several	different	sites,	it	was	not	
practical	 to	 achieve	 this.	 Furthermore,	 TLP	 felt	 there	 was	 ‘bigger	 bang	 for	 buck’	 in	
delivering	 an	offset	 in	London.	 In	partnering	with	 the	London	Wildlife	Trust,	 the	TLP	
offset	was	to	align	with	the	LWT’s	existing	Great	North	Wood	(GNW)	Living	Landscape	
strategy,	 through	 delivering	woodland	 enhancements	 and	 planting	 schemes	 along	 key	
sites	of	the	historic	London	wood.	The	London	Wildlife	Trust	presented	TLP	with	three	
different	 offset	 types.	 CE-TLP	 took	 these	 and;	 ‘drilled	 down	 to	work	 out	 how	much	 it	
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cost	per	biodiversity	unit,	to	really	start	to	look	at	what	presents	value	for	money	for	the	
developer’	(CE-TLP	201113).			
The	first	land	LWT	offered	TLP	was	the	NGO’s	strong	preference	since	it	was	under	their	
own	 control	 and	 the	most	 feasible	 option	within	 a	wider	 context	 of	 ‘highly	 contested’	
(NGO-TLP	270116)	and	heavily	used	parcels	of	land	in	London.	Putting	this	conservation	
opportunity	 forward,	 the	 LWT	 envisaged	 a	 simple	 and	 non-controversial	management	
programme	 on	 a	 well-identified	 conservation	 priority	 that	 simply	 had	 a	 funding	
shortage.	This	proposal	would	entail	some	management	of	woodland	at	Dulwich	Wood,	
a	 site	 ‘not	 too	 far	 away	 from	 the	 actual	 impact’	 (NGO-TLP	 270116).	 All	 the	 same,	 TLP	
rejected	this	option	because	they	had	a	‘corporate	wish	to	be	able	to	show	something	on	
the	ground	-	a	fundamental	change’	(NGO-TLP	270116).	Furthermore,	this	option	didn’t	
offer	the	right	number	of	units	and	in	the	CE-TLP’s	own	words	 ‘was	not	good	value	for	
money’	(Nov	2013)	(see	Table	10).	CE-TLP	said:	
there	was	one	site	where	most	of	the	offset	was	going	to	be	enhancements,	they	
weren't	planting	anything	new	which	immediately	lowered	the	number	of	units	
you	could	get	by	default,	as	enhancing	you	are	not	going	to	generate	as	many	
units	as	you	are	if	you	are	creating	something,	you	know	planting	new	habitat.	
And	the	number	of	units	for	that	were	quite	extortionate	and	at	the	end	of	the	
line,	for	BDO	to	work	the	developer	has	got	to	look	at	it	and	it	has	got	to	make	
economic	sense.	(CE-TLP	201113)		
Table	10	Example	of	biodiversity	offset	options	assessed	as	value	for	money	
Source:	Author	adapted	from	slides	in	the	Network	Rail	BBOP	webinar	July	2014	
Since	the	woodland	enhancements	were	unable	to	offer	value	for	money,	the	drive	was	
thus	 towards	 woodland	 creation	 and	 actual	 tree	 planting.	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	
elsewhere	that	another	reason	for	TLP	rejecting	this	site	for	the	offset	was	that	it	would	
be	 ‘invisible	to	the	public’	 (NGO-TLP	270116).	The	TLP	did	not	consider	enhancements	
Proposal		 Woodland	Offset	 Total	Cost	 Total	BD	units	 Cost	per	BD	
unit	
	
Streatham	
Common	
Creation	 £18,800	 12.96	 £1,451	
Enhancement	 £29,200	 19.20	 £1,521	
	
Brockwell	Park	
Creation	 £31,700	 11.58	 £2,737	
Enhancement	 £17,300	 2.36	 £7,339	
	
Dulwich	Wood	
	
Enhancement	
	
£48,500	
	
2.40	
	
£20,208	
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to	an	existing,	privately	owned	wood	to	be	appropriate	nor	represent	enough	of	a	change	
or	 a	 contribution	 or	 to	 be	 visible	 enough	 for	 the	 demonstration	 of	 the	 project.	 TLP	
considered	it	better	to	do	‘one	big	central	offset	rather	than	little	offsets	dotted	around	
‘because	 you	 will	 get	 the	 maximum	 biodiversity	 from	 that’	 (CE-TLP	 010813).	 But	 this	
would	also	ensure	maximum	visibility.	TLP	required	a	prominent	offsetting	case	study	to	
which	 to	 refer	 in	 public	 engagement	 efforts.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 in-house	 nature	
reserve	options	 for	 the	desired	 scheme,	 the	London	Wildlife	Trust	was	pushed	 toward	
securing	 a	 site	 that	was	 not	 under	 their	 own	 control.	 Streatham	Common,	 a	 Lambeth	
Council	 park	 but	 also	 a	 Local	 Nature	 Reserve	 was	 eventually	 put	 forward	 for	 this	
woodland	 planting.	 Although	 my	 data	 collection	 did	 not	 identify	 the	 reasons	 why	
Streatham	 was	 selected,	 a	 plausible	 link	 was	 the	 existing	 professional	 connection	
between	 an	 individual	 here	 acting	 as	 Head	 of	 Parks	 and	 Green	 Spaces	 at	 Lambeth	
Council	 and	 the	 London	 Wildlife	 Trust,	 where	 this	 individual	 was	 also	 acting	 as	 a	
director	(LR-TLP	July	2016)	until	2014	November	(Companies	House	2016)33.				
Due	 to	 its	 status	 as	 the	DEFRA	 demonstration	 project,	 DEV-TLP	 (261114)	 told	me	 the	
whole	 process	 ‘moved	 quite	 quickly’.	 The	 value	 of	 being	 named	 the	 demonstration	
project	 carried	 weight	 in	 a	 way	 that	 legitimised	 the	 project	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 senior	
executives	but	it	subsequently	allowed	relatively	little	time	to	extensively	scope	out	the	
partners,	 the	nature	of	 the	offset	 delivery	 locations	 and	 any	political	 complexities	 that	
may	 be	 relevant	 to	 these	 (NGO-TLP	 270116).	 This	 time	 pressure	 had	 knock	 on	 effects,	
one	 of	 which	 was	 the	 rapid	 selection	 of	 Streatham	 Common,	 which	 was	 not	 properly	
assessed	in	terms	of	its	suitability	and	later	heavily	contested	by	the	local	community,	as	
I	expand	on	below.	As	such,	 the	 imperative	 for	haste	also	threw	the	programme	out	of	
kilter	 with	 TLP’s	 aspirations	 for	 a	 ‘community	 partnership	 model’.	 The	 downstream	
difficulties	of	these	guiding	criteria	for	the	type	and	value	for	money	of	offset	required,	
and	 the	speed	 in	which	 it	was	delivered,	 strongly	 influenced	how	the	offset	played	out	
and	most	likely	its	prospects	for	long	term	conservation	success.	
The	London	Wildlife	Trust	supplied	the	TLP	with	a	proposed	conservation	management	
scheme	at	Streatham	Common	comprising	seven	different	parcels	of	woodland	planting	
and	management.	CE-TLP	subsequently	worked	through	this	proposal	so	as	to	calculate	
																																																						
33 	The	 professional	 networks	 continue	 to	 open	 up	 doors	 for	 engagement	 as	 this	
individual	 is	 the	 vice	 chairman	 of	 the	 Association	 of	 Local	 Government	 Ecologists	
(ALGE)	 and	 coordinated	 its	 November	 2016	 annual	 conference	 at	 which	 CE-TLP	
delivered	one	of	the	eight	presentations	during	the	day	long	meeting	entitled	Net	Gain	
for	Biodiversity	-	New	Principles	and	Guidance.	
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the	available	units	that	each	parcel	could	provide.	 	Although	these	seven	parcels	would	
supply	 ample	 units	 as	 a	 quantitative	 increase	 to	 the	 impacted	 units,	 when	 the	metric	
multipliers	were	applied,	‘around	50	per	cent	of	these	were	lost’	(CE-TLP	201113)	(see	also	
discussion	 of	 metric	 technicalities	 in	 chapter	 4).	 In	 selecting	 which	 risk	 category	 the	
multipliers	 should	 fall	under,	 the	TLP	consultant	ecologist	 said	 that	 the	 ‘difficulty’	and	
‘spatial	multipliers’	were	‘quite	easy	to	do’	since	the	offset	delivery	partner	was	a	trusted	
conservation	 agency	 and	 the	 location	 is	 strategically	 placed	 within	 the	 Great	 North	
Wood.	 The	 offset	would	 therefore	 fall	within	 an	 existing	 regional	 biodiversity	 strategy	
and	 be	 undertaken	 by	 an	 experienced	 provider.	However,	 after	 applying	 the	 time	 risk	
factor	multipliers,	the	number	of	units	available	at	Streatham	Common	were	drastically	
reduced.	The	basis	of	selecting	the	likely	‘time	to	reach	target	condition’	was	assessed	on	
a	precautionary	principle	according	to	the	existing	recreational	uses	of	the	park	since:		
time	to	target	condition,	especially	if	it	is	an	urban	site	we	wanted	to	err	on	the	
side	of	caution	because	risk	of	failure	if	there	is	a	lot	of	dog	walkers	and	things	
like	that	the	risk	is	possibly	higher	and	we	didn't	want	anything	that	people	
could	tear	apart	our	calculations.	(CE-TLP	201113).	
Due	to	the	‘de-valuation’	of	Streatham’s	biodiversity	unit	budget,	other	sites	were	needed	
to	 make	 up	 the	 unit	 shortfall.	 Brockwell	 Park,	 also	 within	 the	 London	 borough	 of	
Lambeth	was	put	forward	as	a	second	site.	Eventually	a	third	site	called	Ten	Acre	Wood	
in	the	north	west	of	the	city	was	required	as	well.	Ten	Acre	Wood	is	located	on	the	other	
side	 of	 London	 and	 not	 at	 all	 related	 to	 the	 Great	 North	 Wood	 Living	 Landscapes	
project.	Although	it	provided	just	over	half	of	the	total	units	in	compensation,	Streatham	
Common	 is	 the	 only	 offset	 site	 that	 is	 represented	 within	 TLP’s	 public	 engagement	
communications.	 Given	 the	 limitations	 on	 space	 here	 and	 the	 emphasis	 placed	 on	
Streatham	by	TLP,	I	have	restricted	my	focus	to	this	offset	site	only.	Table	11	shows	the	
distribution	of	biodiversity	units	to	be	delivered	from	each	offset	site.	
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Table	11	Spread	of	units	to	be	delivered	from	offset	each	site	
	
	
	
	
	
Source:	Biodiversity	Offset	Management	Plan	2015	
Receptor	site:	Streatham	Common	
Streatham	 Common	 is	 an	 important	 24	 ha	 green	 space	 in	 the	 London	 Borough	 of	
Lambeth,	formerly	on	the	fringes	of	the	GNW.	It	is	an	open	common	with	a	mixture	of	
mostly	recreational	acid	grassland	and	young	native	woodland	dating	to	the	end	of	the	
19th	century.	It	contains	an	orchard	called	The	Rookery,	a	Grade	II	listed	and	landscaped	
garden	 area	 with	 ornamental	 pond,	 streams	 and	 rock	 gardens	 as	 well	 as	 a	 café	 and	
community	garden.	 	Streatham	Common	contains	one	of	the	borough’s	 largest	areas	of	
native	woodland	comprised	mostly	of	oak,	sycamore,	beech,	ash,	hawthorn	and	elm.	In	
2013,	just	over	half	of	Streatham	Common,	including	parts	of	the	Rookery	were	named	a	
Local	Nature	Reserve	by	Lambeth	Council.		
The	 common	was	 afforded	 this	 local	 status	 due	 to	 its	 local	 natural	 interest	 as	well	 as	
community	and	educational	value.	The	common	is	a	heavily	used	recreational	park	and	
sits	at	the	heart	of	a	dynamic	array	of	community	user-management	groups.	The	groups	
include	the	local	residents	groups:	Friends	of	Streatham	Common	(FSC)	and	Streatham	
Common	 Cooperative,	 known	 as	 SCCoop,	 which	 formed	 in	 2014.	 The	 Friends	 of	
Streatham	 Common	 are	 a	 registered	 charity	 run	 by	 local	 residents	 with	 about	 350	
members,	 who	 pay	 a	 token	 annual	 fee	 to	 receive	 newsletters	 and	 the	 opportunity	 to	
contribute	to	the	charity.	SCCoop	became	a	separate	legal	entity	in	early	2014,	so	that	it	
could	receive	monies	to	take	over	management	of	parts	of	the	Local	Nature	Reserve	(LR-	
TLP1	270716).	A	growing	paucity	of	council	resources	meant	the	council	could	no	longer	
manage	the	local	Nature	reserve,	a	point	that	I	will	return	to	later.	Lambeth	owned	the	
site	at	the	time	of	the	BDO	negotiations	at	the	end	of	2013	and	beginning	of	2014,	but	it	
was	devolving	the	responsibility	for	the	park	management	to	SCCoop.	
The	London	Wildlife	Trust	occupied	a	central	position	in	the	network	of	actors.	Its	role	
was	 to	 mediate	 between	 all	 of	 the	 other	 partners	 involved	 with	 the	 offset.	 The	
Offset	site	 Biodiversity	Units	
Streatham	Common		 38.13	
Brockwell	Park		 5.9	
Ten	Acre	Wood		 28	
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distribution	of	responsibilities	within	the	contract	positioned	Network	Rail	as	funders	of	
the	offset,	LWT	as	conservation	managers	for	the	first	five	years	and	Lambeth	Council,	as	
owners	of	the	park	assuming	on-going	habitat	management	thereafter.	FSC	did	not	have	
an	 explicit	 role	 other	 than	 acting	 as	 the	 local	 engagement	 partners	 with	 whom	 LWT	
consulted	 over	 their	 plans	 as	 to	 how	 the	 planting	 schemes	 would	 be	 designed.	 Along	
with	the	strategic	priorities	of	the	London	Wildlife	Trust	for	restoring	parts	of	the	Great	
North	 Wood,	 Lambeth	 Council	 sought	 to	 increase	 the	 wildlife	 opportunities	 in	
Streatham	 Common,	 thereby	 making	 the	 BDO	 an	 attractive	 addition	 to	 the	 existing	
agendas	of	both	partners.	The	odd	one	out	was	 the	FSC,	whose	 interests	and	concerns	
became	 increasingly	misaligned	with	 those	of	Network	Rail	and	London	Wildlife	Trust	
(NGO-TLP	260116,	LR-TLP	270716).		
At	the	initial	discussion	in	2013	when	the	LWT	consulted	the	FSC	(LR-TLP)	about	BDO,	
the	 FSC	 representative	 (LR-TLP1)	 reported	 there	 ‘wasn’t	much	 enthusiasm’.	 The	 FSC’s	
nominated	representative	paraphrased	the	Friends’	collective	thoughts	as	‘well	we’ve	got	
lots	of	 trees	on	 this	 common,	do	we	need	anymore	 and	 if	 so,	where	do	 they	go?’	 (LR-
TLP1	 270716).	 In	 parallel	 to	 the	 disinterest	 in	 increasing	 the	 wooded	 areas	 of	 the	
common,	 the	 LR-TLP	 felt	 that	 what	 they	 needed	more	 than	 new	 trees	 was	 some	 real	
management	 work	 on	 the	 existing	 trees	 as	 the	 representative	mentioned	 ‘certainly	 as	
long	as	 I	 remember,	perhaps	 the	 last	 10	years	or	 so,	 tree	management	has	consisted	of	
cutting	down	any	trees	that	were	dangerous	and	clearing	up	any	trees	that	fell’.		
After	LR-TLP1	had	been	‘tipped	off’	by	the	actor	straddling	roles	in	Lambeth	Council	and	
the	LWT,	 and	 following	 some	preparatory	discussions,	 all	 parties,	 apart	 from	Network	
Rail,	walked	around	the	common	to	discuss	the	proposed	planting	schemes	and	parcels	
that	 LWT	 had	 put	 forward.	 The	 management	 proposals	 for	 the	 existing	 trees	 on	 the	
common	were	 eventually	 incorporated	 into	 the	offset	 plans	 although	LR-TLP1	was	not	
clear	whether	 this	 work	was	 eventually	 going	 to	 count	 towards	 the	 official	 offset	 unit	
calculations.	LR-TLP1	expected	that	LWT	would	send	along	some	volunteers	 to	do	this	
work,	which	would	be	a	customary	procedure	for	the	Wildlife	Trust	to	undertake.	He	did	
wonder	whether	this	management	work	had	been	included	in	the	offset	agreement	as	a	
way	to	‘sweeten’	the	FSC,	given	that	they	did	not	particularly	desire	the	offset	to	happen	
in	Streatham	Common	in	the	first	place.	There	was	no	dialogue	in	relation	to	the	specific	
number	 of	 units	 to	 be	 created,	 and	LR-TLP1	 had	no	 contact	with	Network	Rail	 at	 any	
time.		
Entirely	 contrary	 to	 the	 explicit	 objectives	 of	Network	 Rail,	 the	 process	 of	 getting	 the	
local	Friends	group	involved	with	the	project	as	accepting	of	the	offset	delivery	let	alone	
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in	 any	 kind	 of	 ‘partnership’	 or	 ‘engagement	model’,	 transpired	 to	 be	 one	 of	 on-going	
appeasement	and	persuasion	with	considerable	 ‘horse	 trading’	between	parties	 (NGO1-
TLP	 260116).	 Some	 of	 this	 negotiation	 included	 LWT	 committing	 to	 providing	
management	of	 the	small	orchard	area	used	as	public	access	and	a	demonstration	plot	
but	 which	 wasn’t	 ‘strictly	 part	 of	 the	 offset’	 (NGO1-TLP	 260116)	 in	 addition	 to	 a	
replacement	cedar	of	Lebanon	(cedrus	 libani)	 tree	to	make	up	a	pair	from	one	that	was	
lost	 from	 the	 Rookery	 many	 years	 ago.	 The	 LWT	 were	 amenable	 to	 meeting	 these	
additional	 requests	 so	 as	 to	 navigate	 the	multiple	 demands	 of	 stakeholders	 they	were	
coordinating,	since	by	this	time	the	LWT	found	themselves	caught	in	a	knot	of	interests.	
This	complexity	included	their	obligations	towards	Lambeth	Council	policies,	the	desires	
and	 views	 of	 FSC	 as	 local	 residents	 and	 users	 of	 the	 common	 and	 their	 commercial	
contraction	 to	 TLP	 as	 clients	 for	 the	 delivery	 of	 the	 offset.	 Eventually	 FSC	 were	
encouraged	 that	 the	 new	 trees	making	 up	 the	 offset	 would	 be	 a	 collection	 of	 distinct	
species	to	the	majority	of	existing	trees	on	the	common	and	yielded	(LR-TLP	270716).		
Using	a	 ‘very	rough	map’,	the	LWT	and	the	lead	actors	from	Lambeth	Council	and	FSC	
informally	 agreed	 on	 where	 the	 new	 trees	 would	 be	 allocated.	 The	 initial	 round	 of	
planting	 commenced	 in	 February	 2014	 using	 LWT	volunteers.	However,	 after	 this	 first	
round,	the	project	was	paused	in	relation	to	complaints	and	resistance	from	the	Friends	
group	and	other	local	users	of	the	park	who	were	not	happy	with	the	location	of	the	trees	
(LR1-TLP	270716).	Objections	were	based	on	the	fact	that	the	new	trees	would	eventually	
mature	 to	 obscure	 the	 view	 of	 the	 park	 from	 residents’	 houses,	 (a	 personal	 objection	
from	the	Chair	of	the	Friends	group),	as	well	as	the	specific	planting	arrangement	along	
the	 perimeter	 of	 the	 park	 that	 was	 currently	 being	 used	 as	 a	 running	 circuit.	 People	
valued	 the	 openness	 of	 the	 common	 and	 used	 the	 space	 for	 running,	 football,	
community	 events	 such	 as	 a	 kite	 festival.	 The	 residents	 greatly	 appreciated	 the	 open	
expansive	 views	 over	 the	 Streatham	 Vale	 and	 feared	 the	maturation	 of	 the	 additional	
trees	 that	 had	 been	 planted	 would	 eventually	 interfere	 with	 these	 landscape	
characteristics	of	the	common.	Fundamentally	however,	the	FSC	were	bothered	because,	
despite	 a	 proclaimed	 ‘partnership’	 model,	 the	 offset	 was	 developing	 in	 un-predictable	
ways	with	new	planting	emerging	in	places	that	they	hadn’t	been	aware	of.	According	to	
LR1-TLP,	at	this	stage	of	the	process,	the	complaints	pointed	out:			
that	some	of	the	planting	was	not	according	to	the	planning,	as	much	as	there	
wasn't	a	clearly	defined	plan…It	was	going	to	be	in	the	area	that	was	a	bit	
contentious	anyway	and	I	couldn't	see	how	it	could	have	added	up	to	seven	
230  
hectares,	which	was	never	specified	and	I	don't	know	where	they	got	that	area	
from	or	how	much	more	there	was	to	plant.	(LR1-TLP	270716)	
The	 FSC	 felt	 that	 the	 arrangement	 lacked	 a	 clear	 agreement	 on	 both	 sides	 about	 the	
location	and	the	extent	of	the	tree	planting,	such	that	when	LWT	came	back	to	start	the	
second	 phase	 of	 planting,	 the	 Friends	 largely	 refused	 on	 the	 grounds	 they	 hadn’t	
anticipated	more	trees	and	in	any	case,	 there	had	been	enough	problems	with	the	first	
round.	 While	 the	 LWT	 strongly	 felt	 that	 they	 had	 undertaken	 all	 of	 the	 necessary	
consultations	and	met	the	concerns	of	the	local	park	users	it	wasn’t	until	this	first	round	
of	planting	had	been	completed	that	they	discovered	‘the	friends	were	not	speaking	with	
one	voice!’	(NGO-TLP	260116)	The	manager	at	the	LWT	told	me:	
	So	even	with	the	efforts	made,	it	was	still	controversial.	There’s	this	whole	issue	
where	you	can	have	the	best	discussions,	long	term	consultation,	draw	a	map,	
get	agreement	with	people	but	when	you	are	on	site,	somebody	goes	‘oh	I	didn’t	
think	you	were	going	to	do	it	there!’	Land	in	London	is	highly	contested,	
multiple	uses,	multiple	interests.	So	even	open	public	land	which	may	be	a	park	
or	an	open	space,	on	a	map	it	looks	easy	but	the	reality	is	there	are	huge	
number	of	political	issues	-	we	discovered	those!	(NGO1-TLP	260116)	
Eventually,	much	of	this	initial	planting	work	had	to	be	removed	and	incorporated	into	
other	parcels	of	the	management	scheme.		By	this	stage,	relations	between	parties	at	the	
offset	site	were	becoming	strained.	LR1-TLP	admits	that	it	was	surprising	to	him	that	the	
FSC	had	been	afforded	 so	much	 say	 in	 the	process	 at	 all,	 since	 this	 should	have	 really	
been	 the	 reserve	of	Lambeth	Council	 as	owners	and	managers	of	 the	park	at	 the	 time,	
but	 ‘they	 didn’t	 seem	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 that’	 (LR1-TLP	 270716).	He	wondered	whether	
since	the	individual	from	Lambeth	Council,	that	had	made	the	introduction	in	the	first	
place	and	who	was	also	acting	as	a	Trustee	 for	 the	LWT,	 felt	he	had	better	 stay	out	of	
things	due	 to	having	 interests	 in	both	parties	 (LR-TLP	260716).	Over	 the	course	of	 the	
planting	period	and	ensuing	dispute	in	2014,	LR1-TLP	reported	that	he	had	no	contact	at	
all	 with	 TLP	 and	 so	 did	 not	 know	 whether	 they	 were	 aware	 of	 the	 friction	 that	 was	
arising.	 In	reference	 to	 their	consultant	ecologists,	Parsons	Brinckerhoff,	he	mentioned	
that	he	had	noticed	‘some	mysterious	third	party	putting	out	press	releases’.	One	of	the	
press	releases	reported	that	10,000	trees	were	planted,	which	LR1-TLP	strongly	negated:	
‘well	I	don’t	know	where	10,000	trees	would	have	gone	-	that	was	nonsense!’.	LR-TLP	had	
counted	them	after	the	planting	was	finished	in	2014	and	he	suggested,	‘it	was	more	like	
700’	(LR1-TLP	270716).		
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As	mentioned	above,	one	of	the	contributing	factors	that	led	to	the	planting	dispute	at	
Streatham	Common	was	 the	 timeframe	 that	 had	 been	 set	 to	 achieve	 an	 offset	within.	
The	LWT	were	 familiar	with	the	realities	and	difficulties	of	delivering	on	going	habitat	
management	under	a	spectrum	of	different	legal,	political	and	social	contexts.		For	these	
reasons	the	LWT	conservation	officer	charged	with	managing	the	offset	relationship	and	
project	delivery	suggested	a	five-year	timeframe	would	be	appropriate	with	the	first	year	
used	 for	 assessing	 site,	 ecological	 and	 social	 appraisals	 (NGO1-TLP	 260116).	 This	
assessment	 period	would	 entail	 the	 asking	 of	 questions	 such	 as	 ‘who	 is	 using	 the	 site,	
who	is	responsible	for	it,	what	are	the	issues,	how	is	it	being	used?’	(ibid.).	Anticipating	
these	political	issues	is	why	the	LWT	initially	encouraged	TLP	to	follow	an	offset	on	one	
of	 their	 own	 management	 sites	 to	 avoid	 existing	 user	 complexities.	 However,	 senior	
management	at	the	LWT	at	the	time	considered	that	the	opportunity	to	partner	with	the	
TLP	 reflected	a	unique	 financial	opportunity	 for	 the	 conservation	NGO,	 for	 something	
that	only	amounted	to	 ‘an	easy	tree	planting	project’.	By	the	end	of	the	 first	two	years,	
from	 LWT’s	 perspective,	 however,	 a	 ‘value	 for	 money’	 of	 the	 contract	 had	 all	 but	
evaporated.	 In	 staff	 time	 alone,	 the	 BDO	 arrangement	 is	 calculated	 to	 have	 cost	 the	
conservation	 NGO	 over	 three	 times	 the	 fee	 they	 received	 for	 the	 offset	 (NGO1-TLP	
260116).		
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Figure	19	Offset	planting	scheme	
Source:	TLP	BOMP	2015	
The	specific	ecological	management	to	be	performed	at	Streatham	Common	to	make	up	
the	 compensation	 of	 the	 biodiversity	 offset	 was	 a	 mixture	 of	 woodland	 planting	 and	
habitat	enhancements	through	management.	The	London	Wildlife	Trust	identified	seven	
parcels	 for	 potential	 management	 and	 planting	 (shown	 in	 Figure	 19),	 which	 the	 TLP	
consultant	 ecologist	 verified	 and	 approved	 using	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 to	 calculate	 the	
number	of	units	that	each	would	deliver	(CE-TLP	201113).	Of	these	seven	habitat	parcels	
within	the	common,	parcels	 1-3	were	 located	along	the	boundary	areas	of	 the	common	
with	recorded	habitat	baselines	of	amenity	grassland	dominated	by	perennial	rye-grass,	
with	 cock’s	 foot	 and	 wall	 barley,	 dandelion,	 white	 clover	 and	 plantain	 (BDO	 BOMP	
2015).	 Parcels	 1	 and	 2	 were	 populated	 by	 some	mature	 London	 plane	 trees	 and	 felled	
specimens	had	been	chopped	and	left	as	deadwood	habitat.	As	part	of	the	BDO	planting	
scheme,	 all	 three	 parcels	 were	 to	 be	 converted	 ‘into	 woodier	 shrubby	 areas’	 (CE-TLP	
201113)	 and	 during	 the	 planting	 work	 in	 February	 2014	 parcels	 1	 and	 2	 received	 new	
standards	of	hornbeam,	pedunculate	oak,	alder	and	white	willow	and	whip	mixtures	of	
hazel,	hawthorn,	guelder	Rose,	field	maple,	dog	rose	and	goat	willow	to	complement	the	
existing	 tree	 lines	 (BDO	BOMP	2015).	The	 fourth	parcel	was	 a	 small	 orchard	 area	 that	
233  
was	 included	 as	 part	 of	 the	 ‘horse	 trading’	 agreement	 (NGO-TLP	 260116)	 between	 the	
Friends	of	Streatham	Common	and	LWT	and	‘wasn’t	strictly	part	of	the	offset’	(CE-TLP	
201113).	Parcel	4	had	been	requested	by	the	FSC	and	Lambeth	City	Council	and	brought	
into	 the	 scheme	 as	 part	 of	 the	 ‘engagement/	 partnership	 model	 basis’	 that	 TLP	 were	
driving.	While	LR-TLP01	was	not	clear	whether	 the	enhancement	work	on	 the	orchard	
would	 contribute	 units	 within	 the	 final	 BDO	 budget	 calculation,	 the	 BOMP	 shows	
however,	that	in	end	it	did.	The	plan	was	to	enhance	the	diversity	of	fruit	tree	species	to	
include	 apple,	 pear,	 cherry	 and	 plum	 including	 both	 native	 wild	 species	 and	 other	
varieties	 as	 well	 as	 performing	 some	 management	 on	 existing	 trees	 through	 selective	
clearance	and	replacement	planting.		
The	BDO	Management	Plan	parcels	5,	6	and	7	constitute	the	largest	overall	spatial	area	
of	the	biodiversity	offset	at	Streatham	Common	at	5.2	ha	 in	aggregate	size.	These	were	
extant	 woodland	 blocks	 with	 recorded	 baseline	 habitats	 made	 up	 of	 secondary	
pedunculate	 oak	 woodland	 also	 included	 ash,	 sycamore,	 beech,	 horse	 chestnut,	
hawthorn,	 English	 elm	 and	 hornbeam.	 The	 BDO	 BOMP	 recorded	 the	 under-canopy	
shrub	 and	 ground	 flora	 as	 minimal	 and	 the	 overall	 structure	 of	 the	 woodland	 was	
reported	 to	 be	 poor	 with	 low	 species	 diversity.	 Some	 management	 with	 selective	
thinning	of	 the	canopy	as	well	as	cut	and	control	of	 the	encroaching	bramble	on	these	
parcels	 of	 woodland	 areas	 was	 recommended.	 In	 addition,	 the	 planting	 specification	
outlined	plans	to	install	a	new	mixture	of	hazel,	hawthorn,	guilder-rose,	field	maple	and	
hornbeam,	wild	cherry,	rowan	and	goat	willow	whips	(40-60	cm)	and	more	mature	2-3	
year	old	trees	(60-100cm)	of	silver	birch,	hornbeam,	rowan	and	field	maple	(BDO	BOMP	
2015).	 This	 woodland	 management	 work	 counted	 towards	 the	 BDO	 biodiversity	 unit	
calculation.		
Notably,	the	work	itself	and	the	spatial	boundaries	of	these	planting	parcels	was	simply	
taken	from	the	prior	works	list	and	management	spatial	compartments	recognised	in	the	
Local	 Authority’s	 Local	 Nature	 Reserve	 Management	 Plan.	 	 The	 FSC	 supplied	 this	 to	
LWT	 in	 reference	 to	 the	 woodland	 management	 jobs	 that	 had	 been	 identified	 but	
hitherto	 overlooked	 in	 line	 with	 funding	 squeezes	 (LR-TLP01	 July	 2016).	 As	 such,	 the	
management	activities	were	already	in	line	with	the	objectives	of	the	LNR	Management	
Plan	that	had	been	set	out	between	Friends	of	Streatham	Common	and	Lambeth	Council	
but	 had	 been	 stalling	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 funds	 (LR-TLP	 270716).	 	 This	 indicates	 that	 BDO	
funding	has	come	to	replace	funding	for	works	already	identified.		
An	 increasingly	apparent	 feature	of	 the	TLP	BDO	was	 the	growing	gap	between	public	
performance	 and	 the	 underlying	 reality.	 This	 disjuncture	 was	 encapsulated	 by	 TLP’s	
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public	 launch	 of	DEFRA’s	 biodiversity	 offset	 demonstration	 project	 attended	 by	Owen	
Paterson,	 who	was	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 DEFRA	 at	 the	 time.	 Shown	 in	 Figure	 17,	 the	
picture	was	a	staged	spectacle	in	a	little	area	of	grassland	adjacent	to	the	car	park,	thus	
allowing	a	quick	turnaround	for	 the	Minister	 to	 ‘break	some	ground’	next	 to	a	London	
Wildlife	Trust	banner.	The	trees	were	not	actually	part	the	offset	and	no	longer	exist,	but	
simply	planted	 in	a	convenient	 location	 for	 the	photograph	and	 ‘launch’.	The	 ‘minister	
simply	wielded	a	spade,	gave	a	speech	and	the	trees	were	left	to	fend	for	themselves’	(LR-
TLP	270716).		
In	respect	to	the	wider	planting	schemes,	the	early	challenge	for	the	whips	was	to	survive	
for	 long	 enough	 to	 gain	 visibility	 and	 prevent	 them	 from	 being	 trampled	 or	 mowed.	
While	the	BOMP	recorded	that	the	whips	 ‘would	have’	tube	protection	to	help	provide	
visibility	 for	 rather	 than	 to	 protect	 against	 deer	 or	 rabbits,	 upon	 visiting	 the	 site	 in	
summer	of	2016,	it	was	apparent	that	only	a	proportion	of	these	had	been	given	or	had	
retained	their	shelter	tubing.	In	line	with	the	sporadic	provision	of	protective	tubing,	LR-
TLP01	was	generally	sceptical	about	the	extent	to	which	the	newly	planted	standards	had	
been	given	the	best	chance	of	survival.	In	discussing	the	patchwork	of	standards	that	had	
received	mulched	 areas	 at	 their	 bases	 he	 reported,	 ‘they	 didn't	 do	 very	 much	 of	 that	
surprisingly,	they	did	come	back	and	do	some	of	that	but	I	don't	think	they	did	all	the	
trees,	 some	 have	 just	 been	 left	 to	 fend	 for	 themselves	 as	 far	 as	 I	 can	 tell.’	 (LR-TLP01	
270717)	
While	 we	were	 talking	 about	 the	 parcels	 of	 woodland	 planting	 and	management,	 LR-
TLP01	was	surprised	 to	hear	 from	me	that	 the	Streatham	planting	scheme	consisted	of	
seven	 parcels	 in	 total.	 He	 was	 aware	 of	 five	 areas	 of	 planting,	 which	 he	 described	 as	
‘three	large	ones	and	two	smaller	ones’.	His	view	was	that	the	three	larger	areas	‘seem	to	
be	 okay,	 and	 in	 reasonable	 shape	 (Figures	 20	 and	 21),	 but	 the	 other	 two;	 one	 has	
completely	disappeared	 and	 the	other	 one	has	barely	 survived’	 (LR-TLP01	 Jul	 2016).	 In	
referencing	 the	 LWT	 BDO	 map	 and	 through	 walking	 around	 the	 common	 with	 LR-
TLP01,	it	is	easy	to	see	that	the	area	that	has	disappeared	is	parcel	3	(Figure	22).	Planted	
at	the	south-western	corner	of	the	common,	this	zone	of	the	park	acts	as	vehicle	access	
and	location	for	an	annual	summer	music	 festival.	As	such,	the	 lorries	driving	over	the	
area	 to	 set	up	 for	 the	event	had	obliterated	 the	 trees.	LR-TLP01	was	 further	concerned	
about	 the	 lack	of	 shelter	 tubing	 for	 the	 rest	of	 the	whips,	while	noting	 that	when	they	
were	 no	 longer	 visible	 through	 the	 long	 grass,	 the	 offset	 planting	 has	 just	 been	
continually	 mowed	 over	 by	 Lambeth	 gardeners.	 In	 respect	 to	 parcel	 3,	 LR-TLP01	
remarked:		
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It	was	a	planned	area,	but	even	before	they	were	destroyed	by	lorries	they	were	
not	surviving	well.	It	is	a	very	wet	part	of	the	common.	London	Wildlife	Trust	
always	sold	this	to	us	as	something	to	see	whether	it	was	possible	to	find	city	
areas	where	you	could	successfully	carry	out	this	kind	of	project,	but	how	they	
measure	the	success	of	it,	I	don't	know.	(LR-TLP	270716)	
An	expectation	that	not	all	of	the	whips	would	survive	had	been	noted	in	the	biodiversity	
offset	management	plan.	The	BOMP	Maintenance	Regime	further	proposes	that		
A	proportion	of	whips	will	probably	die	over	the	course	of	the	first	three	years.	
Standards	that	die	or	are	irrecoverably	damaged	in	year	1	or	2	will	be	replaced	in	
the	following	winters.	The	number	of	dead	or	damaged	whips	to	be	replaced	
will	be	determined	after	an	annual	review	over	three	years	(for	example,	
location	may	prove	to	be	problematical	and	therefore	new	locations	sought).	
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	Figure	20	Young	whip	planting	as	the	biodiversity	offset		
Source:	Author’s	photographs	
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Figure	21	Young	offset	planting	scheme	intact	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	22	Offset	parcel	3	‘obliterated’	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source:	Author’s	photographs
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The	site	monitoring	responsibility	falls	principally	within	the	remit	of	the	LWT	but	with	
‘assistance’	from	TLP	and	Lambeth	Council	until	2018	after	which	time	Lambeth	Council	
will	take	over	the	monitoring	and	management	of	the	offset.	Although,	given	the	existing	
arrangement	of	stakeholders	and	the	lack	of	funding	at	Lambeth	Council	to	engage	with	
the	 LNR	 up	 until	 2016,	 the	 attention	 that	 the	 council	 would	 be	 able	 to	 give	 for	
monitoring	 the	 biodiversity	 offset	 going	 forward	 is	 questionable.	 LR-TLP01	 was	
interested	 to	 know	whether	 Lambeth	Council	would	 receive	 funds	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
on-going	management	and	also	whether	these	would	necessarily	be	allocated	to	BDO	to	
prevent	 them	 ‘being	 sneaked	 into	 a	 general	 pool	 and	 used	 for	 cutting	 the	 grass	 or	
something’.	He	mentions	 ‘that's	an	 interesting	question	 -	will	 the	 funds	be	 ring	 fenced	
and	only	be	spent	on	the	project?’	(LR01-TLP	270716).	
Achieving	the	biodiversity	budget	
The	seven	parcels	of	habitat	within	the	Streatham	Common	offset	planting	scheme	were	
calculated	 to	 provide	 a	 total	 of	 38.13	 units	 in	 compensation.	 In	 combination	 with	 the	
other	two	offset	sites	at	Brockwell	Park	and	Ten	Acre	Wood,	the	total	biodiversity	units	
were	calculated	 to	provide	73.12	units	as	 the	 total	biodiversity	offset.	Through	my	data	
collection,	 I	was	not	able	to	 identify	why	this	proposed	net	gain	of	31.12	units	(from	an	
impact	of	42)	was	deemed	to	be	an	appropriate	yield	or	net	positive	gain	for	the	TLP.	The	
unit	 calculations	 and	 the	 decisions	 taken	 over	 them	 were	 not	 available	 for	 public	
consumption.		
What	 is	 worth	 noting	 generally	 is	 that	 the	 total	 offset	 unit	 value	 of	 73.12	 was	 an	
aggregation	from	eleven	individual	habitat	parcels	from	three	separate	offset	sites	across	
London.	The	units	were	pooled	together	as	the	compensation	for	biodiversity	loss	across	
nine	impact	sites	on	the	TLP	route	across	a	large	tract	of	southern	England.	Unit	value	
aggregations	such	as	the	one	showed	in	Table	11	obscure	the	numerous	individual	value	
judgements	 taken	 at	 each	 of	 the	 eleven	 individual	 habitat	 parcels.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	
throughout	 these	 and	 the	 previous	 case	 studies,	 the	 value	 judgements	 involved	 with	
filling	out	 the	DEFRA	metric	 included	 reaching	 stable	conclusions	 for	 the	 input	 scores	
for:	1)	habitat	distinctiveness;	2)	habitat	condition;	3)	difficulty	of	habitat	restoration;	4)	
biodiversity	offset	 spatial	 strategy	and	5)	 time	 to	 target	condition.	These	classifications	
can	sometimes	be	hard	to	pin	point,	especially	if	they	relate	to	mosaic	habitats	without	
clear	boundaries	for	assigning	to	any	single	distinctiveness	or	as	CE-TLP	articulated,	are	
based	 on	 condition	 assessment	 guidance	 that	 is	 not	 suitable	 for	 non-farm	 ecosystems	
and	landscapes.	
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To	arrive	at	this	total	unit	‘budget’	that	is	deemed	to	provide	the	net	gain,	CE-TLP	made	
55	 individual	 value	 judgements,	 made	 up	 of	 five	 classification	 assessments	 on	 eleven	
different	 habitat	 parcels	 (Table	 12).	 Each	 value	 judgement	 using	 the	 metric	 entailed	
categorising	 a	 bounded	 and	 individuated	 habitat	 parcel	 into	 three	 value	 buckets	 as	
‘good’,	 ‘moderate’	 or	 ‘poor’,	 ‘high’,	 ‘medium’	 and	 ‘low’.	 ‘Time	 to	 target	 condition’	
multiplier	scores	are	allotted	to	increments	of	five	year	periods	and	assigned	numerical	
surrogates	that	flow	from	these	classifications.	The	composite	valuations	are	deemed	to	
have	 followed	 DEFRA’s	 standardised	 guidelines,	 though	 as	 we	 have	 already	 seen,	
professional	judgements	are	also	necessary	to	fill	gaps	left	in	the	guidance	or	other	local	
anomalies.	 Much	 like	 the	 journey	 that	 the	 metric	 calculations	 followed	 through	 the	
South	Devon	planning	application,	the	assumptions	around	these	valuations	have	been	
obscured	 from	 view	 and	 subsequently	 compounded	 as	 black	 boxes.	 By	 presenting	 a	
series	of	numbers	proposed	 to	be	 the	biodiversity	unit	budget	of	 loss	and	gain	enables	
TLP	to	claim	that	they	have	achieved	a	‘net	gain’	of	biodiversity	today,	30	years34	before	
such	a	claim	could	be	truthfully	verified.		
																																																						
34	30	years	is	the	longest	‘time	to	condition’	risk	multiplier	used	in	the	calculations.		
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Table	12	Biodiversity	units	by	habitat	parcel	across	the	whole	offset	project	
Habitat	area	 Size	(ha)	 Time	to	target	condition	 Biodiversity	Units	
Streatham	Common	
Parcel	1	 0.2	 10	years	 2.3	
Parcel	2	 0.25	 10	years	 2.9	
Parcel	3	 0.06	 10	years	 0.3	
Parcel	4	 0.29	 15	years	 0.34	
Parcel	5	 	
5.2	
15	years	 7.62	
Parcel	6	 20	years	 	
24.72	Parcel	7	 20	years	
	
Total	
	
38.13	
Brockwell	Park	
Parcel	1	 0.73	 30	years	 2.61	
Parcel	2	 0.45	 5	years	 2.25	
Parcel	3	 0.29	 30	years	 1.04	
	
Total	
	
5.89	
Ten	Acre	Wood	
Whole	area	 5.6	 5	years	 28	
	
Total	
	
28	
	
Total	of	all	three	
	
73.12	
	
		Source:	TLP	BOMP	
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This	 chapter	 has	 shown	how	 the	presence	 of	 displaced,	masked,	 sometimes	 arbitrary	
value	judgements,	albeit	made	with	professional	adjudication	always	sit	in	balance	with	
other	 value	 systems.	 The	 wider	 political	 requirements	 of	 these	 calculations	 demand	
that	 they	 made	 ‘economic	 sense’	 to	 meet	 developer’s	 ‘the	 business	 case’	 or	 enable	
accelerated	 project	 planning.	 The	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 political	 imperatives	 of	 the	
practical	‘valuation’	of	biodiversity	have	shaped	the	numerical	outcomes	are	abstracted	
and	concealed	from	view	within	the	calculative	processes	described	here.	These	factors	
point	towards	an	instability	in	the	numerical	circulations	of	biodiversity	‘gain’.		
There	 is	 further	 instability	 within	 the	 broader	 actor-network	 that	 reproduces	 and	
amplifies	 the	 narratives	 of	 success	 in	 achieving	 ‘net	 gain’,	 located	 in	 the	 precarious	
arrangement	of	human	actors	 and	 the	 tenuous	 commitments	 and	obligations	 set	 out	
for	each	party	within	the	BOMP	and	the	legal	agreement	that	accompanies	this.	These	
commitments	 are	 legitimated	 and	 formalised	 within	 a	 legal	 contract,	 which	 is	 also	
performative	 in	 its	 capacity	 to	 represent	 distributed	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 as	
diligently	observed	fait	accompli	long	before	they	have	actually	been	realised.	There	is	
little	 in	 the	way	 of	 long-term	means	 of	 enforcement	 or	 follow	up	 beyond	 a	 five	 year	
period	 and	 certainly	 little	 scope	 for	 recourse	 should	 the	 evaluations	 reveal	 that	 the	
offsets	had	vanished.	As	these	instabilities	fade	from	view	and	become	neutralised	via	
official	 and	 approved	 textual	 records,	 public	 discourse	 and	 associated	 performances,	
these	inscription	devices	actively	fix	and	stabilise	the	logic	and	coherence	of	corporate	
biodiversity	offsetting	and	TLP’s	‘net	gain’	for	nature.	The	capriciousness	of	this	project	
and	its	ancillary	effects	 is	stabilised	by	official	reports	and	agreements.	 In	so	doing,	 it	
ossifies	 into	 accepted,	 and	unquestionable	 accounts	of	 success	 and	 ‘no	net	 loss’,	 thus	
allowing	TLP	to	make	claims	to	this	effect	decades	before	they	could	earnestly	argue	as	
such.	 The	 chasm	 between	 public	 facing	 corporate	 accounts	 of	 a	 ‘net	 gain’	 for	
biodiversity	 and	 the	 direct	 experiences	 of	 the	 planting	 schemes	 of	 local	 users	 is	
abundantly	 apparent.	The	 idea	of	 ‘net	 gain’,	 in	material	 rather	 than	 abstract	 terms	 is	
challenging,	as	the	BDO	representative	of	Friends	of	Streatham	Common	expressed:		
I	mean	the	whole	principle	of	net	gain	-	I	have	never	really	understood.	You	
have	this	matrix,	which	is	some	bogus	way	to	calculate	the	values	in	land	and	
planning.	Plant	a	few	trees	on	existing	land	and	that's	a	net	gain?	But	the	real	
costs	of	something	like	this	to	Thameslink	should	have	been	peanuts!	Whips	
cost	a	£1	each.	There	we	are-	£700,	done.	It	was	all	done	by	volunteers	and	
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some	management	time,	and	all	the	intermediaries,	you	know	that's	where	all	
the	money	goes	on	the	consultants,	and	the	PR	firms	and	everything	else.	It's	
not	on	the	actual	work.	(LR-TLP01	270716)	
7.4	Discussion		
This	 chapter	 has	 contributed	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 one	 of	 England’s	 first	 voluntary	
BDO	contracts.	The	most	significant	contrast	between	this	case	study	and	the	prior	two	
is	 that	 the	 empirical	 focus	 charted	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 offset,	 rather	 than	 the	
calculation	of	impact	scores	at	the	development	sites.	An	offset	partner	was	identified	
and	enlisted	who	in	turn	solicited	three	actual	offset	sites	for	conservation	investment	
across	London.	Physical	planting	started	promptly	 thereafter.	 	Although	the	elements	
of	 the	assemblage	 resemble	 the	LPA	contexts,	 their	configurations	were	distinct	 from	
the	prior	two	case	studies	in	fundamental	ways.	Although,	in	similarity	to	the	LPA	case,	
what	has	 emerged	as	 a	 central	 theme	 from	 the	empirical	data,	 is	 that	 context	hugely	
shapes	 how	 actors	 assemble	 the	 values	 of	 biodiversity	 in	 situ.	 	 The	 voluntary	 and	
private	 nature	 of	 this	 BDO	arrangement	 is	 therefore	 pertinent	 to	 how	BDO	operates	
within	such	contexts	 in	practice.	Below,	 I	outline	a	variety	of	differences	between	the	
practices	 of	 valuing	 biodiversity	 and	 enacting	 BDO	 in	 a	 voluntary,	 rather	 than	 a	
compliance	 context.	 Drawing	 on	 the	 analytic	 of	 assemblage,	 I	 highlight	 various	
significant	 implications	 arising	 from	 a	 growing	 uptake	 of	 NNL	 in	 corporate	
sustainability	agendas	in	England	and	elsewhere.	
1. Nature	of	the	offset	provider	and	contestation	around	losing	or	gaining	access	to	
‘biodiversity’	
Firstly,	 although	 there	 are	 significant	 divergences	 between	 the	 two	 contexts,	 this	
chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 actors	 in	 the	 voluntary	 private	 corporate	 social	
responsibility	 (CSR)	contexts	of	BDO	 in	England	encountered	various	practical	 issues	
that	echo	the	experiences	of	those	within	local	authority	compliance	contexts.	Many	of	
these	pragmatic	 issues	necessitated	processes	of	negotiation	and	compromise	so	as	to	
‘keep	 things	 going’,	 and	 ultimately	 realise	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 contract	 in	 spite	 of	
various	 frictions.	 Key	 amongst	 these	 challenges	 for	 TLP	 were	 the	 identification	 of	
appropriate	offset	providers	(specific	to	their	needs	for	a	public	and	visible	project)	and	
the	social	embeddedness	and	legal	status	of	the	land	proposed	to	provide	biodiversity	
units.	 In	 the	same	ways	 that	LPAs	and	conservation	NGOs	working	with	offsetting	 in	
the	 planning	 system	 in	 Devon	 preferred	 to	 undertake	 ecological	 compensation	
investments	on	 land	under	 their	own	control,	 this	 factor	was	also	an	 important	 issue	
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for	 the	 TLP	 case	 study.	 This	 chapter	 illustrated	 why	 the	 ownership	 and	 governance	
arrangements	 of	 land	 subject	 to	 conservation	 investments	 is	 such	 an	 important	
component	for	BDO	through	illustrating	the	frictions	associated	with	contested	uses	of	
and	claims	to	land	in	London.		
Local	 user	 resistance	 to	 the	 delivery	 of	 additional	 woodland	 in	 a	 heavily	 used,	 but	
primarily	 openly	 landscaped	 London	 park	 complicated	 matters.	 These	 on-going	
negotiations	 compromised	 the	 market	 efficiencies	 of	 BDO	 as	 a	 trading	 mechanism.	
Such	forms	of	contestation	and	local	frictions	(Tsing	2000)	push	up	‘transaction	costs’	
for	BDO.	Network	Rail’s	 priorities	 for	hasty	 arrangements	 that	made	 ‘good	economic	
sense’	and	represented	‘value	for	money’,	clashed	with	practical	issues	in	delivery.	The	
imperative	was	to	have	a	fast,	public,	visible	habitat	recreation	project,	offering	a	good	
economic	value	per	unit	of	biodiversity	 framed	according	to	 the	corporate	strategy	of	
Network	Rail.	Ironically,	these	objectives	translated	into	very	poor	value	for	money	for	
other	 actors	 in	 the	 process.	 Notably,	 the	 conservation	 NGO	 ended	 up	 significantly	
subsidising	the	process	with	their	existing	funds.		
The	 difficulty	 over	 identifying	 offset	 providers	 that	 have	 the	 correct	 combination	 of	
factors	 to	 meet	 various	 developer	 requirements	 is	 one	 of	 various	 contradictions	
between	the	theory	and	practice	of	BDO.	The	assumptions	on	which	DEFRA	and	other	
advocates	of	BDO	tend	to	base	expectations	for	a	simple	trade	of	loss	for	gain,	overlook	
the	complexities	of	soliciting	appropriate	land	as	offsets.	Identifying	and	securing	land	
for	 the	 provision	 of	 compensation	 biodiversity	 is	 not	 a	 smooth	 process,	 and	 instead	
belies	 the	 neoliberal	 orthodoxies	 anticipating	 the	 efficiency	 of	 trading	 (Sulzman	 and	
Ruhl	 2000).	 Relatedly,	 critical	 theoretical	 expectations	 of	 BDO	 anticipate	 that	 the	
mechanism	 is	 defined	 by	 social	 equity	 implications	 for	 the	 de-politicisation	 of	
biodiversity	 destruction	 through	 development	 and	 the	 eclipsing	 of	 local	 valuation	 of	
habitats	 and	 nature	 (Taherzadeh	 and	 Howley	 2017,	 Apostolopoulou	 and	 Adams,	 in	
press).	 Conversely,	 this	 case	 study	 has	 illustrated	 how	 social	 contestation	 arose	 in	
relation	to	habitat	enlargement	at	the	offset	site	rather	than	reduction	or	displacement	
at	 the	 impact	 sites.	 Perhaps	 counter-intuitively,	 in	 some	 cases	 the	 re-planting	 of	
woodland	in	areas	valued	for	their	openness	is	the	source	of	controversy35.	Nonetheless,	
																																																						
35	This	 is	 a	 problem	 the	 Forestry	 Commission	 in	 the	 UK	 face	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
prospect	 for	 planting	 woodland	 in	 primarily	 grazed	 landscapes	 with	 wide-open	
expanses,	treasured	by	British	walkers.			
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what	 this	 chapter	 does	 highlight	 is	 that	 political	 processes	 inevitably	 find	 their	 way	
back	 in	 where	 new	 claims	 over	 land	 and	 its	 uses	 are	 concerned.	 Whether	 this	
contestation	is	related	to	the	development	site	or	the	land	identified	for	the	provision	
of	 units,	 this	 issue	 will	 likely	 remain	 a	 pervasive	 characteristic	 of	 offsetting	
arrangements	in	England	and	elsewhere.		
2. Reconfigurations	to	the	conservation	‘order’;	institutional	and	discursive	shifts	
The	 voluntary	 nature	 of	 the	 BDO	 contract	 highlights	 a	 novel	 arrangement	 of	 actors,	
institutional	 roles	 and	 the	 reconfigurations	 of	 relationships	 characteristic	 of	 ‘private	
sector	 engagement’	 in	 conservation	 (MacDonald	 2010b).	 It	 also	 illustrated	 the	
discursive	strategies	that	were	mobilised	in	service	to	this	agenda.	I	will	firstly	explore	
some	 of	 the	 significant	 implications	 for	 shifts	 to	 the	 institutional	 arrangements	 that	
BDO	spells	for	conservation	in	England,	before	exploring	the	discursive	strategies	that	
were	integral	to	these	shifts.		
As	with	the	other	case	studies,	the	work	of	one	or	two	catalytic	individuals	were	central	
to	enacting	BDO	 in	practice,	 in	 spite	of,	 rather	 than	because	of	higher	organisational	
commitments.	 The	 chapter	 demonstrated	 that	 it	 was	 due	 to	 these	 two	 individual	
protagonists	actively	positioning	and	framing	BDO	correctly,	that	the	approach	found	
legitimacy	 in	 TLP	 and	 subsequent	 scale	 through	 Network	 Rail	 and	 Balfour	 Beatty,	
respectively.		These	actors	performed	work	that	demanded	a	broad	range	of	particular	
skills	 related	 to	 managing	 different	 audiences	 with	 different	 interests	 (for	 example	
senior	business	executives	as	well	as	civil	society).	Such	competencies	included	framing	
the	business	case	for	undertaking	BDO	in	infrastructural	contexts,	in	balance	with	the	
moral	 imperative	 for	 doing	 so	 (I	 expand	 on	 the	 interplay	 of	 these	 two	 discursive	
strategies	 below).	 The	 professional	 collaboration	 enlisted	 supplementary	 expertise,	
expert	capacity	and	outreach	to	broader	networks	and	forums	in	practices	of	advocacy,	
public	relations,	 technical	knowledge	and	authority.	What	can	perhaps	also	be	said	 is	
that	 this	 partnership	 and	 the	 scaling	 of	 BDO	 in	 both	 organisations	 has	 opened	 up	 a	
sizable	business	opportunity	for	Balfour	Beatty,	most	probably,	for	many	years	to	come	
as	the	principle	of	‘net	gain’	was	brought	into	the	heart	of	Network	Rail	to	be	rolled	out	
across	its	full	range	of	infrastructure	projects.		
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Intermediaries	and	consultants	are	crucial	to	the	advancement	of,	and	negotiating,	the	
‘green	 deal’	 (Fairhead	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Chapter	 5	 explored	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
Environment	Bank	and	other	 sub-contracted	brokers	as	key	 ‘translators’	 and	enablers	
within	 the	 assemblage.	 The	 roles	 and	 interests	 of	 consultants,	 advisors	 and	 other	
intermediary	 actors	 is	 paramount	 in	 this	 case	 study,	 and	 most	 likely,	 many	 other	
corporate	 sustainability	 contexts,	 especially	 those	 like	 BDO	 which	 entail	 technical	
complexity,	both	in	the	Global	North	and	South.	Such	actors	are	positioned	to	capture	
the	bulk	of	the	transactional	value	and	therefore	benefit	from	the	growth	of	such	trades	
in	 environmental	 governance.	 The	 role	 of	 these	 actors	 should	 not	 therefore	 be	
underestimated	 in	 respect	 to	 shaping	 and	 formatting	 the	 legitimation	 processes	 of	
‘valuing	nature’	within	the	green	economy.		
3. New	roles	for	NGOs	
The	novel	institutional	configurations	of	BDO	also	indicate	the	changing	nature	of	the	
roles	 that	 conservation	NGOs	 play	 in	 conservation	 going	 forward	 (some	 of	whom	 of	
course,	may	also	perform	the	role	of	intermediary,	as	was	the	case	in	the	TLP	example).	
As	with	the	RSPB	in	South	Devon,	this	case	study	illustrates	how	conservation	NGOs	in	
England	 are	 being	 drawn	 into	 the	 BDO	 arrangements	 in	 somewhat	 ambivalent	 or	
reluctant	ways.	The	overriding	narrative	for	NGO	involvement	in	each	of	the	case	study	
locales	was	the	need	to	be	‘at	the	table’,	so	as	to	understand	better	and	to	influence	the	
process	and	outcomes.	The	positions	of	NGOs	however,	are	not	uniform.	Rather,	they	
comprise	 contrasting	 and	 contradictory	 objectives	 and	 viewpoints.	 Some	 individuals	
within	 the	 same	 organisation	 may	 be	 more	 enterprising,	 especially	 at	 a	 senior	
management	 level,	 with	 interests	 for	 ‘releasing	money	 into	 the	 organisation’.	 Others	
are	simply	‘pragmatic’,	and	are	‘making	the	best	of	a	bad	situation’	of	existing	planning	
arrangements.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	 throughout	 all	 the	 case	 studies,	 NGOs	 are	 primarily	
favoured	conservation	partners,	since	they	provide	legitimacy	to	the	innovative,	and	at	
times,	controversial	processes	of	market	based	programmes.	Maintaining	legitimacy	is	
especially	 important	 to	 corporate	 sustainability	 programmes	 where	 reputation	
management	and	public	relations	are	part	and	parcel	of	the	initiative	(I	expand	on	the	
idea	 of	 public	 performance	 below).	 For	 this	 reason,	 TLP	 turned	 away	 from	 new	
conservation	actors	within	BDO	like	the	Environment	Bank	in	favour	of	a	partnership	
with	the	London	Wildlife	Trust.		
Paradoxically,	 it	 is	 these	 new	 institutional	 arrangements	 and	 the	 reconfiguration	 of	
traditional	 roles	 which	 simultaneously	 also	 threaten	 to	 undermine	 the	 legitimacy	 of	
NGOs	going	forward.	Under	BDO,	NGOs	now	find	themselves	in	direct	contractual	and	
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financial	 relationships	with	developers,	while	 ‘selling	 their	 services’	 (McDonald	2010),	
even	while	 this	activity	 is	avowedly	an	effort	 to	ameliorate	 the	harder	market	edge	of	
BDO	and	its	worst	excesses	from	purely	profit	driven	actors.	This	 institutional	shift	 is	
consistent	 with	 the	 rubric	 of	 neoliberal	 conservation	 generally,	 which	 is	 shaping	 a	
‘renegotiated	order’	to	the	field,	characterised	by	new	institutional	alliances	and	private	
sector	‘engagement’	(ibid.).	There	are	questions	over	how	BDO	might	alter	NGO	driven	
conservation	 into	 the	 future.	 Such	 questions	 include	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 England’s	
conservation	NGO’s	may	become	limited	by	what	exactly	can	be	said	in	contestation	to	
development	led	biodiversity	loss,	how	and	whether	they	choose	to	participate	in	such	
practices,	whilst	potentially	weakening	their	abilities	to	do	so.		
4. Questions	over	additionality	
Ensuring	that	biodiversity	offsets	deliver	‘additional	gain’	is	a	central	tenet	in	DEFRA’s	
pilot	 policy.	 DEFRA’s	 2013	 Green	 Paper	 outlines	 various	 complexities	 of	 ascertaining	
whether	 an	 offset	 is	 truly	 additional,	 or	 simply	 part	 of	 conservation	 investment	 that	
would	 have	 happened	 anyway.	 The	 report	 also	 discusses	 scenarios	 where	 it	 may	 be	
difficult	 to	 verify	 additionality.	 The	 first	 scenario	 relates	 to	 a	 habitat	 banking	model,	
the	 second	 to	maintaining	 a	 site	 in	 good	 condition	 at	 the	 end	 of	 a	 funding	 or	 grant	
period,	 and	 the	 third	 relates	 to	 incidental	 biodiversity	benefits	 that	would	 arise	 from	
other	 planning	 requirements.	 The	 issue	 of	 additionality	 in	 respect	 to	 BDO	 gradually	
taking	over	allocated	conservation	programmes	that	are	(for	reasons	largely	associated	
with	other	neoliberal	political	norms),	not	receiving	adequate	funding,	is	overlooked	by	
DEFRA.	 And	 yet,	 this	 example	 shows	 that	 that	 is	 exactly	 what	 is	 happening.	
Anecdotally,	this	case	study	example	shows	that	the	BDO	conservation	work	tied	to	the	
financial	 compensation	 was	 acting	 to	 replace	 previously	 identified	 conservation	
management	activities	associated	with	the	Local	Nature	Reserve	at	the	offset	site.		Can	
the	meeting	of	absent,	but	pre-identified	funding	requirements,	really	be	said	to	have	
counted	as	‘additional’?	The	ambiguity	between	utilising	BDO	as	an	innovative	funding	
mechanism	(Comerford	et	al.	2010)	for	pre-identified	works	lacking	actual	funding,	and	
establishing	 the	model	 as	 an	 entirely	 additional	 conservation	 programme	 to	 existing	
arrangements,	 indicates	 uncertainty	 over	 whether	 BDO	 would	 gradually	 displace	
existing	conservation	funding	in	England	in	general.	One	potential	risk	points	towards	
the	 abandonment	 of	 existing	 streams	 of	 conservation	 funding,	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 laissez	
faire	 attitude	 that	 BDO	 could	 happily	 make	 up	 any	 shortfalls.	 Furthermore,	 as	 an	
exacerbation	 to	 the	 risk,	 under	 BDO	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 previously	 identified	
conservation	 requirements	 becomes	 contingent	 on	 development	 impacts	 on	
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biodiversity	 elsewhere,	 exemplifying	 the	 re-configuration	 of	 conservation	 as	
development	led	(Pawliczek	and	Sullivan	2011)	as	discussed	throughout	this	thesis.			
5. Self-regulation	and	the	quality	of	intentions	
Amongst	the	most	significant	of	the	institutional	characteristics	for	the	development	of	
voluntary	 BDO,	 as	 opposed	 to	 compliance	 and	 regulatory	 practices	 contingent	 on	
obtaining	planning	permission,	 is	 precisely	 the	 absence	of	 any	 regulatory	oversight.	 I	
have	 noted	 that,	 compared	 with	 the	 LPA	 BDO	 contracts,	 there	 was	 little	 to	 no	
negotiation	over	the	calculations	of	the	impact	or	offset	values	at	TLP.	The	absence	of	
haggling	 over	 biodiversity	 value	 calculations	 at	 TLP,	 as	we	 saw	 in	Warwickshire	 and	
Devon,	 is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	firm	controlled	 the	calculative	processes	themselves	
and,	furthermore,	did	so	in	private	with	little	or	no	transparency.	The	development	of	
voluntary,	 unregulated	 initiatives	 for	 using	 calculative	 procedures	 such	 as	 NNL	 and	
BDO,	going	above	and	beyond	 ‘business	 as	usual’,	 compromises	 the	accountability	of	
such	processes,	and	in	so	doing,	de-politicises	and	neutralises	such	decisions	(Sulzman	
and	Ruhl	2000).	It	is	under	these	conditions,	that	fears	over	BDO	becoming	adopted	as	
a	 strategy	 for	 ‘green	 washing’	 controversial	 developments,	 would	 seem	 rational.	 In	
circumstances	 of	 self-regulation,	 not	 only	 do	 the	 political	 contexts	 and	 wider	
structuring	 values	 of	 biodiversity	 valuation	 matter,	 so	 too	 do	 the	 actors’	 intentions	
(Kallis	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Stakeholders	 involved	 in	 the	 TLP	 offset	 primarily	 sought	 better	
biodiversity	 outcomes.	 Though	 while	 NNL	 and	 BDO	 mainstream	 as	 corporate	
sustainability	 orthodoxies,	 there	 are	 heightened	 risks	 that	 in	 such	 contexts	 where	
environmental	governance	is	weaker,	the	biodiversity	impacts	are	greater,	competitive	
stakes	are	higher,	or	actors’	intentions	are	just	simply	less	benevolent,	BDO	can	rapidly	
become	the	much	maligned	and	feared	‘license	to	trash’.	
6. Discursive	strategies	and	plural	value	systems		
This	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 within	 a	 corporate	 voluntary	 context	 of	 BDO,	 various	
discursive	 strategies	were	 central	 to	 the	enactment	and	validation	of	 the	mechanism.	
These	strategies	drew	on	duel	justificatory	narratives,	casting	BDO	simultaneously	as	a	
rational	 business	 strategy,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 moral	 thing	 to	 do.	 Both	 narratives	 served	 as	
legitimation	 strategies	 so	 as	 to	 build	 internal	 and	 external	 consensus	 around	 the	
cogency	 of	 the	 policy.	 Legitimation	 helped	 the	 actors	 spearheading	 the	 DEFRA	
demonstration	 project	 to	 naturalise	 BDO	 and	 NNL	 as	 logical	 and	 urgent	 courses	 of	
action,	while	 concurrently	 deflecting	 or	managing	 potential	 antagonism	 (Nyberg	 and	
White	2013).		And	yet,	as	this	case,	and	as	the	other	cases	have	also	shown,	discourses	
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and	 the	 values	 that	 they	 evoke	 actively	 shape	 practical	 action	 and	 the	 pragmatics	 of	
BDO	 arrangements.	 Pursuing	 voluntary	 BDO	 according	 to	 its	 ‘business	 case’	 affected	
the	ways	in	which	the	contract	played	out	in	practice,	such	as	the	speed	of	the	process,	
the	 location	 of	 the	 receptor	 site	 and	 type	 of	 biodiversity	 investments	 that	 were	
considered	appropriate	to	suit	these	priorities.	
Nonetheless,	 a	 simple	 justification	 of	 business	 self-interest	 does	 not	 account	 for	 the	
individual	 agency	 and	 sense	 of	moral	 justification	 that	 actors	mobilised	 in	 respect	 to	
the	sincere	interest	in	‘putting	something	back’	or	an	authentic	‘green’	normativity.	 In	
so	far	as	BDO	is	considered	to	be	reconciling	competing	orders	of	worth	(Boltanski	and	
Thévenot	2006),	it	acts	as	a	market-green	compromise	(Nyberg	and	White	2013).	In	situ	
actors	perceive	NNL	and	BDO	as	capable	of	delivering	multiple	social	goods	(Boltanski	
and	Thévenot	2006)	that	are	held	together	through	such	compromises.	I	expand	on	this	
in	the	next	chapter.		
The	 translation	 of	 biodiversity	 into	 numerical	 unit	 values	 features	 as	 an	 intrinsic	
component	 to	 the	 business	 rationale	 necessary	 to	 legitimate	 BDO	 at	 Network	 Rail.	
Numbers	 were	 celebrated	 for	 offering	 such	 utility.	 In	 this	 way,	 NNL	 and	 the	
quantification	it	is	constituted	by,	is	amenable	to	business	vocabularies	of	cost-benefit	
analysis	 due	 to	 its	 commensurating	 properties	 and	 the	 reduction	 of	 biotic	 and	 social	
heterogeneity	 to	 a	 common	 interchangeable	 unit.	 	 These	 frames	 are	 also	 explicitly	
favoured	for	being	appealing	to	business	audiences	on	account	of	their	black	and	white	
simplification	of	complexity	and	enabling	of	quick	calculative	assessments.	Such	is	the	
avowed	intent	of	powerful	advocates	working	to	stabilise	market	valuation	and	pricing	
approaches	 in	 conservation.	 Peter	 Bakker,	 head	 of	 the	 WBCSD,	 for	 example	 stated	
recently	at	the	BBOP	Summit	in	2014	that:	
We	need	to	improve	our	language.	I	am	a	businessman	and	‘biodiversity	loss’	
means	nothing	to	me.	We	need	to	frame	it	in	the	context	of	there	being	no	
more	bees.	A	language	that	business	is	happy	with	is	natural	capital...	If	people	
create	goals	business	can	relate	to,	then	we	can	stand	back	and	let	business	be	
the	engine	of	change.	(Bakker	speaking	at	the	BBOP	NNL	Summit	June	2014)	
And	yet,	as	highlighted	in	this	and	other	examples	throughout	this	thesis,	NNL	is	being	
frequently	 mobilised	 as	 both	 a	 business	 rationality	 and	 moral	 imperative	 by	 actors	
making	sense	of	 the	new	approach.	The	calculative	device	 is	 taken	to	be	synonymous	
with	environmental	care	and	empathetic	or	dutiful	(deontic)	value	systems,	rather	than	
solely	 for	 business	 expediency.	 Through	 conveying	 the	 moral	 weight	 of	 ‘saving	
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biodiversity’,	 NNL	 is	 a	 ‘boundary	 object’	 (Star	 and	 Griesmer	 1989)	 perceived	 to	
reconcile	 various	 value	 systems	 and	 deliver	 compromises	 to	 different	 parties.	 It	 is	
precisely	NNL’s	ability	to	capture	and	invoke	value	plurality	that	makes	it	such	a	potent	
conceptual	and	practical	technology	for	conservation	norms	going	into	the	future.	
7. Between	performance	and	reality	
Following	the	‘success’	of	the	initial	TLP	offset,	Network	Rail	has	embraced	Biodiversity	
Net	 Positive	as	a	new	corporate	sustainability	standard	across	 the	whole	 firm.	Balfour	
Beatty	meanwhile	has	 been	 contracted	 in	 the	delivery	 of	 this	 policy	 for	 the	 future	 of	
Network	 Rail’s	 future	 development	 initiatives,	 which	 includes	 the	 maintenance	 and	
expansion	 of	 20,000	 miles	 of	 rail	 track	 across	 the	 UK.	 Echoing	 the	 discussion	 from	
chapter	 4	 in	 respect	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 conceptual	 technologies	 like	 NNL	 travel	
through	space	and	time,	 this	case	study	has	highlighted	how	NNL	 ‘sticks’	 to	different	
contexts	and	is	elevated	as	a	new	organisational	or	institutional	standard.	The	example	
has	 also	 highlighted	how	 such	 examples	 and	narratives	 of	 success	 help	 translate	 and	
carry	NNL	 into	new	contexts,	 amid	 frequently	 ad	hoc	and	chance	 circumstances.	 For	
example,	the	TLP’s	offset	was	as	much	an	example	of	two	individuals	 ‘having	a	go’,	 in	
light	 of	 the	 availability	 of	 calculative	 device	 in	 the	 DEFRA	 metric,	 as	 any	 overt	
ideological	 commitment	 to	 the	 market	 potential	 for	 transforming	 biodiversity	
conservation	(c.f.	Bayon	and	Jenkins	2010).	
All	the	same,	there	was	a	certain	amount	of	spectacle	involved	with	TLP	in	relation	to	
maintaining	 a	 strong	 and	 positive	 public	 image.	 The	 spectacle	 was	 partly	 related	 to	
being	the	DEFRA	demonstration	project,	but	also	partly	a	necessary	component	of	the	
‘business	case’	and	appearance	of	corporate	sustainability.	Within	this	context,	failures,	
shortcomings	 and	 uncertainties	 faded	 from	 view	 within	 the	 official	 narratives	 of	
success.	It	is	too	early	to	observe	the	habitat	outcomes	of	the	offset	arrangements,	since	
these	will	take	years	to	materialise.	The	chapter	illustrated	that	accounts	of	a	successful	
net	 positive	 benefit	 for	 biodiversity	 are	 in	 fact	 a	 precarious	 aggregation	 of	 value	
judgements	 and	 compromises	 smoothed	 into	 official	 documents	 and	 packaged	 up	 as	
fact.	 This	 performance	 itself	 has	 a	 value	 for	 being	 official	 and	 authoritative	 while	
eradicating	doubt	and	instability	as	well	as	inviting	buy	in.	
The	chapter	highlighted	some	of	the	constitutive	socio-political	processes	in	which	the	
performance	of	programmatic	 ‘success’	and	NNL	is	achieved.	It	has	also	reiterated	the	
disjuncture	between	these	public	accounts	of	success	and	the	complex	local	realities	to	
which	 they	 relate.	 I	 identified	 how	 TLP’s	 accounts	 of	 success	 were	 stabilised	 and	
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performed	 discursively	 through	 the	 circulation	 of	 textual	 records,	 organisationally	
through	 professional	 alliances	 and	 networks,	 institutionally	 through	 accepted	
narratives	 and	 political	 dynamics,	 and	 technologically	 with	 novel	 representational	
devices	and	pictures	that	create	compelling	yet	abstract	depictions	of	biodiversity	loss	
and	‘net	gain’.	For	example,	‘statistical	picturing’	devices	(Demeritt	2001)	portrayed	the	
scores	of	biodiversity	impacts	at	each	of	the	development	sites	along	the	TLP	route	(in	
Figure	 18)	 and	 equivalent	 numbers	 as	 overall	 net	 gains.	 It	 is	 precisely	 these	 kinds	 of	
devices	that	permit	the	control	at	a	distance	from	‘local	centres	of	calculation’	(Latour	
1987).	 	 Similarly,	 as	 Jim	 Igoe	 (2010:	 389)	 discusses	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 circulation	 of	
referents	 generally,	 ‘spectacular	 productions	 thus	 become	 their	 own	 evidence,	
continuously	referring	back	to	themselves	in	affirmation	of	the	realness	of	the	world(s)	
that	they	show	their	viewers’.		
The	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 England’s	 early	 corporate	 biodiversity	 offsets	 is	 consistent	
with	 geographical	 observations	 of	 the	 field	 of	 ‘business	 and	 biodiversity’	 more	
generally.	 Accounts	 of	 ‘success’	 and	 the	 exercises	 in	 agenda	 building	 are	 explicitly	
performative	 -	 they	are	entrained	on	bringing	people	 together	 in	networks	 for	 ‘public	
enactments’	 to	 extend	 and	 strengthen	 the	 assemblages	 on	 ‘dramaturgical	 stages’	
(Wilshusen	and	MacDonald	2015).	The	power	of	these	success	stories	is	significant	for	
the	wider	assemblages	and	growing	legitimacy	of	BDO	in	England	and	further	afield.	A	
sense	 of	 coherence	 at	 a	 global	 policy	 scale	 is	 central	 to	 the	 sense	 of	 legitimacy	 and	
purpose	at	 the	successively	 lower	scales.	 Indeed	 it	 is	exactly	 such	accounts	of	 success	
that	 will	 likely	 be	 mobilised	 by	 actors	 elsewhere	 in	 justification	 for	 adopting	 BDO.	
DEFRA	relied	on	equivalent	‘success	stories’	to	articulate	and	validate	its	intentions	for	
undertaking	a	pilot	study	in	England	in	the	first	place,	such	as	Australia’s	Bushbroker	
model	 (DEFRA	 2013).	 A	 decade	 down	 the	 road,	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 emerging	 of	
Australian	 offsetting,	 indicates	 that	 its	 biodiversity	 outcomes	 range	 from	 weak	 to	
disastrous	(NCC	NSW	2016).	Network	Rail	therefore,	becomes	one	of	various	other	case	
studies	that	circulate	and	work	in	service	to	the	construction	of	biodiversity	valuation	
policies.		Front-loading	claims	of	success	in	NNL	or	NG	and	the	subsequent	circulation	
of	such	accounts,	mistakes	the	‘paper	offsets’	(Quétier	et	al.	2014)	for	actual	biodiversity	
gains.	 It	 is	 precisely	 this	 inertia,	 between	 the	 initiation	 and	 uptake	 of	 the	 policy	
approach	and	future	material-outcomes	that	makes	biodiversity	offsetting,	at	 its	most	
basic	level,	little	more	than	a	gamble.	The	extent	to	which	this	risk	is	obscured	by	the	
moral	legitimation	that	NNL	is	the	‘right’	thing	to	do,	closes	down	alternative	pathways	
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and	meaningful	debate	 about	 the	 impacts	of	 the	 social	 and	natural	 contract	between	
infrastructure	developers	and	civic	society	more	generally.		
	
The	 focus	 of	 the	 thesis	 remains	 with	 the	 themes	 of	 moral	 justification,	 conflict	 and	
compromise	 in	 turning	 to	 the	 next	 chapter.	 In	 the	 following	 and	 final	 empirical	
chapter,	the	focus	moves	to	the	BBOP,	DEFRA	and	ZSL	biodiversity	offsetting	summit	
in	London	in	June	2014	after	the	pilot	had	ended.	The	aim	of	the	following	chapter,	in	
drawing	 on	 the	 pragmatic	 sociology	 of	 critique	 is	 to	 explore	 more	 fully	 how	 actors	
advance	claims	and	critiques	of	BDO,	so	as	to	make	sense	of	its	conflicts,	compromises	
and	tensions.	The	focus	now	zooms	out	from	the	localised	case	studies	of	the	English	
pilot	study	towards	a	higher	geographical	scale	of	broader	BDO	assemblages.	
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PART	4	
CHAPTER	8	
ARTICULATING	THE	MANY	GREEN	ORDERS	OF	WORTH	AT	THE	
FIRST	GLOBAL	SUMMIT	ON	BIODIVERSITY	OFFSETTING;	TO	
NO	NET	LOSS	OF	BIODIVERSITY	AND	BEYOND		
	
8.1	Introduction	
Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 DEFRA	 pilot	 study	 between	 2012-2014,	 BDO	 in	 England	 was	
situated	within	 an	 on-going	 dispute	 and	 controversy,	 attracting	 outspoken	 advocates	
and	critics	in	equal	measure	(Sullivan	and	Hannis	2015).	Supporters	and	detractors	for	
BDO	 made	 fervent	 contributions	 to	 public	 discourse	 surrounding	 the	 possible	
effectiveness	 and	 indeed	 desirability	 of	 the	 planning	 system	 embracing	 a	 BDO	
mechanism36 .	 In	 the	 prior	 chapter,	 I	 explored	 critique	 circulating	 in	 the	 media,	
illustrating	 the	 tensions	 this	 opened	 up	 for	 the	 Thameslink	 Programme.	 In	 addition,	
this	 dispute	 was	 animated	 through	 the	 multitude	 of	 responses	 and	 contributions	
submitted	 to	 both	 the	 DEFRA	 Green	 Paper	 Inquiry	 and	 the	 UK	 Parliament's	
Environmental	 Audit	 Committee's	 (EAC)	 Inquiry,	 held	 in	 2013.	 Through	 empirical	
discourse	 analysis	 of	 the	 written	 evidence	 to	 the	 EAC	 Inquiry,	 Sullivan	 and	 Hannis	
(2015)	illustrated	how	opposing	stakeholder	positions	broadly	frame	the	policy	in	one	of	
two	 ways.	 The	 first	 group	 sees	 BDO	 as	 ‘revolutionary	 and	 innovative	 means	 of	
pragmatically	 providing	multiple-win	 solutions	 to	 both	 environmental	 and	 economic	
issues’	(ibid.:	10).	The	other	perspective	questions	the	broader	practical	and	contextual	
realities	 of	 the	 policy	 approach	 (i.e.	 critique	 on	 its	 own	 terms).	 This	 second	 position	
also	levelled	a	more	radical	critique	by	challenging:		
																																																						
36	Although,	 at	 this	 stage,	 I	would	point	out	 that	 arguably	 treating	 the	mechanism	of	
BDO	 as	 the	 source	 of	 controversy	 was	 misplaced,	 since	 the	 prior	 and	 far	 less	
controversial	 introduction	 of	 a	NNL	policy	 standard	 to	 the	NPPF	 in	 2011	 had	 already	
accomplished	much	of	what	BDO	critics	 feared	offsetting	would	do.	 In	so	 far	as	NNL	
locks	in	a	balance	sheet	accounting	approach	to	conservation	through	orienting	around	
an	aggregate	rule,	it	circumscribes	certain	calculative	means	of	meeting	this	goal	such	
as	 the	 DEFRA	 metric,	 as	 discussed	 throughout	 chapter	 4.	 BDO	 as	 an	 official	 policy	
approach	is	not	pre-requisite	for	LPA’s	to	embrace	offsetting,	NNL	is	enough.		
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	the	appropriateness	both	of	monetary	valuation	and	of	markets,	arguing	these	
cannot	adequately	reflect	intrinsic	values	conferred	by	uniqueness	or	the	
consequent	non-substitutability	of	species	populations	and	habitats	located	in	
places	(ibid.:	10).		
To	summarise	a	rich	empirical	engagement	with	this	EAC	Inquiry,	Sullivan	and	Hannis	
(2015)	arrive	at	the	conclusion	that	the	impasse	over	BDO	emerges	from	opposing	ways	
of	‘understanding	both	the	value	of	nature,	and	the	nature	of	value’	(ibid:	10).		
Similarly	 the	 2017	 paper	 by	Apostolopoulou	 and	Adams,	 in	Oryx	 evokes	 some	 of	 the	
problematic	 ontological	 and	 ethical	 dimensions	 of	 BDO	 through	 challenging	 its	
dominant	framings	of	what	biodiversity	is	and	how,	therefore,	conservation	policy	and	
practice	 should	 respond.	A	 related	discussion	over	 the	connection	between	ontology-
epistemology-ethics	is	elaborated	in	Sullivan	2017,	and	briefly	discussed	in	chapter	2.	In	
particular,	 Apostolopoulou	 and	 Adams	 (2017)	 focused	 on	 four	 ways	 BDO	 actively	
reconfigures	the	ontologies	and	ethics	of	biodiversity	and	conservation.	To	paraphrase	
their	 conclusions,	 they	 argue	 that	 offsetting,	 erroneously	 and	 dangerously	 reframes	
biodiversity	as	measurable	 isolated	units	 lacking	 locational	specificity	 rendering	 them	
amenable	to	pricing.	 	Under	offsetting,	conservation,	they	propose,	becomes	merely	a	
means	of	exchanging	monetary	values	and	a	practice	driven	through	land	development	
and	economic	growth	(ibid:.	1)	
These	 two	papers	 form	 the	basis	 of	 the	 approach	of	 this	 chapter,	which	 explores	 the	
multiple	 value	 systems,	 conflicts	 and	 compromises	 animating	 the	 dispute	 over	 BDO.	
The	chapter	builds	on	the	findings	from	these	recent	contributions	and	combines	them	
with	the	theoretical	frames	of	the	pragmatic	sociology	of	critique	to	empirically	explore	
the	architecture	of	argumentation	that	sustains	BDO	as	a	controversy.	Throughout	the	
preceding	chapters	 I	have	 illustrated	 the	ways	 in	which	BDO	creates	new	values	 that	
people	 struggle	 over	 in	 practice.	 I	 have	 also	 highlighted	 the	 ways	 in	 which,	 under	 a	
system	of	BDO,	actors	and	devices	seek	and	enact	a	series	of	pragmatic	compromises	
across	 dissonant	 value	 systems	 with	 material	 consequences	 for	 conservation	 policy	
practice	and	outcomes.	In	line	with	the	overall	chronology	of	the	pilot	period,	which	is	
largely	reflected	in	the	structure	of	this	thesis,	this	penultimate	chapter	returns	to	the	
moment	 that	 opens	 the	 first	 chapter,	 namely	 the	DEFRA,	 BBOP,	 Forest	 Trends,	 ZSL	
BDO	summit	in	June	2014	at	London	Zoo:	To	No	Net	Loss	and	Beyond	(denoted	as	the	
NNL	Summit	going	forward).		
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In	this	chapter,	I	document	the	justification	frames	within	the	debates	for	and	against	
BDO	through	event	ethnographies	conducted	at	these	conferences	in	2014.	I	conducted	
detailed	discourse	analysis	on	the	public	debate	staged	at	 the	NNL	Summit	and	drew	
from	wider	ethnographic	observations	from	the	counter	forum	held	by	campaigner	and	
NGO	 groups	 at	 the	 same	 time	 in	 Regents	 Park	 the	 day	 before.	 I	 was	 involved	 as	 a	
volunteer	coordinator	at	both	events	and	as	one	of	the	organisers	for	the	second.	As	I	
discussed	in	chapter	3,	the	dramaturgical	public	enactments	(Wilshusen	and	McDonald	
2015)	of	policy	events	and	 summits	make	 fruitful	 sites	 for	empirical	 research	 into	 the	
globalisation	 of	 ideas	 and	 building	 of	 epistemic	 communities	 (Brosius	 and	 Campbell	
2010).	The	NNL	Summit	furthermore,	was	an	important	moment	in	the	policy	cycle	and	
political	 interest	 in	 BDO,	 not	 just	 in	 England,	 but	 the	 wider	 global	 BDO	 and	
conservation	 community,	 evidenced	 through	 the	 international	 nature	 of	 the	 event	
made	up	of	270	delegates	and	speakers.	The	moment	also	represented	the	 fulcrum	of	
BDO	in	England	after	which,	things	started	to	quieten	down	as	DEFRA	conspicuously	
delayed	 and	 eventually	 put	 off	 indefinitely	 any	 official	 announcement	 about	 the	
Government’s	intentions	towards	BDO	following	the	pilot	study.		
Before	 the	NNL	Summit,	 there	had	been	 few	examples	of	 real-time	dialogue	between	
rival	 and	 divergent	 views	 over	 BDO.	 This	 deficiency	 was	 rectified	 by	 BBOP	 when	 it	
convened	 a	 public	 debate	 to	 open	 the	 conference.	 In	 recognition	 of	 the	 stubborn	
impasse	 that	 had	 emerged	 around	 BDO,	 the	 debate’s	 title	 and	motion	was	 tabled	 as	
Agree	to	disagree?	Including	biodiversity	offsets	in	the	mitigation	hierarchy:	opportunity	
or	peril?	Six	speakers	from	the	private,	NGO	and	academic	sectors	were	involved,	with	
three	 positioned	 on	 either	 side	 of	 the	 motion.	 Those	 arguing	 for	 BDO	 as	 an	
‘opportunity’	were	Tom	Tew,	CEO	for	the	Environment	Bank	Ltd	and	ecologist	turned	
business	 director,	 Susie	 Brownlie,	 ecologist	 and	 founder	 of	 South	 Africa	 based	 BDO	
consultancy,	 Brownlie	 Associates	 and	 Morgan	 Robertson,	 Associate	 Professor	 of	
Geography	at	University	of	Wisconson-Madison	and	former	research	fellow	at	the	EPA,	
who	arguably	has	written	more	that	could	be	characterised	as	critical	of	market	based	
ecological	 compensation	 schemes	 than	 in	 favour.	Representing	 the	 team	 levelling	 the	
critique	of	BDO	(its	 ‘peril’)	were	Hannah	Mowat,	campaigner	and	policy	advocate	 for	
civil	 society	 environmental	 organisation	 FERN	 Europe,	 Aerial	 Brunner,	 Head	 of	 EU	
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Policy	for	Birdlife	International37	and	Isaac	Rojas	Friends	of	the	Earth	Costa	Rica.	Going	
forward	these	two	groups	are	denoted	as	‘advocates’	and	‘critics’	respectively.	
	This	 chapter	 proceeds	 by	 introducing	 the	 pragmatic	 sociology	 of	 critique	 (PSOC)	
(Boltanski	and	Thévenot	 1999,	2006).	 It	 firstly	outlines	 this	 theoretical	 frame	 in	more	
depth	and	considers	 recent	 contributions	 specifically	 related	 to	political	 ecology.	The	
chapter	then	outlines	the	methods	deployed	for	this	analysis,	combining	the	theoretical	
frames	 of	 PSOC	 with	 the	 findings	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 Apostoloupoulou	 and	 Adams	
(2017)	and	Sullivan	and	Hannis	(2015)	papers	to	arrive	at	a	set	of	codes	for	analysing	the	
debate	at	the	main	Summit	and	to	inform	my	observations	of	the	counter	forum.	I	then	
present	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 detailed	 qualitative	 analysis	 and	 conclude	 with	 a	
discussion	of	key	findings.	The	chapter	argues	that	divergent	ontological	foundations	of	
what	biodiversity	 is	 form	the	basis	of	 the	dispute	due	to	ethical	 frameworks	of	action	
they	 imply	 (Sullivan	 2017).	 In	 addition,	 the	ways	 in	which	 these	 different	 ontological	
frames	appear	as	compromises	with	other	value	systems,	or	‘orders	of	worth’	(Boltanski	
and	Thévenot	2006),	create	a	moral	complexity	that	sustains	the	dispute	as	an	impasse.	
In	summary,	this	chapter	contributes	theoretically	and	empirically	grounded	insights	to	
clarify	 and	 elucidate	 the	 value	 conflicts	 embedded	 within	 efforts	 to	 value	 nature	
through	BDO.		
8.2	Pragmatic	sociology	of	critique	
In	their	2006	work	On	Justification,	Boltanski	and	Thévenot	sought	to	map	how	actors	
construct	 claims	 and	 critiques	 through	 social	 norms,	 implicitly	 value-laden	 concepts	
and	moral	assertions.	On	Justification	groups	moral	assertions	(underpinning	criticism	
and	justifications)	into	six	overall	 ‘orders	of	worth’	across	the	market,	industrial,	civic,	
domestic,	 fame	and	 inspiration	value	worlds	 (Table	 13	below).	These	 spheres	of	value	
are	derived	 from	classical	 treaties	 of	 political	 philosophy	 and	 represent	 ‘conventional	
forms	 of	 worth	 which	 sustain	most	 legitimate	 criticisms	 and	 justifications	 in	 public’	
(Thévenot	 2011:	 36).	 Boltanski	 and	 Thévenot	 (2006)	 argue	 that	 during	 controversies,	
actors	tend	to	structure	their	arguments	by	appealing	to	political-moral	accepted	forms	
of	‘duly	qualified	realities’	comprised	of	one	of	several	or	overlapping	‘orders	of	value’,	
which	form	the	backdrop	to	and	rationalisation	for	their	claims.			
																																																						
37 Brunner	wryly	noted	at	the	beginning	of	the	debate	that	while	he	was	attending	the	
conference	 on	 behalf	 of	 his	 pro	 offsetting	 employer	 (Birdlife	 Europe)	 he	 had	 been	
invited	to	speak	to	his	personal	views	that	were	broadly	sceptical	of	BDO.  
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Within	 each	 order	 of	 worth,	 certain	 rules	 of	 acceptability	 demand	 equivalence	 and	
cogency	 thereby	 determining	 how	 facts,	 norms	 or	 ‘utterances’	 display	 commonality	
(Boltanski	 and	 Thévenot	 1999).	 Counter	 claims	 are	 thus	 only	 intelligible	 or	 coherent	
when	 they	 are	 compatible	 with	 the	 order	 of	 worth	 in	 which	 the	 original	 claim	 was	
couched.	In	this	sense,	critique	and	justification	must,	thereby	occupy	commensurable	
‘orders	of	worth’.		Boltanski	and	Thévenot	(1999)	refer	to	these	frames	of	equivalence	as	
‘reality	tests’,	which	determine	the	legitimacy	of	critique	or	justification.	Each	situation	
will	 have	 its	 unique	 forms	 of	 equivalence	 in	 which	 certain	 claims	 are	 considered	
appropriate	and	against	which,	claims	from	another	‘world’	or	‘order	of	worth’	are	not.	
During	 conflict,	 they	 argue,	 actors	 must	 converge	 towards	 the	 objects	 relevant	 and	
legitimate	 to	 those	 situations.	 In	 a	 road	 collision	 for	 example,	 legitimate	 points	 of	
reference	might	be	the	highway	codes	or	state	of	tyres	etc.	(ibid.),	whereas	illegitimate	
ones	 would	 originate	 from	 other	 orders	 of	 worth.	 The	 performance	 of	 equivalence	
within	bounded	orders	of	worth	prevents	argumentative	incoherence	through	a	‘mixing	
of	worlds’	and	subsequent	illogical	justifications	(Boltanski	and	Thévenot	1999).		
The	 notion	 of	 value	 commensurability	 and	 equivalence	 is	 central	 for	 this	 research	
enquiry	 into	 the	 way	 compromises	 are	 built	 in	 the	 dispute	 surrounding	 BDO,	 and	
indeed	in	the	construction	of	exchange	values.	The	same	reasoning	also	illuminates	the	
universalising	 capacities	of	 strict	or	 ‘flat’	 (Fourcade	2011)	 value	 regimes	 like	price	 and	
numerical	 scoring,	 which	 appear	 as	 structurally	 un-equipped	 to	 accommodate	 value	
plurality	 on	 a	 substantive	 level.	Another	 example	 is	 the	 standardisation	 of	 objects	 or	
institutionalisation	 of	 objectified	 rules,	 such	 as	 time	 and	 schedules,	 which	 provide	
frameworks	of	equivalence	to	maintain	coordination	in	the	course	of	common	action.		
To	 supplement	 the	original	 six	 orders	of	 value,	 Lafaye	 and	Thévenot	 (1993)	proposed	
the	 addition	 of	 a	 new	 ‘green’	 order	 of	 worth	 as	 a	 nascent	 sphere	 of	 ecological	
justification.	Thévenot	et	al.	(2000)	tested	the	robustness	of	this	modification	through	
comparative	empirical	studies	of	environmental	controversies	in	France	and	the	US.	In	
querying	 the	 grounds	 for	 adopting	 a	 separate	 ‘green’	 order	 of	 worth	 along	 with	 the	
other	 six,	 they	 noted	 that	 while	 a	 unique	 green	 order	 was	 ‘gaining	 specificity’	 in	
political	 disputes,	 it	 was	 ‘still	 often	 used	 in	 combination	 with	 other	 types	 of	
justification’	(Thévenot	et	al.	2000:	237).	The	green	world,	they	found,	tends	to	sit	in	a	
compromise	with	others	from	the	original	six.	In	discussing	this	empirical	study,	Blok	
(2013:	 5)	 suggests	 that	Thévenot	 et	 al.	 settle	 on	 a	 conclusion	 that	 points	 towards	 the	
moral	complexity	of	environmental	disputes,	‘as	actors	employ	‘green’	justifications,	in	
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compromise	 with	 other	 orders	 as	 well	 as	 by	 reference	 to	 its	 own	 repertoire	 of	
evaluation’	(emphasis	added).			
In	a	later	work,	The	New	Spirit	of	Capitalism,	Boltanski	and	Chiapello	(2007)	developed	
the	 idea	 of	 compromise	 and	 detail	 the	 means	 by	 which	 the	 market	 order	 tends	 to	
subjugate	others,	including	the	green	order.	It	follows	that	within	BDO,	the	rhetoric	of	
‘pragmatism’	 thus	 appears	 as	 the	 ‘magic’	 of	 a	 compromise	 in	 an	erstwhile	hegemonic	
process	 of	 subjugating	 environmental	 values	 (green)	 to	 business	 and	 market	 tests	
(Nyberg	and	Wright	2013).	This	line	of	thinking	sees	the	construction	of	a	compromise	
between	market	and	environmental	logics	that	leads	to	justifications	of	‘green’	practices	
only	 in	so	far	as	these	will	 further	the	interests	of	the	market	truth	tests	 	(ibid.).	As	a	
way	of	settling	disputes	across	 incommensurate	orders	of	worth,	compromises	appear	
as	 unstable	 resolutions	 as	 one	 order	 tends	 to	 dominate	 the	 other	 (Boltanski	 and	
Thévenot	1999).	
The	 orientation	 to	 locating	 how	 compromises	 between	 environmental	 and	 other	
political	 value	 systems	 function	 is	 compatible	 with	 broader	 critiques	 of	 ecological	
modernisation	(Mol	2002)	and	the	 literature	around	neoliberal	conservation	(Büscher	
et	al.	2012),	although	notably	not	widely	drawn	upon	in	these	critical	works.	Indeed,	the	
origins	 of	 ecological	 compensation	 programmes	 that	 are	 foundationally	 grounded	
within	the	logic	of	the	‘third	way’	between	development	and	environmental	protection	
clearly	 encapsulate	 this	 settlement	 between	 a	 green	 order	 of	 worth	 and	 others.	 As	
chapter	 4	 showed,	 the	 net	 in	 no	 net	 loss	 of	 biodiversity	 is	 the	 market-green	
compromise.	 In	 relating	 this	 settlement	back	 to	Li’s	 (2017)	notion	of	 ‘tensions’	within	
the	practices	of	assemblage,	Nyberg	and	White	(2013:	418)	propose	that	the	presence	of	
‘compromises	thus	deny	the	incommensurability	of	goods’,	which	instead	are	made	to	
be	compatible	 through	 ‘forged	alignments’	 (Li	 2007a).	Latour	has	 recently	 referred	 to	
these	 as	 ‘crossings’	 across	 ‘modes	 of	 existence’	 (2013).	 In	 a	 context	 like	 BDO	 that	
depends	on	such	compromises,	 the	value	of	actors	 like	 the	Environment	Bank	within	
this	 assemblage,	 is	 shaped	 by	 their	 unique	 expertise	 that	 straddles	 both	 planning	
(development),	 ecology	 as	 well	 as	 business	 backgrounds.	 Actors	 that	 span	 worlds	 of	
market	 and	 environment,	 it	 seems,	 are	 able	 to	 disproportionately	 benefit	 from	 the	
growth	of	the	‘green	economy’	and	prevail	while	doing	so.	
Drawing	from	this	model	of	the	sociology	of	critique,	I	performed	an	equivalent	reading	
of	the	way	a	green	order	of	worth	emerges	in	the	English	dispute	over	BDO.	In	the	table	
below	 I	 have	 juxtaposed	 the	 original	 seven	 orders	 of	 worth	 against	 common	 ‘green’	
discourses	of	BDO	to	identify	what	the	moral-political	value	compromises	within	BDO	
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look	 like.	 I	 use	 this	 framework	 of	 compromises	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 data	 analysis	 that	
follows.		
	
Table	13	The	six	and	additional	green	orders	of	worth	and	green	compromises	
Original	order	of	
worth	 Stand-alone	values
38	 BDO	green	compromise	
Market	 Economic	performance	and	competition	
Business	relying	on	nature’s	goods	and	
‘services’,	reducing	risks	and	enhancing	
profit	making	opportunities,	enabling	
development.	Basis	of	the	‘green	economy’	
Industrial	
Efficiency	and	rationality	
based	on	technical	
competence	and	long	term	
planning	
Maintaining	the	aggregate	stock	of	'natural	
capital'	through	scientific	expertise	using	
technical	capacity	for	management,	
measurement	and	restoration	
Civic	 Equality	and	solidarity	 Environmental	and	intergenerational	justice	
Domestic	 Tradition,	heritage,	local	and	personal	ties	
Protection	of	local	natural	heritage,	access	
to	nature	for	communities	
Fame	 Public	opinion,	renown,	reputation	
Social	license	to	operate,	moral	economy	of	
‘green’,	building	of	social	capital	
Inspired	 Creativity,	emotion	and	spiritual	grace	
Utilitarian	justifications	for	health	and	
wellbeing,	spiritual	inspiration		
And	Green	
Deep	ecology,	as	an	end	in	
itself,	biocentrism,	intrinsic	
value	of	nature	as	a	whole	
and	also	specific	entities39	
No	compromise,	a	singular	or	‘pure’	
biocentric	value	system	
																																																						
38	Original	definitions	drawn	from	Boltanski	and	Thévenot	(2006).	
39	Latour	 (1998)	draws	on	a	Kantian	means-ends	definition	of	morality	 in	 considering	
the	 idea	 of	 a	 unique,	 post-humanist	 ‘green’	 order	 of	worth.	 To	 follow	Kantian	moral	
philosophy,	 a	 uniquely	 green	 order	 of	 worth	 would	 see	 ecological	 ‘natural’	 entities	
treated	 as	 ends	 in	 and	 of	 themselves	 and	 never	 instrumentalised	 to	 another’s	 use.	
Latour	suggests	 that	under	 these	circumstances	a	unique	green	order	of	worth	would	
indicate	 an	 ethico-political	 transformation	 where	 ‘modernisation’	 gives	 way	 to	
‘ecologisation’	 -	 to	 an	 untenable	 form	 of	 biocentrism.	 Latour	 notes	 that	 the	 intrinsic	
rights	of	specific	entities	are	well	known	in	environmental	ethics.	Even	so,	this	uniquely	
green	 conviction,	 he	 argues,	 is	 too	 specific	 and	 singular	 to	 fit	 within	 the	 classical	
treaties	on	political	philosophy	 from	which	Boltanski	and	Thévenot	have	drawn	 their	
original	 6	 orders	 of	 worth,	 since	 these	 works	 have	 the	 human	 at	 their	 starting	 and	
259  
And	 yet,	 Blok	 (2013)	 contends	 that	 Boltanski	 and	 Thévenot’s	 and	 Latour’s	
understandings	 of	 ‘green’	 in	 the	 pragmatic	 sociology	 of	 critique,	 amounted	 only	 to	 a	
partial	reading	of	the	moral	worths	of	nature.	Instead	Blok	(2013:	3)	argues,	‘ecology,	in	
its	 present	 socio-political	 state	 manifests	 itself	 in	 diverse	 cognitive	 and	 moral	
grammars,	 tied	 to	 specifiable	 projects	 of	 ecological	 justification,	 conflict	 and	
compromise’.	Hence,	Blok	proposes	that	the	nature	to	which	the	green	moral-political	
order	is	related	is	not	simply	‘nature’,	but	natures	in	a	plural	value	sense.	Blok	suggests	
that	 the	 opportunities	 for	 the	 pragmatic	 sociology	 of	 critique	 and	 its	 treatment	 of	
political	 ecology	 are	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	 way	 that	 its	 main	 protagonists	 have	 each	
captured	 different	 ontological	 foundations	 for	 the	 valuation	 of	 ecological	 entities	 in	
public	disputes.		
In	 line	with	Blok’s	 thesis,	what	 initially	 intrigued	me	 to	 investigate	 the	dispute	 as	 an	
important	 element	 within	 the	 assemblages	 of	 BDO,	 is	 that	 there	 is	 one	 at	 all.	 The	
starting	 points	 of	 either	 debating	 team	 appeared	 to	 be	 the	 same	 moral	 concern	 for	
biodiversity	 loss.	 All	 participants	 would	 most	 likely	 primarily	 justify	 their	 claims	
according	to	what	Boltanski	and	Thévenot	refer	to	as	the	'green	order	of	worth'.	Indeed,	
the	 promises	 of	 BDO	 are	 cast	 in	 broadly	 progressive	 terms	 for	 ‘environmental	
improvement’	 and	 to	 ‘protect	 and	 enhance	biodiversity’.	 I	 queried	 therefore,	whether	
this	was	a	dispute	over	the	means	towards	more	or	less	the	same	‘ends’?	Did	it	mirror	
the	early	debates	associated	with	de-coupling	the	regulatory	means	from	the	regulated	
ends	in	in	1970s	detailed	in	chapter	4?	Or	is	there	more	at	play?	Are	the	environmental	
‘ends’	 themselves	 in	 question?	 Is	 there	 an	 elusive	 consensus	 over	 the	 target	 for	
biodiversity	‘gains’	in	a	quantitative	sense?	If	the	latter	is	the	case,	how	can	this	insight	
shed	light	on	the	social	processes	that	constitute	the	worth	of	nature?	More	specifically,	
which	‘nature’	 is	being	disputed?	Moreover,	how	is	it	that	advocates	and	practitioners	
experience	 the	 search	 for	 legitimacy	 themselves	 and	 ground	 justifications	 in	 a	
																																																																																																																																																													
ending	 points.	 Latour	 (1993	 cited	 by	 Blok	 2013:	 6)	 advocates	 for	 a	middle	 ground	 of	
‘indeterminacy’	 whereby	 nonhuman	 entities	 are	 never	 treated	 solely	 as	 a	 means	 for	
some	 human	 endeavour	 but	 always	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 treated	 as	 an	 end	 in	
themselves.	 To	 overcome	 this	 impasse	 (human	 or	 non-human	 oriented	 moral	
philosophies),	Latour	proposes	we	instead	remain	attentive	to	the	‘deep	uncertainty	in	
the	 nature	 of	 attachments’	 between	 things	 (1998:	 232).	 Rather	 than	 committing	 to	
either	the	human	or	the	non-human	as	starting	points	for	political	philosophy,	Latour	
argues	we	need	 to	 simply	 ‘de-centre	ourselves’	 and	certainly	not	move	 from	a	wholly	
anthropocentric	philosophy	to	a	bio-centric	one	(ibid.).	
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consistent	 logic	 -	 and,	 furthermore,	 is	 the	 logic	 consistent?	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 overt	
ideological	 scepticism	 to	 market	 based	 approaches,	 other	 research	 has	 argued	 that	
conservationists	or	ecologists	are	largely	motivated	by	an	‘outcome	focused	enthusiasm’	
(Sandbrook	 et	 al.	 2013).	 The	 emphasis	 on	 ‘outcomes’	 shapes	my	 hypothesis	 that	 the	
dispute	 emerges	 and	 is	 sustained	 not	 only	 over	 the	 appropriate	 means	 of	 meeting	
generally	 accepted	 ‘ends’	 but	 through	 different	 ideas	 over	 what	 those	 outcomes	 and	
ends	should	be	-	in	other	words,	to	the	green	onto-epistemologies	(Sullivan	2017)	that	
these	ends	relate.	
Clarifying	 which	 environmental	 ends	 are	 being	 disputed	 through	 tracing	 the	 moral	
worths	 of	 biodiversity	 further	 illuminates	 the	 normative	 structuring	 of	 BDO’s	
assemblages	and	the	tensions	at	its	heart.	My	proposal	is	that	these	conflicts	were	not	
only	 limited	 to	 establishing	 the	 appropriate	 hierarchy	 of	 such	 orders	 of	 worth	 like	 a	
domination	 of	 market	 over	 other	 political	 values	 (means),	 but	 to	 the	many	 ‘green’	
orders	of	worth	to	which	offsetting	appeals	(the	ends).		
8.3	Event	ethnography	-	methods	
I	attended	both	the	main	NNL	Summit	and	the	counter	forum,	held	the	day	before,	as	a	
volunteer	 organiser.	 The	 context	 of	 each	 event	 was	 significant	 for	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
discourse.	While	the	BBOP	Summit	staged	an	actual	debate	with	a	tabled	motion,	the	
counter	forum	simply	hosted	a	panel	with	speakers	who	more	or	less	converged	on	an	
agreed	 critical	 stance.	 Thus,	 in	 this	 latter	 event	 there	 was	 no	 presence	 of	 an	
oppositional	‘other’.	My	empirical	investigation	into	the	architectures	of	argumentation	
followed	two	layers.	The	first	layer	entailed	systematising	the	appearance	of	specifically	
green	frames	commonly	used	in	argumentation	on	either	side	of	debate	about	BDO.	I	
used	this	initial	layer	to	arrive	at	a	set	of	analytical	codes	that	formed	the	basis	for	the	
second	 layer	 of	 research.	 The	 latter	 stage	 entailed	 performing	 a	 structured,	 coded	
discourse	analysis	of	the	transcript	of	the	NNL	Summit	debate	using	these	codes.		
During	 the	 first	 layer,	 I	 assembled	 a	 range	 of	 green	 framings	 that	 commonly	 appear	
within	 the	 BDO	 dispute.	 I	 arrived	 at	 these	 framings	 deductively	 from	 the	 wider	
literature	 in	 particular	 Apostolopoulou	 and	 Adams	 	 (2017)	 and	 Sullivan	 and	 Hannis	
(2015)	and	inductively	through	my	own	initial	discourse	analysis	from	the	NNL	Summit	
and	 the	counter	 forum.	This	 first	 layer	of	 research	produced	 the	codes	with	which	 to	
analyse	the	detailed	structures	of	argumentation	within	the	NNL	Summit’s	debate.	This	
initial	 layer	 of	 analysis	 confirmed	 the	 broader	 proposition	 of	 this	 chapter	 and	 aligns	
with	Blok’s		(2013)	view	that	divergent	ontological	and	moral	framings	of	 'biodiversity’	
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sustain	the	dispute	over	BDO	in	England.	Notably	many	of	these	green	frames	appear	
diametrically	opposed	(Sullivan	and	Hannis	2015)	and	within	oppositional	patterns	that	
either	facilitate	or	resist	the	market	value	framing	of	non-human	natures.	For	example	
where	one	frame	positions	biodiversity	to	be	ontologically	amenable	to	being	linearly,	
physically	 re-created	 or	 re-storable	 through	 restoration	 science,	 the	 counter	 frame	
positioned	biodiversity	as	being	substantively	‘non-linear	and	dynamic’.		
Many	of	the	green	frames	drawn	from	Apostolopoulou	and	Adams	(2017)	and	Sullivan	
and	 Hannis	 (2015)	 intersected	 and	 overlapped.	 For	 example,	 Apostolopoulou	 and	
Adams	 proposed	 that	 BDO	 en-frames	 biodiversity	 in	 reductive	 and	 simplified	 terms	
e.g.:		
This	narrowing	is	fundamental	to	offsetting	calculations	and	reproduces	the	
reductionist	myth	of	simplicity’	(Levins	&	Lewontin,	1980	cited	by	
Apostolopoulou	and	Adams	2017:	2).		
The	code	(green	frame)	I	drew	from	this	statement	was	reducible	and	simple.	A	similarly	
overlapping	 frame	 put	 forward	 by	 Apostolopoulou	 and	 Adams	 2017	 conceives	 of	
biodiversity	as	a	series	of	isolated	units	e.g.:	
The	creation	of	offset	metrics	to	represent	ecological	losses	and	gains	through	
numerical	scores	(Environment	Bank,	2013)	involves	a	narrowing	of	focus	to	
isolated	parts	of	an	ecosystem	(Apostolopoulou	and	Adams	2017:	2)		
The	full	table	of	these	oppositional	frames	and	examples	from	the	Apostolopoulou	and	
Adams	 (2017)	 and	 Sullivan	 and	 Hannis	 (2015)	 texts	 and	 my	 ethnographic	 notes	 is	
presented	in	Table	14.	
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Table	14	Green	frames	upon	which	advocate	and	critical	positions	for	BDO	are	based	
Green	frames	of	biodiversity	supporting	BDO		
(advocates)	
Green	frames	of	biodiversity	contesting	BDO	
(critics)	
Measureable,	manageable	through	
ecological	scientific	techniques	
Un-knowable,	un-mappable,	mysterious	
Quantitative	 Qualitative,	affective,	plural	in	value	
Amenable	to	balancing	loss	of	gain	 Non-interchangeable,	specific	
Restorable,	creatable	 Non-linear,	dynamic	
Score	of	isolated	units	 Complex,	interrelated,	entangled	ecologies	
Reducible	and	simple	 Dialectically	composed,	dynamic	and	multi-
layered,	holistic	
Knowable	through	surrogates	 Un-knowable,	uncertain	and	recalcitrant	
Manageable	through	numerical	
commensurability	
Incommensurable	with	other	value	
dimensions	such	as	numbers	
Alienable	and	individuated		 Synergistic,	embedded,	inter-connected	
Spatially	non	specific-	abstract	 Spatially	produced	both	physically	and	
socially	
Privatisable	and	a	ready	source	of	profits	 Commonly	held,	inalienable	and	integral	to	
social-environmental	justice	
An	entity	for	which	which	markets	have	the	
due	responsibility	to	govern	–	a	public	good	
best	delivered	through	a	private	mechanism	
A	civic	common	to	be	protected	through	
effective	land	planning	and	regulation	
Service	provider	–	instrumental	value	 Biocentric	–	intrinsic	value	and	therefore	
priceless	
	
I	 subsequently	 distilled	 this	 full	 range	 of	 overlapping	 frames	 and	 their	 oppositional	
counter-parts	 into	 a	 condensed	 framework	 of	 codes	 and	 used	 these	 to	 analyse	 the	
transcripts	from	the	debate.	The	condensed	framework	is	shown	in	Table	15.		Following	
Thévenot	et	al.	(2000),	I	wanted	to	test	whether	these	green	frames	could	be	shown	to	be	
uniquely	 ‘green’	 or	whether	 they	were	positioned	 in	 a	 compromise	with	other	 original	
orders	of	worth,	and	if	so,	which	one.		
In	reflecting	back	on	the	green	compromises	set	out	in	Table	13,	it	was	readily	apparent	
that	 while	 some	 of	 the	 green	 frames	 supporting	 or	 disputing	 BDO	 emerge	 as	 unique	
‘green’	orders	of	worth	many	are	 indeed	nested	within	or	 feature	as	compromises	with	
the	 others.	 A	moral-political	 understanding	 of	 biodiversity	 as	 something	 belonging	 to	
the	 ‘commons’	 rather	 than	 private	 property,	 for	 example,	 is	 not	 simply	 biocentric	 (as	
biodiversity	as	an	end	for	and	of	itself)	but	couched	within	the	civic	order	of	worth	over	
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the	 appropriate	 means	 of	 governing	 non	 human	 natures.	 Similarly,	 Table	 15	 frames	 a	
contrast	 between	 biodiversity	 as	 encapsulating	 instrumental	 over	 intrinsic	 value.	 This	
contrast	 positions	 the	 first	 as	 a	 belonging	 to	 political	 philosophy	 and	 the	 latter	 as	 a	
singularly	green,	biocentric	value	system.	I	subsequently	applied	the	codes	of	Table	15	to	
the	data	with	the	computer	assisted	qualitative	analysis	programme	Dedoose,	to	analyse	
the	 range	 of	 ontological	 framings	 of	 ‘green’	 invoked	 through	 the	 dispute	 over	
biodiversity	offsetting.		
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Table	15	Qualitative	analysis	codes	built	from	‘green	compromises’	
	
8.4	Results	
I	devised	 this	discourse	analysis	as	a	way	 to	build	on	 the	contributions	put	 forward	by	
Sullivan	 and	 Hannis	 (2015)	 as	 well	 as	 Apostolopoulou	 and	 Adams	 (2017).	 I	 sought	 to	
systematise	 which	 of	 the	 green	 value	 frames	 of	 biodiversity	 onto-epistemologies	
appeared	as	singular	greens	and	which	ones	appeared	as	compromises,	and	how	actors	
used	 these	 in	 practice.	 The	 results	 show	 that	 actors	 tend	 to	 mobilise	 a	 patchwork	 of	
green	 compromises	 in	 favour	 of	 or	 against	 BDO	 (shown	 in	 Table	 16).	 The	 results	 also	
revealed	interesting	insights	into	how	the	compromises	are	structured	and	the	ways	they	
are	mobilised	in	the	dispute.	The	coded	outcomes	from	each	side	of	the	debate	revealed	
that	 the	 three	 speakers	 arguing	 in	 favour	 of	 BDO	 as	 an	 opportunity	 invoked	 green	
justifications	 and	 ontologies	 from	 Table	 15	 aboev,	 26	 times.	 The	 critics	 invoked	 green	
justifications	as	the	basis	of	their	argument,	38	times.	The	results	are	shown	in	Table	16.	
Advocates	in	favour	of	BDO	(opportunity)	 Critics	against	BDO		(risk)	
Green	value	frame	 Order	of	worth	
compromise	
Green	value	frame	 Order	of	worth	
compromise	
Measurable,	
quantifiable,	
amenable	to	‘cuts’	
in	making	units	
Industrial	 Unknowable	–	scientific	
uncertainty	complex,	
un-mappable,	non-
linear,	dynamic,	
layered,	holism	and	
synergy	
Industrial	
Anthropocentric/	
utilitarian	service	
providers	
Market,	civic	 Biocentric	-	intrinsic	end	
it	itself	
Green	
	
Bio-physical,	socially	and	
culturally	neutral	
Industrial	 Socio-culturally	made	
and	entangled	
Civic-	domestic	
compromise	
	
Common	good	to	be	
aligned	with	private	
means	and	ends	
Market	 Common	good	to	be	
maintained	by	common	
means	
Civic	(the	ends	
are	agreed	
upon	but	the	
means	are	
different)	
	
Substitutable,	
transferable	(achieved	
through	restoration	
ecology)	
Industrial	 Specific	(non-fungible,	
de	re)	
Green	
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	Table	16	Results	of	coding	exercise	on	debate;	Agree	to	disagree	
Green	code	 Advocates	 Critics	 Totals	
	
Anthropocentric	service	
provider	 1	
	
1	
	
Bio-physical,	socially	neutral		 1	
	
1	
	
Bio-centric	 1	 2	 3	
	
Measurable	 6	
	
6	
	
Public	good-	delivered	
privately	through	market	 8	
	
8	
	
Public	good-	protected	
through	commons	 2	 8	 10	
	
Socio-culturally	entangled	 1	 5	 6	
	
Spatially	specific	 1	 8	 9	
	
Substitutable	-	transferable	 3	
	
3	
	
Unknowable	through	
surrogates	 2	 15	 17	
	
Total	 26	 38	
		
Notably,	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 debate	 mobilised	 a	 combination	 of	 green	 compromises	
simultaneously.	 Neither	 party	 in	 this	 debate	 used	 a	 vocabulary	 in	 purely	 pro	 or	 anti	
position.	 However,	 the	 code	 occurrences	 were	 weighted	 differently	 between	 the	
advocates	 and	 the	 critics	 showing	 some	divergence.	Within	 the	 first	 group,	 the	BDO’s	
advocates,	the	most	frequently	mentioned	green	justification	as	a	compromise	with	the	
market	 order	 of	 worth	 (n=8/26	 or	 31	 per	 cent)	 positioned	 the	 idea	 of	 biodiversity	 as	
something	that	is	fundamentally	a	public	good	but	can	best	be	delivered	through	private	
or	 economic	mechanisms.	This	 idea	of	 separating	 the	means	 from	 the	 ends	 (assuming	
that	the	‘end’	is	a	stable	normative	goal)	returns	us	to	the	initial	opening	premise	of	the	
inquiry	within	this	chapter.	The	following	excerpt	highlights	this	code	and	recounts	the	
dialogue	 between	 Tony	 Juniper	 as	 chair	 and	 Susie	 Browline	 in	 relation	 to	 BDO	 as	 a	
means	of	environmental	governance	that	is	preferable	over	land	planning:	
Is	this	not	a	distraction	away	from	designating	national	parks	and	nature	
reserves	that	should	be	there	as	a	matter	of	law	rather	than	economic	
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disincentive?	Tony	Juniper,	Debate	Chair	
I	think	that	that	is	a	fantastic	theoretically	excellent	point	but	the	main	obstacle	
to	that	is	that	countries	simply	don’t	have	the	resources	to	do	that.	In	South	
Africa	we	have	an	excellent	network	of	protected	areas,	but	we	have	thousands	
of	other	priority	sites	that	will	never	be	protected	we	simply	don’t	have	the	
resources	to	do	that.	So	theoretically	great,	but	in	practice	-	doesn’t	work.’	Susie	
Brownlie	
At	its	heart,	this	justification	is	the	pragmatic	neoliberal	compromise	where	the	market	
is	deemed	as	a	naturalised	replacement	for	the	shortcomings	of	the	State.		
The	second	most	frequently	mentioned	‘green’	the	advocates	invoked	(n=	6/26	or	23	per	
cent)	was	 an	 idea	of	biodiversity	 as	 something	un-problematically	measurable	 through	
quantification	processes	(green-industrial	compromise,	see	Tables	13	and	14).	This	frame,	
noted	 strongly	 in	 Apostolopoulou	 and	 Adams’	 2017	 article,	 sees	 biodiversity	 as	 being	
‘brought	 into	 account’	 for	 decision	making	with	 the	metric.	 An	 example	 excerpt	 from	
this	code:	
To	deliver	accountability,	first	deliver	accounting,	measure	what	is	lost	and	
what	is	gained.	We	have	a	great	opportunity,	through	the	offsetting	metric	to	
do	this	now.	Societies	must	demand	that	their	local	authorities	demonstrate	net	
gain	in	their	decisions.	Tom	Tew,	CEO	of	the	Environment	Bank.	
On	the	other	side	of	the	debate,	the	critics’	frames,	unsurprisingly	contrasted	against	the	
green	values	mobilised	by	the	advocates.	The	most	frequently	invoked	green	as	a	form	of	
critique	 (n=11/38	 or	 29	 per	 cent)	was	 the	 contention	 that	 biodiversity	 is	 in	many	ways	
‘unknowable’,	characterised	by	scientific	uncertainty,	thereby	undermining	the	industrial	
truth	 test	 of	 the	 compromise	 as	 iterated	 in	 Boltanski	 and	 Thévenot’s	 (2006)	 original	
schema.	The	 ‘unknowability’	 frame	directly	contrasts	with	the	 ‘measureable’	one	above.	
In	this	respect,	biodiversity	 is	conceived	to	be	 intrinsically	 incompatible	with	reductive	
methods	of	measurement	such	as	the	DEFRA	metric.	An	example	of	the	biodiversity	as	
‘unknowable’	frame	lifted	from	Apostolopoulou	and	Adams	2017:	
No	single	surrogate	(or	even	a	series	of	them)	can	entirely	capture	biodiversity,	
since	not	all	biodiversity	attributes	are	measurable,	and	therefore	it	is	
impossible	to	guarantee	that	no	biodiversity	is	lost	(and	thus	that	No	Net	Loss	
is	actually	achieved)	(Apostolopoulou	and	Adams	2017).		
An	example	excerpt	from	the	debate	data	is	as	follows:	
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There’s	another	thing	we	should	probably	be	honest	about	restoring	
biodiversity	and	ecosystems.	Technically	it	is	very	difficult	and	I	think	there	are	
few	in	this	room	who	would	challenge	that...And	therefore	I	start	to	get	a	bit	
uneasy	when	we	talk	about	biodiversity	in	terms	of	units,	which	can	be,	as	the	
DEFRA	green	paper	puts	it,	bought	off	the	shelf.	It	makes	the	assumption	that	
you	can	swap	it	and	you	are	losing	nothing.	Hannah	Mowat,	Fern	International	
If,	as	a	society	we	decide	we	don’t	care	about	biodiversity,	we	will	lose	
biodiversity	it	is	as	simple	as	that.	So	either	we	will	win	the	social	fight,	that	you	
need	to	value	biodiversity,	not	necessarily	a	monetary	value	but	give	it	a	value	
or	we	lose	it,	and	the	idea	that	you	can	lose	the	social	fight	but	still	win	it	
through	some	sort	of	clever	metric	or	some	sort	of	technicality	or	mechanism	is	
just	not	the	case	-	it	doesn’t	work!	Aerial	Brunner,	Birdlife	International	
The	two	second	most	 frequently	 invoked	green	frames	used	by	the	critics	were	equally	
weighted	(n=8/38,	n=8/38	or	21	per	cent	each).	The	first	emerged	as	the	counter-stance	
to	the	means	-	ends	frame	of	biodiversity	as	a	public	good.	This	position	saw	biodiversity	
as	a	public	good	and	as	such,	something	that	should	always	be	delivered	through	public	
regulatory	means	(market-civic	compromise).	For	example:		
The	devil	is	always	in	the	details,	and	by	the	way	there	are	other	ways	to	make	
the	polluter	pay.	The	obvious	one,	and	in	the	US	you	are	not	even	allowed	to	
say	it	in	public,	it’s	called	taxes!	So,	if	the	idea	is	to	make	certain	types	of	
development	less	appealing,	for	example	you	want	to	drive	people	off	green	
fields	and	onto	brown	fields,	well	slap	a	nice	development	tax	on	green	field	
development	and	you	will	see	that	this	will	change	people’s	calculation.	This	is	
not	a	concrete	detailed	proposal	but	the	point	is	that	there	a	lot	of	ways	of	
making	the	polluter	pays	principle	work	and	one	of	them	is	through	taxation	
and	the	other	is	through	proper	land	planning.	Aerial	Brunner,	Bird	Life	
International.	
The	other	equally	weighted	code	related	to	biodiversity’s	specificity,	as	something	non-
exchangeable	through	its	uniqueness	and	embeddedness	in	place:	
But	of	course,	we	all	know	that	biodiversity	is	not	an	abstract	term,	people	live	
in	biodiversity	because	biodiversity	are	places,	it	is	our	wider	world.	And	if	it’s	
not	about	biodiversity	but	about	the	places	in	which	that	biodiversity	is,	in	that	
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case	places	are	unique,	and	biodiversity	is	unique	and	therefore	can’t	be	
replaced.	Hannah	Mowat,	Fern	International	
The	 ‘green’	 under	 the	 code	 of	 specificity	 -	 conveying	 non-substitutability	 and	 non-
fungibility	is	arguably	a	bio-centric	singular	green;	it	reflects	a	value	in	biodiversity	that	
is	an	end	in	itself.	It	is	not	surprising	that	critics	invoked	this	moral	worth	of	biodiversity	
as	 a	 way	 to	 criticise	 BDO.	 It	 is	 however,	 interesting	 that	 this	 was	 not	 their	 primary	
critique.	 The	 primary	 grounds	 on	 which	 critics	 contested	 BDO	 were	 through	
undermining	 the	 industrial	 order	 of	 worth	 of	 the	 green-industrial	 compromise,	 by	
emphasising	 the	 technical	 fallibility	of	 ecological	 currencies	 and	quantification	 -	based	
on	biodiversity’s	‘un-knowability’.	Under	this	critique,	biodiversity’s	ontological	mystery	
defies	 epistemological	 and	 technical	 capacities	of	 simple	 reflection	 through	 surrogates.	
This	 frame	positions	biodiversity	as	unknowable	and	resistant	to	the	pacification	of	 the	
metric’s	modernising	 and	 rationalising	 values.	As	Apostolopoulou	and	Adams	 (2017:	 2)	
point	out:	
	In	reframing	biodiversity	as	fully	replaceable	and	re-creatable	by	human	action,	
offsetting	deliberately	confuses	the	state	of	ecological	restoration	science	and	
practice	with	its	aspiration.	
8.5	Discussion	
This	 chapter	 has	 employed	 a	 pragmatic	 sociology	 of	 critique	matrix	 to	make	 sense	 of	
how	the	ontologies	and	moral	worths	and	value	framings	of	nature	are	mobilised	for	and	
against	BDO.	The	results	from	the	data	analysis	align	with	Blok’s	(2013)	contribution	by	
highlighting	 that	 the	 controversy	 over	 BDO	 does	 not	 relate	 to	 simply	 one,	 universal	
green	 order	 of	 worth	 or	 one	 definition	 of	 biodiversity.	 Instead	 ‘many	 green	 orders	 of	
worth’	 sustain	 the	 dispute	 over	 BDO,	 especially	 in	 binary	 oppositional	 value	 frames.	
Furthermore,	it	illustrates	that	although	a	variety	of	green	values	shape	the	debate,	these	
frequently	 appear	 in	 compromises	 with	 other	 values,	 which	 through	 injecting	 further	
moral	 complexity,	 deepens	 the	 impasse.	 In	 summary	 and	 discussion	 I	 highlight	 four	
points	that	are	relevant	to	my	broader	investigation	into	the	assembling	of	value	through	
biodiversity	offsetting.		
1. Green	compromises	of	BDO;	disputing	BDO’s	rationalising	tendencies	
For	 the	 most	 part,	 the	 findings	 show	 that	 critics	 and	 advocates	 draw	 on	 green	
justifications	with	other	orders	of	worth,	according	 to	 the	market,	 industrial,	 civic	and	
domestic	 spheres	 as	 illustrated	 in	 Table	 13.	 Advocates	 constructed	 green-industrial	
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compromises	 through	 a	 belief	 in	 the	 technical	 accuracy	 and	 ecological	 capacity	 of	 the	
metric	 to	 produce	 appropriate	measurements	 of	 value.	 For	 this	 group,	 accounting	 for	
and	managing	nature	 through	audit	 technologies	was	deemed	 to	be	a	good	 thing,	 and	
thus	 leant	moral	weight	 and	 further	 justification	 to	 the	 frame.	 Somewhat	 surprisingly,	
the	analysis	also	shows	that	the	main	moral-political	strategy	used	to	mount	a	critique	in	
this	 debate	was	 to	 use	 forge	 a	 compromise	with	 the	 industrial	 order	 of	 worth.	 Critics	
used	 the	 industrial	 ‘reality	 test’	 (Boltanski	 and	 Thévenot	 1999)	 to	 undermine	 the	
coherence	of	BDO	by	emphasising	the	fallibility	of	ecological	science	and	biodiversity’s	
measurability.	 Critics	 contested	 what	 Turnhout	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 have	 called	 the	 growing	
‘measurementality’	 of	 biodiversity	 conservation,	 premised	 on	 techno-managerial	 ideals	
of	 control,	 standardisation	 and	 audit.	 This	 critique	 rightly	 points	 to	 the	 tendency	 of	
BDO’s	scientific	knowledges	to	ignore	over	a	decade	of	ecological	research	into	systemic	
approaches	 (consisting	of	 ecological	dynamics,	processes	and	 interactions)	 and	 instead	
fixates	 on	 habitats	 and	 species	 as	 static	 units	 (Calvet	 et	 al.	 2015b).	 But	 similarly,	 the	
critics’	 industrial	 reality	 test	 signals	 the	 continuation	 of	 a	 longer	 debate	 and	 value	
struggle	 in	 conservation	 generally.	 This	 struggle	 sees	 the	 shaping	 of	 the	 biodiversity	
conservation’s	 knowledge	 and	 institutional	 framework	 by	 ecological	 science	 as	 always	
having	 been	 related	 to	 the	 rationalisation	 of	 nature	 through	 control	 and	management	
(Adams	 1997b).	 For	 this	 reason,	 offsetting,	 according	 to	 these	 critics	 is	 an	 inherently	
risky	and	dangerous	endeavour	since	it	is	driven	by	the	same	‘rationalist	project	that	has	
generated	the	damage	that	conservationists	wish	to	oppose’	(ibid.:	287).	
2. Playing	with	the	‘master’s	tools’?	
It	was	noticeable	how	speakers	(critics)	at	the	Counter	Forum	tended	to	focus	less	on	the	
fallibilities	of	measurability	or	restoration	science	according	to	the	industrial	truth	test.	
Instead,	 in	 this	context,	where	 there	was	no	antagonistic	 ‘other’	 critics	emphasised	 the	
intrinsic	green	values	of	biodiversity	and	its	specificity,	evoking	non-exchangeability	and	
socio-cultural	entanglements.	This	is	an	important	difference,	even	if	it	emerges	from	a	
somewhat	 impressionistic	 observation	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 thorough	 going	 coding	
exercise	 on	 the	 presentations	 of	 the	 Counter	 Forum.	 This	 difference	 is	 significant	
because	 it	 shows	 that	 interlocutors	 mobilise	 argumentative	 strategies	 in	 different	
contexts	for	different	audiences	(as	also	discussed	in	chapters	6	and	7).	As	I	have	shown,	
in	 the	 debating	 context	 of	 the	NNL	 Summit	 debate,	 critics	mirrored	 the	 advocates	 by	
drawing	on	the	truth	tests	from	the	industrial	orders	of	worth,	but	so	as	to	specifically	to	
counter	them.	Sullivan	and	Hannis	(2015)	point	towards	the	erroneous	strategy	of	using	
the	 truth	 tests	 of	 those	 you	 seek	 to	 criticise.	 In	 reference	 to	 their	 own	 analytical	
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engagement	with	the	BDO	controversy,	they	remind	us	that	there	are	‘limits	to	what	can	
be	achieved	by	arguing	within	the	terms	of	reference	set	by	enthusiasts	for	market-based	
approaches	 to	 biodiversity	 conservation’	 (ibid.:	 2015:	 11).	 Instead,	 a	 more	 fruitful	
approach	 might	 be	 enacted	 through	 resisting	 the	 commensurating	 frames	 of	 value	
equivalence	within	each	order	of	worth	entirely.	 In	this	sense,	 following,	Boltanski	and	
Thévenot	(1999)	-	critics	might	deliberately	‘mix	worlds’,	even	if	apparently	illogical	so	as	
to	prevent	the	subjugation	of	one	by	another	through	compromises40.		
Eschewing	the	‘masters	tools’	(Harvey	1996)	in	critique	of	BDO	would	entail	returning	to	
values	based	arguments,	rather	than	technical	ones.	For	example,	while	the	green	frame	
of	specificity	was	present	in	the	critics’	strategies	within	the	NNL	Summit	debate	it	was	
more	noticeably	evoked	at	 the	Counter	Forum.	This	 frame	appeals	 to	an	ontology	and	
moral	 worth	 of	 biodiversity	 as	 specific	 in	 its	 essence,	 unique	 and	 mutually	 entangled	
with	 biotic,	 abiotic	 and	 socio-cultural	 places.	 As	 a	 substantively	 oppositional	 frame	 to	
the	 idea	 of	 exchange,	 substitutability	 and	 spatial	 flexibility,	 green	 specificity	 therefore	
clashes	with	another	central	 rationale	 for	BDO,	 that	 is	 its	movability	 for	making	space	
for	 development	 (which	 I	 discussed	 in	 chapters	 5	 and	 6).	 Green	 specificity	 is	 not	
amenable	 to	 being	 streamlined,	 nor	 rationalised.	The	notion	of	 biodiversity	 as	 specific	
and	 inimitable	 is	 a	 unique	 ‘green’	 order	 and	 end	 unto	 itself.	 It	 cannot	 therefore	 be	
positioned	 in	 a	 compromise.	 As	 John	 O’Neill	 has	 observed	 (2013),	 valuing	 a	 class	 of	
objects	for	their	own	specificity	as	‘de	re’	-	meaning	‘of	the	thing’,	in	contrast	to	‘de	dicto’	
meaning	 ‘of	 the	 word’	 -	 is	 an	 ethical	 commitment	 that	 cuts	 straight	 to	 the	 heart	 of	
sustainability	 debates.	 Valuing	 things	 as	 particulars,	 as	 you	 would	 a	 person,	 eludes	
fungibility	and	reflects	a	bio-centric	political-moral	sensibility.	
3. A	return	to	the	means-ends	debate	and	neoliberal	rationalities	
For	the	BDO	advocates,	the	virtues	of	market	and	other	economic	instruments	are	taken	
to	 be	 self-evident	 as	 natural	 correctives	 to	 barriers	 towards	 achieving	 pre-defined	
unproblematic	 ends.	 Such	 barriers	 might	 include	 a	 lack	 of	 funding,	 lack	 of	 effective	
																																																						
40 	The	 cognitive	 neuroscientist	 George	 Lakoff	 (2004)	 points	 towards	 the	 material	
neurological	basis	for	the	ways	that	oppositional	value	frames	are	activated	in	the	mind.	
In	his	popular	work	‘Don’t	think	of	an	Elephant’	Lakoff	emphasises	that	critical	strategies	
should	never	use	the	language	of	the	frames	the	strategies	seek	to	denounce.	Using	the	
opposition’s	 vocabulary	 and	 value	 frames	 in	 criticism,	 Lakoff	 argues,	 positively	 and	
materially	 activates	 neurological	 pathways	 of	 the	 mind	 that	 are	 triggered	 by	 those	
frames,	 thus	 inadvertently	 self-sabotaging	one’s	 critique	and	affirming	 the	opposition’s	
logic.		
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governance,	 lack	 of	 wider	 interest	 or	 political	 will	 to	 protect	 biodiversity	 for	
biodiversity’s	sake.	These	perspectives	neatly	encapsulate	a	neoliberal	ideology	(Castree	
2008	 and	 Büscher	 et	 al.	 2012	 for	 a	 synthesised	 discussion)	 that	 crowds	 out	 alternative	
motivations	or	policy	solutions	and	provides	its	own	reality	tests.	Such	perspectives	also	
illustrate	how	the	moral	normativity	of	NNL	(as	an	aggregate	quantitative	goal)	sustains	
a	 neoliberal	 ideology	 with	 respect	 to	 BDO	 and	 market	 based	 instruments	 for	
conservation	more	generally.	In	emphasising	the	market	means	over	the	ends,	advocates	
continued	to	take	for	granted	the	idea	of	one	common	desirable	biodiversity	‘goal’.	The	
end	 point,	 as	 these	 advocates	 see	 it,	 would	 be	 an	 overall	 quantitative	 increase	 in	
generalised,	 but	 un	 specific	 biodiversity	 indicators,	 reminiscent	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	
aggregate	normativity	described	in	chapter	4.	
4. The	performative	and	circular	frames	of	BDO	
Finally,	of	the	many	greens	identified,	the	substantive	and	normative	representations	of	
biodiversity	 as	 simply	 quantifiable	 ‘flat’	 data,	 abstracted	 from	 biophysical	 context	 and	
amenable	 to	 market	 exchange,	 are	 outcomes	 of	 wider	 historical	 and	 geographical	
currents,	which	I	touched	upon	in	chapters	2	and	4.	As	Fredriksen	(2017)	and	Turnhout	
(2011)	 point	 out,	 the	 epistemological	 ordering	 practices	 of	 biodiversity	 according	 to	
various	 categories	 and	 signifiers	 (non	 market	 values)	 that	 in	 turn	 lend	 themselves	 to	
market	valuations,	is	part	of	a	much	longer	story	than	that	which	this	thesis	has	covered	
or	 is	able	to.	 I	propose	that	these	a	priori	representations,	 in	tandem	with	the	range	of	
other	actants	I	have	outlined,	are	performative	of	biodiversity	offsetting	as	a	mechanism	
and	biodiversity	units	as	commodities.	These	frames	make	BDO	and	its	associated	values	
appear	 coherent	 and	 logical.	 But	 this	 process	 is	 circular,	 as	 these	 frames,	 in	 turn	 are	
actively	confirmed	and	entrenched	by	BDO.	Offsetting	actively	en-frames	biodiversity	as	
a	 series	 isolatable	 processes	 and	 relationships,	 amenable	 to	 pricing	 and	 representation	
through	universal	units	(Apostolopoulou	and	Adams	2015).		
Boltanski	 and	Thévenot	 (1999:	 373)	 propose	 that	 ‘situations	 in	which	 important	 reality	
tests	 are	 performed	 are	 usually	 contrived	 so	 as	 to	 be	 as	 pure	 as	 possible’.	 The	 objects	
from	other	worlds	are	removed	in	order	to	discourage	criticism	and	to	make	challenging	
the	test	difficult	(ibid.).	The	calculative	and	conceptual	technologies	of	BDO,	such	as	the	
DEFRA	metric	 or	 the	 NNL	 framework	 can	 therefore	 be	 viewed	 as	 both	 circular	 truth	
tests	 as	 well	 as	 value	 compromises.	 Through	 producing	 flattened	 values	 that	 lend	
themselves	 to	 equivalence,	 the	 metric	 serves	 to	 smooth	 moral	 as	 well	 as	 ontological	
pluralism	of	biodiversity	into	one	overall	prevailing	logic.	As	a	truth	test	that	adjudicates	
the	validity	of	worth	according	to	a	market	or	industrial	order,	the	metric	is	performative	
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in	a	circular	sense.	It	confirms	the	worth	of	biodiversity	according	to	the	values	it	itself	
provides.	 In	 so	 doing	 the	 metric	 acts	 as	 a	 self-referential	 confirmation	 of	 the	 duly	
qualified	 reality	 of	measurable,	mappable	 biodiversity	 invoked	by	 the	 advocates	 in	 the	
debate.	The	metric	provides	proof	by	way	of	justifying	biodiversity	value	in	a	format	that	
is	compatible	with	and	verifiable	by	the	political	and	technical	construction	of	the	BDO	
mechanism.	The	metric	 is,	 in	 this	sense,	performative	 -	 it	enacts	both	quantitative	and	
moral-ethical	 values	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 is	 in	 turn,	 enacted	 through	 them.	 Through	
facilitating	 quantified	 and	 monetised	 mechanisms	 for	 exchanging	 harm	 for	 loss,	 as	 a	
scientific	 practice	 and	 economic	 instrument,	 the	 metric	 may	 reveal	 desired	
environmental	ends	as	‘improvements’-	albeit	judged	according	to	its	own	truth	test.		
In	conclusion,	reflecting	the	contributions	from	Thévenot	et	al.	(2000),	the	findings	from	
this	 chapter	 demonstrate	 that	 the	moral-political	 pluralism	 in	 society	 is	 echoed	 in	 the	
environmental	 pluralism	 of	 ecological	 disputes.	 	 Market	 based	 mechanisms	 like	 BDO	
silence	this	value	plurality	as	well	as	material	biological	differences	 into	numerical	and	
monetary	 values	 so	 as	 to	 rationalise	 and	 flatten	 them	 -	 to	 simplify.	 Meanwhile	 the	
broader	value	system	in	which	BDO	is	couched	(principally	industrial	and	market	orders	
of	worth)	means	that	actors	must	forge	uneasy	compromises	with	green	values	or	other	
orders	of	worth	to	make	claims	and	counter	claims	and	participate	in	the	conversation.	
Sometimes	 these	 green	 values	 undermine	 and	 thus	 counter-perform	 (MacKenzie	 et	 al.	
2007)	the	logic	of	BDO	by	appearing	in	intractable,	irresolvable	tension	with	it.	Through	
analysing	 the	 structures	 of	 argumentation,	 this	 chapter	 has	 clarified	 how	 and	 when	
actors	mount	justifications	and	critique	of	BDO,	showing	the	inherent	moral	complexity	
that	sustains	the	dispute.	Such	complexity	is	unlikely	to	go	away	anytime	soon.	It	points	
towards	and	the	need	for	an	urgent	debate	about	the	wider	democratic	values	to	which	
conservation	should	respond	and	be	positioned	to	uphold.		
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PART	5	
CHAPTER	9		
CONCLUSION	
	
To	open	the	conclusion	to	my	thesis,	 I	start	with	the	conclusion	to	the	DEFRA	pilot	 in	
the	 form	 of	 the	 official	 evaluation	 report.	 I	 reflect	 on	 the	 apparent	 overlaps	 and	
divergences	with	my	own	 ‘unofficial’	evaluation	study	laid	out	 in	the	chapters	above.	 	 I	
then	return	to	my	research	questions	before	summarising	the	trajectory	of	the	thesis	and	
illustrating,	 therein,	 the	ways	 in	which	 I	have	answered	 these	questions.	Following	 the	
thesis	summary	I	present	my	main	findings	and	contributions	to	those	wishing	to	better	
understand	 value	 making	 in	 conservation	 through	 biodiversity	 offsetting.	 Having	
pointed	to	the	occlusions	that	valuing	biodiversity	through	offsetting	sustains,	I	will	not	
take	 for	 granted	 the	 partialities	 I	 have	 unavoidably	 created	 in	 the	 course	 of	 my	 own	
research.	 Finally,	 therefore,	 I	 will	 discuss	 some	 of	 the	 research’s	 limitations	 while	
reflecting	 on	 fruitful	 avenues	 for	 future	 enquiry,	 before	 offering	 some	 concluding	
thoughts.	
9.1	An	unofficial	evaluation	of	the	DEFRA	pilot	study	
Throughout	 this	 thesis	 I	 have	 explored	 the	 polarising	 value	 systems	 in	which	 BDO	 in	
England	was	justified,	enacted	and	because	of	which,	ultimately	stalled.	These	polarising	
values	sustained	a	pernicious	and	irresolvable	tension	pertaining	to	desires	for	expanded	
economic	 growth	 as	 well	 as	 ecological	 flourishing.	 I	 explored	 the	 way	 these	 values	
conflicted	 in	chapter	8	and	 the	management	of	often	contradictory	values	 through	 the	
situated	 application	 of	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 and	 BDO	 throughout	 chapters	 5,	 6	 and	 7.	
However,	the	overarching	value	tension	inherent	in	the	BDO	approach,	especially	for	the	
UK	Government	was	discussed	in	chapter	4.	In	this	chapter,	I	illustrated	the	significance	
of	 the	pro-development	 and	 aggressively	 de-regulatory	 political	 climate	 in	which	BDO	
was	embraced	by	DEFRA	and	introduced	into	England’s	planning	system	under	the	pilot	
study	in	2012.	I	have	argued	that	BDO	was	originally	conceived	and	initiated	by	the	UK	
Government	in	2010	under	a	market-green	compromise	(Nyberg	and	White	2013).	It	was	
this	 very	 unequal	 compromise	 that	 could	 no	 longer	 accommodate	 ‘green’	 values	 and	
which	has	underpinned	DEFRA’s	retreat	from	the	policy	since	the	pilot	study.		
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This	 paradox	 is	 partly	 evidenced	 by	 the	 delay	 in	 DEFRA	 releasing	 the	 pilot’s	 final	
evaluation	 report.	 The	 pilot	 study’s	 evaluation	 report	 was	 written	 by	 consultants	 at	
Collingwood	 Environmental	 Planning	 and	 the	 IEEP	 and	 submitted	 to	 DEFRA	 in	 the	
spring	of	2014,	yet	it	only	surfaced	for	public	access	in	April	2016.	What	was	surprising	to	
me	upon	reading	this	 report	was	 the	realisation	that	 I	had	more	or	 less	undertaken	an	
unofficial	evaluation	of	the	DEFRA	pilot.	I	arrived	at	this	conclusion	after	noting	that	the	
official	evaluation	research	design	reflected	the	focus	of	my	own	research	by	tracing:	
Individual	development	projects	and	associated	offsets:	including	the	
identification	and	accreditation	of	offset	providers	and	engagement	with	
developers;	development	of	legal	agreements,	formal	approval	and	monitoring	
arrangements;	and	use	of	the	metric	around	specific	development	projects.	
(Baker	et	al.	2013:	1).		
Over	 the	 course	 of	 my	 research,	 several	 of	 my	 interlocutors	 also	 described	 their	
participation	 in	 the	 evaluation,	 yet	more	 than	once	noted	 that	 I	was	 seeking	 far	more	
detail	 than	 the	 evaluation	 interviews	 had	 done.	 Perhaps	 less	 surprising	 therefore,	 and	
also	moderately	 reassuring,	 was	 that	many	 of	 the	 findings	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 official	
evaluation	report	upheld	and	reflected	many	elements	of	my	own	findings	laid	out	in	the	
chapters	above.	In	particular,	the	report	emphasised	that	the	development	of	offsetting	
under	the	pilot	study	was	slow	coming	and	peppered	with	institutional,	governance	and	
other	practical	 challenges	prohibiting	 the	establishment	of	 the	approach.	Like	my	own	
findings,	it	noted	that	where	BDO	did	eventually	get	underway	at	particular	sites	during	
or	 since	 the	 pilot	 period,	 it	 was	 largely	 contingent	 on	 the	 specific	 arrangement	 of	
elements	 and	 actors	 located	 there.	 The	 interim	 evaluation	 report	 in	 2013	 stated,	 for	
example	 that	 ‘ecological,	 procedural	 and	 spatial	 planning	 expertise	 appears	 to	 be	
necessary	 for	 the	 effective	 delivery	 of	 the	 offsetting	 strategy’	 (Baker	 et	 al.	 2013:	 2).	 In	
relation	 to	 this	 prior	 point,	 the	 evaluation	 also	 noted	 throughout,	 that	 the	 unique	
attributes	 of	 the	 WCS	 pilot	 site	 (chapter	 5)	 enabled	 it	 to	 gather	 disproportionate	
experience	in	using	the	mechanism,	making	it	a	rare	example	of	how	biodiversity	values	
are	made	in	practice	under	the	offsetting	mechanism.		
Other	findings	from	the	DEFRA	evaluation	study	that	overlapped	with	my	own,	which	I	
discussed	 at	 different	 points	 throughout	 the	 case	 studies	 in	 chapters	 5,	 6	 and	 7	 are	
presented	in	Table	17.		
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Table	17	Overlapping	results	between	DEFRA	evaluation	and	my	own	unofficial	evaluation		
Official	DEFRA	Evaluation	Report	Key	Findings		
(Baker	et	al.	2014a:	3-6)		
Findings	overlapping	with	my	own	
Very	high	quality	and	quantities	of	
ecological	and	biological	spatial	data	and	
expertise	were	essential	to	implementing	
BDO		
	
The	size	of	the	LPA	team,	the	presence	of	a	
broker	and	the	ecological	and	spatial	data	
records	(the	HBA)	at	the	disposal	of	the	WCS	
pilot	in	chapter	5	were	shown	to	be	necessary	
components	to	the	building	of	a	market	like	
infrastructure	for	BDO.	Comparatively,	in	
South	Devon	a	smaller	team	and	the	poorer	
data	set	prohibited	the	emergence	of	the	
policy.	
‘The	metric	omitted	certain	ecological	aspects	
such	as	species,	ecological	connectivity	and	
habitat	function’.		
	
Illustrated	most	strongly	in	the	efforts	to	form	
a	hybrid	currency	between	habitat	and	
species	units	in	chapter	6.	The	metric’s	
partialities	were	also	evidenced	through	its	
design	features	detailed	in	chapter	4.	I	
discussed	how	the	metric	sought	to	balance	
ecological	precision	with	economic	efficiency	
as	well	as	policy	pragmatism,	thereby	
resulting	in	it	not	‘seeing’	anything	that	its	
algorithms	did	not	provide	abstracted	
categories	for.		
A	shortage	of	LPA	resources	(in	all	sites	except	
Warwickshire)	undermined	the	ability	of	LPAs	
to	promote	BDO	and	the	metric	more	widely	
to	planning	stakeholders.	The	paucity	of	
regulatory	capacity	in	general	was	also	
associated	with	difficulties	in	developing	the	
necessary	frameworks	and	local	policies	(due	
to	the	weaknesses	of	national	policy)	that	
would	empower	LPAs	to	impose	a	mandatory	
programme	of	BDO	on	generally	unwilling	
developers.	
	
In	all	case	studies,	the	presence	of	
intermediaries	to	enable	translations	
between	and	enroll	different	actors	and	
actants	to	the	network	was	key	to	the	
realisation	of	offsetting	in	practice.	Motivated	
and	empowered	individuals	that	were	able	to	
insert	NNL	as	a	policy	standard	to	institutional	
frameworks	in	chapters	5	and	7	illustrated	the	
potency	of	this	element	for	the	development	
of	actual	offsetting	approaches.		
A	lack	of	knowledge	and	experience	stalled	
LPAs’	abilities	to	define	the	costs	of	different	
types	of	habitat	creation	and	restoration	in	
compensation	biodiversity	units.	
	
The	overall	sense	of	‘muddling	through’	I	
discussed	in	chapters	5	and	6	illustrated	the	
ways	in	which	local	government	ecologists	
and	officials	work	with	partial	knowledge	and	
capacities	according	to	a	spirit	of	‘getting	
something	back	for	nature’.	In	the	absence	of	
predetermined	habitat	creation	costs	
bespoke	BOMP	reports	are	required.	In	the	
case	of	South	Devon,	the	LPA	sought	
expedient	solutions	such	as	the	RSPB’s	
original	costing	methodology	for	cirl	bunting	
grassland.	
Problems	in	identifying	receptor	sites	for	the	
provision	of	credit	units	prohibited	an	offset	
market	from	forming	
I	discussed	the	shortage	of	receptor	sites	
throughout	chapters	5	and	6	and	discussed	
the	differences	between	these	as	LPA	sites	
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	 and	the	hastier	process	with	the	TLP	offset,	as	
a	corporate	voluntary	process.	The	absence	of	
receptor	sites	during	and	immediately	after	
the	pilot	period	is	reflected	through	the	
emphasis	of	the	empirical	evidence	presented	
throughout,	which	dwells	at	the	valuation	
processes	related	to	impacts	rather	than	
offsets.	The	receptor	site	shortages	also	
directly	relate	to	the	efforts	to	establish	
habitat	banking	models	in	chapter	5.	
Evidence	that	BDO	is	occasionally	
undermining	the	mitigation	hierarchy	through	
allowing	developers	to	leapfrog	prior	steps	
towards	compensation.	
	
Although	my	empirical	evidence	did	not	
explicitly	identify	leapfrogging	of	the	
mitigation	hierarchy,	it	was	apparent	in	
several	cases	that	BDO	can	easily	confuse	
matters	as	planners	still	cannot	easily	
distinguish	between	mitigation	and	
compensation	under	BDO.		In	chapters	5	and	
6	I	discussed	examples	of	where	the	presence	
of	BDO	had	influenced	decision	making	
processes	and	deflected	civil	society	
contestation	to	the	development.		Conversely	
I	noted	in	chapters	6	and	7	that	ecologists	and	
NGOs	often	felt	that	mitigation	provision	is	
actually	more	problematic	than	offsite	
compensation	because	of	the	mitigation	
habitat’s	proximity	to	urban	development	and	
the	lack	of	effective	ongoing	monitoring.		
Stakeholders	perceived	that	the	value	of	a	the	
metric	lay	in	its	quantification	of	impacts	for	
ease	of	communication	to	other	audiences	
		
As	a	means	for	simplifying	the	ways	in	which	
actors	spoke	about	biodiversity	impacts,	the	
potency	of	numbers	as	communication	
strategies	was	apparent	in	different	ways	in	
each	case	study.	We	encountered	this	most	
clearly	in	chapter	7.	
The	timing	at	which	BDO	is	introduced	was	
important	and	required	‘early	engagement	
between	applicant	and	authority’.	
	
In	chapter	6	I	discussed	how	developers	
contested	compensation	provision	on	
account	of	the	stage	in	the	application	
process	in	which	it	was	proposed.	There	is	a	
bigger	issue	here	around	the	political	
economy	of	land	markets	and	its	connection	
to	the	affordable	‘housing	crisis’	as	well	as	the	
minimal	allowance	for	biodiversity	on	account	
of	developers’	squeezed	profit	margins.	
Many	contracts	involved	significant	
negotiation	between	LPAs	and	developers	
over	arriving	at	the	BIA	scores	and	the	costs	of	
offsetting.	Applicants	typically	searched	for	
cheaper	solutions	or	refused	the	full	costs	
associated	with	delivering	compensation,	
since	these	would	result	in	fees	higher	than	
under	current	practice.		
	
This	feature	was	the	basis	for	the	section	in	
5.3	‘Something	we	can	live	with’	where	the	
establishment	of	impact	values	and	
compensation	costs	were	actively	negotiated	
by	the	developer	and	LPA.	Searching	for	
‘value	for	money’	and	concurrent	
adjustments	to	the	metric’s	scores	was	
present	in	each	case	study.	
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The	 final	 point	 of	 this	 list	 is	 among	 the	most	 significant	 in	 illustrating	 the	 paradox	 in	
which	DEFRA’s	engagement	with	BDO	was	situated,	specifically:	the	wider,	overarching	
political	 commitment	 to	 England’s	 developers	 and	 house	 builders.	 The	 finding	 is	
particularly	 relevant,	 therefore	 in	 speaking	 to	 the	 report’s	 evaluation	 objectives.	 These	
were	to:		
Assess	the	extent	to	which	the	biodiversity	offsetting	pilots:		
A)	Help	to	use	resources	more	effectively	to	delivery	greater	benefits	for	
biodiversity		
B)	Streamline	the	processes	for	agreeing	compensation	for	biodiversity	loss	as	
required	by	planning	policy,	in	a	cost	effective	way	(Baker	et	al.	2014a:	15	
emphasis	added).		
In	 relation	 to	 these	 research	 objectives,	 the	 report’s	 summary	 showed	 that	 actual	
experience	of	BDO	was	almost	completely	inimical	to	what	Government	hoped	it	would	
be.	The	evaluation	report	anticipated	that	BDO	would	require	extra	capacity	and	funding	
for	 local	 government	 and	 eventually	 increase	 rather	 than	 decrease	 the	 compensation	
costs	for	developers	therefore	countering	their	manifesto	pledge	to	house	builders:	
Evidence	from	the	pilot	programme	suggests	that	whilst	biodiversity	offsetting	
has	the	potential	to	deliver	improvements	in	biodiversity	outcomes	it	will	
require	additional	resources	and	ecological	expertise	in	local	authorities	to	
deliver	it	and	in	instances	where	residual	biodiversity	loss	is	identified	will	
increase	costs	for	developers	compared	with	current	practice.	It	is	likely	that	it	
would	at	best	only	deliver	marginal	benefits	in	terms	of	streamlining	the	
planning	process	for	agreeing	compensation	for	biodiversity	loss’	(Baker	et	al.	
2014a:	6,	emphasis	added)	
Thus,	 as	 a	 form	of	 official	 appraisal,	 the	 evaluation	 report	 outlined	 the	many	 ‘failures’	
and	barriers	to	‘success’	for	BDO	during	the	pilot	study	according	to	its	own	normative	
standpoints.	 The	 invisible	 hand	 could	 not,	 in	 other	 words	 remain	 hidden	 after	 all	 in	
conservation	 governance.	 Instead,	 offsetting	 required	 sufficient	 (and	 more	 than	
Government	 was	 willing	 to	 give)	 regulatory	 input	 to	 initiate,	 catalyse	 and	 stabilise	 a	
market	 like	 infrastructure	 for	 biodiversity	 compensation	 in	 English	 planning.	 ‘No	 net	
loss’	of	biodiversity	was,	 in	the	end	shown	to	be	incompatible	with	the	neoliberal	drive	
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towards	the	net	 loss	 in	regulation,	even	if	 it	was	originally	conceived	to	be	 in	 line	with	
this	 imperative.	Herein	lies	the	central	paradox	of	BDO	in	England	that	 is	 indicative	of	
the	wider	value	plurality	and	complexity	that	it	encapsulates.		
The	 evaluation	 report	 catalogued	 various	 failures	 and	 successes	 defined	 against	 the	
programme’s	own	terms	of	reference	-	in	seeking	to	achieve	a	‘no	net	loss’	of	biodiversity	
while	 streamlining	 the	 means	 by	 which	 biodiversity	 decisions	 are	 disposed	 of	 within	
planning	processes	and	making	it	cheaper	and	faster	to	do	so	(DEFRA	2013).	Through	my	
analytic	 of	 assemblage,	 failures	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 tensions	 or	 counter-
performativities	 (MacKenzie	 et	 al.	 2007),	 Li	 (2014:	 600)	 uses	 the	 expression	 ‘lines	 of	
fracture’,	that	threaten	the	assemblage	from	stabilising	towards	market	formation.	In	so	
far	as	my	thesis	contributes	another	form	of	appraisal	of	the	DEFRA	pilot,	I	propose	that	
a	 portion	of	my	 findings	 ally	with	 those	 of	 the	 evaluation	 and	have	 thus	 engaged	 in	 a	
form	of	 immanent	critique	(Castree	2008).	 Immanent	critique	shows	that	 the	object	of	
analysis	 fails	 according	 to	 its	 own	 standards	 (ibid.),	 the	 terms	 of	 reference	 are	
commensurable.	I	too	have	pointed	out	the	shortcomings	of	BDO	according	to	 its	own	
terms	of	success	-	to	the	lines	of	fracture	inherent	in	the	offsetting	model,	threatening	it	
from	 stabilising	 (Latour	 2005).	 I	have	 already	discussed	 the	multitude	of	 compromises	
and	value	schisms	that	BDO	entails	at	every	step	of	the	process,	which	actors	necessarily	
navigated	as	they	 ‘muddled	through’	to	keep	things	going	(Li	2007a).	This	 includes	the	
aforementioned	paradox	of	BDO	as	a	neoliberal	market	based	policy	 that	 cannot	meet	
Government’s	 expectations	 and	 proves	 that	 economic	 and	 environment	 rationales	 are	
not	the	easy	bed-fellows	the	2011	White	Paper	would	have	us	believe.	The	rupture	is	also	
evident	at	the	level	of	the	actual	DEFRA	metric,	which	must	continually	enact	acceptable	
compromises	between	policy	pragmatism,	economic	efficiency	and	ecological	precision.	
Other	 failures	 are	 evident	 in	 the	 way	 economic	 imperatives	 shape	 the	 trajectory	 of	
offsetting	 in	 practice.	 The	 arrangement	 of	 offset	 sites	 in	 habitat	 banks	 according	 to	
pragmatism	 and	 the	 minimisation	 of	 transaction	 costs	 with	 large	 private	 landowners	
may	or	may	not	align	with	the	habitat	spatial	strategies	intrinsic	to	the	Lawton	Review’s	
original	vision	for	offsetting.	These	failures	according	to	the	policy’s	own	terms	are	also	
manifestly	 evidenced	 by	 the	 precarity	 of	 the	 actual	 value	 calculations	 that	 were	
produced,	 and	 their	 propensity	 to	 simply	 reflect	 prior	 configurations	 of	 power	 in	 the	
English	planning	system.		
But	in	divergence,	my	thesis’	focus	has	also	been	intensely	concerned	with	another	kind	
of	critique	-	one	exploring	the	axiomatic	basis	of	 the	move	to	 ‘value’	biodiversity	using	
offsetting	and	the	normative	policy	ideal	of	‘no	net	loss’.	This	alternative	form	of	critique	
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is	 the	gateway	 to	 the	 remainder	of	 this	 concluding	chapter,	 and	 is	 aptly	 articulated	by	
Foucault:	
A	critique	is	not	a	matter	of	saying	that	things	are	not	right	as	they	are.	It	is	a	
matter	of	pointing	out	on	what	kinds	of	assumptions,	what	kinds	of	familiar,	
unchallenged,	unconsidered	modes	of	thought	the	practices	that	we	accept	rest.	
(Foucault	1981	cited	by	Palsson	and	Rabinow	2008:	91)	
In	 contrast,	 the	 evaluation	 report	 remains	 attached	 to	 the	 calculative	 and	 normative	
standard	of	NNL	while	noting	 that	 it	 is	 ‘apparent	 that	 the	 current	 system	needs	 to	 be	
improved	 in	 some	 way	 if	 no-net-loss	 policy	 is	 to	 be	met’	 (Baker	 et	 al.	 2014a:	 6).	 As	 I	
discussed	 in	 chapter	 2,	 commitment	 to	 the	 ideal	of	NNL	on	either	 technical	or	 ethical	
grounds	(which	I	have	argued	are	entirely	entangled	with	each	other)	 is	 fundamentally	
grounded	 in	 an	 epistemological	 and	 ontological	 commitment	 to	 the	 balance	 sheet	
accounting	approach	to	save	biodiversity	through	calculating	and	capturing	 its	 ‘values’.	
‘No	net	loss’,	therefore	is	neither	a	neutral	or	self-evident	goal	for	conservation.	Even	in	
cases	within	my	enquiry	that	make	demonstrative	claims	to	having	achieved	a	‘net	gain’	
(actual	 time	 to	 ‘target’	 habitat	 maturation	 notwithstanding)	 offsets	 still	 require	 social	
consent	to	the	adequacy	of	such	representations	(Robertson	2012).	This	consent,	Sullivan	
(2017:	 231)	 argues,	 derives	 from	 processes	 of	 disavowal	 mounted	 as	 a	 form	 of	
psychological	‘defence’,	appearing	thus	as	a	‘fetishised	substitute	for	facing	and	reducing	
the	cause	of	environmental	pathology’.		
Questioning	 the	 assumption	 that	 such	 values	 exist	 in	 any	 a	 priori	 sense,	 thereby	
circumscribing	 their	 management	 to	 accounting	 and	 economic	 practices	 formed	 the	
opening	gambit	for	my	enquiry	laid	out	within	the	preceding	chapters.	With	this	in	mind	
I	return	to	my	research	questions	to	frame	my	thesis	summary.	In	this	thesis	I	asked;		
1) How	 is	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 assembled	 discursively,	 institutionally	 and	
materially	as	a	governance	approach?		
2) How	is	habitat	turned	into	a	market	good?		
3) How	do	actors	manage	tensions	associated	with	the	formation	of	BDO	policy	and	
production	of	the	valued	entity,	the	biodiversity	unit?	
4) What	are	the	implications	for	policy	and	practice?  
9.2	Thesis	summary	and	main	findings	
This	thesis	has	empirically	documented	efforts	to	value	and	trade	biodiversity	values	in	
English	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 frameworks.	 Specifically,	 it	 has	 focussed	 on	 how	 actors	
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make	sense	of	BDO	and	enact	the	mechanism	in	situ	as	well	as	the	broader	institutional	
arrangements,	material	devices	and	discursive	frames	that	made	this	possible.	The	thesis	
has	 contributed	 detailed	 empirical	 examples	 of	 how	 biodiversity	 values	 (as	 ‘units’)	 are	
made	 and	 exchanged	 in	 practice	 through	 offsetting	 and	 with	 what	 effects.	 	 Such	
examples	make	a	unique	contribution	to	a	wider	scholarly	context	of	relative	case	study	
paucity	 of	 BDO.	 They	 demonstrate	 the	 value	 of	 performative	 and	 assemblage-based	
analysis	 for	understanding	the	practices	of	value	making	within	the	 ‘green	economy’	as	
well	as	the	empirical	specificities	of	BDO.		
In	chapter	2	 I	 introduced	my	conceptual	 foundation,	which	combined	political	ecology	
interests	 in	 the	 power	 of	 certain	 environmental	 framings	 (I	 labelled	 abstractions)	
amenable	 to	being	 translated	 into	universal	 equivalents	 in	 the	production	of	 exchange	
values	under	commodification.	I	drew	from	Robertson’s	(2012:	388)	theoretical	diagnosis	
that	 the	 relationship	 between	 abstract	 signifiers	 and	 economic	 exchange	 can	 be	
explained	by	the	ways	 in	which	a	 ‘Derridean	concern	with	the	ordering	of	appearances	
could	speak	constructively	to	the	Marxian	concern	with	the	constitution	of	abstraction’.	I	
subsequently	 combined	 performativity	 literatures	 from	 economic	 sociology	 with	
assemblage	 literatures	 from	 ANT	 to	 frame	 my	 methodology	 through	 which	 I	 could	
empirically	 trace	 the	 associations	 combining	 in	 networks	 that	 shape	 and	 sustain	 the	
circulation	of	such	abstractions.			
In	chapter	4,	I	traced	the	historical	background	to	the	conceptual	technologies	rendering	
biodiversity	 conceptually	 and	 practically	 ‘offsettable’.	 In	 particular	 I	 followed	 the	
emergence	and	movement	of	the	 increasingly	 immutable	aggregate	rule	of	 ‘no	net	 loss’	
of	biodiversity,	noting	its	origins	in	US	environmental	policy	in	the	1970s	and	re-scaling	
to	local	and	national	English	contexts	40	years	hence.	I	illustrated	the	political	drivers	for	
conceiving	of	aggregate	technologies	in	environmental	regulation	and	showed	how	such	
technologies	 were	 transferred	 across	 institutional	 and	 geographic	 contexts.	 In	 this	
chapter	 I	 highlighted	 the	 role	 of	 key	 brokers	 and	 intermediaries	 that	 assisted	 in	
performing	 these	 translations.	 I	 outlined	 the	 role	of	 individuals	within	BBOP	as	policy	
entrepreneurs	seeking	to	institutionalise	NNL	amid	growing	overlaps	between	business,	
NGO	and	state	actors	under	a	nascent	field	of	‘business	and	biodiversity’	(Wilshusen	and	
MacDonald	2015).	Drawing	on	the	analytical	lens	of	practices	of	assemblage	(Li	2007a),	I	
noted	 how	 ‘forged	 alignments’	 through	 discursive	 and	 normative	 reasoning	 came	 to	
combine	imperatives	for	economic	growth	with	stabilising	imaginaries	of	biodiversity	as	
a	general,	 abstract	 and	 interchangeable	 state	or	 aggregate	quantity	 (Maier	 2012).	 I	 also	
highlighted	 that	 these	 political,	 scientific	 and	 ethical	 currents	 coalesced	 in	 England	 in	
281  
2010,	 when	 BDO	 was	 introduced	 within	 a	 broader	 political	 moment	 of	 de-regulation,	
financial	austerity	and	a	consolidating	scientific-policy	consensus	around	the	economic	
values	of	biodiversity.		
Again	at	this	locale,	intermediaries	served	as	lively	advocates	for	offsetting	in	promoting	
it	 to	mainstream	 planning	 policy.	 I	 framed	 a	 revolving	 door	 of	 individuals,	 traversing	
governance	 scales	 lending	 substantial	weight	 towards	 the	 potential	 and	 importance	 of	
undertaking	 a	 mandatory	 system	 of	 BDO	 in	 England.	 Finally,	 having	 considered	 the	
socio-political	processes	that	lead	up	to	DEFRA’s	announcement	of	a	BDO	pilot	study	in	
2011,	I	introduced	and	analytically	dissected	the	calculative	device	that	was	necessary	to	
fulfil	the	quantitative,	calculative	drive	of	NNL	policy	within	a	BDO	model.	Within	this	
discussion	 I	 unpacked	 some	 of	 the	 metric’s	 background	 assumptions	 and	 inherent	
tensions	 to	 illustrate	 how	 it	 was	 able	 to	 strike	 pragmatic	 compromises	 between	
ecological	precision	as	well	as	economic	and	policy	pragmatism.	Through	connecting	the	
historical	 origins	 of	 NNL	 to	 the	 conception	 of	 the	 DEFRA	 metric	 in	 England,	 I	
introduced	NNL	and	the	DEFRA	metric	as	two	of	BDO’s	foremost	actants	and	illustrated	
the	associations	between	them.			
In	 the	 three	 DEFRA	 pilot	 sites	 that	 comprised	 chapters	 5,	 6	 and	 7	 in	 the	 empirical	
exploration	 of	 how	 BDO	 worked	 and	 values	 were	 made	 in	 practice,	 I	 illustrated	 how	
habitats	are	made	 into	market	goods	 (or	not	as	 the	case	may	be	 -	when	actual	market	
arrangements	did	not	materialise).	Following	the	LPA	pilot	case	studies	of	Warwickshire	
and	South	Devon	through	chapters	5	and	6,	I	traced	the	iterative	layers	of	value	making	
under	 BDO	with	 calculative	 technologies	 (DEFRA	metric	 and	 the	Habitat	 Biodiversity	
Audit)	 through	the	subsumption	of	biological	heterogeneity	to	universal	equivalents	as	
the	 basis	 for	 comparability	 and	 exchange.	 I	 demonstrated	 how	 values	 are	 enacted	 as	
numerical	surrogates	and	denoted	as	a	fabricated	currency	of	‘biodiversity	units’	with	the	
use	 of	 the	 Biodiversity	 Impact	 Assessment	 (BIA).	 I	 demonstrated	 the	 way	 in	 which	
scientific	uncertainties	in	relation	to	particular	habitat	classification	in	chapter	5	and	the	
establishment	of	boundaries	for	a	single	hectare	of	cirl	bunting	habitat	in	chapter	6	were	
navigated	 and	 stabilised	 by	 actors	 in	 practice.	 These	 layered	 textual	 inscriptions,	 with	
numerical	surrogates	later	became	black	boxes	and	incontestable	scientific	facts	(Callon	
and	 Latour	 1981).	 I	 illuminated	 how	 qualitative	 data	 inputs	 from	 conventional	 habitat	
surveys	are	processed	and	codified	through	the	Excel	algorithms	of	the	DEFRA	metric	to	
produce	abstract	numerical	representations	of	impacts	and	gains.	The	cases	clarified	the	
commensuration	 processes	 of	 the	metric,	 through	 its	 work	 to	 ‘make	 things	 the	 same’	
(MacKenzie	2009).	 In	so	doing	 I	highlighted	the	sometimes	surprising	and	ecologically	
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unintuitive	 (Sullivan	 2010,	 Carver	 and	 Sullivan	 2017)	 outcomes	 these	 fabricated	
equivalences	create.	In	particular,	in	chapter	5,	I	demonstrated	this	by	exploring	the	role	
of	football	pitches	that	through	their	large	spatial	 value	 (as	legitimate	numerical	inputs	
to	 the	 equation)	 could	 provide	 very	 high	 biodiversity	 value	 mitigation	 values.	 This	
commensuration	was	made	possible	through	the	metric’s	enactment	of	a	flat,	numerical	
value	system	that	enabled	but	also	concealed	the	true	nature	of	such	trade-offs.	I	showed	
the	 role	 of	 spatial	 area	 as	 a	 valued	 field	 within	 the	 algorithm	 that	 can	 stand	 in	 as	 a	
replacement	for	other	valued	indicators	such	as	habitat	distinctiveness	or	condition.			
In	considering	 the	question	of	how	habitat	becomes	a	market	good	 I	have	emphasised	
the	 multiple	 components	 (human	 and	 non	 human)	 involved	 that	 come	 together	 as	
socio-technical	assemblages	to	produce	biodiversity	units	as	valued	entities	(Bracking	et	
al.	2014).	I	have	demonstrated	throughout	this	thesis	that	whether	and	how	biodiversity	
values	 are	 manifest	 under	 BDO	 and	 if	 they	 reach	 the	 point	 of	 trade,	 are	 thoroughly	
conditional	on	 the	configurations	of	elements	 that	are	actively	 involved.	 In	 tracing	 the	
socio-technical	assemblages	of	BDO	and	biodiversity	values	through	my	three	 in	depth	
case	studies,	I	identified	the	starring	role	of	catalytic	individuals	and	their	collaboration	
with	brokers	and	 intermediaries.	As	Latour	 (2005	cited	by	Greenhough	2011:	 136)	notes	
‘each	assemblage	 requires	 labour,	materials	 and	agents	 to	 fuel	 assembly’.	 In	chapters	5	
and	6,	 labour	was	 contributed	by	motivated	 individuals	 in	 the	 ecology	departments	 at	
the	 local	 planning	 authority	 at	 the	 county	 or	 district	 council	 offices.	 Nevertheless,	
biodiversity	offsetting	was,	 for	 these	professionals,	 simply	a	mechanism	through	which	
they	sought	to	meet	national	planning	policy	set	out	in	the	NPPF	in	relation	to	achieving	
a	‘no	net	loss	of	biodiversity’.		It	was	not	therefore	an	overtly	ideological	commitment	to	
economism	or	market-based	governance	but	a	pragmatic	response	to	an	accepted	policy	
goal.	In	these	contexts	NNL	was	generally	adopted	uncritically	as	an	ethical	and	virtuous	
policy	 goal,	 the	 moral	 significance	 of	 which	 lent	 further	 weight	 to	 its	 perceived	
coherence.		
The	 moral	 significance	 of	 BDO	 was	 further	 illustrated	 in	 chapter	 7.	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	
outlined	the	TLP	sustainability	manager’s	personal	inspiration	and	ethical	commitment	
to	 the	 ‘net	 gain’	 policy	 framework.	 In	 this	 respect,	 for	 the	 leading	 protagonists	 in	 all	
three	 case	 studies,	 NNL	 and	 biodiversity	 net	 gain	 had	 come	 to	 embody	 powerful	
normative	 conservation	objectives,	which	 simultaneously	 legitimated	 and	underpinned	
their	 efforts	 to	 drive	 BDO	 forward.	 In	 so	 far	 as	 NNL,	 as	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 and	
policy	 standard,	 encompasses	 a	moral	weight	 (Stott	 and	 Sullivan	 2000,	 Fairhead	 et	 al.	
2012)	 and	 mechanism	 for	 quantification	 under	 accounting	 frameworks,	 it	 acts	 as	 a	
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boundary	object	(Star	and	Griesmer	1993)	that	can	do	different	things	for	different	actors	
according	to	whichever	value	system	they	require	in	the	moment.	NNL	thusly	appears	as	
the	ultimate	market-green	compromise	(Nyberg	and	White	2013).	The	agency	of	NNL	is	
especially	significant	as	I	showed	in	chapter	8,	that	in	unison	with	its	calculative	device,	
the	DEFRA	metric,	 it	 actively	 locks	 in	 certain	 framings	 of	 biodiversity	 according	 to	 is	
own	 reality	 tests	 (Boltanski	 and	 Thévenot	 1999).	 The	 calculative	 and	 moral	
entanglements	of	NNL	mean	that	actors	 inadvertently	entrench	neoliberal	economistic	
framings	 as	 ‘economists	 in	 the	 wild’	 (Callon	 and	 Rabeharisoa	 2003),	 while	 ostensible	
making	moral	claims.		
Strategies	of	legitimation	and	justification	were	central	to	the	assembling	and	stabilising	
of	BDO.	Chapters	7	and	8	illustrated	how	actors	tend	to	mobilise	different	augmentative	
strategies	 for	 different	 contexts	 and	 audiences.	 Communications	 might	 target	 senior	
decision	makers	 or	wider	 epistemic	 communities	 in	 sustainability	 professions	 so	 as	 to	
convince	 them	of	BDO’s	value	and	 justify	 its	business	case.	Sometimes	 these	strategies	
might	 emphasise	 the	 conservation	 value	 of	NNL	 and	 at	 other	 times,	 its	 business	 case.	
And	yet,	the	market-green	compromise	is	not	a	settlement	without	consequences,	nor	is	
it	 a	 balanced	 compromise.	 As	 I	 have	 shown	 throughout	 all	 case	 studies,	 green	 values	
tended	 to	 hold	 fast	 until	 they	 conflicted	with	market	 ones.	When	 they	 did	 eventually	
clash,	rather	than	 ‘transcending	the	trade	offs’,	BDO	instead	opened	up	a	range	of	new	
tensions.	Conservation	practices	under	BDO	were	pulled	in	particular	directions	so	as	to	
comply	with	market	efficiency,	economies	of	scale	and	value	for	money.		
The	role	of	intermediaries	as	‘translators’	were	central	to	furnishing	the	assemblage	with	
supplementary	expertise,	networks	and	support,	in	particular,	shown	through	chapters	5	
and	7.	 In	 chapter	 5,	 I	 illustrated	 that	due	 to	 the	pragmatic	barriers	 to	market	 creation	
through	 identification	 of	 receptor	 sites,	 the	 Environment	 Bank	 working	 within	 the	
Warwickshire	 pilot	 area	 sub-contracted	 another	 broker	 so	 as	 to	 assume	 a	 vital	
connection	 in	 the	 biodiversity	 credit	 value	 chain	 in	 opening	 up	 links	 to	 and	 making	
contact	with	large	landowners	(Figure	12.).	 	For	all	of	these	intermediaries	and	brokers,	
there	was	an	expectation	that	an	on-going	pipeline	of	contracts	would	materialise	from	
the	arrangements,	thus	indicating	that	the	interests	and	importance	of	consultants	and	
brokers	to	the	growth	of	the	green	economy	cannot	be	underestimated.	In	chapter	7,	an	
almost	serendipitous	encounter	between	two	professionals	became	a	productive	working	
relationship	 as	 TLP	 defined	 a	 new	 policy	 standard	 for	 net	 positive	 impact	 that	 was	
subsequently	rolled	out	to	the	whole	of	Network	Rail.	
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In	 reflecting	 on	 serendipity	 and	 coincidence,	 and	 the	 frequently	 ad	 hoc	 nature	 of	 the	
arrangements,	 all	 three	 case	 studies	 illustrated	 the	 development	 of	 socio-technical	
assemblages	 as	 a	 form	 of	 ‘muddling	 through’,	 as	 people	 and	 organisations	 became	
embroiled	 in	 the	 process.	 In	 this	 respect,	 I	 noted	 how	 conservation	 NGOs	 were	
becoming	increasingly	entangled	 in	BDO	arrangements	simply	because	 it	was	hard	not	
to.	A	consistent	pattern	 that	emerged	 from	exploring	 the	experiences	and	views	of	 the	
RSPB	and	the	Wildlife	Trusts	was	that	it	was	better,	on	balance	to	be	involved	with	the	
pilot	 study	 than	 not	 to	 be,	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 that	 standards	 remained	 high	 or	 so	 their	
organisation	 could	 ‘be	 at	 the	 table’	 as	 the	 conservation	policy	 landscape	 changed.	The	
extent	 to	 which	 these	 organisations’	 roles	 are	 thus	 shifting	 in	 a	 changing	 planning-	
conservation	 policy	 landscape	 and	 the	 opportunities	 and	 risks	 such	 transformations	
might	 engender	 are	 important	 questions	 for	 future	 research.	 I	 pointed	 to	 several	
implications	 throughout	 the	 empirical	 chapters	 and	 highlighted,	 that	 while	 in	 some	
instances	more	entrepreneurial	 individuals	 in	NGOs	might	perceive	BDO	to	be	a	good	
funding	opportunity,	 in	 two	of	 the	 three	cases,	BDO	also	 thrust	NGOs	 into	sometimes	
difficult	and	expensive	contractual	relationships	with	developers.		
In	all	three	case	studies,	I	demonstrated	how	BDO	processes,	despite	being	perceived	to	
be	 neutral	 calculative	 frameworks,	 instead	 create	 values	 that	 people	 struggle	 over.	
Sometimes	 this	 lead	 to	negotiations	over	 the	ways	 in	which	parcels	of	habitat,	or	 their	
sizes	were	classified	on	the	BIA	spread	sheets.	In	other	cases,	adjustments	came	about	at	
the	explicit	behest	of	 the	developer	who	considered	the	compensation	requirements	to	
be	 too	 high.	 In	 the	 corporate	 voluntary	 context	 in	 chapter	 7,	 value	 struggles	 over	 the	
scores	 were	 less	 noticeable	 since	 the	 developer	 determined	 the	 processes,	 themselves.	
Adjusting	scores	to	better	suit	commercial	priorities	was	hardly	ever	the	envisaged	ideal	
of	 BDO	 in	 planning.	 However,	 the	 ability	 to	 not	 adjust	 numbers	 because	 you	 are	
accountable	 to	 no	 one	 and	 control	 the	 process	 privately,	 as	 corporate	 or	 voluntary	
programmes	 will	 do,	 is	 also	 indicative	 for	 some	 of	 the	 concealed	 but	 problematic	
outcomes	of	corporate	biodiversity	offsetting.	Furthermore,	these	practices	also	entailed	
the	 conscious	 selection	of	offset	 sites	 for	 the	provision	of	units,	 and	 the	habitat	works	
from	which	they	were	to	be	generated	that	represented	‘good	value	for	money’	triggering	
a	series	of	social	and	environmental	consequences	downstream.		
In	all	of	the	cases	explored,	the	values	that	the	BIA	framed	depended	on	overflows	and	
exclusions	elsewhere,	on	things	that	stood	outside	of	the	economic	frame	(Callon	2007).	
Overflows	were	created	either	because	of	a	substantive	tension	within	the	metric	itself.	
For	example,	 its	requirements	for	ease	of	use,	simplicity	and	pragmatism	meant	 it	only	
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accommodated	 a	 narrow	 subset	 of	 ecological	 attributes.	 Simultaneously,	 cultural	 or	
social	values	are	invisible	to	the	value	calculations	and	were	occluded.	This	is	particularly	
the	 case	 for	 values	 connected	 to	 specific	 parcels	 of	 land	 subject	 to	 either	 residential	
development	 or	 the	 woodland	 planting	 works	 as	 part	 of	 the	 offset.	 In	 chapter	 6,	 I	
described	how	the	challenges	 local	communities	 levelled	to	 the	planning	committee	 in	
objecting	 to	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 beauty	 and	 landscape	 features	 of	 the	 urban	 fringe	 were	
necessarily	translated	into	scientific	and	rational	critiques	in	terms	of	‘biodiversity	loss’.	
In	so	doing,	these	challenges,	couched	in	general	abstract	terms	of	‘biodiversity’	became	
easier	for	the	Head	of	Planning	to	dispense	with	because	they	appeared	to	be	accounted	
for	 within	 the	 calculative	 frames	 of	 the	 metric.	 Beauty	 and	 cultural	 or	 aesthetic	
attachments	to	specific	landscapes	are	incommensurate	with	what	the	metric	can	see	(or	
indeed	 seeks	 to	 do)	 and	 were	 thus	 overlooked	 as	 legitimate	 grounds	 for	 complaint.	 I	
further	 explored	 this	 issue	 of	 value	 commensurability	 in	 disputes	 through	 the	 lens	 of	
Boltanski	and	Thévenot	(2006)	orders	of	value	in	chapter	8.		
Similarly	 in	chapter	7,	the	complexity	and	messiness	of	the	actual	delivery	of	the	offset	
planting	 scheme	 generated	 social	 contestation	 from	 the	 local	 residents.	 Yet	 these	
processes	 and	 frictions	 were	 actively	 framed	 out	 from	 the	 public	 performances	 and	
official	 accounts	 of	 the	 project’s	 success.	 The	 official	 accounts	 of	 ‘success’	 generated	
social	 and	 professional	 capital	 (Büscher	 2014)	 for	 those	 involved	 in	 the	 project	 at	
Network	 Rail	 in	 connection	 with	 pioneering	 a	 corporate	 ‘net	 positive	 impact’	 policy.	
Where	overflows	(Callon	2005,	Lohmann	2009)	threatened	the	project	of	accounting	for	
biodiversity	values	through	enacting	offsets,	these	‘counter-performativities’	(MacKenzie	
et	al.	2007)	were	actively	framed	out	so	as	to	maintain	the	coherence	and	the	legitimacy	
of	the	approach.	Numbers	were	central	to	the	performance	of	legitimacy	and	sometimes	
explicitly	deployed	to	support	claims	of	success.	 It	 is	 in	this	way	that	BDO	is	a	circular	
and	performative	process	caught	in	a	loop	of	one	logic	over	another.	It	is	this	process	of	
performativity	 that	 I	 wish	 to	 emphasise	 in	 conclusion	 to	 this	 thesis.	 I	 illustrated	 this	
most	strongly	in	chapter	7,	but	also	demonstrated	the	political	agency	of	numbers	within	
the	planning	committee	meeting	in	chapter	6.		
Finally,	existing	assemblages	shaped	the	ways	in	which	the	BDO	was	enacted	in	specific	
places.	 Biodiversity	 offsetting	 collided	 and	 often	 clashed	 with	 existing	 assemblages	
creating	 hybrids	 and	 local	 interpretations.	 These	 existing	 assemblages	 included	
biological	 data	 assemblages,	 in	 the	 Habitat	 Biodiversity	 Audit	 (chapter	 5),	 alternative	
conservation	 frameworks	and	value	hierarchies	 (chapter	6)	or	 the	political	 economy	of	
land	 and	 housing	 markets	 (chapters	 5	 and	 6).	 The	 approach	 was	 struggling	 and	
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stuttering	through	some	spaces	and	networks,	accelerating	elsewhere.	 It	was	morphing	
and	adapting	 to	 the	 existing	 frameworks	 in	place	 and	being	 selectively	drawn	upon	 to	
suit	 some	 interests	 over	 others.	 Government	 had	 little	 active	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	 way	
BDO	 was	 interpreted,	 a	 large	 part	 of	 which	 was	 due	 to	 its	 reluctance	 to	 provide	
meaningful	regulation.	Throughout	this	thesis	I	have	shown	how	BDO	is	a	socio-material	
assemblage	that	 is	made	up	of	numerous	elements	that	reconfigure	how	BDO	operates	
in	practice,	making	it	a	socially	and	geographically	contingent	process	and	its	calculated	
values	and	market	formations	provisional	and	performed	entities.		
9.3	Research	reflections	and	future	directions	
The	 thesis	has	provided	a	 robust	picture	of	 the	many	ways	 in	which	NNL	and	BDO	as	
conceptual	 and	 valuation	 technologies	 are	 pulling	 and	 shaping	 conservation	 in	 new	
directions.	 And	 yet,	 the	 picture	 it	 presents	 is	 also	 inevitably	 a	 partial	 one	 that	 cannot	
possibly	 fully	 account	 for	 the	 contemporary	 moment	 or	 dynamic	 unfolding	 of	 this	
vibrant	 policy	 field.	 New	 offsetting	 events,	 webinars,	 reports	 and	 programmes	 are	
announced	 frequently,	 even	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 pilot	 period.	 Indeed	 this	 unruliness	
reflects	 a	 pervasive	 difficulty	 with	 ANT	 methodologies,	 ‘where	 the	 elements	 that	 are	
encountered	 can	 rapidly	 proliferate	 out	 of	 control’	 (Michael	 2016:	 50).	 In	 this	 respect,	
this	 thesis	 is	 inevitably	 one	 that	 was	 constrained	 by	matters	 of	 practicality,	 and	 in	 so	
doing,	created	many	occlusions	of	its	own.		
While	 I	 focused	 on	 the	 networked	 relations	 between	 many	 human	 and	 non-human	
elements	within	the	BDO	assemblages,	my	focus	arguably	disproportionately	tracked	the	
agency	 of	 calculative-technological	 devices	 in	 favour	 of	 biotic	 non-humans	 agents.		
Although	 requiring	 alternative	 methodologies,	 a	 commitment	 to	 emphasising	 the	
political	 agencies	 of	 biotic	 non-humans	 and	 their	 assemblages	 would	 align	 with	 the	
broader	 post-humanist	 turn	 in	 environmental	 geography	 and	 political	 ecology	 more	
generally	(Whatmore	2002,	Bakker	and	Bridge	2006).	Valuable	work	at	the	intersection	
of	post-human	and	resource	geographies	 traces	 the	materiality	of	unruly	biotic	entities	
and	 assemblages	 and	 their	 resistances	 towards	 being	 translated	 into	 inventory	 (Kama	
(2015).	 As	 yet,	 this	 approach	 has	 found	 less	 footing	 among	 the	 economisation	 of	
immaterial	commodities	such	as	ecosystem	service	credits,	such	that	an	intriguing	future	
research	direction	might	look	towards	tracing	the	‘recalcitrant	natures’	being	subject	to	
various	forms	of	economisation	and	financialisation	under	the	‘green	economy’.	
Similarly,	I	might	have	also	attended	more	closely	to	the	experiences,	roles	and	values	of	
the	individuals	and	proximate	residential	communities	directly	affected	by	the	planning	
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applications	 in	 question.	 This	 is	 especially	 so	 given	 that	 civil	 society’s	 values	 and	
attachments	to	landscape	have	historically	and	continue	to	constitute	a	‘potent	source	of	
energy	in	the	conservation	movement’	in	England	(Adams	1997b:	287).	As	the	lexicon	of	
‘valuing	nature’	is	picked	up	and	foregrounded	in	mainstream	discourse,	it	would	seem	a	
judicious	 time	 for	 society	 in	 general	 to	 harness	 this	 powerful	 legacy	 of	 civil	 society	
conservation	efforts	 and	engage	 in	 a	more	deliberative	debate	 seeking	 to	 excavate	 and	
illuminate	the	value	plurality	that	the	new	orthodoxy	tends	to	silence.	How	can	society,	
and	 not	 in	 ways	 that	 depend	 on	 commensurable	 yardsticks	 of	 value,	 embark	 on	 a	
considered	 and	 democratic	 deliberation	 about	 not	 only	 plural	 values	 of	 non-human	
natures	 and	 the	 landscapes	 they	 encompass	 as	 well	 as	 the	 role	 and	meaning	 of	 value	
generally?		Further	research	in	this	area	is	certainly	warranted.	
Such	 an	 endeavour	 seems	 exceptionally	 timely	 given	 England’s	 political	 moment,	
wherein	 a	much	broader	debate	over	 the	 future	use,	 funding	 and	 ‘valuation’	 of	 land	 is	
underway	in	the	wake	of	the	Brexit	referendum	vote	and	decision	for	the	UK	to	leave	the	
EU	(Helm	2017,	Mace	2017).	In	chapter	6,	I	wrote	about	the	significance	of	the	BDO	pilot	
and	the	wider	natural	capital	discourse	in	which	it	was	embedded,	for	coming	to	inform	
the	Government’s	 thinking	over	how	to	replace	the	EU	farm	subsidy	system	from	2020	
onwards.	 Additionally,	 I	 also	 highlighted	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 political	 economy	 of	
land	for	biodiversity	considerations	under	planning.		The	performative	analysis	into	BDO	
using	an	analytic	of	assemblage	makes	one	contribution	to	this	emerging	research	field.	
Important	 further	 research	would	 extrapolate	 the	 findings	 from	 this	 investigation	 into	
the	 assemblages	 of	 broader	 land	 economy	 in	 England	 to	 better	 explain	 how	 the	
intersection	 of	 these	 different	 markets	 and	 value	 systems	 shapes	 possibilities	 for	
conservation	activities	in	England,	in	both	planning	as	well	as	farming	discourses.	
Throughout	 this	 thesis,	 I	 have	 juxtaposed	 the	 abstract	 idealism	 of	 biodiversity	 as	
numbers	against	its	material	embeddedness	in	land.	I	have	argued	that	the	contestation	
over	different	uses	for	physical	space	in	England	is	an	underlying	driving	force	for	BDO,	
much	as	the	Lawton	Review	(2010)	had	originally	diagnosed.	The	significance	of	this	idea	
is	 most	 strongly	 felt	 when	 considering	 the	 overt	 de-regulatory	 drive	 of	 the	 present	
Government	to	‘un-block’	the	planning	system,	often	increasingly	justified	by	advocates	
of	 all	 political	 stripes	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 ‘affordable	 housing	 crisis’.	 The	 underlying	
drivers	 of	 the	 paucity	 of	 appropriate	 and	 affordable	 homes	 in	 the	 UK	 are	 becoming	
increasingly	apparent	(Ryan	Collins	et	al.	2017).	There	is	therefore	mileage	in	connecting	
these	 insights	better	 to	 those	offered	by	 this	 thesis,	 in	 other	words,	 to	 insert	 a	 critical	
analysis	 of	 land	 economy,	 its	 uses,	 possibilities	 and	 deficiencies	 into	 biodiversity	
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conservation	discourses.	This	effort	would	appear	to	be	a	worthwhile	avenue	for	 future	
empirical	investigation	building	from	the	findings	put	this	thesis	puts	forward. 
9.4	Concluding	thoughts	
This	thesis	has	empirically	documented	the	social,	 institutional	and	technical	processes	
assembling	 the	 values	 of	 biodiversity	 under	 offsetting	 in	 England.	 I	 have	 shown	 how	
these	 socio-technical	 assemblages	 are	 constituted	 by	 a	 range	 of	 actants;	 the	 human	
actors	in	different	institutional	arrangements,	the	ontological	and	moral	commitment	to	
the	aggregate	framing	mechanism	of	NNL,	calculative	devices	such	as	the	DEFRA	metric,	
the	political	economy	of	English	development	policy	and	other	extant	 scientific,	policy	
and	market	assemblages	to	which	BDO	inevitably	binds.	Collectively	these	components	
constitute	 the	 metrological	 network	 (Latour	 1987)	 of	 BDO	 as	 an	 idea	 and	 policy	
approach	 as	well	 as	 its	 valued	 entity	 -	 the	 biodiversity	 unit.	 Through	 highlighting	 the	
connections	 between	 all	 of	 these	 things	 and	 their	 specific	 configurations	 across	 scales	
and	contexts,	I	have	shown	empirically	how	values	are	made	under	offsetting	in	England	
as	the	effects	of	these	relational	actants	in	situ.		
Therefore,	 a	 central	 finding	 of	 this	 research,	 is	 that	 the	 practices	 of	 value	 making	 in	
conservation	 must	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 performative	 project	 through	 which	 values	 of	
nature	 are	 actively	 constructed.	 The	 socio-technical	 assemblages	 of	 BDO	 are	
performative	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 circumscribe	activities	 to	 enact	 the	value	 to	which	
they	 refer	 (Callon	 2007,	 Çalışkan	 and	 Callon	 2009,	 2010).	 I	 wish	 to	 emphasise	 that	
biodiversity	 values	 do	 not	 therefore	 exist	 waiting	 to	 be	 captured,	 as	 Government’s	
rhetoric	 around	 the	 ‘true	 value	 of	 nature’	 (DEFRA	 2011b:	 66)	 suggests.	 Instead	 the	
economic	 values	 of	 nature	 are	 actively	 performed	 through	 the	 socio-cultural,	
institutional	 and	 technological	 practices	 and	 processes	 I	 have	 traced	 throughout	 this	
thesis.	Moral	framings	are	central	to	the	process	-	to	which	DEFRA’s	above	petition	also	
attests.	 Practices	 that	 perform	 value	 in	 non-economic	 terms,	 emphasising	 intrinsic	 or	
moral	 care	 are	 thought	 to	 actively	 de-stabilise	 the	 economic	 frames	 through	 their	
counter-performative	 tendencies.	 Although,	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 frequently	 these	moral	
value	framings	are	actively	co-opted	and	utilised	to	advance	 the	substantive	structuring	
frames	 of	NNL	 and	 BDO,	 en-framing	 biodiversity	 as	 amenable	 to	 pricing	 and	 rational	
management	and	as	non-specific	and	exchangeable	 (Apostolopoulou	and	Adams	2017).	
Neoliberal	conservation	techniques	are	often	enabled	by	a	moral	imperative	(Fairhead	et	
al.	 2012)	 -	 the	 road	 to	 ‘securing	 the	 value	 of	 nature’	 using	 offsetting,	 therefore	 is	
ostensibly	 paved	 with	 good	 intentions.	 I	 have	 also	 shown	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 the	
ample	 scope	 for	 BDO	 to	 succumb	 to	 the	 ‘tragedy	 of	 the	 well	 intentioned	 valuation’	
289  
(Gómez-Baggethun	and	Ruiz-Perez	2011),	as	it	submits	to	prior	configurations	of	power,	
creates	a	series	of	unforeseen	and	often	perverse	outcomes	and	signals	new,	questionable	
directions	for	conservation	policy	in	England.		
The	 values	 of	 biodiversity	 under	 offsetting	 are	 stabilised	 through	 the	 on-going	
interaction	 of	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 assemblage.	 If	 any	 number	 of	 associations	 between	
these	elements	fails	then	the	assemblage	would	stumble	and	fail.	For	example,	without	
the	DEFRA	metric,	the	value	of	biodiversity	would	be	little	more	than	a	normative	ideal	
conjured	through	NNL	and	there	would	be	no	means	of	actually	calculating	‘net’	changes	
to	biodiversity.	Without	NNL	and	the	abstract	 idea	of	an	aggregate	sum	of	biodiversity	
made	 of	 interchangeable	 parts,	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘biodiversity	 units’	 would	 be	 incoherent.	
Without	the	array	of	human	actors	consenting	to	the	meaningfulness	of	NNL	(in	both	a	
scientific	and	moral	 sense)	 the	offsetting	assemblage	would	not	hang	 together	and	 the	
architecture	for	biodiversity	value	making	would	not	materialise.	Offsetting	is	therefore	
performative	in	a	circular	way	-	certain	elements	support	and	perform	others	within	the	
assemblage.	
This	 circularity	 indicates	 that	 the	 assemblage	 itself	 has	 agency	 (Deleuze	 and	 Guattari	
1987)	 -	 it	 expands	 our	 ‘capacity	 to	 envision’	 (Li	 2014)	 biodiversity	 as	 a	 valued	 and	
calculable	 entity.	 Therefore,	 despite	 DEFRA’s	 retreat	 from	 imposing	 an	 obligatory	
programme	 of	 offsetting,	 these	 assemblages	 account	 for	 the	 momentum	 BDO	 has	
continued	 to	 gather	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 pilot	 study	 and	 the	 continuing	 logic	 and	
coherence	of	the	approach.	The	world	making	(Tsing	2000)	effects	of	BDO’s	assemblages	
and	the	new	relationships,	vocabularies,	technologies	and	alliances	it	has	opened	up	also	
act	 as	 the	 means	 through	 which	 the	 offsetting	 network	 is	 reproduced	 and	 extended	
(Murdoch	 1997,	 Wilshusen	 and	 MacDonald	 2015).	 Sometimes	 these	 performative	
processes	are	explicit.	They	are	conjured	as	agenda	building	exercises,	otherwise	known	
as	 ‘mainstreaming’	 in	 policy	 lexicon.	 Such	 approaches	 are	 often	 lubricated	 by	 shared	
normative	 assumptions	 amongst	 epistemic	 communities	 or	 for	 those	 for	 whom	 such	
developments	would	apparently	open	up	professional	or	commercial	opportunities.	For	
this	 reason,	 BDO	 as	 a	 governance	 approach,	 its	 calculative	 devices	 and	 the	 broader	
imaginaries	of	NNL	are	constituted	through	mutually	circular	strategies	of	 legitimation	
across	scales	and	geographies.	Practices	of	‘forging	alignments’	and	‘rendering	technical’	
(Li	 2007a),	 ‘selling	 success’	 (Büscher	 2014)	 and	 the	 political	 agency	 of	 numerical	
representations	as	potent	iconic	devices	(Porter	1995)	all	play	their	respective	parts	in	the	
continuing	performativity	of	biodiversity	offsetting	arrangements.	
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I	 have	 shown	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 that	 BDO	 and	 its	 higher	 structuring	 values	 are	
together	acting	to	engender	actual	shifts	 in	conservation	thought	and	practice	 through	
enacting	and	en-framing	more	than	human	natures	as	a	series	of	calculable	things	and	in	
turn,	 conservation	 actors	 as	 calculating	 beings	 (Muniesa	 2011).	 In	 this	 respect	 both	
people	 and	devices	 are	 endowed	with	 calculative	 agencies	 (Callon	 and	Muniesa	 2005).	
These	factors	bear	acute	relevance	for	a	changing	institutional	order	of	conservation	and	
for	the	material	landscapes	it	in	turn,	shapes.	My	thesis	has	therefore	been	engaged	with	
explicating	the	implications	of	a	valuation	approach	in	conservation	noting	the	necessary	
occlusions	 this	 sustains	 and	 the	 important	 changes	 to	 biodiversity	 conservation	 policy	
and	practice	it	signals.	
The	 thesis	 has	demonstrated	 that	 the	policy	 standard	 and	 scientific	 imaginary	 of	NNL	
has	 colonised	 the	 field	 of	 biodiversity	 conservation	 in	 England	 and	 in	 so	 doing	 has	
further	 rendered	 non-human	 life	 conceptually	 interchangeable.	 I	 say	 further,	 because	
while	 BDO	 in	 England	 is	 engendering	 significant	 changes	 in	 conservation	 policy	 and	
practice,	in	many	ways	it	simply	reflects	the	continuation	of	a	longer	trajectory	entailing	
managerial	 and	 scientific	 rationalisation	 of	 nature	 (Adams	 1997b)	 and	 neoliberal	
discourses	of	environmental	planning	gains	(Whatmore	and	Boucher	1993).	‘No	net	loss’	
is	characteristic	of	an	a	priori	drive	to	rationalise,	manage	and	emplace	nature	according	
to	a	singular	value	framework	and	preponderant	neoliberal	economic	and	development	
priorities.	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 the	 logic	 of	 rationalisation	 is	 achieved	 through	 the	
commensurating	properties	of	 the	DEFRA	metric.	This	 logic	ensures	 that	 it	 is	easier	 to	
dispose	of	one	area	of	grassland	so	as	to	permit	urban	development	if	it	is	assumed	that	
some	other	kind	of	habitat	planted	somewhere	else	and	in	the	future	is	both	intrinsically	
and	 scientifically	 equivalent.	 Indeed,	 ideas	 linking	 commensuration	 to	 rationality	
(rationalisation)	 stretch	 back	 to	 Plato,	 who	 considered	 it	 necessary	 to	 render	 ethical	
values	 commensurate	 so	as	 to	prioritise	 them	(Naussbaum	 1984	cited	by	Espeland	and	
Stevens	 1998).	 Numbering,	 measuring	 and	 commensuration	 are	 integral	 to	 a	 sense	 of	
control	-	of	making	sense	of	complexity	(Bowker	2008).	But	as	Blomley	(2008)	reminds	
us,	 ‘simplification	 is	 complicated’,	 both	 technically,	 because	 it	 entails	 sometimes	
uncomfortable	decisions	over	what	 to	 include	or	exclude	and	 therefore	also	politically,	
since	this	adjudication	is	never	neutral.	The	construction	of	BDO	and	biodiversity	units	
therefore	 depends	 on	 various	 occlusions	 -	 environmental	 histories,	 biotic	 relationality,	
blurred	 ecological	 boundaries,	 non-scalability	 and	 unknowability.	 All	 of	 this	 could	 be	
summarised	by	what	Kathryn	Yusoff	(2013)	refers	to	as	biodiversity’s	‘insensibility’.	These	
ontological	and	epistemological	factors	are	additional	to	the	multiple	ways	these	specific	
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emplaced	non	human	natures	 are	 endowed	with	moral	meaning	and	valued	by	people	
with	attachments	to	landscape.	In	short,	BDO	cannot	accommodate	non-rational	values	
and	 in	 so	 doing	 excludes	 them.	 These	 are	 not	 only	moral	 and	 ethical	 values	 but	 also	
include	alternative	ontological	understandings	of	the	nature	of	nature.		
If	 the	 values	 of	 biodiversity	 are	 performed	 through	 the	 assemblages	 they	 are	made	up	
from,	then	I	propose	this	finding	illuminates	windows	of	possibility	for	alternative	ways	
to	 conceive	of	nature’s	 value(s).	 I	 therefore	 suggest	 that	 foregrounding	 the	constituent	
elements	of	the	assemblage,	as	well	as	the	various	tensions	and	counter-performativities	
as	 this	 thesis	 has	 done,	 invites	 and	 arguably	 demands	 a	 broader	 dialogue	 over	 the	
directionality	 of	 conservation	 and	 its	 valuation	 approach	 to	 which	 it	 is	 apparently	
acquiescing.	 Since	 decisions	 over	 what	 to	 count	 and	 how	 are	 always	 a	 social	 practice	
(Muniesa	2007)	an	acknowledgement	of	such	armed	with	empirical	specificities	such	as	
those	offered	in	this	thesis,	provides	openings	for	meaningful	critical	interventions.			
My	 thesis	 has	 provided	 an	 empirically	 detailed	 example	 of	 value	making	 in	 the	 green	
economy	 thereby	 contributing	 urgent	 particularity	 and	 nuance	 to	 understandings	 for	
how	the	values	of	biodiversity	are	made	 in	practice	(Castree	2002,	Lohmann	2012,)	and	
with	what	effects.	Arguably	the	work	of	observing	how	valuation	is	done	is	more	critical	
than	 ever	 as	 technocratic	 forms	 of	 environmental	 management	 through	 markets	
proliferate	 (Bigger	 and	Robertson	 2017).	 This	much	 can	 also	 be	 said	 for	 other	 areas	 of	
public	 policy	 becoming	 rapidly	 subsumed	by	 their	 own	 socio-technical	 assemblages	 of	
valuation.	My	project	therefore	 is	a	central	contribution	to	the	broader	understandings	
of	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 value	 in	 society	 when	 a	 drive	 to	 represent	more	 and	more	
things	with	money	and	numbers	seems	to	be	soaring.	For	this	reason,	the	findings	from	
my	study	 into	 the	economisation	of	conservation	bear	acute	 relevance	 for	other	public	
policy	 fields	 being	 stalked	by	 valuation	 approaches	 (Carver	 and	 Sullivan	 forthcoming).	
These	 fields,	 along	 with	 the	 one	 forming	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 enquiry	 -	 assume	 that	 the	
things	such	approaches	ostensibly	‘value’	are	purely	technical	and	scientific	when	in	fact	
they	are	also	deeply	political	and	ethical.		
Even	 if	 the	 ‘valuing	 nature’	 discourse	 -	 experienced	 by	 some	 as	 an	 optimistic	 and	
transformative	 opportunity	 is	 avowedly	 in	 service	 to	 this	 greater	 effort,	 the	 question	
remains	as	to	whether	such	practices	ultimately	serve	to	render	habitats,	species,	carbon	
emissions,	land	titles,	water	or	even	human	lives	even	more	disposable	than	before	such	
‘valuation’.	This	thesis	suggests	that,	where	this	much	is	true,	a	performative	reading	of	
valuation	yields	both	conceptual	and	empirical	clarity	as	well	as	strategic	possibilities	for	
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intervention.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 my	 preceding	 discussion,	 I	 suggest	 both	 appear	 as	
immediate	priorities	for	further	investigation.		
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